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ABSTRACT
Asset securitisation represents an alternative risk management and refinancing method, which allows 
issues to convert classifiable cash flows from a diversified portfolio o f pre-existing assets and 
receivables (liquidity transformation and asset diversification process) of varying maturity and quality 
(integration and differentiation process) into negotiable capital market paper, so-called “asset-backed 
securities” (ABS). Over the recent past ambivalence in the definition o f capital adequacy for credit 
risk has particularly facilitated the development o f loan securitisation as a refined “regulatory 
arbitrage tool”. However, as impending regulatory change shifts the prime objective o f securitisation 
to the efficient management o f economic capital, procedural and substantive aspects o f asset 
securitisation warrant closer inspection. The dissertation presents a comprehensive examination of 
the risk modelling, asset selection, optimal security design and competitive market pricing o f asset- 
backed securities. We first provide an overview of the main characteristics of asset securitisation and 
explain its attendant benefits and drawbacks, especially as they pertain to the refinancing o f illiquid 
asset exposures, such as SME-related payment obligations. Subsequendy, we explain the gradual 
evolution o f the regulatory treatment o f asset securitisation adopted by the Basle Committee on Banking 
Supervision in the wake of a general revision of the 1988 Basle Accord, which finally led to the adoption 
o f the so-called Basle Securitisation Framework in 2004. We then present a single-factor, loss-based asset 
pricing model, which estimates the risk-neutral investment return o f subordinated debt securities 
(“tranches”) as leveraged contingent claims on a securitised reference portfolio of pooled credit 
exposures. We challenge common wisdom of robust statistics for the estimation of portfolio credit 
risk by adopting extreme value analysis, mainly because the leveraged exposure of securitised debt on 
fundamental asset value changes requires a better parametric specification o f extreme quantiles to 
gauge unexpected loss. Based on the loss sharing between issuers and investors in a common security 
design, we examine how securitised asset exposure translates into investment risk o f asset-backed 
securities. As a longitudinal extension to this valuation model, we also investigate the price dynamics 
o f securitised debt. A multi-factor GARCH process is applied as an econometric specification of the 
heteroskedasticity o f secondary market spreads o f selected types of ABS transactions for valuation 
and forecasting purposes. In light o f the substantial valuation uncertainty in securitisation markets, 
we conclude with a simple one-shot auction model, in which issuers maximise net payoffs from 
securitised debt under “winner’s curse”-type underpricing as agency cost o f adverse selection. In 
particular, we study how uninformed investment demand at varying degrees o f valuation uncertainty 
affects the utility o f endogenous price discovery by informed investors. Overall our synthesis of 
empirical and theoretical approaches yields instructive findings about important yet unexplored issues 
concerning the economic rationale o f asset securitisation.
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G23, G24, K23, L51, M20
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I. INTRODUCTION
I.i. Definition of asset securitisation
Asset(-backed) securitisation represents an expedient means o f asset funding and risk transfer, which 
substitutes external capital market-based funding for credit finance. The basic tenet o f securitisation 
rests on the efficient conversion o f present or future cash flows from a diversified pool of illiquid 
balance sheet exposures o f varying maturity and quality into tradable debt securities. This is done by 
re-packaging and diversifying receivables into commoditised structured claims {liquidity transformation 
and asset diversification) to: (i) realise certain accounting objectives and balance sheet patterns, (ii) hedge specific 
risk from currenty and interest rate exposures, (iii) reduce economic cost of capital and ease regulatory capital 
requirements, and/or (iv) overcome agenty costs of asymmetric information in external finance (e.g. 
“underinvestment” and “asset substitution”). As a hybrid o f asset risk management (“asset risk 
component”) and fixed income security design (“security component”), the securitisation paradigm 
has witnessed dramatic changes in the way commercial banks and corporate issuers envisage their 
funding activity via asset-backed securities (ABS). Securitisation was initially used to refinance simple, 
self-liquidating assets (e.g. credit card balances and student loans in the case o f financial institutions 
and trade receivables with respect to larger corporations). In the meantime, however, mounting 
competitive pressure over external funds and a notorious squee2e on net interest income has 
motivated banks in particular to resort to securitisation to offset shrinking client deposits and to 
proactively manage balance sheet exposures. Securitisation fosters a more efficient use of economic 
capital by taking fair asset pricing to capital markets, thereby stretching asset funding beyond what 
would have been possible through conventional on-balance sheet refinancing and depository lending. 
In the effort to expand external funding sources securitisation also encourages sophisticated internal 
risk management and improves overall market efficiency by commoditising designated asset 
exposures into new marketable financial claims of merchantable quality.1 Aside from its economic effect 
o f installing capital markets as external sources of funds (rather than credit relationships) asset 
securitisation leads to fair market pricing o f securitised asset risk and broadens the investor base, as 
the pooling o f asset exposures makes the securitisation large enough to be efficient.
Asset securitisation typically involves a complex transaction structure, where issuers create 
subordinated investor debt claims as stratified positions (or tranches) with different seniority. The
1 Merchantable quality refers to the fact that financial commitments are secured to the investors’ satisfaction.
subordinated security design determines the contractual repartitioning o f repayments and default 
losses from the securitised asset portfolio. Such a form of risk-sharing supports a fine-tuned security 
design, which not only caters to varying risk appetites of investors, but also guards investors against a 
multiplicity o f investment risks. These risks arise for the most part from delayed repayment or 
outright default risk, adverse movements of market prices (market risk) and the inability o f issuers to 
honour contractual repayment due to prepayment risk (liquidity risk). By convention, most if not all of 
these risks are hedged by internal and/or external credit and liquidity support mechanisms, where the 
issuer’s equity base commonly backs the amount o f expected first loss exposure to ensure incentive 
compatible monitoring and servicing activity.
While corporations originally conceived asset securitisation as a flexible refinancing technology for 
outstanding trade receivables and leases, the prominence of loan securitisation as it is known today 
mainly evolved from regulatory inefficiency due to the mis specification o f “one-si2e-fits-all” 
minimum capital requirements of banks under the 1988 Basle (Capital) Accord. Since existing 
provisions would impose the same capital charge on credit exposures o f similar risk, banks could 
optimise regulatory capital by dispensing with better quality (but low-yielding) assets through 
securitisation.2 Given such “regulatory capital arbitrage”, national banking supervisors undertook 
concerted efforts to remedy the shortcomings of the overly simplistic Bask Accord. On 11 May 2004 
the Basle Committee on Banking Supervision3 finally reached agreement on a new framework for the 
International Convergence of Capital Measurement and Capital Standards, termed “Basle 2”, to come into 
force in 2006. Basle 2 establishes new capital adequacy rules, which link minimum capital 
requirements more closely to the actual risk exposure o f bank assets to reward both active credit risk 
management and efficient management of economic capital. The Basle 2 proposal also sets forth a 
new regulatory treatment of asset securitisation in the so-called Securitisation Framework, which was 
adopted in both the (Third) Consultative Taper to the New Basle Accord (April 2003) and Changes to the 
Securitisation Framework (January 2004) in response to the prominence o f more complex forms o f asset 
securitisation. Similar to the Basle 2 proposal, the Securitisation Framework features more risk-sensitive 
measures of required bank capital to moderate regulatory arbitrage through (i) the reconciliation of 
regulatory and economic costs of capital on similarly securitised exposures and (ii) a more consistent 
regulatory treatment o f both securitised and non-securitised credit risk exposures.
2 This incentive would persist until higher bankruptcy risk associated with the retention of (residual) riskier 
(high-yielding) on-balance sheet assets would render further securitisation non-profitable.
3 The Bask Committee on Banking Supervision is a steering group of all G10 member countries of the Bank for 
InternationalSettkments (BIS).
Notwithstanding imminent regulatory changes, the popularity o f securitisation markets betrays no 
hint o f abating, which suggests that loan securitisation seems to be largely motivated by major 
economic benefits from credit risk transfer and cost-efficient refinancing rather than by regulatory 
incentives alone. Admittedly, also its sheer size makes the securitisation market too important to just 
disappear in the wake of regulatory reform. Once the regulatory capital arbitrage paradigm is 
repealed, the systemic flexibility o f asset securitisation can accommodate regulatory change only if it 
promises economic viability comparable to what explains the meaning of other investment 
instruments. From a broader economic perspective, the evolution o f securitisation has served to 
mitigate disparities in the availability and cost of credit in primary lending markets by linking singular 
credit facilities to the aggregate pricing and valuation discipline o f capital markets. Aside from 
regulatory considerations, loan securitisation entails a more efficient allocation o f capital and credit 
risk as well as a decrease of systemic risk throughout the financial system as a whole. One particular 
economic dimension in securitisation is the risk-sharing agreement between issuers and investors in 
the security design o f securitised debt. However, the question o f how the security design translates 
and alters asset exposure o f the underlying reference portfolio into actual investment risk of 
securitised asset-backed debt is difficult to answer and not yet fully understood, mainly because 
securitisation transactions can be structured in a wide variety o f ways, resulting in disparate risk 
profiles for both issuers and capital market investors. Other important economic aspects evolving 
from perceived investment risk o f securitisation include (i) the way valuation uncertainty about 
securitised assets manifests itself in the design of the issuing process for asset-backed debt securities 
and (ii) how the non-verifiability of trading motives associated with the agency cost o f asymmetric 
information between issuers and investors affects information processing in secondary market 
pricing of securitised debt. Given the low liquidity o f securitisation markets these question promise 
instructive insights for management and research, whose interests coincide concerning essential 
requirements for sustainable securitisation markets.
I.ii. Research objective and structure
This dissertation constitutes a comprehensive theoretical and empirical enquiry into the nature of 
asset-backed securitisation (ABS) to explain risk modelling, asset selection, optimal security design and 
competitive market pricing o f securitised debt. It presents an original contribution to the field of 
contingent claims analysis in structured finance by way of promoting a deeper understanding of the 
elaborate procedural and substantive aspects of asset securitisation. The first chapter describes the 
economic rationale o f asset securitisation and its attendant benefits and drawbacks especially as they 
pertain to the refinancing of illiquid asset exposures, such as SME-related payment obligations. The
second chapter surveys the pathology of the regulatory treatment of asset securitisation under the 
Basle Securitisation Framework in response to the growing complexity o f securitisation structures since 
the 1988 Basle A.ccord. The third chapter presents a single-factor, default-based asset pricing model of 
loan securitisation, which estimates the risk-neutral investment return in subordinated debt securities 
as leveraged exposures on securitised credit risk. It also demonstrates how the economics of 
securitisation can be reasoned on the grounds of the relationship between security design and 
primary market pricing of asset-backed securities. As a longitudinal extension to this pricing model, 
the fourth chapter investigates how information processing and market liquidity affect the market 
pricing o f securitised debt. A multi-factor GARCH process with time-varying forecast confidence 
intervals elicits an econometric specification of the heteroskedasticity o f secondary market spreads of 
selected types o f ABS transactions. In light of the substantial valuation uncertainty in securitisation 
due to intricate transaction structures, the absence o f sufficient market rigor and insufficient 
standardisation in measuring and pricing securitised exposures, the dissertation concludes with a 
simple one-shot auction model, where issuers o f securitised debt maximise net issue payoffs under 
“winner’s curse”-type underpricing as agency cost of adverse selection. Given the scarcity o f 
empirical research on asset securitisation, several important economic and regulatory implications, 
instructive findings and actionable recommendations emerge from this research effort into several 
important yet unexplored structural and information contingencies impacting the economic rationale 
o f asset securitisation.
CHAPTER I: “ASSET SECURITISATION AS RISK MANAGEMENT 
AND FUNDING TOOL”
published as:
Jobst, A. (2006), “Asset Securitisation as a Risk Management and Funding Tool: The German Case,” 
in: Krause, A. (ed.) Managerial Finance (forthcoming).
excerpts published in:
Jobst, A. (2003), “Collateralised Loan Obligations (CLO) -  A Primer,” The Securitisation Conduit, Vol. 
6, Nos. 1-4, Social Science Research Network (SSRN) Electronic Library (available at 
http: /  /papers.ssm.com/so!3 / papers.cfmPabstract id=370641).
Jobst, A. (2003), “Loan Securitization and Moral Hazard — Is Increased Transparency More 
Beneficial ?,” The ICFA1 Journal of Applied Finance, Vol. 9, No. 9 (December), 5-30.
1 ABSTRACT
The following chapter critically surveys the attendant benefits and drawbacks o f asset securitisation 
on both financial institutions and firms. It also elicits salient lessons to be learned about the 
securitisation o f SME-related obligations from a cursory review of SME securitisation in Germany as 
a foray o f asset securitisation in a bank-centred financial system paired with a strong presence of 
SMEs in industrial production.
Keywords: securitisation, A B S, structured finance, SME 
J E L  Classification: D 81, G15, M 20
“Just as the electronics industry was formed when the vacuum tubes were replaced 
by transistors, and transistors were then replaced by integrated circuits, the 
financial services industry is being transformed now that securitised credit is 
beginning to replace traditional lending. Like other technological transformations, 
this one will take place over the years, not overnight. We estimate it will take 10 to 
15 years for structured securitised credit to replace to displace completely the 
classical lending system — not a long time, considering that the fundamentals o f 
banking have remained essentially unchanged since the Middle Ages.”
Lowell L  Bryan1
1 Mr. Lowell L Bryan is Director (Global Strategy Practice) McKinsey&Co. (Edwards, 2001).
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2 OBJECTIVE
If  one was to believe the above statement by Lowell Bryant, the advent o f asset securitisation heralds 
a profound reshaping o f conventional financial intermediation. Many financial institutions, large 
corporates, quasi-government agencies and even local governments and municipalities have issued 
securitised debt on diverse asset classes ranging from credit card receivables all the way to expected 
tax revenues. However, asset securitisation lacks cross-sectional reach. The securitisation paradigm 
has so far been largely confined to liquid asset types, which relegated SME securitisation (i.e. the 
securitisation o f trade receivables and future revenue by SMEs) to sporadic captive finance 
transactions. In countries whose industrial foundation is made up in large part by SMEs, such as 
Germany, however, asset securitisation offers an interesting funding alternative to a pernicious bank- 
based financial system, which leaves many corporate borrowers overleveraged. The following chapter 
acknowledges the topical nature of asset securitisation and surveys how its attendant benefits and 
drawbacks impact on the refinancing decision of financial institutions and firms alike. It also elicits 
salient lessons to be learned about the securitisation o f SME-related obligations from a cursory 
review of SME securitisation in Germany as a foray o f asset securitisation in a bank-centred financial 
system paired with a strong presence o f SMEs in industrial production. The utility o f this instructive 
yet succinct exercise is to set the stage for a comprehensive and purposeful debate about use of 
securitised debt as an alternative refinancing mechanism regardless of issuer size and financial system.
The chapter is structured as follows. After a brief definition of asset-backed securitisation (ABS) we 
describe the key benefits and investment risks associated with asset securitisation in the third and 
fourth sections. The fifth section focuses especially on the securitisation of SME-related claims, such 
as SME loans held by banks or trade receivables owed to SMEs. The sixth section provides a 
synopsis o f the German approach to SME securitisation. Section 7 concludes.
3 DEFINITION OF ASSET SECURITISATION
3.1 The motivation of securitisation
Over the last ten years asset securitisation has established the status o f a premier structured finance 
segment in international capital markets and has redefined the strategic orientation o f banking 
business in a way that qualifies as a critical juncture in the evolution of financial intermediation. Asset 
securitisation is a refinancing technique that allows for credit to be provided direcdy to market
processes rather than through financial intermediaries. Securitisation specifically refers to the process 
of refinancing a diversified pool o f financial and /o r non-financial assets through structured claims, 
so-called asset-backed securities (ABS), issued on the back o f these assets, whose cash flows from 
repayment are used to pay principal and interest on the securities in addition to the transaction 
expenses.2 By engaging in securitisation, issuers actively sponsor the commoditisation o f asset risk 
through disintermediated debt refinancing, where capital markets channel funds to efficient uses o f 
economic activity. In principal, securitisation serves as a refinancing mechanism to diversify external 
sources o f asset funding and to transfer specific risk exposures.
O rig in a to rs  transfer ban k  
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Fig. 1. The securitisation process.
Conceptually, asset-backed securitisation (ABS) converts regular and classifiable cash flows from a 
diversified portfolio o f illiquid present or future receivables (liquidity transformation and asset 
diversification process) of varying maturity and quality (integration and differentiation process) into negotiable 
capital market paper (“tranches”) issued by either the originator o f the securitised assets/receivables3 
or a non-recourse, single-asset finance company, called a “special-purpose vehicle” (SPV).4 So these 
tranches are contingent claims on a designated portfolio of securitsed assets, which can be “divided 
into different slices o f risk to appeal to a range o f investors” (Wighton, 2005). They come in two 
broad classes o f securities: debt-like (secured) notes and equity (see Figs. 1 and 2). Whilst the holders 
o f debt-like notes establish structured claims to the underlying reference portfolio in order of 
seniority, issuers and /o r asset originators frequently retain a residual equity-like class as illiquid first
2 See Moody’s Investor Services (2003) for a brief and Jobst (2003a) for a more exhaustive introduction to 
asset-backed securitisation (ABS).
3 The redemption o f these securities takes places at maturity out o f the cash flow generated by the collected 
claims o f asset exposures. The collection and servicing o f securitised payment claims generally remain within 
the domain o f  the originator under the general supervision by a trustee.
4 In the latter case, the securitisation structure involves transfer o f assets or the assignment o f equitable 
accessory rights by the sponsor (i.e. the asset originator) to an SPV.
3
loss position (credit enhancement)} Rating agencies require credit enhancement as bad debt provision 
for expected loss implied by the weighted average rating o f issued tranches. The tranching itself 
allows an efficient placement o f securitised claims to capital market investors with distinctive risk- 
return profiles.
Issued debt securities6 differ in denomination, size, seniority and risk exposure (“stratified 
positions”),7 whose subordination creates leveraged investment on the performance o f securitised 
assets (“reference portfolio”). Both investment return (principal and interest repayment) and losses 
associated with the underlying reference portfolio are allocated among the various tranches through 
prioritised contractual repartitioning according to subordination.8 This risk sharing mechanism 
sustains a fine-tuned security design of customised debt securities with optimal mean-variance 
properties. Hence, issuers o f asset-backed securities improve overall market efficiency9 by offering 
marketable financial claims on securitised asset exposures at merchantable quality.10 From a broader 
economic perspective, the evolution of efficient securitisation markets has served to mitigate 
disparities in the availability and cost o f credit in primary lending markets by linking singular credit 
facilities to the aggregate pricing and valuation discipline o f the capital markets.11 Hence, the 
emergence of securitisation as an asset funding tool also remedies deficiencies in financial markets 
arising from incomplete capital allocation and imperfect information dissemination.12-13
5 Credit enhancement represents the varying willingness of issuers to securitise only part of the structured claim 
on the selected loan portfolio and retain a marginal equity claim on some portion to provide capital cover for 
all expected losses. Issuers buy back the most junior securities, while capital market investors hold the 
remaining tranches of the securitisation transaction. Alternatively, such credit enhancement could also take the 
form of a standby letter of credit to the conduit, or by the sponsoring bank. In return for providing such credit 
enhancement (and the loan origination and servicing functions) the sponsoring bank lays claim to the residual 
spread between the yields on the underlying loans and the interest as well as non-interest cost of the conduit, 
net of any losses on pool assets covered by the credit enhancement.
6 These positions may take the form of fully/partially funded asset-backed securities or unfunded derivatives.
7 Especially in securitisation transactions of very heterogeneous reference portfolios comprised of assets, which 
may be domiciled in different countries, constituent tranches also very in terms of currency denomination, 
interest rate specification (fixed rate notes vs. floating rate notes), maturity and repayment speed.
8 See also Telpner (2003).
9 The securitisation process also broadens the investor base, as the pooling of asset exposures makes the 
securitisation large enough to be efficient — even though securitised assets tend to be fairly illiquid and private 
in nature.
10 i.e. financial commitments are secured to the investors’ satisfaction (Kendall, 1996).
11 So one might assert that securitisation represents a structural approach of stretching asset funding beyond 
what would have been attainable by means of conventional self-funding, on-balance sheet and depository 
lending against the background of existing inefficiencies in the organisation of financial intermediation and 
asset pricing.
12 The Bond Market Association (1998) considers securitisation “an increasingly important and widely-used 
method of business financing throughout the world, [given that its] continued growth and expansion ... 
[generates] significant benefits and efficiencies for issuers, investors, securities dealers, sovereign governments 
and the general public.” See also The Bond Market Association (2001).
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Fig. 2. Structure of a traditional A B S  transaction (Jobst, 2003a).
Debt securities issued in securitisation transactions generally feature lower levels o f investment risk 
than the original credit risk o f underlying securitised exposures,14 mainly because securitised debt 
benefits from diversification and a variety of incorporated security mechanisms against credit and 
liquidity risk. Issuers have a wide range of support mechanisms at their disposal to improve the 
quality o f securitised assets to the extent that they warrant a selling price beyond what would be 
deemed necessary to offset attendant costs o f managing the transaction. For instance, potential 
timing mismatch between repayment from the secuntised (reference assets) and investor payout to 
issued debt securities requires tight interest and cash flow management. Commonly, liquidity facilities 
are set aside in the form of back-up lines to cover liquidity shortfalls and to guarantee the full 
refinancing of an SPV as issuing agent. Even more importantly, the external rating assessment o f 
securitisation transactions strongly hinges on visible signs o f credit risk protection. In many cases, 
issuers resort to (i) over-collateralisation by transferring credit risk at a cash discount, (ii) implicit
13 See also Jobst (2003a and 2003b) in this regard.
14 Although asset securitisation represents an increasingly attractive alternative for investors looking for greater 
diversification as well as investments with lower risk exposure than traditional corporate bonds, investment 
demand has not translated into a level o f market liquidity comparable to traditional fixed income markets. The 
prevalence o f “buy and hold” investment (as many investors hold long-term securities until they mature) does 
not support a robust estimation o f  sensitivity o f investment interest (i.e. spread) o f  long-term secured bond 
obligations in ABS transactions to key rate chances (of the term structure), which is further complicated by the 
fact that the complex structure o f ABS the accurate grading of liquidity (compared to corporate bond market).
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guarantees through the cash flow structure (“excess spread”)15 and /o r (iii) external third-party 
guarantees in order to provide credit enhancement to investors of issued debt securities.
O f a wide range o f creative financing techniques that lost their spark during the 1980s, securitisation 
remains intact as a cost-efficient and flexible structured finance instrument. Asset securitisation 
initially started as a way o f depository institutions and non-bank finance companies to explore new 
sources o f asset funding in light o f competitive pressures in the finance industry, stronger focus on 
shareholder value and a notorious squeeze on interest spreads from traditional financial 
intermediation. Originally, securitisation was only used to refer to simple asset-backed securities 
(ABS), where issuers would reorganise the financing o f mortgages as well as consumer and 
commercial debt by moving asset exposures off their balance sheet or by borrowing against an 
insulated pool o f selected on-balance sheet assets (“liquifying”) at a lower cost o f capital thanks to 
the “upgrading effect” o f securitisation.16
Asset-Backed S 
(broade
ecurities (ABS) 
r sense)
- ------------
M ortgage-B acked S e c u ritie s  
(MBS)
A sse t-B acked  S ec u ritie s  (ABS) 
(n a rro w er sen se )
C o lla te ra lised  D ebt O bliga tions 
(C D O )
\  '
Agency MBS 
(quasi-governm ent 
backing, 
e.g . FHLMC, FNMA, 
GNMA)
Non-agencyM BS
Real estate 
ABS
(second-lien m ortgages)
Non-real esta te  
ABS
Collateral ised 
Bond Obligation 
(CBO)
Collateralised 
Loan Obligation 
(CLO)
-res id en ta l m ortgacp-backed security  (RNBS) 
-comm ercial m ortgage-backed security (CVBS) 
-collateralised m ortgage obligation (CMO)
-home equity loans) 
-m anufactured housing 
loans
-credit ca rdreoeivatfes 
-equipment leases  
-student loans 
-auto loans 
-export receivables 
-tax receivables 
-insurance premiums 
-film receivables 
-health-care receivables 
-m usic royalties 
-lottery winnings 
-dealer floorplans 
-whole business 
-project loans
bonds trad e d  on the 
m arke t cr held on 
balance by issuer
loans held by bank, 
non-bank financial 
interm ediary or 
non-financial institution
Fig. 3. Classification of asset-backed securitisation (ABS) (Jobst, 2003a).
Besides securitising a wide variety o f bank loans, including short-term commercial loans, trade and 
credit card receivables, auto loans, first and second mortgages, commercial mortgages and lease
15 Excess spread is generated from interest surplus between payment obligations to outstanding debt securities 
and payment collections from secuntised exposures.
16 The “upgrading effect” refers to the case when highly-rated securitisation o f  a selection o f designated asset 
exposures provides an issuer with an opportunity to obtain a commensurate refinancing interest rate lower than 
the cost o f capital based on the issuer’s actual credit rating (corporate radng) thanks to the de-linkage of 
securitised assets from the balance sheet. See also Everling (1999).
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receivables, banks have also turned to small business loans and middle-market commercial loans as 
suitable for securitisable reference portfolios (see Fig. 3). Apart from structured leasing and project 
finance, alternative means o f external investment finance vie for the attention o f firms, whose credit 
standing influences their mode o f funding, such as small and medium-sized companies (SMEs) (see 
Fig. 2). The ability o f issuers to obtain liquid funds, reduce the cost of capital charge and increase the 
scope o f reinvestment implies benefits not only for financial institutions and their lending activities. 
Also corporations have mounted efforts to actively seek new sources o f external funds through the 
securitisation of operating cash flows and trade receivables as diversified project finance.17 So 
securitisation registers as an alternative source of funds for profitable economic activity at most 
resourceful factor input and efficient cost of capital if issuers realise one or more o f the following key 
motivations:
(i) to curtail balance sheet growth and realise certain accounting objectives and/ or balance sheet
patterns,
(ii) to reduce economic cost of capital as a proportion o f asset exposure associated with asset
funding,
(iii) to ease regulatoiy capital requirements (by lower bad debt provisions) in order to manage risk
more efficiendy,
(iv) to efficiendy access capital markets in lieu of intermediated debt finance at a cost of
capital, which would not be possible on account o f the issuer’s own credit rating, and
(v) to overcome agency costs of asymmetric information in external finance (e.g.
“underinvestment” and “asset substitution”).
While the last two aspects are particularly pertinent to corporate issuers, the first three arguments are 
more related to the refinancing advantages enjoyed by financial institutions, where asset securitisation 
serves as a powerful capital management tool. Most commonly, a balanced mix o f all these objectives 
and further operational and strategic considerations determine the type o f securitisation in the way 
issuers intend to shed excessive asset exposures. Depending on the relative importance o f these 
objectives, issuers engage in either traditional/true sale or synthetic securitisation. In a true sale transaction 
structure, the originator sheds the asset risk associated with a selected pool o f on-balance sheet
17 As a rule, securitised payment claims are average-rated financial assets with a remaining maturity of more 
than one year. Frequendy, they satisfy further conditions, such as specific diversification rules, the 
transferability of legal ownership or equitable assignment and the availability of historical performance data. 
The principal asset classes of securitised reference portfolios are loans, high-yield bonds, mortgages, credit card 
transactions, licence and franchise operations, lease agreements as well as trade deliverables and services, which 
determine the classification of the securitisation transactions: collateralised loan obligations (CLOs),
exposures by selling them to an SPV (“conduit”),18 which takes legal tide to the assets. Such single­
purpose securitisation conduits are completely remote from the asset originator in terms o f economic 
and legal recourse (“bankruptcy-proof’).19 The SPV collateralises the purchased asset portfolio and 
refinances itself by issuing multiple classes of asset-backed securities (and equity) with different 
degrees o f risk to capital market investors. In compliance with disclosure requirements the originator, 
however, retains the obligation to ensure the timely collection and administration o f repayments 
from securitised assets (“servicing”), which limits the asset exposure o f the SPV only to the risk 
arising from securitised assets. By unloading credits off their books, loan originators reduce their 
economic (and regulatory) capital charge and, at the same time, may use liquid funds from the 
proceeds o f the true sale to refinance future lending activity. Special purpose vehicles may also 
support synthetic transactions,20 in which issuers create generic debt securities, so-called credit-linked notes 
(CLN), out o f derivative structured claims on securitised assets to reduce economic cost of capital 
and raise cash from borrowing against existing assets and receivables.21*22 Synthetic transactions only 
transfer unwanted risk exposure o f a specifically defined asset pool without placing assets under the 
control of investors through a transfer of legal title. This mechanism also allows (asset) originators 
themselves to securitise assets through derivative transactions without an SPV as underwriting 
agent.23
collateralised bond obligations (CBOs), collateralised mortgage obligations (CMOs), credit card asset-backed 
securitisation (ABS), student loan ABS or trade receivables asset-backed securitisation ABS.
18 SPVs are best understood as trust-like entities, which are founded solely for the task of securitising the 
reference portfolio of assets.
19 We assume the securitisation vehicle is registered under the statues governing corporations, and, therefore, 
pays taxes. However, these taxes are offset by tax credits of debt. Since we do not intend to unveil specific tax 
advantages of loan securitisation (Sullivan, 1998), we consider the tax expense to have the same structure as in 
the case of the originating company.
20 Synthetic transactions come in various structural arrangements, which can be specified along three major 
dimensions: (i) the level of funding (unfunded, (fully) funded or partially funded); (ii) the involvement of an 
SPV as issuing agent (indirect or direct securitisation); and (iii) the degree of collateralisation of funded 
elements by means of government bonds, third-party guarantees, letter of credit, certificate of indebtedness, 
Pfandbriefe and other acceptable type of collateral). The funding level of synthetic structures varies by the 
proportion of derivative elements in the security design. Unlike true sale transactions, which are commonly 
fully funded, synthetic transactions are partially funded (or unfunded) if the notional amount of issued debt 
securities represents only a fraction of underlying exposures (or all exposures are swapped with a third party as 
protection provider).
21 Originators only transfer credit risk, which allows them to retain customer relationships and servicing 
revenues (Bohringer et al., 2001). See also Zweig (2002 and 1989).
22 The IMF defines true sale transactions as “the creation of securities from a pool of pre-existing assets and 
receivables that are placed under the legal control of investors through a special intermediary created for this 
purpose.” (IMF, 2004).
23 In both traditional and synthetic securitisation the issuer is required by law to regularly inform investors 
about the performance (and composition) of the underlying reference portfolio in so-called “investor reports”, 
which include aggregate information about the portfolio balance, delinquency and termination rates, maturity 
(weighted average life (WAL)) and seasoning as well as the industrial and geographical classification of 
securitised claims.
3.2 Strategic purposes of securitisation
Depending on various strategic and operational objectives of risk management and asset funding 
securitisation is mainly used for either balance sheet or arbitrage purposes. Although both synthetic and 
traditional types of structures share similar usefulness for regulatory and economic risk management, 
they delineate distinctive properties in the treatment o f securitised exposures. While the creation of 
generic securities out o f derivative claims in synthetic securitisation affords issuers expedient risk 
management due to structural flexibility, administrative efficiency and legal practicability, true sale 
securitisation is particularly useful for the generation of additional sources o f liquid funds and/ or 
balance sheet restructuring (see Tab. 1).
Transaction structure
True sale Synthetic
Purpose of transaction transaction transaction
Risk management & regulatory aspects
Transfer of asset risk + +
Physical asset transfer + -
Regulatory optimisation + +
Management of cluster risk + +
Hedging of interest and currency risk - +
Liquidity management + -
Funding and cost of capital
Alternative source of funding + -
Balance sheet restructuring + -
Optimisation of cost of capital (+) (+)*
Reduction of imputed equity capital (+) (+)
Degree of compatibility of transaction type and securitisation objective: 
+ = yes, - = no, (+) = possibly, (+)* = indirectly possible.
Tab. 1. Attribution of means and objectives in asset securitisation.
We distinguish between balance sheet transactions and arbitrage transactions as two broad categories. In 
balance sheet transactions issuers unload defined asset exposure to third parties in order to change their 
balance sheet composition or debt maturity structure, whereas in arbitrage transactions issuers act as 
active portfolio managers who acquire assets for arbitrage purposes only. However, this securitisation 
arrangement only warrants the appellation o f an arbitrage transaction if issuers realise leveraged asset 
return as riskless profit after accounting for structuring cost, investor repayment and default loss. 
Hence, in a strictly economic sense, the normative distinction between balance sheet transactions and 
arbitrage transactions as discrete structural types is to be found wanting. In many cases issuers of
balance sheet transactions could potentially enjoy as much “arbitrage profit” from holding the equity 
tranche as first loss position as would an equity investor in securities sold in the open market or 
included in managed reference portfolios underlying arbitrage transactions. In the remainder o f this 
chapter we focus on balance sheet transactions, which offer an intuitive and straightforward 
understanding of how firms implement asset securitisation as an efficient risk management and asset 
funding technique in debt refinancing (Altrock and Rieso, 1999).24
3.3 Securitisation as a hybrid fixed income asset
In contrast to the legal and commercial definition o f a “security” as a secured (investment) 
instrument, the process of asset securitisation involves the creation o f a financial claim (with 
contractual terms and conditions), whose marketability and liquidity derive from its acceptability as a 
store o f value and whose quality is certified by rating agencies and/or collateralisation through 
substantial assets. In order to asses the economic value added of securitised debt, we need to 
translate the complex reality o f securitisation into an abstract illustration o f viable trading motives 
between issuers and investors that would support the marketability and liquidity o f securitised debt.
The need for securitisation follows the same rationale as the evolution o f organised financial markets 
in the effort to create multiple financial transactions involving a large number o f investors. In their 
most basic form, financial intermediaries enable two (or more) entities to engage in mutually 
dependent financial relationships over certain periods of time. Although restricted in scope and 
efficiency, intermediated finance carries significant benefits as to the erosion o f asymmetric 
information and the durability o f effective financial contracting. However, as funding needs grow 
more diverse, capital market-based financial instruments (external debt finance) replace intermediated 
finance as a mechanism of large-scale refinancing. Financiers compensate for the loss o f informed 
investment from the borrower-lender relationship by converting financial claims into liquid, 
homogenous and transparent investment products, which can be easily tailored in quality and 
denomination to suit investment demand. The conception of asset securitisation — in its generic form 
-  reflects this very interaction between information intensity and financial contracting. Asset 
securitisation amalgamates two separate areas of finance research — financial intermediation (as regards 
the information economics and risk management of the underlying reference portfolio) and bond 
pricing (as regards fixed income analysis and security design) by reconciling information-intensive 
financial relationships o f securitised assets (“credit component”) and financial contracting in capital
24 See also Burghardt (2001).
markets (“security component”) through the creation o f generic securities from structured claims 
sold to a large pool of investors.
For instance, loan securitisation blends aspects of credit business and fixed income management, 
where the economic value o f commoditised structured claims on defined credit risk exposure 
determines the degree of marketability and liquidity of securitised asset risk. Loans are non­
standardised, non-commoditised asset claims, whose general illiquidity is mosdy due to the opaque 
nature of the lender-borrower relationship and substantial non-diversifiable idiosyncratic risk. The 
bonding effect o f lending relationships, even at the lowest level of information intensity from client 
customisation, fuels potential informational advantages o f loan originators relative to outside 
investors. Although loan agreements allow for the renegotiation o f credit terms in the event of 
delinquency or insolvency, their specificity (“credit component”) compromises essential trading 
motives underlying the marketability o f credit risk25 in the presence of asymmetric information from 
lending relationships. Asymmetric information might arise from (see Fig. 4): (i) incentives of biased 
loan selection at the time the asset composition o f the portfolio is determined {ex ante moral hazard) 
and (ii) reduced loan monitoring {expost moral hazard).26
Issuers of asset-backed debt securities try to purge most of these loan-specific idiosyncrasies by 
converting credit risk from a diversified pool of illiquid credit claims into state-contingent (cash flow) 
claims. In this commoditisation process, issuers and investors share the attendant investment risk 
according to a transparent security design27 (“security component”), which defines the allocation of 
cash flows and default losses to issued debt securities (tranches) of different risk sensitivity. If  done 
successfully, the mitigation o f valuation uncertainty facilitates the tradability and fungibility of 
securitised (credit) exposures, which allows investors to quickly adjust their investment holdings at 
low transaction cost in response to changes in personal risk sensitivity, market sentiment and/or
25 Skora (1998) defines credit risk as the risk of loss on a financial or non-financial contract due to the 
counterparty’s failure to perform on that contract. Credit risk encapsulates default risk and recovery risk. 
Whereas default risk denotes the possibility that the counterparty will fail to meet its obligation, recovery risk is 
the possibility that the recovery value of the defaulted contract may be less than its promised collateral value. 
See also Rosenthal and Ocampo (1988).
26 For one, issuing banks could take advantage of private information gained from longstanding credit 
relationships by designating predominantly “bad risks” for inclusion in the reference portfolio of a 
securitisation transaction (ex ante moral hazard). Moreover, the transfer of repayment claims on originated 
loans (regardless of the so-called servicing function) is likely to decrease incentives on part of banks to continue 
carrying the high costs of loan monitoring and renegotiation at the same intensity (Gorton and Pennacchi, 
1995). See also Elsas and Krahnen (1999). For a detailed description of asymmetric information in asset 
securitisation, please refer to section 4.2.1.
27 Additionally, issuers eliminate uncertainty from the specificity of credit risk by including support mechanism 
(i.e. risk mitigants), which confine the investment risk of securitised debt to a predefined maximum. See also 
sections 4.2 and 5.4.
consumption preferences. Hence, for loss of fully transparent underlying portfolio quality, issuers 
seem to entrust both marketability and liquidity of securitised debt mainly to the transaction 
structure, which matters as it determines the risk sharing between the issuer and investors. 
Nonetheless, the flexibility o f issuers to devise a particular transaction and payment structure bears 
the risk of misaligned information between issuers and investors about the loss volatility associated 
with the expected default term structure o f securitised debt. In the following section, we expand the 
critical analysis o f information constraints arising from private information by issuers to include 
other sources o f investment risk. Before we do so, let us first survey the economic benefits of asset 
securitisation in more detail.
ex ante moral hazard 
(incentive problem)
adverse selection 
(information problem)
issue date
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Fig. 4. Asymmetric information problems in securitisation.
4 KEY BENEFITS OF ASSET SECURITISATION
The economic reasoning of securitisation hinges on the ability of issuers as profitable enterprises to 
maximise shareholder value as the principal goal of economic activity. The market value of 
outstanding equity as a measure of shareholder value depends on three factors: (i) the amount of 
future cash flows accruable to shareholders, (ii) the timing o f cash flows, and (iii) the risk involved in 
the generation o f these cash flows. Management decisions involve the use o f capital market-based 
models to evaluate the economic impact of competing strategic and operational objectives on
shareholder value, i.e. the amount and timing of cash flows (i.e. expected returns) and the associated 
risk. Financial activities within business entities have to be geared to support the realisation of 
profitable objectives to what capital markets deem as attainable levels of economic efficiency. The 
securitisation of balance sheet assets into structured debt securities as contingent claims on pooled 
asset exposure confers upon issuers mainly financial advantages related to more competitive capital 
management through efficient asset funding. Further objectives o f securitisation might also include 
active balance sheet restructuring, market-oriented risk management o f credit risk and diversified 
liquidity (Bar, 1997 and 1998).28 Hence, from a capital market perspective, it is imperative to assess 
how securitisation affects the (shareholder) value of the issuer and whether the trade-off between 
attendant benefits and drawbacks yields positive payoffs to both issuers and investors. Obvious 
benefits from asset securitisation include capital gains from the issuance o f securitised debt to capital 
market investors and the servicing fee that accrues to the originator o f the securitised assets. 
However, only efficient risk management and the reduction o f funding costs (in corporate finance) 
imply economic value added (EVA) from asset securitisation.
4.1 Risk management
Risk Management is a transmission and control mechanism, which encapsulates different approaches 
to determine risk-return profiles o f alternative (investment) strategies to maximise shareholder value. 
Asset securitisation is one operational means o f risk management, which allows issuers to reallocate, 
commoditise and transfer different types o f risk (e.g. credit risk, interest rate risk, liquidity risk or 
pricing risk) to capital market investors in return for some fair market price.29
While banks and other financial institutions view securitisation as an expedient means to evade 
inconsistent regulatory capital charges for credit exposures of similar risk (“optimisation o f regulatory 
capital”), non-financial entities would employ securitisation primarily for the liquidity management of 
existing trade receivables. Both objectives benefit largely from active portfolio management through 
asset securitisation, which mitigates concentration risk (i) by individual exposure to creditors 
(granularity) and/or (ii) by regional area or industrial classification in optimal portfolio allocation 
under risk-retum efficiency. As issuers rid themselves o f clearly identified risk through securitisation 
transactions, they alter the composition of their asset claim portfolios for purposes of greater 
diversification. For instance, private economic rents from bank lending explain the prominence of
28 See also Bigus (2000).
29 This fair market price would carry a discount for valuation uncertainty, which results in a reservation utility 
of investors (“discounted offering price”).
asset securitisation as a risk management tool. Banks are adept at originating credit exposures due to 
their long experience o f assessing credit risk and strong client relationships.30 The benefits from 
relationship lending result from economic rents in revolving loan commitments and improved debtor 
screening, which leads to higher margins from loan origination (Krahnen and Elsas, 1999).31 The 
reduction of economic and /o r regulatory cost of capital through securitisation allows issuers to use 
their capital base more efficiendy to pursue lending opportunities without incurring balance sheet 
growth. Especially, informational rents from SME lending in heavily bank-centred financial systems 
and the rather unfavourable rating grade distribution o f typical SME loan portfolios (see Fig. 5 
below) make loan securitisation a perfect candidate for efficient risk management. Hence, loan 
securitisation not only contributes to the sustainability of client relationships, but also leads to an 
increased availability o f credit finance at lower cost in the primary lending markets Qobst, 2003a).
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Fig. 5. Risk characteristics of corporate loan and SM E loan portfolios (Jobst, 2003a).
Furthermore, asset securitisation o f fixed interest debt shields originators from adverse interest rate 
changes. A decrease in loan interest rates reduces the interest rate margin from deposit-based loan 
refinancing (i.e. high deposit interest rates and low loan rates as the worst case scenario), whereas an 
increase in loan interest rates leads to actuarial losses and cost-accounting depreciation. By 
securitising fixed interest loans issuers are able to parcel out a defined proportion o f interest rate risk 
associated with the receipt o f future debt repayments. Analogously, liquidity risk from maturity
30 These relationships might yield informational rents as shown by Elsas and Krahnen (1999) in the context o f 
German banking. See also Elsas and Krahnen (1998) and Mayer (1988).
31 Unfortunately, the ease o f lending coupled with ready and cheap access to liquidity results in a recipe for 
disaster as banks achieve suboptimal outcomes from holding loans in the long-term.
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mismatch, reinvestment risk as well as call (option) risk (e.g. redemption, termination and 
prepayment) could equally be remedied with the help of securitisation.32
4.2 Corporate finance -  private information and capital structure
Although there is not a single theory that explains the economic tenet o f loan securitisation, the 
burgeoning securitisation market has sparked a large range of theoretical accounts o f what arguably 
motivates the issuance o f secured debt on pooled asset exposures. In general, a major strand of 
research explores the interdependence and the adverse selection effects of the issuer’s asset structure. 
It proffers several corporate finance-based incentives which stack up to support securitisation as a 
more efficient means o f external finance: (i) private information as a means to mitigate the regulatory 
capital charge and achieve greater specialisation in areas of comparative advantage, (ii) avoidance of 
asset substitution and underinvestment, and (iii) reduction of the agency cost from asymmetric 
information in asset funding.
4.2.1 Private information: mitigation of the regulatoiy capital charge and greater specialisation in areas of 
comparative advantages
According to Greenbaum and Thakor (1987) private information held about the quality o f originated 
assets would induce financial institutions to prefer the securitisation of better quality assets to 
mitigate their regulatory capital requirement for “overcharged” asset exposures, whilst worse quality 
assets are retained.33 For this selective bias to be economically sustainable issuers must extract 
positive payoffs from trading off the benefits from securitising low-risk reference portfolios against 
increased bankruptcy risk.34 Private information might also find an oudet in securitisation if issuers 
aim to achieve greater specialisation in sourcing and monitoring as areas o f comparative advantage.35 
Millon and Thakor (1985) assert that banks enjoy certification comparative advantage as opposed to
32 However, securitisation is barely used in the bid to reduce excessive exposures from interest rate risk or 
liquidity risk, because derivative transactions, future and options are more flexible and cost-efficient (Betsch, 
2000).
33 Also it will not be long before a more fine-tuned regulatory treatment of asset securitisation will come into 
force (Basle Committee, 2004), the current regulatory regime of the 1988 Basle Accord imposes the same risk- 
based capital charge on differently rated loans. Such a broad treatment of credit risk has led to a problematic 
outcome. Banks would securitise high quality but low yielding loan claims (for whom opportunity cost of 
regulatory capital is higher than with higher yielding assets) to reduce minimum capital requirements for credit 
exposures. Such “regulatory arbitrage” would result in a continuous drain of high-quality loans from loan book, 
which increases the probability of bank insolvency. The new proposals for the revision of the Basle Accord 
remedy this shortcoming through the implementation of more risk-sensitive capital requirements.
34 Greenbaum and Thakor (1987) demonstrate not only how the perceived quality of the asset structure comes 
to matter, but also assess the extent to which certain credit risk management techniques, such as asset 
securitisation, could prove to be a suitable for transforming asset structures.
asset funding, where securitisation offers an alternative and diversified source of finance compared to 
traditional channels o f refinancing.
4.2.2 Agency costs of asymmetric information in the capital structure choice
The capital structure decision has traditionally been addressed in the context o f on-balance sheet 
funding, where financial intermediaries and corporations are faced with fundamental choice between 
debt and equity as sources o f funds to meet specific investment needs. By definition the different 
state-contingent payoff functions o f equity and debt in the capital structure o f firms causes agency 
costs o f asymmetric information. Debt represents a disciplinary device to establish sufficient 
incentive compatibility of equity and debt holders to prevent non-value maximising managers from 
implicitly appropriating and transfer wealth from bondholders to equity holders (“asset substitution”) 
if they engage in sub-optimal risky investments at a too low a level o f debt (Jensen and Meckling, 
1976).36 However, an excessive debt burden could induce the opportunity cost o f abandoning 
profitable future investment opportunities. The cost o f this “underinvestment problem” (Myers, 
1977 and 1984) and other agency costs of debt, such as bankruptcy cost, increase in the level o f debt 
in the capital structure.
4.2.3 A  voidance of underinvestment and asset substitution
Asset securitisation might redress these conflicts of interest between creditors and shareholders of 
firms and associated agency cost induced by risky debt, which would otherwise result in suboptimal 
investment decisions. James (1988), as well as Benveniste and Berger (1987), show that securitisation 
tranches resemble secured debt, whose agency costs (from monitoring as well as underinvestment 
and asset substitution) may be lower than for unsecured debt (Stub and Johnson, 1985).37 Similar to 
secured debt, securitisation allows issuers to appropriate partial debtholder wealth by carving out a 
defined pool o f assets (i.e. the “reference portfolio”) to satisfy securitised debt claims, which do not 
capture gains from the firm’s future investments. This prioritisation of debtor claims potentially 
alleviates underinvestment and renders existing debt less inhibitive on the realisation o f new
35 Berger and Udell (1993) proposed a monitoring technology hypothesis in this context.
36 The role of debt could be conjured as a signal of future profitability (to sustain the payment obligation 
associated with debt) (Ross, 1977), leading to an alleviation of the agency cost from uncertainty about the true 
firm value.
37 See also Berkovitch and Kim (1990), who find that secured debt lower the adverse effect of the 
underinvestment problem on firm value.
investment opportunities.38 However, this possible resolution o f agency problems in the capital 
structure choice needs to be qualified as to whether securitised debt actually increases firm value and 
makes existing bondholders better off.39 Any positive effect from the appropriation of debtholder 
wealth ultimately depends on the way the investment policy o f entrenched managers guides the 
riskiness o f the use of securitisation proceeds relative to the ex ante riskiness o f the issuer.
The issuance of securitised debt implies a “nested” capital structure decision, which bears the 
potential o f expropriating claimholder wealth.40 On the one hand, an absence o f bond covenants to 
restrict the use of proceeds from securitised debt would allow issuers to extract debtholder wealth. 
Issuers may securitise low risk assets (i) to fund riskier future investment activities or (ii) to pay out 
securitisation proceeds direcdy to shareholders and repurchase shares. For instance, banks could 
similarly be tempted to expand the scope o f making fresh loans by using securitisation as a form of 
“revolving door” refinancing for riskier future lending business. Hence, shareholder wealth increases 
at the expense o f diluted bondholder claims in line with asset substitution. On the other hand, non­
value maximising issuers could extract shareholder wealth if asset securitisation allows them to 
monetise balance sheet assets for negative net present value investment projects without disciplinary 
effects o f poor performance.41 Alternatively, issuers might also evade capital market discipline by 
using securitisation proceeds as part o f their capital management plan to pay down existing debt at 
the expense o f future equity payouts. Less market monitoring o f secured debt compared to 
unsecured debt could exacerbate this negative effect on shareholder value.42-43 Consistent with
38 Additionally, the agency cost of securitised debt might be lower than the cost of bank borrowing and bond 
debt, mainly because securitised debt does not carry restrictive bond covenants and might be easier to negotiate 
as it is not subject to asset substitution like in the conventional capital structure choice. Although reference 
portfolios underlying securitised debt are heavily scrutinised by rating agencies, with debt claims backed by 
payments from the reference portfolio and not the issuer, debt holders require less information about the 
issuing firm than unsecured debt holders of corporate bonds. See also Wolfe (2000).
39 Stulz and Johnson (1985) find that existing debtholders can be made better off by the issuance of secured 
debt if the financing decision is accompanied by a positive change in investment policy.
40 The utility of asset securitisation as a means of skirting the agency cost of underinvestment implicitly 
involves a rearrangement of risk sharing between constituent debtholders and equity holders. However, the 
potential claimholder expropriation through reinvestment of proceeds generated from securitised debt in turn 
effects the variability of issuer cash flows ex post. The agency cost of a given capital structure and associated 
funding constraints also supports use of securitisation if the volatility of cash flows also depends on the 
management of foreign exchange rate exposures. Besides the shortening of the maturity of outstanding debt or 
payout restrictions on dividends generally enhance the level of internal funds, also hedging of foreign exchange 
risk through asset-backed securities might lower the volatility of cash flow and mitigate the underinvestment 
problem (Nandy, 2002) if the riskiness of issuer cash flows does not increase. Froot et al. (1993) show that 
hedging could reduce the volatility of cash flows and leave sufficient funds available to the firm to take 
advantage of viable investment opportunities, Whose riskiness formerly disqualified them from being 
undertaken for a given level of debtholder claims. If greater availability of internal cash flows from proceeds of 
securitised debt lessens the adverse impact of cash flow volatility lower underinvestment ensues.
41 See Lang et al. (1995), who argue that asset sales may allow managers to pursue poor projects by creating 
liquidity for investment. See also Pennacchi (1988).
42 See also Lockwood et al. (1996).
conventional thinking about the capital structure choice, issuers with high agency costs o f debt 
(which implies high financial leverage and/or financial distress) and/or low growth prospects have 
higher incentives for asset substitution and a higher chance o f an underinvestment problem, so they 
should be more likely to engage in asset securitisation. Any negative effect o f shareholder 
expropriation by suboptimal investment should increase (decrease) the higher (lower) the 
securitisation proceeds (growth prospects).
4.2.4 Asymmetric information and funding cost
We also need to investigate the impact of asset securitisation on the capital structure decision as a 
funding choice under asymmetric information, which necessarily involves a closer inspection of both 
pecking order theory and trade-off theory. The trade-off theory postulates that managers choose a leverage 
level, where the marginal benefit o f debt, such as the interest tax shield, just outweighs the costs of 
debt, including agency and financial distress cost (“optimal trade-off’).44 In contrast, the pecking order 
theory (Myers and Majluf, 1984) states that firms prefer internal to external finance due to adverse 
selection arising from information asymmetry in financial relationships between insiders and 
outsiders.45 If external funds are needed to undertake a profitable investment project, firms choose 
the safest claim (which involves the lowest degree of asymmetric information). Without asset 
securitisation the pecking order theory suggests that firms with high internal refinancing cost and low 
bankruptcy cost generally prefer debt to equity because of lower information costs from valuation 
uncertainty.46 However, this form of external finance increases both the balance sheet volume and
43 Note that the use of funds from asset securitisation leads to a reduction in balance sheet volume only in cases 
of shareholder payout, debt repayment or negative net present value investments.
44 Bamea et al. (1981) define this consideration as the optimal trade-off between the agency costs of debt and 
the benefits associated with different financial contracts in terms of their inherent capacity to resolve agency 
problems and tax exposure.
45 In Myers and Majluf (1984) managers have superior knowledge about the value of the firm and act to 
maximize shareholder value. Due to asymmetric information rational potential investors (“outsiders”) would 
discount the value of any security issue.
46 Hence, rational investor behaviour compels managers to qualify their capital structure choice on the actual 
firm value. Managers are more likely to prefer debt (equity) if they believe the firm to be undervalued 
(overvalued). In recognition of these strategic alternatives investors would perceive an equity issue an indication 
of poor quality, which increases the cost of issuing equity. So the hierarchy of funding alternatives in line with 
the pecking order theory would suggest that firm issue equity only after the chances of issuing debt or hybrid 
securities, such as convertible bonds, have been exhausted. In accordance with the modified pecking order 
theory (MPOT) the following empirically testable hypothesis for managerial capital structure decisions would 
ensue: (i) avoidance of external equity and risky debt, (ii) dividend policies which can be maintained by 
internally generated equity, (iii) the maintenance of financial slack, and (iv) the acquisition of additional funds 
with risky debt rather than new equity, given “sticky” dividend payout and variable investment opportunities. 
These ideas were later refined by Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999) into a key testable prediction, which states 
that the incidence of the pecking order in the capital structure decision of firms should yield a strong 
correlation between net debt issues and the financing deficit of firms.
the debt-to-equity ratio,47 which could increase the marginal cost o f funding due to higher financial 
distress cost.48 By the same token, securitised debt may be considered even safer than unsecured 
debt, as the value o f the insulated reference portfolio entails less information asymmetry than the 
assessment o f the issuer’s firm value. Furthermore, the off-balance sheet characteristic of 
securitisation allows refinancing at a potentially lower cost than equity without attendant balance 
sheet growth.
Under the pecking order theory the issuance of asset-backed securities registers as viable a source of 
external finance as unsecured debt if issuers face high capital costs o f internal funds; yet, issuers with 
severe information asymmetry problems would be more inclined to issue secured debt, which comes 
closest to internal funds from an agency cost perspective. Since capital market investors in 
securitisation transactions receive their payment direcdy from a diversified pool o f asset exposures 
insulated from the issuer,49 securitised debt carries lower agency cost.50 The trade-off theoiy would 
restrict this assumption only to those cases, where the capital structure o f the issuer reflects the 
optimal balance between the benefits and drawbacks from the agency cost o f debt under asymmetric 
information. Hence, under both the pecking order and trade-off theory, asset securitisation is the 
structured finance instrument o f choice for issuers with stretched internal funds. Their high on- 
balance sheet funding costs, possibly substandard credit (ratings) and high agency costs of 
asymmetric information debar them from other forms of external finance.51
47 Furthermore, the credit rating of the newly issued securities may be capped at the issuer’s rating.
48 As existing creditors would command higher debt returns at a higher leverage ratio, the consolidated credit 
linkage of the unsecured debt to the originator (unlike in off-balance sheet transactions) raises the cost of 
funding.
49 The straightforward calculation of future cash flows from accrued repayment in a diversified asset portfolio 
replaces the assessment of the overall business risk and the income generating potential of the issuer.
50 This theoretical observation implies a property of securitised debt, which should be most attractive for small 
corporate and SME issuers, whose firm value is hard to assess.
51 Issuers can refinance defined asset exposure at lower cost due to a possibly higher standalone rating of 
secured debt. If the rating of asset-backed securities might supersede the issuer rating thanks to superior 
quality, securitisation tranches could be sold at tighter spreads and higher prices. This rating effect 
(“upgrading”), known as credit risk arbitrage (Bar, 1998; Rochling, 2002), stems from mainly from two sources. 
For one, after issuers parcel out high quality assets or shed defined risk exposure from their risky core business, 
the issued debt securities are solely supported by the cash flow from underlying reference portfolio (and any 
asset protection if available) without interference on part of the asset originator, leaving the rating assessment 
largely unaffected by counterparty risk. Second, if assets are securitised through a true sale transaction, the legal 
title is irrevocably transferred to investors (via an SPV). This transaction structure precludes any recourse or 
economic interest on part of the originator. See also Cantwell (1996).
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4.3 Equity return, imputed cost of equity and economic risk transfer
The analysis of the benefits associated with asset securitisation as a funding alternative to traditional 
on-balance sheet debt finance also needs to consider the role o f equity in the capital structure of 
issuers. The assessment of securitisation on the basis of the cost o f debt alone essentially ignores 
what could be viewed as a conscious capital structure decision o f “leverage in disguise.” In the 
following section we examine the leverage effect of securitisation on the return on equity and the 
imputed (calculative) cost of equity (“capital coverage”) (Rochling, 2002; Bar, 1998) for a true sale structure, 
which by definition changes the balance sheet composition o f the asset originator.52 We can sketch 
the effect of asset securitisation on both economic cost o f capital, whenever the imputed cost of 
equity indicates actual cost advantages associated with asset securitisation. First, we specify the total 
cost of funding as the weighted average cost of capital (WACC)53
W ACC = kB x f f -  + kB x - f — , (1)
E  + D E  + D
where the cost of equity kE and the cost of debt kD are weighted by the market value-based 
proportion o f equity and debt in the capital structure (Damodaran, 1996). The imputed cost of equity 
km is defined as the contribution margin from the cost of equity over the cost o f capital of 100% debt 
finance (i.e. full leverage), so that
kFE  + k nD — kD( E  +D)  E ( k E —kD) k P—k n krp = W ACC - k D= — ------- 2 -------21--------L = _ E l i  21= e d  (2 )
m D E + D  E + D  E + D  w
A numerical example illustrates the effect o f (true sale) securitisation on the imputed (economic) cost 
o f equity. Let us assume that the issuer holds exacdy 8% equity (which would match the 8% 
minimum capital requirement o f banks for 100% risk-weighted assets and no risk weight reduction
52 For simplicity we assume that the issuer re-invests the maximum proceeds from the securitisation (nominal 
value of the reference portfolio minus expected loss and structuring cost) at the weighted average cost of 
capital (WACC), so claimholder rights of debt and equity remain unaffected by use of funds from securitised 
debt. This approach also implies no change in the balance sheet volume if we rule out negative net present 
value reinvestment of proceeds.
53 Note here that this WACC-based balance sheet approach is taken from the perspective of the asset 
originator, whose total assets are assumed to be securitised. In other words, we only analyse the relative balance 
sheet effect of increased leverage over a defined set of securitised asset exposures of the same asset return and 
marginal cost of debt.
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under Basle Accord (Basle Committee, 2004a and 2004b)54 and shareholder require at least 15% 
return on equity, given a cost o f debt o f 5% at a debt-to-equity ratio o f 0.08/0.92 ~ 8.7% (see Tab. 
2). Hence, the imputed cost o f equity before securitisation amounts to
= E ( ^ O  = 0.0B(0.15 -  0.05) = 0008 5 0 8 %
E  + D  0.08 + 0.92
By accepting a first loss position (FLP) o f 3%, the issuer now holds 3% instead o f 8% equity after 
completion o f the securitisation transaction. The imputed cost o f equity has fallen from 0.80% to
_ ) _ 
E  + D
0.03(0.15-0.0525)
----- *-----------------1 = 0.002925
0.03 + 0.97
» 0.29%.
On-balance sheet funding Off-balance sheet funding
Debt capital 92.00% 
Equity capital 8.00% 
Total capital 100.00%
Debt
Equity
Total capital
97.00%
3.00%
100.00%
Return of available assets 7.00% Return of securitisable assets 7.00%
Weighted cost of equity (CoE) 
Weighted cost of debt (CoD)
Risk-free rate 
Corporate risk spread
1.20%
4.60%
4.50%
0.50%
Weighted cost of equity (CoE) 
Weighted cost of debt (CoD)
Risk-free rate 
Corporate risk spread 
ABS structuring cost
0.45%
5.09%
4.50%
0.50%
0.25%
WACC 5.80% WACC 5.55%
Imputed cost of equity 0.80% Imputed cost of equity 0.29%
Expected (credit) loss (EL) 1.00% Expected (credit) loss (EL) 
Credit enhancement (CE)
1.00% 
0.25%
Total direct cost 
(CoD + EL)
5.60% Total direct cost 
(CoD + EL + CE)
6.34%
Net return
before CoE 
after CoE
1.40%
0.20%
Net return
before CoE 
after CoE
0.66%
0.21%
Return on equity (RoE) 17.50% Return on equity (RoE) 21.92%
T ab. 2. Simplified calculation of imputed cost of capital and net return from asset securitisation.
In our calculation the absolute reduction of the imputed cost o f equity by 0.51% to 0.29% in off- 
balance sheet refinancing stems from lower capital coverage, which could eventually reach zero in the
54 See also Basle Committee (2002a, 2002b and 2001).
extreme case of full leverage. In order to gauge the implications of different levels o f imputed 
(marginal) cost of equity on shareholder return, we consider the net return o f securitisation before 
and after including the cost o f equity. We subtract the “total direct cost of debt” (weighted cost of 
debt, expected loan loss (and the cost o f credit enhancement for the case of securitisation)) from the 
expected “return on securitisable assets” (“return on available assets”) for off-balance sheet (on- 
balance sheet) funding in order to derive the net return before the (weighted) cost of equity. Dividing 
this result by total equity capital yields the return on equity, which is clearly higher in the case o f off- 
balance debt refinancing (21.92%) compared to conventional on-balance sheet funding (17.50%).
The off-balance sheet conversion o f securitised assets through the issuance o f securitised debt also 
involves a change in the riskiness o f debt as the return on equity increases.55 The default distribution 
o f securitised assets shall serve as a straightforward example to illustrate this point. Since issuers 
commonly retain a first loss position (FLP) as “concentrated risk exposure” to cover expected losses 
only (see Fig. 6), any loss in excess o f FLP is transferred to capital market investors via securitised 
debt. Although the weighted cost o f debt increases in a higher debt-to-equity ratio, the transfer of 
economic risk implied by the reduction in equity (as FLP) from 8% to 3% alters the issuer’s residual 
risk exposure from credit default56 and caps the probability density at expected default loss.57 This 
risk sharing arrangement creates leveraged investment, where the risk-retum profile o f issued 
tranches differs from the risk-return profile of direct investment in the underlying assets.
The leveraged loss exposure o f securitised debt relative to the overall notional amount o f securitised 
assets depends on the level o f expected loss covered by the issuer through FLP (“enhancement 
level”) to make securitised debt less sensitive to moderate value changes of securitised assets. At the 
same time, the retention o f “concentrated risk exposure” lowers the amount o f required economic 
(equity) capital if ex ante total default loss (i.e. expected and unexpected loss) from securitised assets 
originally exceeded FLP.58 Note here that the configuration o f securitisation itself might imply 
interest rate and liquidity risk (see section 4.1), depending on the nature of the underlying reference 
portfolio o f securitised assets and the security design of the transaction at hand, which complicate the 
economic rationale o f securitisation beyond this admittedly simplified illustration (see section 5).
55 Hence, we do not adjust the corporate risk spread for a higher degree of leverage in the computation of the 
imputed cost of equity and return on equity, provided that the transfer of economic risk fully compensates for 
higher bankruptcy cost from increased leverage (see Fig. 4).
56 In asset securitisation of other asset types, such as whole business ABS or mortgage-backed securities (MBS) 
a shortfall of expected revenue or debtor prepayment would also constitute instances of liquidity and market 
risk aside from credit risk as a source of investment risk in asset securitisation.
57 Issuers shed all unexpected risk and restrict their effective loss distribution to expected loss as upper 
boundary.
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Expected Loss Unexpected Loss
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S e c u r itisa tio n
c o v e re d  b y  e a rn e d  risk  
p re m iu m  a n d  loan  lo s s  
p ro v is io n
c o v e re d  by  e c o n o m ic  
cap ita l
A fter
S e c u r itisa tio n
re ta in e d  r isk  e x p o s u re  
(firs t lo s s  p ro v is io n ) tra n s fe rre d  risk  e x p o su re
Fig. 6. Economic risk transfer,:59
In the context o f loan securitisation by financial institutions, this analysis also illustrates that 
securitisation does not cast banks free from what is generally considered their traditional function in 
financial intermediation — namely to measure, assume and manage credit risk. Asset securitisation can 
potentially carry as much or more credit risk exposure as traditional lending, if banks pursue the 
mitigation o f loan portfolio risk in an unbalanced and single-sided fashion without consideration o f 
concentrated credit risk and systemic risk o f asset correlation. For all practical purposes, 
securitisation qualifies as a remedy for issuers caught in the throes o f mounting pressure over 
diminishing asset returns or excessive regulatory burdens; yet it does not serve to resolve systemic 
issues o f credit risk management or inefficiencies in loan origination and financial intermediation per 
se. Instead, asset securitisation rather rewards the general capacity o f superior credit risk management 
and facilitates efficient financial intermediation.
58 From a return perspective, the economic risk transfer through asset securitisation decreases the imputed cost 
o f  equity, which results in a higher net return after cost o f  equity.
59 Adapted from Bluhm (2003). See also Schierenbeck (2001) and O ng (1999).
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5 GENERAL INVESTMENT RISKS IN ASSET SECURITISATION
Securitisation is commonly understood as an important risk management tool, mainly because its 
inherent differentiation and integration process (“risk restructuring”) allows issuers to reduce their 
cost of investment funding by segregating the risk exposure of a designated pool of assets.60 
However, the conversion of balance-sheet risk into marketable securitised debt involves more refined 
and complicated financial structures in terms of security design and reporting standards than 
conventional on-balance sheet refinancing. Although securitised assets exhibit the same kinds of risks 
as loan exposures in bank-based financial intermediation and corporate debt o f banking operations, 
the rarefied and complex nature of asset securitisation intensifies both the importance and scale of 
how credit (or asset) risk, market risk, liquidity risk and operational risk concur in securitised debt 
(see Fig. 7). The degree of investment risk in asset securitisation stems from two areas, namely (i) the 
characteristics and performance of existing and/or future receivables and other financial assets as 
sources of payments to the securitisation transaction (collateral level) as well as (ii) the allocation and 
distribution o f payments from securitised assets to holders o f the various tranches o f issued debt 
securities (security level) in accordance with specific payment priorities and loss tolerance levels.61 
Moreover, the form of transaction defines the kind o f investment risk, which emanates from either
(i) uncertainty about payment to investors, who hold (fully funded) contingent claims on the 
performance of the underlying reference portfolio of asset exposures (in traditional securitisation) or
(ii) from the exercise of credit derivatives (mostly in synthetic securitisation),62 where partially or 
unfunded investor claims are subject to the risk of a pre-defined credit event.
5.1 Credit risk
First and foremost, investors in securitisation transactions are concerned with the credit (or asset) risk 
o f fully and timely repayment o f securitised assets in the underlying reference portfolio. Rating 
agencies commonly distinguish between downgrade risk and claim-paying ability to describe the debtor’s 
credit posture. For descriptive purposes we follow Canor et al. (2000) to distinguish both concepts. 
Whereas the claims-paying ability speaks to the probability of a debtor to default on some obligation
60 See Skarabot (2002), Leland (1998), Frankel (1991) as well as Rosenthal and Ocampo (1988) for an economic 
analysis of this risk transfer property of securitisation.
61 The Bond Market Association (2001) refers to the assessment of these two components of securitisation as 
“transaction reporting”, which denotes the periodic (usually monthly) post-issuance calculation and 
dissemination of performance data about such transactions.
62 See also Batchvarov et al. (2000).
at one point in time, downgrade risk reflects the probability o f a reassessment o f the claims-paying 
ability due to modest changes in the financial condition of the obligor. This forward-looking “benefit 
o f doubt” about credit quality in the definition of downgrade risk primarily focuses on the question 
o f whether available financial resources will withstand some stochastic risk exposure, irrespective of a 
change in the macroeconomic environment.63
Although credit risk transfer by means of structured finance debt obligations lies at the core o f risk 
management through securitisation, there is a host o f further credit risk contingencies beyond the 
collateral level, such as the servicing function of securitised assets, the payment o f administrative fees 
to the SPV, the transfer o f payments from debtors to investors and counterparty risk (if the reference 
portfolio is collateralised by some guarantee or other default protection). Issuers apply structural 
provisions to mitigate credit risk, such as (internal or external) credit enhancement to attain a desired 
credit risk profile for issued debt securities and risk-sharing mechanisms (through the subordination of 
issued debt securities), which largely shape the security design of securitisation transactions.
Market risk in securitisation mainly stems from adverse effects o f interest rate and exchange rate 
movements on the issuer’s cash flow management and the ability to repay securitised debt. In 
transactions with varying repayment terms and multiple (unhedged) currency denominations of 
securitised assets the payment agent o f the transaction (i.e. the SPV or the issuer, if the transaction is 
completed without an SPV as conduit) would need to reconcile expected repayment from securitised 
assets (fixed or floating) with coupon payments (fixed or floating) to securitised debt issued to 
investors in order to minimise term structure risk, reinvestment risk and/or base risk.64 Failure to do 
so would cause fundamental market fluctuations to upset the scheduled amortisation and the 
timeliness of contractually agreed repayment to investors. The same considerations o f balanced cash 
flow management apply analogously in the case of currency risk exposures on the basis o f covered
63 In loan securitisation, the distressed performance of the high-yield structured finance market since 2001 and 
persistent downward rating drift of credit claims (with adverse follow-on effects on the performance of 
securitised loans) has sparked great interest in a diligent surveillance of asset performance. Especially the term 
structure of loan defaults has drawn attention to the fact that the issuer’s ability to cover expected losses 
through credit enhancement hinges on the capacity to avert unexpected levels of substandard asset 
performance. As banks have identified loan securitisation as an expedient refinancing vehicle and risk 
management tool, prudent monitoring of the reference portfolio (“collateral surveillance”) commands a more 
careful contemplation of defaults (i.e. delinquencies and termination rates). Consequently, translating credit risk 
into investment risk of structured claims in a securitisation transaction becomes essential.
64 Investment risk arises if both cash inflows and cash outflows are fixed interest payments but differ in 
maturity (“maturity mismatch”). In contrast, base risk arises from a mismatch of cash inflows and cash 
outflows as floating interest payments on different interest reference rates. Term structure risk refers to an 
insufficient immunisation against interest rate movements if cash inflows are fixed (floating) interest payments 
and cash outflows are floating (fixed) interest payments.
interest rate parity. Both currency and interest rate risks are frequendy hedged with standard 
derivative tools, such as cross-currency swaps and interest rate swaps.
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Fig. 7. Fundamental investment risks in asset securitisation.
5.2 M arket and liqu id ity  risk
A  change in the interest rate term structure also changes the propensity o f debtors to prepay 
securitised mortgages and other credit obligations with early termination provisions. If a reduction in 
short-term interest rates would warrant re-financing, prepayment might significantly change the 
composition and drain the size o f the underlying reference portfolio to generate sufficient repayment 
to cover expected investor return on securitised debt. Issuers usually attempt to remedy balance sheet- 
based liquidity risk from a possible maturity mismatch of cash inflows and cash outflows through 
diligent liquidity management. Depending on the transaction structure it is commonplace to allow for 
asset substitution under certain conditions and/or replenishment o f amortising assets in the 
reference portfolio, with the latter being a routine feature o f revolving credit exposures. Moreover, 
the payment structure65 o f securitisation transactions enables issuers to avoid any liquidity shortfalls
65 In asset securitisation we distinguish between various payment structures, i.e. the ways o f  scheduled 
repayment o f principal and interest o f the underlying reference portfolio to investors. While some securities 
return total principal to investors throughout the life o f the security (fully amortising) or in equal payments 
over a set period o f time (often one or two years) after a contractually predetermined “revolving period” o f 
defined interest payments (controlled amortisation). So-called “bullet structures” are a viable alternative to 
controlled amortisadon structures for revolving assets (such as credit card receivables, trade receivables, dealer 
floor-plan loans and some leases). They are designed to return principal to investors in a single payment. 
Similar to controlled amortisadon transacdons, “bullet” payment structures feature two separate cash flow
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by tailoring future cash flow profiles conditional on changes in actual repayment proceeds. Issuers 
can combine various options, such as the configuration of cash flow management (pass-through or 
pay-through), the design o f interest and principal repayment (pro-rata or sequential), the definition o f 
early amortisation criteria (economic and/or legal “trigger events”) and the use o f liquidity facilities 
to shield investors from balance sheet-based liquidity risk.
Additional liquidity risk from low trading activity in asset securitisation markets (market-based liquidity 
risk) cuts both ways for issuers and investors. On the one hand, investors might be faced with high 
trading cost (Duffie and Garleanu, 2001) associated with a small market volume of outstanding 
securitised debt issues with comparable characteristics and the prospect o f high agency costs from 
adverse selection of securitised assets due to valuation uncertainty. On the other hand, higher 
searching cost and the possibility o f incomplete issuance due to insufficient investment demand from 
a limited pool o f potential buyers compel originators to offer tranches to the highest bidder at 
relatively short notice, which implies a clear shift of negotiation power from sellers to buyers.66 
Hence, possible liquidity risk of secondary markets complicates dynamic hedging strategies and 
entails a misallocation o f investment funds if limited discretion in trading asset-backed securities 
forces investors into a buy-and-hold investment strategy. Issuers alleviate these market frictions by 
means of liquidity facilities.
5.3 Legal risk
Given the evolving regulatory and legal treatment of asset securitisation in response to perpetual 
financial innovation in structured finance, legal uncertainty from securitised debt is a major concern 
of investors and issuers. In this section we consider the constraints imposed by legal risks on the 
governance and due diligence of asset securitisation without reference to specific laws, regulations
management periods. During the “revolving period” principal received from the reference portfolio is retained 
to buy more receivables, before the principal payments build up in an escrow account during the subsequent 
“accumulation period” to fund a future bullet payment to investors. As much as in controlled amortisation 
structures “bullet maturities” suffer from early amortisation risk. We distinguish between “soft bullet maturity” 
and “hard bullet maturity”. The former structure is the most common bullet structure, where only part of the 
deal is guaranteed on the expected maturity date (unlike the “hard bullet” deal), although past evidence 
indicates that most such ABS return principal on this date. Nonetheless, a “soft bullet” payment includes the 
implicit shortfall risk during the accumulation period, so that investors may receive the remaining principal 
payments over an additional period (usually one to three years) after the maturity date (Fabozzi and Yuen, 
1998). In contrast, investors in “hard bullet” structures can expect the principal to be paid off on the scheduled 
maturity date. This is usually done by providing for a longer accumulation period, a third-party guarantee, or 
both (The Bond Market Association, 1998).
66 Market-making investors recognise the risk involved in future resale of any securitised claims on non­
transparent reference portfolios and discount their valuation accordingly in addition to adverse selection 
effects.
and/or statutory provisions. This approach allows us to discuss de facto legal concepts in lieu of a 
non-exhaustive normative discussion o f de jure provisions in various jurisdictions. We identify the 
most salient general areas o f possible regulatory and legal uncertainty, which would help deduct 
specific legal risks applicable to varying securitisation structures if transposed to a certain legal 
framework.
Asset securitisation involves a multitude of legal issues, such as trade law compliance, the 
implementation o f legal claims, information disclosure under divergent national banking laws and 
income tax liability, which all need to be addressed by both asset originators and issuers for a certain 
transaction structure o f asset securitisation. The completion of traditional securitisation best 
illustrates the potential for conflicting rules and regulations as regards the “true sale” o f securitised 
assets from the originator’s balance sheet to another entity. Most national trade laws recognise a 
“true sale” only if originators do not retain material economic risk associated with the transferred 
assets and/or reserve any other form of economic recourse.67 However, an approved legal separation 
o f assets (“credit de-linkage”) might still imply reclassification risk if the continued exercise o f dominant 
influence and/or the retention o f primary beneficiary status warrant the consolidation o f transferred 
assets under national and/or IAS and U.S. GAAP accounting standards. Hence, in absence of 
“bankruptcy remoteness”, originators would still see their chances of capital reduction through 
traditional securitisation impeded by the extent to which transferred assets might need to be 
consolidated in the case o f insolvency. Moreover, the regulatory recognition of asset (risk) transfers 
(Basle Committee, 2004a and 2004b) might differ from provisions under existing trade law, so that 
the retention o f asset exposures by originators as first loss position (“credit enhancement”) might 
infringe on the attribution o f a clean break on the true sale.
The structural complexity of contractual commitments (with or without an SPV) in asset 
securitisation also induces significant uncertainty about the tax liability o f entities involved and the 
extent to which the nature o f the assets and cash flows transferred are subject to taxation (tax 
attribution risk). Income tax, sales tax and other direct taxes are most pertinent to the business 
transactions involved in the completion of asset securitisation. Specific areas of uncertainty as regards 
tax liability include: (i) unexpected cash flow mismatches could upset the fine-tuned regime of 
eliminating (intertemporal) accrual of taxable income (accrual risk) from completing the securitisation 
transaction (e.g. taxation o f interest income by the SPV); and (ii) the identification o f all activities
67 For instance, repurchase agreements or clean-up calls tend to compromise a full transfer if they inflict 
substantial economic risk on the originator, and any payment received from the SPV in return for the asset 
transfer might be interpreted as secured credit to the originator.
subject to sales tax requires the delimitation o f taxable returns and an a case-by-case assessment of 
how the basis of taxable return would be calculated (sales tax risk).
Furthermore, particularly in traditional securitisation, the insolvency o f the asset originator (who 
commonly retains the servicing function o f securitised assets) could jeopardise the orderly 
implementation o f legal claims in asset securitisation. In order to guarantee the full and timely 
fulfillment o f securitised asset claims in the event o f originator bankruptcy (“bankruptcy 
remoteness”), several preventative measures safeguard the role of issuer (which is an SPV in the case 
of true sale securitisation) vis-a-vis the asset originator and ensure unobstructed payment to 
securitised debt (realisation risk). These measures are: (i) “no petition clauses”, which allow only 
investors to force the SPV into bankruptcy; (ii) “no recourse provisions”, which delay any legal 
challenges related to contractual obligations o f the SPV outside the defined scope o f the 
securitisation until after the closing o f the transaction; and (iii) credit de-linkage of the securitised 
assets to preserve the economic and legal insulation o f the SPV from credit claims levied on the 
originator. Unless such “safety features” were put in place, all payments made as regards the legal 
transfer o f asset exposure and any additional collateralisation o f issued debt securities68 would be 
subject to insolvency proceedings (risk of rescission) in the event o f originator bankruptcy.69 The 
realisation risk o f incomplete and/or delayed repayment of debt securities due to insolvency 
procedures also includes set-off risk if liquidators terminate in advance or charge against each other 
mutual payment obligations held by originators and their debtors so as to reduce the net balance of 
outstanding payment obligations. If this set-off procedure affects securitised payment claims, issuers 
need to make up for lost interest income from the underlying reference portfolio to meet payment 
obligations.70 Although insolvency proceedings apply to almost all agents involved in the 
management o f a securitisation transaction, the task of mitigating legal risk by means o f careful due 
diligence and comprehensive contractual documentation mainly falls upon the issuer. At the same 
time, servicers, investors and rating agencies are at pains to seek detailed and exact information about the
68 e.g. if the SPV invests repayments from securitised assets to invest in government debt securities as 
additional collateralisation of issued debt securities.
69 This situation might even occur if the assets in question have previously been removed from the originator’s 
balance sheet, provided that one or more of the following causes apply: (i) binding contractual and general 
principles of contract law could void asset transfer or any assignment of asset risk, e.g. originators and debtors 
have agreed on prohibiting the sale of assets or the assets have already been transferred to a third party; (ii) if 
insolvency law and trade law coincide in the treatment of transferred assets, the asset transfer is not recognised 
by trade law and the purchasing entity (i.e. the SPV) remains to be consolidated; and (iii) the originator did not 
conduct the asset (risk) transfer through securitisation bona fide but with the purposeful intent to defraud 
creditors (preference risk).
70 The run-off of cash flows from payment obligation in the case of originator insolvency is also prone to 
commingling risk (as a further facet of realisation risk), which arises from the indiscriminate treatment of cash 
flows received from securitised assets and other income. Commingling risk could compromise the issuer’s 
ability to make full and timely collection of repayment proceeds to be disbursed to investors.
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specification o f securitised assets and their associated risk exposure of issued debt securities 
(tranches) in the event o f issuer insolvency. However, many times confidentiality provisions of 
certain banking laws and statutes impede the unrestricted disclosure of asset information.71*72
5.4 Operational risk
The variety o f credit and legal risks from securitised asset exposures goes hand in hand with 
operational risk from the intricate structural arrangements o f securitisation transactions involving 
multiple agents (see Fig. 4). In the presence of asymmetric information, originators and issuers might 
be tempted to abuse contractual powers within their area o f responsibility to achieve their own 
economic incentives, which imposes substantial agency cost on efficient asset securitisation.
First and foremost, market imperfection due to information asymmetry from valuation uncertainty 
could lead to moral hazard on part of issuers (asset originators in true sale transactions)73 if their effort 
level before and after the issue date is not incentive compatible with investor interests. Issuers (asset 
originators) could (i) retain a disproportionately large share of high-quality assets from the designated 
pool o f securitised assets (reference portfolio) and replace them by assets o f inferior quality (ex ante 
moral bayard), or (ii) neglect (or even relinquish altogether) the costly enforcement o f contractual 
restrictions imposed on debtors (“effort choice”), whose payment obligations have been securitised 
(ex post moral bastard). Given the impending transfer o f asset exposures through securitisation asset 
originators might reduce monitoring of securitised assets or exhibit selective bias in the composition 
of the securitised reference portfolio due to private information about individual asset exposures 
(cherry picking).1 A Alternatively, cherry picking could arise as ex post moral hazard from biased asset 
sorting, in which maturing assets of the reference portfolio are replenished by the sponsoring originator
71 Note that originators are apprehensive about seeking permission to divulge client information to investors 
and rating agencies for consideration of maintaining the integrity of client relationships, even though such 
action might mitigate some uncertainty from insufficient data availability.
72 Especially if originators do not act as servicers, information disclosure within the defined servicing 
arrangement is imperative to satisfy the monitoring requirements of asset securitisation, so that investors and 
rating agencies are able to continuously update their risk assessment. Any securitisation transaction that fails to 
address the issue of comprehensive information disclosure about securitised assets would merit subsequent 
amendments, subject to continual review as to their compliance.
73 Note that the distinction of issuer and asset originator reflects the fact that asset originator and issuer are the 
same entity in synthetic structures without SPV. The involvement of an SPV in the transaction structure limits 
our comments on major incentive problems to the asset originator only.
74 In so-called cherry picking asset originators would deliberately select a pool of securitisable assets, which 
does not reflect the general average asset quality of the loan book. Such an ex ante moral hazard problem of 
asset selection could be explained by the incentive of asset originators to misrepresent the average quality of 
their loan book quality by including over-priced, low-quality loans in the reference portfolio. Although cherry 
picking is prohibited by national supervisory bodies, testing the adherence to this requirement is riddled with 
methodological and administrative difficulties.
(on request by the issuer). If issuers fail to successfully negotiate the structuring process and replace 
securitised asset claims prior to the maturity date o f the securitisation transaction (“portfolio 
replenishment”), repayment proceeds from the reference portfolio might fall well below the level of 
natural attrition due to prepayment and/or amortisation. Overall, both ex ante and ex post moral 
hazard involve the expropriation of investor wealth if issuers (asset originators) engage in selective 
bias as to the asset composition of the securitised reference portfolio or precipitate reduced effort 
levels as regards risk monitoring and portfolio administration after issuing securitised debt.75
Given the significant agency cost from moral hazard, issuers install support mechanisms, which 
transpire incentive compatible behaviour towards investors so as to mitigate investment risk from 
asymmetric information. The detrimental effects o f moral hazard are generally resolved through a 
subordinated security design, whose prioritisation of asset claims implies risk sharing through loss 
cascading. Issuers would securitise a large proportion o f senior tranches as interest-generating asset 
claims, whose high probability o f full repayment inhibits incentives o f asset originators to either 
reduce monitoring effort or include poor asset quality in the reference portfolio. At the same time, 
originators ffequendy retain the most junior tranche (or buy junior default protection) to indicate 
their willingness to bear most (if not all) expected loss from the securitised assets. This loss coverage 
is termed first loss position (FLP) or credit enhancement,76 which allows issuers to attain a desired credit 
risk profile of securitised debt. The concentration of expected losses in the first loss position reduces 
both investor default tolerance and leverage of senior tranches, whose relative expected and 
unexpected losses are smaller than relative portfolio losses.77-78 Hence, its effect on loss allocation79 is
75 See also Leland (1998). See also Leland and Pyle (1977) for a reference on the agency cost of asymmetric 
information in external finance.
76 The Basle Committee on Banking Supervision (2002b) defines credit enhancement as a contractual 
arrangement [,] in which the bank retains or assumes a securitisation exposure and, in substance, provides some 
degree of added protection to other parties to the transaction. [...].” See also Jobst (2004).
77 Since contractual measures, such as credit enhancement, guard investors against information constraints 
arising from lending relationships, investment incentives of loan securitisation appear to depend more on how 
the transaction structure processes unexpected loss from portfolio risk of securitised assets. Since issued debt 
securities represent individual interests on aggregated cash flows rather than individual loan claims, structural 
measures (e.g. credit enhancement or other forms of credit support) help issuers cover aggregate expected asset 
exposure only. Yet the treatment of unexpected risk is not as straightforward. Prudent investment would 
warrant a careful assessment of how the transaction structure (security design) effects the risk allocation of 
unexpected default loss (and its change over time). See also Jobst (2003c).
78 From regulatory point of view, the credit enhancement is termed a direct credit substitute (CDS), whose 
value derives from the price movement of the underlying reference portfolio. In a bank-sponsored conduit 
issue the most junior tranche retained by the asset originator/issuer commonly represents the first loss credit 
protection for the total notional balance of the transaction. The amount of first loss provision is chosen such 
that it its notional amount effectively absorbs all estimated default risk of the underlying reference portfolio. 
From the issuer’s perspective, the computation of the required level of credit enhancement is predicated on a 
detailed credit assessment of securitised assets. Rating agencies ascertain the credit enhancement level for a 
reference portfolio based on the analysis of the credit quality, expected loss and pool diversity required for 
senior and mezzanine classes to achieve the desired rating of issued debt securities. The fundamental
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instrumental for a viable security design.80 Essentially, the first loss position/credit enhancement 
represents an effort choice against ex ante moral hazard to restore incentive compatibility between 
issuers and investors.81-82 However, it merely compensates for the difference in quality between 
securitised assets and higher rated securitised debt. Both levels o f quality can vary and do not allow 
for an inference o f actual quality upon observation of one or the other.83 Therefore, the provision of 
credit enhancement primarily guards against adverse information constraints o f credit risk from 
lending relationships (credit component) in loan securitisation. Consequendy, for transactions with 
sufficient credit enhancement we would expect the risk sharing agreement between issuers and 
investors (security design component) to be the most important source o f investment risk from valuation 
uncertainty in asset securitisation.84
parameters entering calculation of the level of first loss position include: (i) average maturity of the reference 
portfolio, (ii) historical performance, (iii) debtor concentration, (iv) record of payment delinquencies, (v) default 
rate of portfolio, and (vi) dilution of asset claims/receivables. The amount of credit enhancement signifies the 
resilience of the reference portfolio to sustain an amount of scheduled losses (determined by the desired 
structured rating) without compromising the continued servicing of issued debt securities. See also Jobst 
(2003a).
79 In the rating process the importance of credit enhancement differs by transaction structure. In case of 
synthetic transactions rating agencies particularly concentrate on the credit support implied in the amount of 
the first loss position, since any other asset risk has been isolated and transferred to counterparties by means of 
credit default swaps or other types of credit derivatives.
80 Although credit enhancement is commonly derived from internal sources, it can take a wide range of external 
forms, which includes third-party guarantees, letters of credit from highly-rated banks, reserve funds, first and 
second loss provisions and cash collateral accounts, which have overtaken letters of credit as the method of 
choice for major public transactions (Zweig, 2002). If credit enhancement is achieved through subordination, 
issuers retain the most junior tranche as equity tranche (or “first loss position”; see also section 4.2)), whose 
amount predicts reasonably well the expected losses on the reference portfolio (Cumming, 1987). Its high 
illiquidity forces banks to retain it on their balance sheets. Besides the portfolio characteristics, such as the 
quality and the concentration of debtors, especially the administration (i.e. payment structure and contractual 
obligations of agents) and configuration (i.e. security design) of securitisation transactions influence the level of 
credit enhancement. For one, the treatment of accrued interest of defaulted loans can alter the amount of credit 
enhancement required by rating agencies, depending on whether accrued interest of the distressed reference 
portfolio is excluded or included, the likely level of interest rates at the time of the credit event and the time 
horizon of accrued interest. See also Pfister (2002), Gluck and Remeza (2000), Falcone and Gluck (1998), 
Howard and Merritt (1997) as well as Becker and Speaks (1996).
81 See also Calvo (1998) for a detailed discussion of the “lemons problem” in the context of financial 
contagion.
82 Depending on the perceived average loan quality in the portfolio, the residual cash flow rights of equity 
holders (i.e. the junior tranche as credit enhancement/FLP) act as limited liability for trust claimholders against 
costly bankruptcy (Frost, 1997). In absence of control rights the restricted role of equity upholds bankruptcy 
protection of senior claimholders, as it also serves as an early amortisation trigger for inexpensive prepayment 
of liquidation value of a deteriorating reference portfolio.
83 However, as opposed to DeMarzo and Duffie (1997), who interpret the retention of the most junior claim in 
a transaction as a costly signal in the spirit of Leyland and Pyle (1977), credit enhancement does not constitute 
a signalling device, as it fails to increase transparency. Only in combination with remedial measures against ex 
ante moral hazard (such as optimal tranching) can issuers ward off the risk of possible adverse selection a la 
Akerlof (1970).
84 The security design of securitisation, in turn, is determined by the envisaged economic effects of information 
asymmetries and valuation uncertainty of securitised assets. However, also the market implications of private 
information as well as trading costs affect the way the potential agency costs associated with illiquidity affect 
the feasibility of securitisation. For instance, the efficiency-improving effect of securitisation could be subject to
Adverse selection is the second effect o f market imperfection due to asymmetric information between 
agents in the securitisation process. The valuation uncertainty o f securitised assets (due to the 
complex security design and/or opaque nature of securitised assets) suggests superior information of 
issuers about the true valuation of securitised debt, which enables them to appropriate claimholder 
value from (uninformed) investors. Hence, rational investors would form negative beliefs about the 
actual quality of securitised assets and expect the adverse selection o f securitised debt with poor 
reference portfolios similar to the lemons market problem a la Akerlof (1970).85 The estimated value of 
private information about the actual value o f the securitised assets imposes a lemons premium on the 
issuer. Since investors assume all (or most) transactions to be o f poor quality, they request a 
reservation utility in the form of a lower selling price and/or higher return (“underpricing”) as 
compensation for the anticipated investment risk o f a disproportionately large share of poor 
transactions in the securitisation market.86*87 Securitisation transactions cannot exhaustively guard 
investors against the agency cost from adverse selection arising from the private nature of many types 
o f “securitisable” asset classes, such as bank loans. Although issuers seek to counteract adverse 
selection by bundling assets and then further tranching these bundles before they are sold in capital 
markets as debt securities, some residual degree o f private information remains sanctioned by 
investors. In cognisance of the asymmetric information, issuers could suppress the pecuniary charge 
associated with the lemons premium only by soliciting increased transparency about the true value of 
securitised assets through signalling and screening mechanisms. Issuers usually commit additional
the “capitalisation” of a particular financial system and the importance of market transparency of borrower 
fundamentals in external finance (e.g. relationship lending (Petersen and Rajan, 1994)). Hence, we would expect 
capital-market oriented financial systems to offer a higher capacity to absorb investment risks in a 
commensurate configuration of the security component of securitisation compared to bank-based systems.
85 See also Calvo (1998) for a detailed discussion of the “lemons problem” in the context of financial 
contagion.
86 Hence, they will be prepared to pay only some average market price below the fair market price of high- 
quality reference portfolios.
87 Adverse selection from private information is also intimately linked with ex ante moral hazard. The agency 
cost of negative investor beliefs is frequendy compounded by the attendant degree of unilateral information 
advantage by asset originators if they also act as issuers. Since private information associated with securitised 
assets also induce ex ante moral hazard in the asset selection process, rational investors being outsmarted by 
issuers, who are in a better position to judge the true credit quality of the reference portfolio. Note that we 
need to carefully distinguish between remedial structural measures as regards the kind of information problem 
at hand. Both adverse selection and moral hazard impose agency cost of asymmetric information. Whereas the 
former requires issuers to increase investor information about the actual quality of the transaction (in order to 
achieve market separation), the latter case typically calls for some disciplining mechanism that ensures incentive 
compatible behaviour of issuers. Hence, the rating process of transactions and disclosure requirements of asset 
information increase market transparency, whilst essential credit enhancement required by rating agencies to at 
least cover expected loss of the reference portfolio clearly serves as a commitment device by issuers to mitigate 
moral hazard. In the securitisation process the sources of agency cost are highly inter-related, e.g. ex ante moral 
hazard of biased asset selection — paired with some information advantage by issuers — could give rise to 
rational investor beliefs about adverse selection.
internal and external resources to a securitisation transaction, such as reserve funds, variable proceeds 
from excess spread as well as second loss positions and liquidity facilities, as a cosdy signal o f asset 
quality. Securitisation transactions typically include further credit and liquidity support mechanisms 
beyond subordination and credit enhancement. We distinguish the following types of internal and 
external support mechanisms o f securitisation transactions, which protect investors from a 
deterioration o f the securitised reference portfolio (see also section 10 (Appendix)):
(i) internal credit support reserve fund, yield spread (excess servicing), “turboing”, and 
“commingling”.
(ii) external credit support; third-party and parental guarantee, bond insurance, letters of 
credit (LOC), bank facility, cash collateral account (CCA), collateral invested amount 
(CIA).
The implicit risk sharing mechanism of these support mechanisms especially bears critical importance 
as to how issuers signal their ability to absorb default risk through the tranching and loss allocation o f 
the transaction, without affecting the promised repayment to investors.88.
In arbitrage structures o f securitisation transactions the principal-agent problem89 between managers 
of securitised assets and investors constitutes a further source o f uncertainty surrounding the proper 
administration o f securitisation due to asymmetric information. So-called front running as a principal- 
agent problem occurs if the benefit from trading activities exceeds the gains to be generated from 
securitising assets based on these trading activities. For instance, traders in securitised market value 
portfolios might prefer to trade on their own account rather than allocating the traded assets to a 
securitised reference portfolio. However, if issuers choose to securitise less liquid assets to encourage 
incentive-compatible trading behaviour, an increase in transaction cost entails allocational 
inefficiencies and may result in a lower valuation.
Issuers of asset-backed securities have to carefully balance this array o f potential investment risks 
(credit risk, structural risk and legal risk) against the economic benefits of securitisation by evaluating 
the significance o f pros and cons vis-a-vis the strategic and operational demands they impose on
88 This insight has important implications for the provision of credit enhancement, mainly because the essential 
level of first loss provision required by rating agencies as credit enhancement varies by the quality of the 
underlying reference portfolio. Note that credit enhancement is not a costly signal as it fails to separate good 
from bad issuers of debt securities with the same rating — assuming that relationship between the quality of 
securitised assets and the degree of credit enhancement is linear.
89 For an explanation of the principal-agent problem in context of corporate finance see Weiss (1999). Jobst 
(2003a) provides a succinct overview of transactions structures in asset-backed securitisation.
securitisation. Certainly, an informed securitisation decision will need to consider the suitability of the 
type of assets to be securitised. In the following section we analyse possible ways more illiquid assets, 
such as SME-related claims, are securitised by financial institutions and corporations.
6 ASSET SECURITISATION OF SME-RELATED CLAIMS
While bank-sponsored structured finance has mostly been in the limelight o f finance professionals, 
growing internationalisation o f business relationships and capital market-based business models have 
also encouraged non-financial enterprises to consider asset securitisation as a more cost-efficient 
form of corporate finance. Corporate issuers mainly employ securitisation in order to both diversify 
funding sources at more competitive capital costs90 and pro-actively manage balance sheet growth.91 
Large corporations in particular have begun to replace traditional on-balance sheet debt and equity 
finance by securitised debt as an alternative external source o f corporate finance to convert illiquid 
payment claims from services and deliverables (trade receivables) into marketable, commoditised 
debt.92 This proposition o f corporate securitisation, however, does not apply to small- and medium 
sized companies (SMEs), which largely remain dependent on bank lending and private equity, mainly 
because low turnover, weak public disclosure of accounts and high monitoring effort inhibit direct 
access to capital markets.93 At the same time, shrinking margins from interest-based deposit business 
and new, more risk-sensitive regulatory capital standards (Basle Committee, 2004) keep banks hard 
pressed to adopt a more stringent long-term lending policy, which leaves risky borrowers most 
affected. Against this background, SMEs find themselves squeezed in the middle between rising 
borrowing cost in traditional channels o f bank finance and restricted capital market access.
Although corporate securitisation has become a favourite structured finance instruments for an 
expedient reorganisation of financial relationships, technical barriers to entry (e.g. critical amounts 
securitisable asset exposure and prohibitive start-up costs) have dissuaded smaller companies from 
directly accessing asset securitisation markets without the support o f financial institutions. Aside
90 Lower refinancing costs are mainly owed to the “upgrading effect” associated with the insulation of 
securitised asset exposures from legal recourse and economic influence by the originator. Since most tranches 
of securitised asset pools enjoy high investment-grade ratings, originators with lower credit ratings can 
refinance at a lower interest rate if the rating assessment of securitised exposures concurs with the higher rating 
classification. Especially unrated SMEs benefit from this effect.
91 More recently the focus has also shifted to risk transfer as a motivation of synthetic securitisation structures.
92 The efficiency-improving effect of securitisation, however, depends on whether the security design of 
securitisation can largely absorb adverse implications arising from both private information, i.e. adverse 
selection and moral hazard, and trading costs as potential sources of illiquidity.
93 The “capitalisation” of the financial system at hand arguably signals the importance of market transparency 
in external finance.
from bank-sponsored loan securitisation through collateralised loan obligations (CLOs), asset-backed 
commercial paper (ABCP) programmes have evolved as an alternative form of asset securitisation, 
whose flexibility (in terms of security design and underlying asset type) and disclosure requirements 
about securitised assets remedy existing market challenges of refinancing SME-related exposures. 
ABCP programmes are typically administered by bankruptcy-remote SPVs to finance the acquisition 
of consumer and commercial receivable pools or securities o f varying maturity with the proceeds of 
short-term commercial notes issued to capital market investors.94 The most common types of 
exposures sold by asset originators to these conduits are trade receivables, consumer loans, 
mortgages, as well as lesser known asset classes, such as auto rentals and revenues from whole 
business and project finance. While some financial institutions use ABCPs for the sole purpose of 
refinancing their own lending activity on the back o f existing or revolving asset pools, many banking 
organisations (called “arrangers”) have successfully sponsored multi-seller ABCP securitisation 
programmes to fund corporate clients by securitising their asset exposures from trade receivables via 
SPVs. This refinancing mechanism allows banks to extend loans to corporate customers in return for 
their contribution o f payment claims to a standing asset portfolio.95-96 Corporate banking clients, 
especially SMEs, benefit from the cost efficient funding through ABCP conduits.97 In SM E conduits 
o f multi-seller ABCPs small companies especially can seek indirect funding from capital markets in 
return for selling their payment claims from trade receivables to the SPV (“liquidity generation”).98-99 
Multi-seller ABCPs in the dealer-placed commercial paper market offer intermediated access to 
securitisation markets for small-scale originators, whose collateralisation of commercial receivables 
works up the spectrum of refinancing alternatives. ABCP programmes frequently decrease overall 
refinancing costs (after consideration of transaction costs) lower than what would have been 
obtainable in conventional on-balance sheet external finance (such as bank debt) and standalone off-
94 In many cases the participation in ABCP conduits allows asset originators to remove assets from their 
balance sheets and free up economic and regulatory capital.
95 ABCP conduits exploit arbitrage opportunities by purchasing longer term securities from asset originators 
and funding these acquisitions with shorter term capital market debt securities (commercial notes).
96 The sponsoring bank typically provides liquidity and credit enhancements to the ABCP programme, which 
aid the program in obtaining high quality credit ratings (Office of Thrift Supervision, 2003).
97 The attractive risk-retum trade-off associated with ABCP issues draws growing investor interest, spurred by a 
general shift from savings accounts to higher yielding money market investments, especially highly rated, short­
term commercial paper.
98 The flexible security design of asset-backed securitisation as regards the maturity and redemption criteria has 
critical consequences for the liquidity of issued debt securities. Many investors are inclined to hold long-term 
securities until they mature, which makes short-term commercial papers the most liquid deals in the 
securitisation market. The combination of “buy-and-hold” investment and the attendant lack of market 
liquidity of ABS transactions with long maturities impede corporate bond-style analysis, adding to the 
limitations imposed by the complexity of ABS structures in general.
99 SME conduits traditionally accept only large SME receivables of at least €50 million (U.S.$60 million) into 
ABCP programmes. However, over the last three years some arrangers of ABCP have begun to specialise in 
small-sized deals, which involve more than 10 creditors and a minimum value of individual asset claims of at 
least €5 million (U.S.$6 million).
balance sheet funding (project finance ABS and whole business ABS).100-101 Such a reduction in the 
financing cost mainly derives from the diversification effect o f pooling individual asset claims into 
the securitised reference portfolio and the higher rating classification o f ABCP programmes thanks 
to credit de-linkage and bankruptcy remoteness o f issued debt securities from the originator. ABCP 
has become a popular source o f external finance particularly, in those countries where more 
restrictive bank lending has dried up conventional channels o f credit supply amid a deteriorating 
equity base. In summary, asset-backed securitisation (ABS) techniques that involve the issuance of 
structured claims on the performance o f SME-related payment claims, such as trade receivables by 
SMEs, future operating revenues from SMEs and SME loans originated by financial institutions, are 
specified as follows:
(i) Channels of securitised asset refinancing by corporations (“corporate securitisation”):
a. indirect102: Multi-seller asset-backed commercial paper (ABCP) programmes103 are 
methods of securitisation sponsored by financial institutions to facilitate the funding 
o f selected asset exposures on a short-term basis. If  these assets are trade receivables 
o f SMEs, the ABCP programme is referred to as a SM E conduit.
b. direct: Companies themselves engage in asset-backed securitisation (ABS) by 
securitising own payment claims, such as long-term revenues from entire operations, 
a particular line of business (whole business AB S) or defined project cash flows (project 
ABS).™
(ii) Channels of securitised asset refinancing by banks: banks securitise medium-term and 
long-term SME credit exposures in large scale asset-backed transactions, so-called SM E  
collateralised loan obligations (CLOs).105>106
i°° Nonetheless, securitisation is only profitable if it increases the average value of the reference portfolio to a 
selling price beyond what would be deemed necessary to at least offset the management cost associated with a 
securitisation.
101 Moreover, ABCP programmes do not necessarily reveal what types of assets have been sold by which asset 
originator, leaving the underlying lending relationship unaffected by issues of confidentiality.
102 In this context, the distinction of indirect and direct securitisation refers to the involvement of an 
intermediary in the securitisation process. We have pointed out earlier that the professional use of “indirect 
securitisation” indicates the presence of an SPV as issuing agent (see section 4.3).
103 Note that ABCP programmes of consumer and corporate loans are the short-term equivalent to CLO and 
other ABS loan transactions. However, they warrant conceptual distinction for they allow corporate clients to 
pledge trade receivables against short-term funding in lieu of seeking funds from an outright asset 
securitisation.
104 In this case financial institutions merely act as underwriters. Note here many large corporations have 
established own securitisation platforms (e.g. General Electric, Siemens). Whole business and project loan ABS 
transactions of SMEs are hardly observed but in the U.K.
105 See also Bund (2000a and 2000b), Herrmann and Tierney (1999), Eck (1998), Kohler (1998), Stopp (1997), 
Ohl (1994).
106 Sometimes the transaction structure is arranged by a government-sponsored agency (such as Kreditanstalt 
fur Wiederaufbau (KfW) in Germany, see section 7.2).
In the next section we use the example of Germany to sketch important lessons from the 
development of SME securitisation in a historically bank-dominated financial system with a strong 
SME sector.
7 THE GERMAN APPROACH TO SME SECURITISATION
7.1 Asset securitisation in Germany
In the German bank-centred financial system is renowned as a hallmark o f a close-knit network of 
long-term lending relationships between commercial borrowers and their Hausbanken (“house 
banks”), with capital markets playing only a minor role in external finance. More than three million 
German Mittelstand (SME) companies represent the backbone o f the German economy107 and are 
traditionally financed by banks, which partly refinance their exposures by “on-lending”108 through 
government-sponsored credit programmes109 as secured credit finance. Notwithstanding the inherent 
benefits o f long-term, trust-based lending, such a system o f corporate finance has now become a 
pernicious inheritance of Germany’s post-war organisation o f financial relationships, which has 
discouraged risk taking, biased companies into excessive leverage and misallocated capital, “while 
producing a fragmented banking system overburdened with underpriced loans” (Pearlstein, 2004) 
and huge loan loss provisions.110 This make-up of the financial system has made corporate lending 
vulnerable to mounting competitive pressure on already beleaguered banks.111 Tighter risk controls
107 According to the Institut for Mittelstandsforschung (IfM) in Bonn, more than 3.3 million SMEs represent 
99.5% of all registered enterprises in Germany. German SMEs employ more than 70% of the total workforce 
and generate almost 60% of GDP (DSGV, 2004). See also Albach (1983) for a general description of the 
German Mittelstand and its pivotal economic role.
108 “On-lending” of residential mortgages by government agencies could be compared to mortgage funding by 
Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac and Ginnie Mae or collateralised bank advances for mortgages by the Federal Home 
Loan Bank in the U.S. In the case of Germany government agencies, such as the Kreditanstalt fur 
Wiederaufbau (KfW), would provide funding to SMEs via commercial banks as underwriters, who retain full 
liability for the repayment of principal and interest.
109 The Kreditanstalt fur Wiederaufbau (KfW), jointly owned by the Federal Republic of Germany and the 
German states, is one of the development agencies, commissioned by the German government to ease the 
financing costs for SMEs and private homeowners as well as to promote export and project finance in 
Germany and developing countries abroad. See also Deutsche Bundesbank (1997) for an early assessment of 
the asset securitisation market in Germany. For a historical account of the role of large banks in the German 
financial system see Riesser (1910).
110 According to the association of German savings banks (DSGV, 2004) the own-funds rate (capital ratio) of 
German SMEs was merely 7% in 2000 and averaged 5.5% between 1993 and 1999. In contrast, large 
corporations (with an annual turnover of more than €50 million (U.S.$ 60 million)) boast an equity rate of 23%. 
37% of all German enterprise have no equity or are overleveraged (i.e. negative capital ratio). See also Edwards 
and Fischer (1994).
111 The abolishment of state guarantees to the savings bank system, which originates most of SME loans in 
Germany, and the slow-paced implementation of sophisticated credit risk management technologies with this
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of revised bank capital standards and higher investor demands on equity returns poised German 
banks to recast riskier and less standardised financing of SME-related obligations and residential 
mortgages). In corporate lending, this development especially pitted those companies against a 
shortage of funds, which had previously amassed quite substantial leverage during times of lower- 
than-average interest burden from bank-based debt finance.
More recently, however, German banks, once considered trapped in the fixation towards credit- 
based financial intermediation, seem to have awakened to the new reality o f a more risk-retum 
oriented approach. After the U.K. mortgage lending companies were the first financial institutions to 
debut modern securitisation in Europe, German commercial banks emulated high street U .K  banks, 
who began to see the benefits of loan securitisation in earnest around 1997. Large banks, such as 
Deutsche Bank and Dresdner Bank fully embraced asset-backed securitisation through CLOs and 
ABCPs as one possibility to marry the benefits of credit business with fixed income management in 
moving to lower the economic cost o f capital, improve risk management and remedy funding 
shortfalls (Rajan, 1996).112 Surprisingly, such bank-sponsored securitisation of payment claims also 
included SME-related obligations early on.113 This development is remarkable to the extent that it 
reflects the potential o f a bank-based financial system to seize on an inherently capital market-based 
structured finance technique to refinance highly illiquid asset exposures.
In 1998 the first German SME portfolio was securitised by Deutsche Bank in CORE 1998-1, which 
was followed by successive transactions on the CORE and CAST securitisation platforms.114 After 
Deutsche Bank had launched this first large-scale loan securitisation transaction in Germany to 
unload excess risk capital and proactively manage its balance sheet by means o f a true sale 
structure,115 other large commercial banks quickly followed suit and enlisted securitisation as a
segment of the banking sector. Note that 75% of all German SMEs bank with at least one of the 17,700 (2002) 
regional branches of the German savings bank system. Savings banks and state banks (which act as clearing 
houses of the savings bank system) have originated 42.3% of all corporate loans in Germany (DSGV, 2004).
112 Although many large banks have begun shifting main business interests to investment banking and asset 
management, they did so without necessarily abandoning less profitable lending and deposit business.
113 While corporate loans, mortgages as well as different types of consumer loans (student loans, credit card 
debt) have been securitised for more than 20 years in U.S., it was only until the mid-1990s that European fixed 
income markets have seen significant issue volumes of asset-backed securitisation (ABS). SME loans have 
proven to be a highly attractive asset class, partly because their inherent valuation uncertainty and illiquidity put 
a premium on sophisticated security design and risk management capabilities. Overall, given the sizeable 
contribution of SMEs to the economic factor output in many of the largest economies across the globe, the 
market for securitised SME loans and trade receivables by SMEs has already grown to more than €1.3 billion 
(U.S.$1.6 billion) of outstanding obligations world-wide in 2002.
114 These securitisation platforms differ insofar as CORE transactions feature a conventional true sale structure, 
while CAST transactions rely on partially funded synthetic structures.
115 The CORE 1998-1 transaction securitised the cash flow proceeds from DM-denominated loans to over 
5,000 German SMEs (and a small selection U.S.$-denominated bonds) at a total notional value of DM4.26
39
refinancing technology to unload highly illiquid SME credit exposures. Subsequendy, one prominent 
government-sponsored credit programme administered by the Kreditanstaltfur Wiederaufbau (KfW) for 
the promotion of SME loans and residential mortgages116 was extended to include an asset-backed 
securitisation scheme as a more cost-efficient source o f hands for bank creditors wishing to refinance 
the origination o f such asset exposures. In this way KfW envisaged to discharge its public service 
obligation of alleviating competitive pressures o f commercial banks to adopt more stringent lending 
conditions for SME and private mortgage loans. As a result o f this political effort and the emphasis 
on shareholder value and equity return, German commercial banks have quite successfully pursued 
the securitisation of SME loans over the last six years — either as standalone transactions or 
sponsored by securitisation platforms o f quasi-government agencies. KfW’s PROMISE (Promotional 
Mittelstand Loan Securitisation) synthetic CLO programme, for example, has issued 12 transactions 
so far at total market value o f more than €17.4 billion (U.S.$20.9 billion) in collaboration with large 
private banks such as HVB (HypoVereinsbank) Group, Commerzbank and Dresdner Bank since its 
inception at the end o f 2000.117-118 Although many German SMEs have become aware o f the benefits 
associated with direct ABS transactions in view of more stringent bank lending conditions, they have 
not made the securitisation o f trade receivables an integral part o f their refinancing decisions.119
billion (€2.17 billion, U.S.$2.6 billion). This ground-breaking deal did not only win critical acclaim for kick- 
starting the European CLO/CBO market, which has developed into the fastest growing sector of European 
asset-backed securities. It was also the first securitisation of German SME loans and the most highly diverse 
CLO portfolio to come to global capital markets. At that time, Deutsche Bank AG estimated its overall share 
in total lending to German SMEs to amount to 5.3% of a total market volume of €58 billion (U.S.$70 billion) 
in the first half of 1999 (Deutsche Bank, 1999). Securitised loans were included in the CORE 1998-1 
transaction on the basis of the following selection criteria (Deutsche Bank, 1998): (i) loans must have been 
originated by Deutsche Bank AG; (ii) all obligors must have their primary office/residence registered in 
Germany and all loans must be denominated in Euro or a national currency, which is part of EMU; (iii) no 
credit obligation must exceed 1.9% of the nominal original balance of the reference portfolio; (iv) all loans 
must be serviced in according to contractual conditions, without any repayments being delinquent or credit 
recovery subject to court action; (v) the date of final loan repayment coincides with scheduled termination of 
issued debt obligations on the reference portfolio; and (vi) no debtor has been rated lower than “C” (approx. a 
“Caal” Moody’s rating) according to the credit risk classification (internal rating system) of Deutsche Bank.
116 The complete range of statutory tasks of KfW include the promotion of SMEs, home finance or housing 
modernisation, the protection of the environment and the climate, export and project finance and the 
promotion of the developing and transition countries.
117 Besides the PROMISE programme, the KfW has also established a separate securitisation scheme for 
residential mortgages at the end of 2001, called PROVIDE.
118 Although both agency-sponsored SME and RMBS securitisation platforms have already established an 
impressive four-year track record, the “German share” in European securitisation of 3.4% of €207 billion 
(U.S.$248 billion) in 2003 (Source: Thomson Financial) is still found wanting; yet, the German on-balance sheet 
equivalent to off-balance sheet ABS structures, the Pfandbrief, claimed a respectable 81.5% of €219 billion 
(U.S.$263 billion) outstanding volume in 2003 (Source: Dealogic Bondware).
119 The exact definition of SMEs as a mostly privately owned, niche market operators varies by country. For 
instance, according to the Institut for Mittelstandsforschung (IfM) in Germany SMEs are classified by annual 
turnover (<€1 million [small size enterprise] and <€50 million [medium size enterprise]) or by the number of 
employees (<9 employees [small size enterprise] and <499 [medium size enterprise]). A revised classification by 
the European Union in May 2003 (which will take effect from 1 January 2005) raises the threshold values of 
annual turnover and introduces balance sheet volume as a third measure: (i) annual turnover (<€2 million
Hence, amidst sporadic corporate securitisation (such as Tenovis Finance Lid. (2001) and Volkswagen 
Car Lease No. 1-3 (1999-2002) to name two well-known examples), bank-sponsored securitisation -  be it 
through SME CLOs (with and without the involvement o f KfW as arranger) or SME conduits -  
constitutes the main driver o f incipient SME securitisation in Germany.
7.2 The KfW PROMISE platform and the True Sale In itiative (TSI)
7.2.1 The KfW  PROMISE platform
In anticipation o f potential structural changes and associated adverse effects on lending conditions 
due to tighter risk controls in the German banking sector, the PROMISE platform is meant to assist 
German financial institutions to achieve regulatory capital relief (see section 3) for securitised SME 
lending.120 The idea behind this concept is that lower levels o f equity (i.e. minimum capital 
requirements) required by banks to support existing SME loan exposures create more scope for 
future loan origination to SMEs. Aside from capital reduction on on-balance sheet loan exposures, 
further reasons for the prominence of KfW’s securitisation programme include the limitation o f the 
economist cost o f capital and the generation of additional liquidity from an alternative source of 
external finance. The organisational requirements of securitisation also create economic incentives of 
consistent internal risk management and internal rating systems. Additionally, the KfW programme 
adds both economies of scale from a standardised securitisation structure and lower heterogeneity of 
asset pools, which help originators keep securitisation costs low, while contributing to a further 
maturation o f the SME securitisation market.
The standardised securitisation structure o f PROMISE CLOs is based on a partially funded, 
synthetic transaction, where the originating bank enters into a credit default swap (CDS) with KfW as 
protection provider, taking over the entire default risk of a selected pool o f SME loan exposures (i.e. 
the notional value o f the reference portfolio o f assets) (see Fig. 8). The transferred credit risk is 
subsequently structured in a subordinated set of tranches with different seniority, so that the largest 
share o f the risk exposure (80-90%) carries hardly any default risk. This co-called “super-senior”
[micro size enterprise], <€10 million [small size enterprise] and <€50 million [medium size enterprise]), (ii) 
balance sheet volume (<€2 million [micro size enterprise], <€10m [small size enterprise] and <€43 million 
[medium size enterprise]), and (iii) number of employees (<10 employees [micro size enterprise], <50 
employees [small size enterprise] and <250 employees [medium size enterprise]). Note that in smaller 
economies these criteria might be lower. Besides the quantitative criteria, the following qualitative criteria 
typically apply to SMEs: (i) strong interdependence between ownership and management, which manifests 
itself in the direct influence of executive management on all strategically important processes, (ii) personal 
accountability of management for all significant business decisions and (iii) trust-based relationship between 
employees and management.
tranche is passed onto another bank (preferably an OECD bank for a low risk-weighting o f the risk 
transfer) via a senior CDS. The first loss position (FLP), the most junior tranche, which carries 
almost all o f the expected default loss (based on historic default rates), is retained by the originating 
bank or covered by a junior CDS. KfW sells the remaining mezzanine tranches as subordinated 
bonds (credit-linked notes (CLNs)) to capital markets via an SPV, which operates under the 
PROMISE platform and assumes credit-linked certificates o f indebtedness to link the issued CLNs 
to the reference portfolio. The SPV might seek collateralisation by a third party up to the notional 
amount o f the issued CLNs.
In are more advanced security design, KfW accommodates several loan portfolios of different banks 
in a slightly modified structure. In 2002 KfW made inroads with the diversification demands raised 
by the stratified German mortgage loan market by arranging a multi-seller securitisation transaction (see 
section 6) with the cooperative mortgage bank D G  Hyp (Deutsche Genossenschafts-Hypothekenbank A.G) 
as originator. The credit risk o f several portfolios o f credit cooperatives were pooled with D G  Hyp 
and placed in the capital market via the KfW’s PROMISE platform (PROMISE 2002-C). This 
arrangement would also allow smaller financial institutions to resort to securitisation conduits as an 
alternative refinancing mechanism. In this way, KfW  extends the reach o f securitisation in the effort 
to maintain the viability o f SME lending under the KfW ’s promotional credit programme.
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120 N ote that only loans originated under the KfW credit prom otion programme for SME loans.
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7.2.2 The True Sale Initiative (TSI)
True sale securitisation has remained scarce in Germany due to regulatory and taxation constraints as 
well as unresolved legal issues regarding redemption criteria and insolvency proceedings in cross- 
border disputes. It took until 1997 (BaFin, 1997a and 1997b; Bartelt, 1999) for the national regulatory 
body for banking supervision, the German Federal Financial Supervisory Authority (Bundesaufsichtsamt 
fu r Kreditmsen (BaFin)), to first permit the use of ABS,121>122 at a time when the U.S. and most all 
(Western) European countries had already put in place a legal framework for true sale securitisation. 
Moreover, in 2003 the German trade tax (Gemrbesteuer) law, a major obstacle to true sale 
securitisations in the past, was amended by the Act to the Support o f Small Businesses (Geset^  %ur 
Forderung von Kleinuntemehmen und upr Verbesserung der Untemehmenfman^erung), which exempts SPVs 
purchasing certain receivables originated by banks in (true sale) securitisation transactions from trade 
tax.123 Further efforts are underway to actively promote true sale transaction structures in the bid to 
(i) improve the external financing o f SMEs by creating an alternative source of funds, and (ii) 
facilitate the risk management o f asset originators by way o f securitising SME loans.
In keeping with its public service task o f safeguarding adequate private and SME sector financing the 
KfW has recently sponsored the so-called “True Sale Initiative” (TSI) as a concerted effort of 
German banks to facilitate traditional off-balance sheet (true sale) asset securitisation in Germany, 
targeting a capital-market segment whose national development has been retarded by unfavourable 
legal, tax and accounting provisions. After consultation with market participants, supervisory 
authorities and rating agencies the TSI puts forth a uniform securitisation platform, which promises 
to lower refinancing cost and capital charges for credit exposures securitised by participating banks.
According to a joint statement released on 12 December 2003 by representatives o f the 13 
participating banks — the most important commercial banks, cooperative banks and the savings bank 
group124 — the proposed TSI foundation structure (see Fig. 9) establishes a multi-seller securitisation
121 See also Eichholz (2000).
122 After the Circular 4/97 by the German Federal Financial Supervisory Authority (BaFin, 1997a and 1997b), 
the October 2002 Guideline by the German Institute of Accountants (IDW) laid the groundwork for the legal 
and accounting treatment of asset securitisation in Germany, the continued trade tax liability (“withholding 
tax”) of bankruptcy-remote special-purpose vehicles has practically rendered true sale securitisation 
meaningless.
123 See also Bernard et al. (2003).
124 On 9 July 2003, Bayerische Landesbank, Citigroup, Commerzbank, DekaBank, Deutsche Bank, Dresdner 
Bank, DZ Bank, Eurohypo, HSH Nordbank, HVB Group, KfW Group, Landesbank Hessen-Thiiringen and 
WestLB AG signed a Letter of Intent to define the business model for a securitisation platform to facilitate 
traditional (true sale) transaction structures in Germany (KfW Group, 2003).
platform as a standing arrangement for the formation of SPVs as insolvency-remote ABS issuers in 
compliance with national competition law and regulatory requirements as well as international 
standards o f true sale constructions. The economic case for TSI derives from the development of a 
cost-efficient, ready-made securitisation infrastructure, which allows participating banks to securitise 
reference loan portfolios through newly established SPVs within a foundation structure. The 
structural model o f TSI is comprised o f a limited liability service company (“TSI Service G m bH ”)125 
as servicing agent and three non-profit foundations (charitable trusts),126 which jointly create separate 
SPVs as limited liability companies under German law (“G m bH ”) to refinance each loan portfolio 
bought from a participating bank. The SPV converts the payment received from a reference portfolio 
o f securitised assets into tradable debt securities. Although any bank is permitted to use the 
securitisation platform without mandatory participation in TSI, all servicing privileges to securitised 
assets are to be surrendered to the TSI Service GmbH as servicing agent. The TSI Service GmbH is 
also charged with the tasks o f (i) developing uniform minimum standards for (true sale) securitisation 
in terms o f both reporting and administration and (ii) providing a forum o f exchange for originating 
banks.127
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125 Since its first successful launch o f an ABS transaction using a TSI-certified German SPV, Driver One 
G m bH , with ABN AMRO bank as arranger and lead manager o f the transaction, the servicing entity o f TSI has 
adopted the business name “True Sale International G m bH ” (see also http://www.true-sale- 
intemational.de /index.php?id= 118).
126 The charitable trusts establish the foundation element o f the TSI structure, whose principal statutory 
requirement is the prom otion o f research topics related to Germany as “ financial centre” .
127 These functions are envisaged to promote (i) the standardisation and branding o f  the TSI securitisation 
platform structure as well as (ii) further development o f true sale securitisation in Germany.
Overall, the structure of TSI conspicuously emulates the economic logic o f large-scale (indirect) 
synthetic securitisation facilitated by the KfW-sponsored PROMISE and PROVIDE securitisation 
programmes (see section 7.2.1), which aim to dissuade German banks from restrained SME and 
private mortgage lending as they adjust their risk exposure in the face of rising competitive pressures 
on traditional funding. Given an apparent lack of gross-roots conviction by German corporations to 
make asset securitisation an important source of external finance any time soon, the multi-seller 
design o f TSI provides brokered access to securitisation markets as an alternative form of refinancing 
to small and regional banks in a financial system whose dominance o f bank-based external finance 
has so far thwarted any serious attempt at establishing large-scale corporate securitisation.
7.3 Lessons learned from SME securitisation in Germany
Although the case o f quasi-govemment sponsored asset securitisation in Germany is limited in scale 
and scope, the successful introduction o f synthetic securitisation platforms by KfW bears witness to 
the capacity o f  a heavily bank-dominated financial system to absorb a capital market-based 
refinancing tool. I t  also reveals the appreciable influence o f  efficient and transparent 
securitisation on  the willingness o f  banks to securitise SME loan exposures to realise strategic and 
operational objectives. Although securitisation markets generally have been equivocal about a 
preferred transaction type (true sale vs. synthetic securitisation), in Germany, the volume o f partially 
or unfunded, synthetic ABS transaction structures has outstripped fully-funded traditional (true sale) 
ABS structures at a ratio o f roughly 25 to l in 2002, while only €1.31 billion (U.S.$1.57 billion) o f the 
€32.8 billion (U.S.$39.3 billion) total involved true sale transactions (Althaus et al., 2003). The 
synthetic nature o f the German ABS term market due to the predominance of large scale KfW- 
arranged transactions (PROMISE and PROVIDE) and several ABS/ABCP securitisation schemes 
developed by large German commercial banks (e.g. CORE, CAST, GLOBE and HAUS by Deutsche 
Bank, GELDILUX by HVB Group and SILVERTOWER by Dresdner Bank to name a few) 
indicates that mainly systemic obstacles (e.g. the trade taxation o f SPVs of true sale transactions in 
Germany) have fuelled the growth of synthetic securitisation, which caters to the optimisation of 
regulatory capital and risk management rather than efficient refinancing (which typically applies to 
true sale structures).128 At the same time, standardised securitisation structures have contributed to 
informed investment and lower issuing cost. Hence, the case o f asset securitisation in Germany is 
instructive as to how institutional constraints shape the nature o f securitisation, whose structural
128 See also Meissmer (2001).
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versatility offers economic benefits irrespective o f the configuration of the financial system. It also 
suggests that a bank-based financial system like that in Germany would be more likely to encourage 
the development of mature securitisation markets to be determined by financial sector initiatives, 
whose reach and intensity might be enhanced by top-down initiatives of quasi-government agencies 
like KfW.
8 CONCLUSION
In the previous sections we attempted to equally privilege the benefits and drawbacks associated with 
asset securitisation by financial institutions and corporations. We also explained the various forms of 
ABS structures as they pertain to the securitisation o f SME-related claims. Finally, we reviewed the 
evolution o f the German securitisation market as a foray of SME securitisation in a financial system, 
where bank-based external finance coincides with a strong presence of SMEs in industrial 
production. Overall, SME securitisation as an alternative source o f liquid funds seems promising 
amid increased political attempts to foster what could be regarded a level playing field in the 
regulation, taxation and legal treatment of asset securitisation across countries. The elimination of 
significant national disparities in these areas, especially as regards true sale transactions, would 
certainly be highly desirable to expand the spectrum of “securitisable assets” to include more illiquid 
and heterogeneous asset classes, such as SME-related payment claims. So far SME securitisation 
remains largely limited to indirect securitisation transactions, where banks mainly issue securitised 
debt on the back of SME-related claims to fund future lending activities. A t the same time, smaller 
corporations in capital-market based financial systems (e.g. the U .K  and the U.S.) would enlist the 
help o f banks as arrangers o f securitisation transactions due to cosdy direct capital market access.129 
However, as banking competition dries up traditional channels of funding riskier SME borrowers, 
the search for alternative sources o f capital might encourage SMEs to consider asset securitisation to 
meet funding needs by pledging asset receivables to multi-seller ABCPs. Also lower agency cost of 
asymmetric information vis-a-vis external investors in securitisation transactions (which are valued on 
the specific performance of a designated asset portfolio) might give securitised debt an edge over 
other forms of external finance. Banks would be more inclined to make use o f uniform securitisation 
platforms (such as KfW’s PROMISE deal structure) to lower the refinancing cost of SME loans they 
are inevitably bound to originate due to traditionally higher risk-adjusted margins from SME loans 
and/or high macroeconomic importance o f SMEs as commercial borrowers (like in Germany).
129 In our analysis will deliberately ignored operational and fundamental constraints to the securitisation of 
SME-related claims, such as reporting standards of SMEs, the idiosyncratic nature of SME loan contracts and
Although substantial legal uncertainty and incompatible financing strategies may render securitisation 
less pressing for SMEs than for the banking industry, it is safe to say that it might not be too long 
until asset securitisation will join ranks with traditional (intermediated) debt finance.
credit scoring of SMEs and/or the cash flow analysis of trade receivables held by SMEs, which certainly render 
SME securitisation more costly than bank-sponsored ABCPs or corporate securitisation for that matter.
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10 APPENDIX: ALTERNATIVE FORMS OF STRUCTURAL
SUPPORT IN ASSET SECURITISATION
The use o f a reserve fund is a popular alternative to a bank facility in senior/subordinated structures in 
order to finance timely payments on outstanding debt of the securitisation transaction. A reserve 
hand, is separately created by the issuer to reimburse the issuer for losses up to the amount of the 
reserve amount. It is often used in combination with other types o f enhancement. This form of 
credit support draws its prime benefit from the permanent coverage of asset losses, as it is required 
to be sufficiently liquid (held on the issuer’s bank account) to ensure its availability whenever 
necessary. Moreover, issuers forgo the cost of maintaining a bank facility and incurring interest on 
any drafts made. Nonetheless, notwithstanding these inherent benefits, the cost associated with its 
funding, such as bond proceeds or a loan whose accrued interest must be repaid with surplus funds 
held by the issuer, have to taken into account in benchmarking the reserve fund mechanism with a 
bank facility. Since the issuer cannot release the surplus unless the reserve fund is sustained at its 
contractually required size, the risk of a rating downgrade o f an issue is mitigated.
Excess sp read  represents the net amount of interest payments generated from the underlying assets 
after repayment of issued debt securities, which can also be employed as credit coverage and liquidity 
support.131 Excess spread is used to cover current-period losses and may be paid into a reserve fund 
to boost credit enhancement (Giddy, 2002). In the case o f so-called turboing excess servicing is 
applied to outstanding tranches as principal. Any excess spread must cover financial shortfall arising 
from the combination o f credit loss, in the worst-case scenario o f both prepayments and termination 
rates on asset claims, and maximum payments to debtholders. Additionally, taxation o f any excess 
spread further reduces the amount available to the issuer. Nonetheless, in some cases a portion of the 
excess spread might be trapped, i.e. it is stricter from being released by the issuer, as it stands to be 
available for future needs.
In cases where collections of interest and principal on assets are pooled in a general account by the 
servicer and commingled with its other funds (especially in cases of mortgage-backed securities)132 
before these payments are passed on to the issuer, insolvency risk (see section 5.3) might inhibit
130 The Basle Committee (2002a) defines excess spread as “gross finance charge collections and other fee 
income received by the trust or special purpose entity (SPE) minus certificate interest, servicing fees, charge- 
offs, and other senior trust or SPE expenses. Finance charges may include market interchange fees.”
131 A specialised form of excess spread is the so-called yield spread, which comprises the difference between the 
coupon on the underlying assets and the security coupon. As a first defence against losses, excess servicing 
complements the yield spread, which may be applied to outstanding classes as principal (Giddy, 2002).
132 See also Fabozzi (2000 and 1998) as well as Fabozzi and Yuen (1998).
appropriate credit coverage. Based on the legal opinion from the issuer’s counsel as to whether the 
loss of funds would be temporary (liquidity stress) or permanent (credit loss), the availability o f 
sufficient funds to cover credit losses has to be guaranteed. In the move to evade negative 
implications o f commingling as regards credit coverage, any payments received from assets should be 
redirected to the issuer, such as the SPV. Hence, the amount o f funds likely to be drawn into any 
bankruptcy or insolvency resolution process could be minimised.
In addition to internal credit and liquidity supports, external credit enhancement from a third party 
also represents an alternative means of shielding investors from expected credit loss. Under a third- 
party or parental guarantee, an external party (such as an insurance company or the parent company of 
the servicer/issuer o f the transaction) enters into a contractual commitment to reimburse the issuer 
for losses up to a predetermined notional amount. Such a guarantee agreement could also be 
extended to include the obligations o f advancing principal and interest to investors in a trustee-like 
fashion and/or buy back defaulted loans.133 Bond insurance (through surety bonds) can serve as a 
vehicle o f specialised third-party credit/liquidity support. It is provided by a rated monoline insurance 
companies (generated triple-A rated), which guarantees full payment o f principal and interest to 
noteholders o f the transaction, as it reimburses the issuer o f the transaction for any losses incurred. 
Even though issuers are able to achieve an “AAA” rating for “insured” tranches, bond insurance is a 
credit enhancement much less prevalent as a means of credit support in securitisation transactions 
than subordination due to higher cost. The higher expense associated with this form of credit 
coverage stems not only from the cost of insurance but also from the requirement o f the underlying 
reference portfolio to be drawn on a loan pool of a sufficient investment-grade rating level. In most cases 
the insurer provides guarantees only to investment-grade securities. Hence, the insurance-based 
credit/liquidity support disciplines issuers to carefully balance both the level o f credit enhancement 
needed for a desired structured rating o f a designated reference portfolio and their financial capacity 
to provide such additional enhancement if they so desire. Letters of credit (LQCs) are the surety bond- 
equivalent in regards to non-insurance financial institutions are guarantors, where typically banks 
promise to cover any amount o f losses up to the level of credit enhancement needed for a given 
portfolio quality o f the underlying reference pool of assets. Third-party guarantees, bond insurance 
and letters of credit expose the security level rating of securitisation transactions to the claims paying 
ability o f the institutions providing enhancement as we need to think of these provisions as pledges 
o f cash in keeping with some guarantor obligations, devoid o f actual cash transfer or other payments. 
Hence, the character o f such external credit enhancements does not betray any hint o f downgrade 
risk independent o f the actual time-varying loan performance of the underlying reference portfolio.
A bank facility represents another possibility o f external liquidity support for a securitisation 
transaction, as the issuer can draw and redraw on the facility as and when needed, with repayment of 
drawn amounts being made when sufficient funds are held by the issuer of the transaction. The 
continuity of a standing bank facility is only guaranteed if the rights o f the facility provider to 
termination are limited to cases of issuer’s bankruptcy, whereby the lender is prohibited from 
petitioning the issuer into bankruptcy given that any utilisation o f the facility does not constitute an 
act of insolvency. However, under the provisions of a bank facility, the issuer ought to be entided to 
terminate the facility agreement if the lender’s rating is downgraded or, if specially agreed, has been 
downgraded such that future drawing rights can no longer be guaranteed. This impediment to third- 
party risk is obviated by a cash collateral account (CCA). Here, the issuer borrows the required amount 
o f first loss provision (credit enhancement) from a commercial bank only to purchase a 
corresponding amount of highest-rated short-term commercial paper. Unlike in the case of third- 
party guarantees, CCA represents an actual deposit o f cash rather than a pledge of cash only, and, 
thus, the downgrade risk o f the securitisation transaction remains unaffected by a rating change of 
CCA providers. The collateral investment amount (CIA) is the final forms o f credit support. The CIA, 
akin to a subordinated tranche o f a transaction, is either purchased on a negotiated basis by a single 
third-party credit enhancer or securitised as a private placement and sold to several investors.
133 See also The Bond Market Association (1998).
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1 ABSTRACT
This chapter provides a comprehensive overview of the gradual evolution o f the supervisory policy 
adopted by the Basle Committee for the regulatory treatment o f asset securitisation. We carefully 
highlight the pathology of the new “securitisation framework” to facilitate a general understanding of 
what constitutes the current state o f computing adequate capital requirements for securitised credit 
exposures. Although we incorporate a simplified sensitivity analysis o f the varying levels of capital 
charges depending on the security design o f asset securitisation transactions, we do not engage in a 
profound analysis of the benefits and drawbacks implicated in the new securitisation framework.
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2 INTRODUCTION
2.1 Loan securitisation and regulatory arbitrage
The broadbmsh determination of capital requirements for credit risk exposures in the one-size-fits-all 
regulatory straightjacket of the 1988 Basle Capital Accord has rendered the cost-effective origination of 
loans (especially investment-grade credits) increasingly difficult and prompted banks to consider 
large-scale loan securitisation as one way to lower their regulatory cost o f capital. Securitisation 
generally refers to the process o f refinancing a diversified pool of illiquid present or future financial 
and/or non-financial receivables through the issue o f structured claims into negotiable capital market 
paper issued to capital market investors (liquidity transformation and asset diversification process).1 The fairly 
indiscriminate risk-weighting and a flat regulatory capital charge for on-balance sheet credit risk 
exposures under the existing regulatory framework of the 1988 Basle Capital A.ccord and later 
amendments made it less efficient for banks to retain highly rated loans (with low yields relative to
1 See Moody’s Investor Services (2003) for a brief introduction to asset-backed securitisation (ABS).
required regulatory capital) vis-a-vis risky loans with high net interest income. The main channel 
through which banks arbitraged these inflexible regulatory provisions was by offering securitised debt 
on their better quality assets, whilst retaining their riskier assets on their own books. Consequendy, 
the market for securitised assets grew dramatically from the early 1990s onwards and attracted a large 
following with all major investment banks (Jobst, 2003).
2.2 The consultative process of the Basle Committee
Following protracted efforts over recent years to enhance financial market stability, the Basle 
Committee on Banking Supervision2 on 11 May 2004 finally reached agreement on new international 
rules for the capital adequacy o f internationally active banks in International Convergence of Capital 
Measurement and Capital Standards: a Revised "Framework (June 2004), termed “Basle 2”. It provides 
binding guidance as to establishment of international convergence on revisions to supervisory 
regulations governing bank capital. The new regulatory provisions link minimum capital 
requirements closer with the actual riskiness o f bank assets in order to redress shortcomings in the 
old system of the overly simplistic 1988 Basle Accord. The new regulations represent the final 
outcome of a series of consultations, each of which followed the three proposals for revising the 
capital adequacy framework in June 1999, January 2001 and April 2003, with associated quantitative 
impact studies.3
Given the rapid growth of securitisation markets around the world, the Basle Committee 
acknowledged the importance o f asset securitisation as an emergent structured finance funding tool 
for financial intermediaries and adopted a comprehensive regulatory policy for asset securitisation, 
which was deemed critical to a viable implementation of a revised Basle Accord.4 As an integral part 
o f the new proposal of the Basle Accord (Basle Committee, 2004b), the Basle Committee was poised 
to establish the so-called Securitisation Framework based on earlier provisions in the (Third) Consultative 
Paper to the New Basle Accord (April 2003) and subsequent Changes to the Securitisation Framework (January 
2004) in response to new developments in bank-based structured finance and growing sophistication 
in synthetic forms of asset securitisation. Prior to the Securitisation Framework, which will finally come 
into force in 2006, the Basle Committee had made several proposals and revisions for a consistent
2 The Basle Committee on Banking Supervision is a steering group of all G10 member countries of the Bank for 
International Settlements (BIS).
3 For a general discourse on the rationale of banking regulation we refer readers to Benston and Kaufman 
(1996) as well as Besanko and Kanatas (1996).
4 Failure to do so would have certainly missed the objective of financial stability set out by the Basle 
Committee.
I
regulatory treatment of securitised exposures based on feedback received from banks and 
supervisory agencies.
The First Consultative Paper (see Fig. 1), released by the Securitisation Group of the Basle Committee in June 
1999, introduced a general securitisation proposal, which was later expanded upon in the Second 
Consultative Paper on securitisation in January 2001. At this stage, the drafting o f common regulatory 
policy focused primarily on the standardised treatment o f traditional securitisation transactions, where 
banks were required to assign risk-weights to securitisation exposures based on few observable 
characteristics, such as an issue rating. However, it also presented an initial distinction o f sponsoring 
and investing banks, revolving asset securitisation, cash advancement and liquidity facilities as well as 
risk transfer requirements for traditional securitisation.
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Fig. 1. The evolution of securitisation framework by the Basle Committee.
After consultation with the industry and further analyses, the Basle Committee issued the First 
Working Paper on the Treatment of Asset Securitisation in October 2001 (see Fig. 1), which comprised an 
in-depth intemal-ratings based (IRB) treatment o f securitisation exposures m addition to the standardised, 
“one size fits all” approach. It also sought to initiate further consultation on a concrete treatment of 
synthetic securitisation, liquidity facilities and early amortisation features, which culminated in the 
Securitisation Framework (Credit Risk — Securitisation Framework, §IV of the QIS 3 Technical 
Guidance) before yet another round o f consultation talks then commenced to fine-tune the
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quantitative criteria o f higher risk-sensitivity in the determination of minimum capital requirements 
for issuers and investors of securitisation transactions. The products o f this latest regulatory effort 
were the Second Working Paper on the Treatment of Asset Securitisation o f October 2002 and the (Third) 
Consultative Paper to the New Basle Accord of April 2003, which — among many new qualitative aspects 
of securitisation regulation, such as supervisory review (Pillar 2) and market discipline (Pillar 3) -  also 
proposed a more ratings-based approach (RBA) for securitisation transactions in line with the distinction 
o f the standardised approach and the internal ratings-based (IRB) approach to the computation o f general 
minimum capital requirements.
As a decisive step on the way towards a securitisation framework, the Committee issued the Second 
Working Paper on the Treatment of Asset Securitisation on 28 October 2002, a result o f a series of 
consultations to sound out the viability o f new, more risk-sensitive elements of a securitisation 
framework it had already set forth in the First Working Paper on the Treatment of Asset Securitisation. The 
existing regulatory framework according to the 1988 Basle Accord then fell short o f providing 
guidance on the comprehensive treatment o f synthetic securitisation structures, liquidity facilities, 
asset-backed commercial paper (ABCP) programmes and securitisation transactions o f revolving 
credit exposures containing early amortisation features. Besides improvements to the standardised and 
the intemal-ratings based (IRB) treatment as well as the supervisory formula approach (SFA) in context of 
capital adequacy in securitisation, the Second Working Paper on the Treatment of Asset Securitisation was 
mainly put forward in the effort to request input from hanking organisations on the need of future 
modifications to the existing proposal or adjustments to the regulatory treatment of asset 
securitisation. Notwithstanding its tentative nature as a way to solicit feedback from financial 
institutions concerning the supervisory review component (“Pillar 2”, see Basle Committee, 2002a 
and 2002b),5 the Second Working Paper on the Treatment o f Asset Securitisation represented a purposeful 
attempt to address critical gaps in the securitisation framework.
Before the conclusion of the third consultative phase on the regulatory treatment o f asset 
securitisation, the Basle Committee issued its Changes to the Securitisation Framework (January 2004) to 
establish greater consistency o f capital charges for (i) securitised exposures and conventional credit 
risk o f the same rating grade and (ii) similar exposures across different regulatory approaches in the 
bid to reduce the complexity o f the (Third) Consultative Paper to the New Basle Accord (April 2003). 
Eventually, after incorporating most o f the proposed modifications in Changes to the Securitisation 
Framework, the Basle Committee released the final version o f the securitisation framework as part of 
the new Basle Accord o f International Convergence of Capital Measurement and Capital Standards.
2.3 Objective and structure
The following sections provide a comprehensive overview of the gradual evolution of the 
Securitisation Framework for the treatment o f asset securitisation, a culmination o f a series of 
consultative processes completed by the Basle Committee in response to the continued use of loan 
securitisation for purposes o f regulatory arbitrage. We carefully probe the founding components of 
this new regulatory framework so as to provide accessible understanding o f what constitutes a 
consistent yet still contested regulatory approach to the computation o f adequate capital 
requirements for securitised credit exposures. Although we incorporate a simplified sensitivity 
analysis o f the varying levels o f capital charges depending on the configuration o f asset securitisation 
transactions, we do not engage in a profound analytical discourse about the benefits and drawbacks 
that the new securitisation framework entails.
In the following section, we first explain the contents of the First Consultative Paper and the Second 
Consultative Paper of 2001, before moving on to specify the supervisory formula approach (SFA) and the 
ratings-based approach (RBA) in their original tenors as stated in the Second Working Paper on the Treatment 
of Securitisation (Basle Committee, 2002a and 2002b), which had been the first account of a consistent 
regulatory policy for asset securitisation until the adoption of the (Third) Consultative Paper to the New 
Basle Accord (Basle Committee, 2003). Finally, a final exposition of substantial modifications to the 
regulatory'treatment o f securitisation under the IRB approach in the new Basle Accord o f International 
Convergence of Capital Measurement and Capital Standards (Basle Committee, 2004b) outlines the Changes to 
the Securitisation Framework (Basle Committee, 2004a).
3 THE PATHOLOGY OF THE REGULATORY TREATMENT OF 
ASSET SECURITISATION -  THE SECURITISATION 
FRAMEWORK
3.1 The new Basle Accord and the regulatory treatment of asset securitisation
The revised version o f the Basle Accord rests fundamentally on three regulatory pillars. In principle, 
the first pillar (Pillar 1, “Minimum Capital Requirements”) is set for a similar tenor as the 1988 Basle 
Accord, which requires banks to meet minimum capital requirements for exposures to credit risk, 
market risk and operational risk. Banks are permitted to use any one of the following approaches to
5 See also Basle Committee (2003).
the computation of regulatory capital: the standard approach, the foundation internal ratings-based (IRB) 
approach or the advanced internal ratings-based (IRB) approach. Although most attention has been 
devoted to capital adequacy set out in Pillar 1, the two remaining pillars are believed to be of even 
greater importance fThe Economist, 2004). The second pillar (Pillar 2, “Supervisory Review”) grants 
discretion to national supervisory authorities to tweak regulatory capital levels, e.g. they may impose 
additional capital charges for risk exposures they deem insufficiently covered in Pillar 1. Pillar 2 also 
includes the requirement for banks to develop internal processes to assess their overall capital 
adequacy commensurate to their risk profile in compliance with supervisory standards, and to 
maintain appropriate capital levels. The third pillar (Pillar 3, “Market Discipline”) compels banks to 
disclose more information to financial markets under the objective o f strengthening their market 
discipline and transparent risk management practices (Basle Committee, 2003).
Similar to the on-balance sheet treatment of straightforward credit exposures, the revised Basle 
Accord also requires banks to hold a certain amount o f capital against any securitisation exposure 
under the Securitisation Framework for Credit Risk. It applies to securitisation transactions (synthetic or 
traditional) involving one or more underlying credit exposures from which stratified positions (or 
tranches) are created that reflect different degrees o f risk. Besides distinguishing between different 
transaction structures, the securitisation framework not only accounts for the characteristics of 
securitised assets in terms o f both available rating and portfolio characteristics but also for the 
different roles played by banks in the securitisation process (e.g. originating bank, investing bank and 
servicing agent/sponsoring bank). Originating banks are o f particular interest in this exposition of 
capital adequacy, mainly because they must satisfy a set o f operational criteria depending on the type 
of transaction structure. Interestingly, these operational criteria for the capital treatment of 
traditional and synthetic structures are based on the economic substance o f the credit risk transfer 
rather than its legal form. While initial proposals almost exclusively focused on traditional (true sale) 
securitisation transactions, subsequent amendments also included credit risk transfer exposures 
arising from synthetic transactions, investments in ABS securities and retentions o f  subordinated 
tranches, as well as liquidity facilities and credit enhancements. The securitisation framework 
distinguishes only between the so-called standardised approach and the internal ratings-based approach 
(IRB) in the way investing and originating banks compute the regulatory capital charge for 
securitised positions as so-called “risk-weighted assets” by multiplying the notional amount of 
securitised tranches by a specific risk-weight applied to the standard capital ratio o f 8%.
3.2 The Consultative Package: the First Consultative Paper,, the Second 
Consultative Paper and the First Working Paper on the Treatment o f  A sset 
Securitisation
After the first serious attempts at formulating a regulatory position on the regulatory governance of 
asset securitisation in the First Consultative Paper in June 1999 the Basle Committee issued the Second 
Consultative Paper for the capital requirements of asset securitisation transactions on 16 January 2001, 
which eventually led to the publication of the First Working Paper on the Treatment of Asset Securitisation 
in October 2001. This revised proposal for an adjustment o f regulatory capital and supervision by 
financial regulators was published as a separate 32-page chapter o f a new proposal for the Basle 
Accord on the International Convergence of Capital Measurement and Capital Standards as a comprehensive 
effort to codify a regulatory framework. Although the First Consultative Paper had already set out 
definitions o f key aspects of securitisation and established minimum operational criteria related to 
traditional (true sale) structures o f credit risk transfer (i.e. where the originator transfers assets usually 
to an SPV), it remained completely silent on synthetic transactions as a coming structural innovation 
in asset securitisation. It was not until the First Working Paper on the Treatment of Asset Securitisation was 
published that initial regulatory provisions were revised to include a separate section on synthetic 
securitisation and operational criteria for the status of banks in securitisation transactions.6 The 
subsequent exposition outlines the most prominent aspects raised in the First Working Paper on the 
Treatment of Asset Securitisation?
3.2.1 Definition of true sale transactions by originating banks
The outright transfer of assets off the balance sheet in standard (true sale) transactions represents the 
most fundamental case of regulatory relief sought by an originating bank. The originating bank is 
permitted to remove assets from the calculation of risk-based capital ratios only if a “clean break” (or 
“credit de-linkage”) o f transferred assets meets regulatory approval. According to the First Working 
Paper on the Treatment of Asset Securitisation, regulatory capital relief through true sale transactions 
applies only if the following operational criteria are satisfied: (i) in compliance with legal provisions 
governing asset sales, the transferred assets have been legally isolated from the transferor; that is, the 
assets are put beyond the reach o f the transferor and its creditors, even in bankruptcy or receivership;
6 Besides the critical issue of information disclosure requirements, the revised proposal also draws an important 
distinction between implicit/residual risks and explicit risks in securitisation. In this context implicit risk refers 
to residual risk that is thought of not being legally assumed by an originating or sponsoring bank; however, due 
to an obligatory commitment to safeguard investors’ interests it might still be tacitly recognised to that extent 
that actions in defiance of an understanding might prejudicially affect the reputation of the originating or 
sponsoring bank participating in a securitisation transaction.
7 See Basle Committee (2001), 87ff.
(ii) the transferee is a qualifying special-purpose vehicle (SPV) and the holders o f the beneficial 
interests in that entity have the right to pledge or exchange those interests, and (iii) the transferor 
does not maintain effective or indirect control over the transferred assets.8 Unless these conditions 
hold, the Basle Committee proposes to retain the respective assets on the books o f the originating 
bank for regulatory accounting purposes (RAP), even if the assets have been removed from the 
books under GAAP standards. These operational criteria were refined later on in the Second 
Working Paper on the Treatment of Asset Securitisation and the new Securitisation Framework of 
the agreement on International Convergence of Capital Measurement and Capital Standards by the Basle 
Committee (see section 3.4).
3.2.2 Regulatory capital requirements of originating and investing banks
The regulatory provisions in the Second Consultative Paper and the First Working Paper on the Treatment of 
Asset Securitisation also specify minimum capital requirements o f securitised exposures held by 
investing banks (and originating banks, if they retain a fraction o f the original transaction volume or a 
standing commitment/residual claim). For loss o f detailed information about the underlying 
exposures o f securitised reference portfolios, investing banks are required to hold regulatory capital 
for positions of securitisation transactions. In a nod to previous regulatory advances the Second 
Consultative Paper proffers the adoption o f ratings-based risk weightings (“ratings-based approach” 
(RBA)) for rated tranches (see Tab. 1 below) as a regulatory default risk equivalent to their external 
rating grade.
Rating range Risk weighting
AAA AA- 20%
A+ A- 50%
BBB+ BBB- 100%
BB+ BB- 150%
B+ D capital deduction*
unrated capital deduction*
* regarded as credit enhancem ent
Tab. 1. Risk-weights according to the revised “Consultative Package” (2001).
In the case of low-risk, unrated tranches (e.g. in private placements) or guarantees, the Basle 
Committee introduced the so-called look-through approach for the calculation o f the capital charge.
8 These conditions are essentially the same as in IAS 39/FASB 140/FASB 125, and therefore, there is no new
Subject to supervisory review this approach requires that the unrated, most senior position of a 
transaction will receive the average risk-weight that would otherwise be assigned to all securitised 
credit exposures in underlying portfolio on aggregate, whilst all subsequent, less senior tranches 
(mez2anine classes but also second loss facilities and other similar structural enhancements) will be 
accorded a 100% risk-weighting. An originating bank (but also a sponsoring or even an investing 
bank) might provide a first or second loss position as credit support (credit enhancement).9’10 For 
instance, the originating bank commonly retains the most junior, unrated tranche as a first loss piece. 
Any first loss position would be fully deducted from capital, whilst a second loss facility is considered 
to be a credit substitute with a 100% risk-weighting after it has been valued at an arm’s length basis in 
line with normal credit approval and review processes. The restrictive use of the look-through approach 
for the most senior positions implies that investing banks (which hold the more senior “investor” 
positions) are effectively exposed to the aggregate default risk arising from securitised exposures. 
According paragraph 527 o f the First Consultative Paper the following conditions would need to be 
satisfied for the look through approach to be applicable:
(i) rights on the underlying assets are held either direcdy by investors, by an independent 
trustee11 on their behalf, or by a mandated representative;
(ii) in the case of a direct claim, the holder of the securities has an undivided pro rata 
ownership interest in the underlying assets, i.e. the underlying assets are subject to 
proportional rights o f investors, whilst the SPV must not have any liabilities unrelated to 
the transaction;
restriction or qualifying condition being put up by the regulators.
9 Under the First Working Paper on the Treatment of Asset Securitisation the originating bank would need to deduct 
the notional amount of the first loss position directly from its capital stock. Thus, if a sponsoring bank, for 
instance, accepts a credit enhancement for first losses in the amount of €5m out for a €100m transaction, a full 
capital deduction (which implies a risk-weighting of 1250%) reflects the capital loss in case of default. 
However, any additional loss protection is viewed as a direct credit substitute with a 100% risk weighting, provided 
that a sufficient and significant level of first loss protection is being provided. Hence, a second loss provision 
of €10m on top of a first loss protection of €5m would incur a further capital charge of €0.8m.
10 The Basle Committee (2002b) defines credit enhancement as a contractual arrangement [,] in which the bank 
retains or assumes a securitisation exposure and, in substance, provides some degree of added protection to 
other parties to the transaction. [...].” According the current regulatory framework, the optimal structure of 
securitisation transactions would avoid a first loss piece altogether, so there would be no specific credit 
enhancement for the most junior tranche. Consequently, the degree of the credit enhancement needed also 
proxies for the discrepancy of standardised minimum capital requirements and the issuer’s own assessment of 
adequate risk provision for a certain quality of the reference portfolio to be securitised. However, if the 
provision of a so-called “first loss piece” cannot be avoided, the issuers follow the objective of setting credit 
enhancement levels as bw as possible. Although credit enhancement is commonly derived from internal sources, 
i.e. they may be generated from the assets themselves, it can take a wide range of external forms, which includes 
third-party guarantees, letters of credit from highly-rated banks, reserve funds, first and second loss provisions 
and cash collateral accounts, which have overtaken letters of credit as the method of choice for major public 
transactions.
11 e.g. by having priority perfected security interest in the underlying assets.
(iii) in the case of an indirect claim,
a. all liabilities o f the trust or special purpose vehicle (or conduit) that issues the 
securities are related to the issued securities;
b. the underlying assets must be fully performing when securities are issued;
c. the securities are structured such that the cash flow from the underlying assets fully 
meets the cash flow requirements of the securities without undue reliance on any 
reinvestment income, i.e. the securitisation transaction perfecdy matches the cash 
flow stream generated from the underlying portfolio; and
d. funds earmarked as pay-out to investors but not yet disbursed do not carry a 
material reinvestment risk.
Furthermore, the look-through approach requires a risk-weighting o f unrated tranches equal to the 
highest hsk-weight assigned to an asset o f the reference portfolio. When the First Consultative Paper 
was published, however, the method proposed by the Basle Committee still lacked sufficient
clarification o f how the capital charge would be determined in this case. At the time, two basic
approaches would have lent themselves as suitable means of resolution either: (i) some inferred 
external rating o f an unrated securitisation tranches or (ii) the quantification o f both the residual risk 
held by the originating bank following the securitisation of assets and the amount of credit risk that 
was actually transferred in the stratified positions of securitised exposures. Soon it became clear that 
the incentive o f originating banks to engage in regulatory arbitrage by shifting high quality assets 
from their balance sheet would require regulatory action to prevent banks from assuming a higher 
risk profile at the same regulatory charge. Hence, the Basle Committee gave more credence to a 
model-based method o f deriving risk-weights for unrated tranches.
3.2.3 Regulatory distinction between credit support and liquidity support in securitisation programmes and asset- 
backed commercialpaper (ABCP) conduits
The notion o f sponsoring or managing banks includes the administration of securitisation 
programmes or asset-backed commercial paper (ABCP) conduits, where credit exposures from different 
banks and/or small business creditors are pooled in a securitised reference portfolio. These conduits 
typically feature an integrated liquidity support mechanism by sponsoring banks (either programme- 
wide or pool-specific). Such a contractually fixed commitment to lend on the part of the sponsoring 
or managing bank attracts risk-weightings depending on its maturity. While a short-term agreement 
to lend is converted with a 0% risk-weighting, any long-term agreement is treated as a direct credit 
substitute, and, thus, attracts a 100% risk-weighting. Moreover, as one of several special provisions 
concerning such off-balance sheet exposures, the First Working Paper on the Treatment of Asset
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Securitisation addresses mounting concern over the regulatory treatment o f liquidity facilities to ABCP 
as credit enhancement without any clear-cut practical distinction o f credit support and liquidity 
support being put in place. Consequently, the Basle Committee has established a set o f essential 
criteria to conceptually distinguish liquidity support from credit support:
(i) a facility, fixed in time and duration, must provided to the SPV, not to investors, which is 
subject to usual banking procedures,
(ii) the SPV must have the option at its disposal to seek credit support from elsewhere,
(iii) the terms o f the facility must be established on grounds o f a clear identification in what 
circumstances it might be drawn, ruling out the utilisation of the facility either as a provider 
o f credit support, source o f permanent revolving funding or as cover for sustained asset 
losses,
(iv) the facility should include a contractual provision (on the basis o f a reasonable asset quality 
test) either to prevent a drawing from being used to cover deteriorated or defaulted assets or 
reduce or terminate the facility for a specified decline in asset quality, and
(v) the payment of the fee for the facility should not be further subordinated or subject to a 
waiver or deferral, while the drawings under the facility should not be subordinated to the 
interests o f the note holders.
If  the above-mentioned criteria hold, liquidity support as a contingent commitment for future 
lending draws a 20% conversion factor. Otherwise, the liquidity facility will qualify as a credit 
enhancement, which would be treated no different than an investment in a securitisation transaction 
with a risk-weighting based on either internal or external ratings. So a back-of-the-envelope 
calculation o f a liquidity facility for a partly-supported ABCP conduit o f €100m (of which €50m have 
already been drawn) would require a capital charge of €50m+(€100m-€50m)*20%=€60m.
Moreover, the First Working Paper on the Treatment of Asset Securitisation considers the reimbursement of 
cash advances by the servicing bank in the context of liquidity or credit support granted to an SPV. 
Nonetheless, it recognises contractual provision for temporary advances to ensure uninterrupted 
payments to investors only as long as “the payment to any investors from the cash flows stemming 
from the underlying asset pool and the credit enhancement [are] subordinated to the reimbursement 
o f the cash advance.” This qualification ensures seniority of cash advances and requires the servicer 
o f the transaction to withhold a commensurate fraction o f the subsequent cash collections to recoup 
previous cash advances.
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3.2.4 Revolving asset securitisation
In most revolving asset securitisation transactions, the SPV advances funds to the originating bank in 
the form of revolving credit in return for the receipt o f periodic repayments from a pool of 
outstanding loans that this refinancing arrangement allows the originator continue to generate.12 At 
the same time, the SPV refinances itself by issuing commoditised structured claims as debt securities 
to capital market investors. These revolving securitisation structures are frequendy supplemented by 
early amortisation triggers, which force an early wind-down of repayment o f principal and interest to 
investors in the event of a significant deterioration of securitised portfolio value due to higher than 
expected levels o f debtor delinquency and/or loan termination. However, in the case o f a sudden 
drop in the cash flow position o f the underlying reference portfolio, the originator could be denied a 
timely withdrawal o f revolving credit from the SPV. Early amortisation compels the SPV to use cash 
flows from securitised loans to pay down investors instead o f revolving the amount back to the 
originator because the originator’s claim in appropriating collections in replenishing the collateral 
portfolio is subordinated to the payment claims o f investors.
Although early amortisation functions like credit support to the benefit o f investors, the Basle 
Committee considers such a mechanism potentially hazardous to proper cash flow allocation if early 
amortisation is triggered in the context of revolving asset securitisation transactions. Hence, if a 
transaction includes an “amortisation trigger”, the First Working Paper on the Treatment of .Asset 
Securitisation set forth that the notional amount of the securitised asset pool is to be regarded a credit 
equivalent and charged with a minimum 10% conversion factor for the off-balance sheet piece of the 
reference portfolio, which may be increased by national regulatory authorities depending on their 
assessment of various operational requirements.
3.3 The Second Working Paper on the Treatment o f  A sset Securitisation and the 
(Third) Consultative Paper (CP3)
The Second Working Paper on the Treatment of Asset Securitisation (Basle Committee, 2002a and 2002b) 
refines the preceding consultative process on the treatment o f synthetic transactions by providing a 
more detailed specification o f distinctive operational criteria applicable to different types of 
transaction structures, depending on their economic substance rather than their legal form. An 
originating bank is exempted from including securitised exposures in the calculation o f their 
minimum regulatory capital requirement for credit risk if the following conditions below hold:
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(i) traditional securitisation:
a. the credit risk o f associated exposures has been transferred to third parties;
b. no legal and/or economic recourse: the transferor has no direct or indirect control 
over the transferred assets, i.e. assets are legally isolated from the transferor and 
beyond the reach of the transferor and its creditors, even in the event o f insolvency 
or receivership (which must be supported by a legal opinion);13
c. the transferee is a qualifying special-purpose vehicle (SPV) and the holders o f the 
beneficial interests in that entity have the right to pledge or exchange those interests 
without restrictions;
d. investors purchasing debt securities issued by the SPV as a means of refinancing the 
purchasing price of the securitised assets have a claim on the underlying assets but 
not on the transferor;
e. clean-up calls are permissible if they are (i) not mandatory, (ii) exercised at the 
discretion o f the originating bank and (iii) not designed as credit support;14 and
f. transaction must not contain clauses that would require the originator to 
systematically alter (i) the asset quality o f the reference portfolio, (ii) the level of 
credit enhancement and (iii) the nominal investor return after inception o f the 
securitisation transaction.
(ii) synthetic securitisation:
a. originating banks must have sought appropriate legal opinion, which verifies that 
the contractual obligations arising from the documented credit risk transfer are 
legally enforceable and binding to all parties involved;
b. significant transfer of credit risk of securitised exposures to third party and 
protection provider as eligible guarantor;
c. the credit quality of the [credit default swap] counterparty (i.e. the protection 
provider) and the value o f the securitised reference portfolio must not have a 
material positive correlation;
d. clearly defined redemption criteria: procedures for timely liquidation o f collateral in 
a credit event/default o f the counterparty;
12 See also Grill and Perczynski (1993) for a more detailed description.
13 Direct control is defined as any provision that gives rise to economic recourse, such as the possibility to 
repurchase transferred exposures or the obligation to retain some residual risk in the performance of 
transferred assets.
14 The exercise of a clean-up call should be limited to cases when the notional value of assets <10% and the 
cost of servicing outweighs the benefits from continued repayment.
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e. the types of collateral that qualify for synthetic transactions are: cash, certificates of 
deposit, gold, rated debt securities, certain unrated debt securities, equities15 and 
funds; and
f. transaction must not contain clauses that would (i) limit credit protection, (ii) alter 
the nature of the credit risk transfer or (iii) alter the securitised exposures in a way 
that would deteriorate the quality of the reference portfolio.
Once a traditional (true sale) or synthetic securitisation meets these requirements, the securitised 
exposures are subject to a regulatory treatment pursuant to the securitisation framework.16 Under the 
securitisation framework, both originating and investing banks are required to provide a regulatory 
capital charge for the risk-weighted assets o f securitised exposures held.17
Moreover, in combination with the (Third) Consultative Taper to the New Basle Accord (Basle Committee, 
2003) the Second Working Taper on the Treatment of Asset Securitisation represents the first attempt to 
expand the Securitisation Framework (see Fig. 1) in a revised definition o f risk-weightings (RWs) of 
securitised assets. In particular, the proposition aims to discriminate between rated and unrated 
securitisation exposures held by originating and investing banks. The regulatory policy put forward 
by the (Third) Consultative Taper to the New Basle Accord distinguishes between two methodologies for 
the treatment o f securitisation transactions in keeping with the general regulatory treatment of credit 
risk: the standardised approach and the internal ratings-based approach (IRB), where the latter approach 
breaks down into the supervisoiy formula approach (SFA) and the ratings-based approach (RBA) in an 
advanced treatment o f positions in securitisation transactions.
3.3.1 Standardised approach for securitisation exposures
§526 (Third) Consultative Taper to the New Basle Accord (Basle Committee, 2003) explicidy mentions that 
issuing banks have to choose the same method for the regulatory treatment of securitisation 
transactions as the one used to determine the capital requirements for the type o f underlying credit
15 Only equities listed in main indices are eligible for the simple approach of operational criteria that qualify for 
eligible collateral in synthetic securitisation. The comprehensive approach allows for all equities to be 
considered.
16 Note that the securitisation framework does not cover implicit support mechanisms, such as moral recourse.
17 Generally, in §§521-524 the (Third) Consultative Paper to the New Basle Accord stipulates that banks are required 
to hold regulatory capital against all of their securitisation exposures arising from (i) the provision of credit risk 
mitigants to securitisation transactions, such as investments in asset-backed securities, (ii) the retention of 
subordinated tranches, and (iii) the extension of liquidity facilities or credit enhancements. In case of capital 
deduction for securitisation exposures, banks are required to provide appropriate regulatory capital by taking
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exposures. Hence, for loss o f insufficient information about the designated reference portfolio 
and/or inadequate in-house credit risk management capabilities (in order to calculate the IRB risk- 
weightings and the regulatory capital requirement K /rb ),18 the use o f the standardised approach for the 
credit risk o f the underlying exposures of securitised exposures automatically entails the use the 
standardised approach within the securitisation framework.
Rating Grades
AAA to 
AA-
A+ to 
A-
BBB+ to 
BBB-
BB+ to 
BB- B+ to B- below B- Unrated
Claims on 
Sovereigns 0% 20% 50% 100% 100% 150% 100%
Banks Option 1 20% 50% 100% 100% 100% 150% 100%
Option 2 20% 50% 50% 100% 100% 150% 50%
Corporates 20% 50% 100% 100% 150% 150% 100%
Securitisation products 
(long-term rating) 20% 50% 100% 350%
Capital
deduction
Capital
deduction
Capital
deduction
Tab. 2. Risk-weighting (standardised approach).
The standardised approach does not distinguish between originators and investors in securitisation, 
while third-party (non bank) investors are treated differently. Analogous to the standardised 
approach o f ordinary credit exposures, the basic procedure for the risk-weighting of individual claims 
(in the context o f securitisation, read securitised claims or tranches) is determined by the external rating 
(see Tab. 2). The risk-weights for securitised claims are based on the long-term rating of the securitisation 
products and decrease in a higher rating grade (similar to “regular” claims, categorised by the type of 
debtor, e.g. sovereigns, banks19 and corporates). These risk-weights are further distinguished by the 
type o f underlying exposure, i.e. retail portfolios (individual and SM E claims), residential property 
(residential mortgages) and commercial real estate (commercial mortgages). Whereas unrated securitisation 
exposures with an internal rating equivalent to a non-investment grade classification (i.e. below 
“BBB-“) are deducted from capital by issuers (§§529 and 530 (Third) Consultative Taper to the New Basle
50% from Tier 1 capital and 50% from Tier 2 capital — except for regulatory provisions of any expected future 
margin income, which would need to be deducted from Tier 1 capital (Basle Committee, 2003).
18 -Kzrb is the ratio of (a) the IRB capital requirement for the underlying exposures in the securitised pool to (b) 
the notional or loan equivalent amount of exposures in the pool (e.g. the sum of drawn amounts plus undrawn 
commitments).
19 The risk-weights for banks break down into two options: (i) risk-weighting on the country the bank is 
incorporated (Option 1) or (ii) risk-weighting based on the assessment of the individual bank (Option 2). 
Moreover, claims on banks with an original maturity of three months or less would receive a risk-weighting that 
is one category more favourable.
Accord),20 the unrated most senior tranche of a securitisation transaction would be subject to a so- 
called look-through treatment, i.e. the risk-weight is determined by the average risk-weighting of the 
underlying credits. However, as illustrated in Tab. 2, the capital charges o f securitised claims (esp. for 
non-investment grade tranches) are substantially higher than the charges imposed on corporate and 
bank credits with the same rating.21
3.3.2 Internal ratings-based approach (IRB) for securitisation exposures
The IRB approach extends the standardised approach along two dimensions. First, it (i) modifies the 
external ratings-based assignment of risk-weightings (RWs) o f the standardised approach by controlling for 
tranche si2e, maturity and granularity o f securitisation tranches {ratings-based approach (RBA); see Tab. 
2)22 and (ii) introduces the supervisory formula approach (SFA) as an intemal-ratings based (IRB) measure to 
allow for more regulatory flexibility o f issuers (and investors) with sophisticated credit risk 
management capabilities, which would otherwise not be accounted for in the standardised approach.
Second, according to §567 (Third) Consultative Paper to the New Basle Accord (Basle Committee, 2003) 
the IRB approach departs from an undifferentiated treatment of originators and investors in 
securitisation markets under the standardised approach. A distinction of originating and investing banks 
requires that (i) investors generally use the ratings-based approach (RBA) (except for those approved by 
national supervisors to use supervisory formula approach (SFA) for certain exposures), and (ii) originators 
use either the supervisory formula approach (SFA) or the ratings-based approach (RBA), depending on the 
availability o f an external or inferred rating and sufficient information about the securitised exposures 
(see Tab. 4).
20 Similarly, securitisation exposures in second loss positions do not have to be deducted if the first loss position 
(most junior tranche) provides enough protection (§§529 and 532 (Third) Consultative Paper to the New Basle 
Accord). Third-party (non-bank) investors may recognise external ratings up to “BB+” to “BB-” for risk- 
weighting purposes of securitisation exposures, i.e. capital deduction for securitised claims applies only for 
rating grades of “B+” and lower.
21 The (Third) Consultative Paper to the New Basle Accord also proposes specific risk-weightings according to the 
type of underlying exposure: (i) claims included in regulatory retailportfolios (75% risk-weighting), i.e. exposures to 
individuals (e.g. credit card debt, auto loans, personal finance) or SMEs with low granularity (e.g. single obligor 
concentration must not be higher than 0.2% of overall regulatory retail portfolio) and low individual exposure (i.e. 
maximum counterparty exposure not higher than €1 million); (ii) claims secured by residential property (35% risk- 
weighting); and (iii) claims secured by commercial real estate (100% risk-weighting).
22 Hence, both the standardised approach and the internal ratings-based approach (IRB) allow for qualifying external 
ratings and various operational criteria (see §525 (Third) Consultative Paper to the New Bask Accord (2003)) to be 
used in the ratings-based approach (RBA).
74
Originating banks are required to calculate K irb in all cases and hold capital against held positions (i.e. 
securitisation claims/tranches) as follows:
(i) unrated tranches:
a. insufficient information to calculate the IRB capital charge from K ir b - full capital 
deduction;
b. sufficient information to calculate the IRB capital charge from K ir b- capital deduction of 
tranche sizes (“thickness levels”) up to K irb , then application o f the supervisory formula 
approach (SFA).
c. The maximum capital requirement is capped at K irb  regardless o f the notional amount of 
unrated tranches.
(ii) rated  tranches:
a. inferred rating: risk-weighting according to the ratings-based approach (RBA) based on the 
rating of the externally rated subordinate tranche, provided that it is longer in maturity;
b. external rating23: capital deduction of tranche sizes (“thickness levels”) up to K irb, then 
risk-weigh ting according to the ratings-based approach (RBA).24
c. The maximum capital requirement is capped at K irb  regardless o f the notional amount of 
unrated tranches.
Investing banks would need to use the ratings-based approach (RBA) if an external rating were available 
or could be inferred, irrespective of whether a position held falls below or above the K irb  boundary. 
Unrated positions must be deducted unless the investing bank receives supervisory approval to 
calculate the K irb  through SFA like originating banks if the position in question is above the Kirb 
threshold.
The supervisory formula approach (SFA) determines the regulatory requirement for each issued tranche 
k& m  as “risk-weighted asset”, where the (regulatory) IRB capital charge for a certain tranche amount 
(i.e. its exposure at inception) is multiplied by factor 12.5 (which would imply a full capital deduction 
o f the tranche size if the IRB capital charge amounts to a 100% risk-weighting at an 8% capital 
ratio). The SFA-based regulatory capital requirement is computed on the basis o f five essential bank- 
supplied input variables, reflecting the structured risk of the transaction set forth in Section III Credit 
Risk — the Internal Ratings-based Approach (Basle Committee, 2002a): Km , the internal ratings-based
23 i.e. public ratings only.
24 see §§575-577 (Third) Consultative Taper to the New Basle Accord.
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(IRB) capital charge that would be applied had the underlying exposures not been securitised (but 
held direcdy on the sponsor’s balance sheet);25 the “credit enhancement level” of each tranche 
(position) L k ; the “thickness” o f each tranche Tk ; the effective total number N  of loans in the 
securitised loan pool; and the exposure-weighted average loss-given-default (LGD) o f the given 
reference portfolio26 The IRB capital charge for each tranche k27 is defined as the amount o f
securitised exposures Ck multiplied by max ^ 0.0056 x Tk, S  (L a + Ta) -  T (L a)J , where the supervisory
formula (SF) is defined by the function T(.), and the credit enhancement level L k gives rise to an 
intensity-based approximation of the tranche-specific capital charge.28 This securitisation framework 
of the Second Working Paper on the Treatment of Asset Securitisation was subsequently followed by a period 
of intense negotiations between national regulatory authorities and banks about the risk sensitivity of 
proposed measures during the so-called third consultative phase, which resulted in the (Third) 
Consultative Paper in April 2003. For further amendments in response to continued concern by the 
banking industry eventually established a new securitisation framework within the revised Basle 
Accord on International Convergence of Capital Measurement and Capital Standards in 2004.
3.4 Amendments to the Third Consultative Paper: Changes to the Securitisation 
Framework and International Convergence o f Capital M easurement and 
Capital Standards: Credit R isk — Securitisation Framework
In October 2003 the Basle Committee announced plans to revise the internal ratings-based (IRB) 
approach within the securitisation framework in response to criticism received by the banking 
industry, which mainly concentrated on what was considered an unbalanced treatment of senior 
securitised asset exposures and conventional credit risk o f the same rating grade. After the Basle 
Committee issued a working paper on proposed Changes to the Securitisation Framework (Basle 
Committee, 2004) in the bid to reduce the complexity and the burden o f implementing the 
provisions o f the Second Working Paper on Asset Securitisation and the (Third) Consultative Paper (CP3) on
25 The Basle Committee defines as the ratio of (i) the IRB-based capital requirements including the EL
portion for the underlying reference portfolio of securitised assets to (ii) the exposure amount of the “exposure 
amount of the pool (e.g. the sum of drawn amounts related to securitised exposures plus the EAD [exposure- 
at-default] associated with undrawn commitments related to securitised exposures (Basle Committee, 2002a).” 
The IRB-based capital requirements have to be calculated in accordance with the IRB approach for credit risk 
as if the securitised exposures were continued to be held by the originating bank, mainly because it reflects the 
beneficial effect of any credit risk mitigant applied to the underlying reference portfolio on all of the securitised 
exposures.
26 See Appendix 1, section 7.1 for the definition of the effective total number of exposures N and the average 
loss-given-default (LGD).
27 Note that whenever a bank holds proportional interest in a tranche, the capital charge for this position equals 
a commensurate proportion of the capital charge of the entire tranche.
28 See Appendix 2, section 7.2 for the specification of the supervisory formula (SF) and the credit enhancement level L.
30 January 2004, it finally published new guidelines on the treatment o f asset securitisation as part of 
the International Convergence of Capital Measurement and Capital Standards: Credit Risk — Securitisation 
Framework in June 2004. Based on the Changes to the Securitisation Framework the Committee affirms 
efforts to (i) install greater internal consistency o f risk-weightings applied to similar securitisation 
exposures, irrespective of the approach used (SFA vs. RBA) and (ii) eliminate differences in the 
treatment of securitisation exposures held by originators and investors (see Tab. 3).
Securitisation Standard Approach IRB Approach
exposure Originating
Bank Investing Bank Originating Bank1 Investing Bank
Investment Grade 
Rating
Risk-weight (RW) of long-term ratings: 
AAA to AA- (20%), A+ to A- (50%), 
BBB+toBBB- (100%) 
Risk-weight (RW) of short-term ratings: 
A1/P1 (20%), A2/P2 (50%), A3/P3 
(100%)
RBA
Rated3
Max. capital 
requirement: KIRB
Max. capital 
requirement: None
Non-Investment 
Grade Rating
All positions: 
Deduction
Risk-weight (RW) of 
long-term ratings: BB+
RBA
to BB- (350%); all 
positions rated B+ and 
lower: Deduction
Max. capital 
requirement: K,RB
Max. capital 
requirement: None
Unrated4 All positions: Deduction
SFA1 
Simplified SFA2
All positions: 
Deduction
Max. capital 
requirement: KIRB
Max. capital 
requirement: None
1: Investing banks need to seek supervisory approval for inclusion in this category of regulatory capital treatment, whereas 
originating banks automatically fall into this category. 2: The application of the Simplified SFA in lieu of the SFA is also subject 
to supervisory approval. 3: Under the IRB approach the term “rated* refers to positions with an external rating or an inferred 
rating. 4: The IAA permits originating banks to used RBA for exposures to ABCP conduits, where the internal rating 
equivalent represents an investment grade/rating.
Tab. 3. The new securitisation framework (Basle Committee, 2004a and 2004b).
The major structural change proposed in the revision of the (Third) Consultative Paper concerns a 
refined methodological treatment of unrated and rated positions o f investing and originating banks in 
securitisation transactions for regulatory purposes. For one, the new securitisation framework adopts 
the proposed Changes to the Securitisation Framework (January 2004) concerning the IRB approach by 
extending the Ratings-Based Approach (RBA) to include all rated positions (either rated explicidy or 
with an inferred rating), regardless of whether the bank is an originator or an investor. This provision 
also renders irrelevant both the availability o f sufficient information for the computation of K ^ 29
29 i.e. the capital charge that would have been applied to the underlying exposures had they not been 
securitised.
and the question of whether positions fall above or below the threshold as put forth by the 
(Third) Consultative Paper for the application of RBA to rated positions held by originating banks. 
Moreover, the RBA would also be used in the Internal Assessment Approach (IAA) for unrated low-risk 
positions,30 e.g. liquidity facilities and credit enhancements banks extend to ABCP conduits. The IAA 
maps internal risk assessments of such exposures to rating agency criteria for the asset type 
purchased by the conduit so as to more closely reflect leading banks’ current risk management 
practices.
New RBA Risk Weights (CP3 RBA Risk Weights)
Long-term Rating Grade 
[Short-term Rating Grade] 
(illustrative)
Senior tranches1
(fomerly: thick 
tranches, backed 
by highly granular 
pools (N>99))
Base Case
Tranches backed 
by non-granular 
pools (N<6)
Aaa/AAA [A-1/P-1] 7 12 20
Aa/AA 8 15 25
A1/A+ 10(20) 18(20)
A2/A [A-2/P-2] 12 (20) 20 (20) 35
A3/A- 20 (20) 35 (20)
Baa1/BBB+ 35 (50) 50
Baa2/BBB [A-3/P-3] 60 (75) 75
Baa3/BBB- 100
Ba1/BB+ 250
Ba2/BB 425
Ba3/BB- 650
Below Ba3/BB-
[all other ratings/unrated]
Deduction
T he ‘old’ RBA risk w eights according to  the  S econd  Working P aper on the Treatm ent o f A ss e t  
Securitsation  (2002) have  been  add ed  in paren thesis. Note the  ch an g e  of the  qualification criteria for 
th e  m ost preferential risk w eights from “highly g ranular tranches* to ‘senior tra n ch es '. 1: T he m ost 
preferential risk w eights a re  a lso  ass igned  to  unrated low-risk positions subject to IAA u n less  a  
liquidity facility o r credit e nhancem en t constituted a  m ezzanine position in econom ic su b stan ce , which 
would ren d er applicable the “b a se  c a s e ’ applicable in this situation.
T ab. 4. The new long-term and short-term RBA risk-weights (Basle Committee, 2004a and 2004b)A
Changes during the third consultative phase towards a revised securitisation framework also include a 
closer alignment o f the RBA-based risk-weights to the actual riskiness o f securitised positions with a 
high external or inferred rating (as well as low-risk exposures to ABCP, where the IAA applies). The
30 The IAA only applies to exposures with an internal rating equivalent of investment-grade at inception.
31 The “mark-up” of risk-weights on securitisation tranches can be illustrated by comparing the IRB risk- 
weights perse for an underlying asset class, e.g. residential mortgages and corporate loans, with the risk-weights 
imposed on securitisation claims. The difference is the greatest especially for low investment grade ratings (e.g. 
“A”, “Baal” and “Baa2”).
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proposed measure moves the focus of assigning the lowest set of risk-weights for investment grade 
ratings away from the “thickness” (as in the (Third) Consultative Paper) to the level o f seniority of 
exposures with little or no loss o f risk sensitivity, at the cost o f disqualifying some granular tranches 
from the use of the most preferential risk-weights (see Tab. 4).32 Separate risk-weights are assigned to 
(i) senior, granular tranches, (ii) non-senior, granular tranches (“base case”) and (iii) tranches backed 
by non-granular pools. The change o f eligibility for the preferential risk-weights is also accompanied 
by a more fine-tuned differentiation o f risk-weights for different levels o f investment grade-rated 
positions, so as to simplify the RBA framework.
Generally, the regulatory risk-weightings for unrated positions (including liquidity facilities and credit 
enhancements extended to ABCP conduits, which are not captured by the IAA) in securitisation 
transactions continue to be based on a modified Supervisory Formula Approach (SFA), which, in its 
initial version, was considered unnecessarily complex (see Appendix 2, section 7.2). However, the 
new securitisation framework according to the International Convergence of Capital Measurement and 
Capital Standards partially redresses the complexity o f the original SFA formula.33 The Changes to the 
Securitisation Framework before the agreement on the definition o f SFA within the framework o f the 
International Convergence of Capital Measurement and Capital Standards also set forth the so-called Simplified 
Supervisory Formula (“Simplified SF”) as an alternative calculation to the existing Supervisory Formula 
(SF) o f the (Third) Consultative Paper, easing some the computational burden involved in the old SF.34 
However, the Simplified SF  did not find entry in the final agreement on a new securitisation 
framework as subsection to the agreement on International Convergence of Capital Measurement and Capital 
Standards in June 2004.
Additionally, the Basle Committee decided to develop less restrictive operational criteria for the “top- 
down” IRB approach under the (Third) Consultative Paper to calculating , especially for purchased 
receivables as securitised exposures. This revision reflects the inability o f many banks during the 
consultative process to decompose expected loss estimates into reliable estimates o f default
32 Generally, the working paper on Changes to the Securitisation Framework defines the term “senior tranche” in 
context of RBA as a position that is “effectively backed or secured by a first claim on the entire amount of the 
assets in the underlying securitised pool.” Although this definition may only apply to the most senior position 
within a securitisation transaction, “in some instances there may be some other claim that, in a technical sense, 
may be more senior in the waterfall (e.g. a swap claim) but will be disregarded for the purpose of determining 
which positions are subject to the ‘senior tranches’ column (Basle Committee, 2004a).”
33 Note that the final Basle agreement on the International Convergence of Capital Measurement and Capital Standards 
(2004) suggests the elimination of the non-linear solution to the computation of a minimum risk weighting (i.e 
the “Floor”) for a given tranche thickness (see Appendix 3, section 7.3).
34 See Appendix 4, section 7.4 for the definition of the Simplified SF.
probabilities (PD) and loss-given default (LGD). A flexible regime of deriving the capital charge for 
these assets (consistent with the IAA) would allow banks to rely on their own LGD estimates.
Overall, the revision of the securitisation framework enhances internal consistency across the 
standardised and IRB approaches as regards the treatment o f both unrated and rated positions. This 
effort addresses concerns by the banking industry about the need for greater consistency within the 
securitisation framework in the way capital charges are computed on similar securitisation exposures 
irrespective o f the approach (SFA or RBA) being used. The Simplified SF  and the IAA represent 
viable alternatives to the modification o f the original SF of the (Third) Consultative Taper in order to (i) 
simplify the complex IRB approach for unrated positions and (ii) reconcile the difference between 
the two-factor model used to verify the RBA risk-weights and the single risk factor model applied in 
the context of SFA. Moreover, the implementation of the so-called “external rating override” grants 
originating banks (like investing banks) the privilege to calculate RBA-based risk-weights even if a 
rated position falls below the KIRB boundary. This expanded use o f RBA, irrespective o f whether the 
tranche size meets the threshold, rewards the use o f the IRB approach of securitisation
especially for non-investment grade rated tranches, whereas the more fine-tuned treatment of senior 
tranches (and the associated benefit of preferential risk-weights) helps align capital requirements 
closer to the actual risk included in low-risk investment grade tranches. This measure attests to the 
growing importance o f external ratings as market signals o f the inherent risk of securitisation 
exposures, which should carry the same regulatory capital charges irrespective o f the holders o f such 
positions.35 Finally, the Basle Committee upholds the original prerequisite o f significant credit risk 
transfer in a securitisation transaction to ensure integrity o f the securitisation framework between 
securitised and non-securitised exposures within the overall revision o f the capital requirements of 
the new Basle Accord.
35 At the same time, the Basle Committee rejects further decomposition of risk-weights into portions of 
unexpected loss (UL) and expected loss (EL) in the bid to increase risk sensitivity of the securitisation 
framework due to the current definition of K as the sum of UL and EL portions of on-balance sheet credit 
risk exposures. Since the EL tends to be relatively small compared to UL for senior securitisation positions the 
existing capital requirements are treated as fully representing capital against UL for investment grade-rated 
positions and unrated positions above K j . Conversely, in the case of unrated positions that fall below 
or are rated non-investment grade, full deduction of the notional tranche amount appears sufficiently adequate 
to account for the changing proportions of EL and UL in declining seniority of securitised exposures.
4 CASE STUDY: THE OPTIMISATION OF REGULATORY 
CAPITAL
The new Basle Accord on the International Convergence of Capital Measurement and Capital Standards 
(“Basle 2”) presents a consistent securitisation framework, which all but eliminates possibilities of 
regulatory arbitrage through securitisation due to both (i) a more risk-sensitive computation o f the 
capital charge for on-balance sheet credit exposures and (ii) a close alignment of capital requirements 
o f securitised exposures and non-securitised credit exposures. While the mitigation o f regulatory 
capital requirements cannot be deemed the single most important motivation for securitisation, 
regulatory optimisation has influenced and continues to influence the way issuers devise and advance 
securitisation techniques to transfer asset exposures to capital markets until the new Basle Accord 
comes into effect in 2006. If  we were to limit our analysis to the regulatory capital charge o f originating 
banks only, benefits from securitisation still remain if the issuer incurs different capital charges for 
non-securitised and securitised exposures o f similar credit risk and both operational and processing 
costs remain low. Let us assume that under the existing Basle Accord a portfolio of on-balance sheet 
credit exposures would translate into 100% risk-weighted assets (RWA), which draw a standard 
capital charge o f 8% (“capital ratio”) on their notional amount. Hence, any arrangement that yields 
minimum capital requirement for securitised exposures of less than 8% under simplifying 
assumptions would attest to regulatory optimisation through asset securitisation.36 The different 
degrees o f reduced regulatory capital requirements o f securitised credit risk exposure can be best 
illustrated on the basis o f the disparate configurations o f transaction structures commonly used in 
loan securitisation. In Tab. 4 we traverse the spectrum of different structures o f securitisation 
transactions — from conventional (true sale) to synthetic securitisation — to show the capital requirements 
of an originating bank.
Under the most straightforward transaction type of conventional true sale securitisation, the asset 
originator completes an outright asset sale to an SPV, which issues senior and mezzanine debt 
securities (notes) to capital market investors, where the originator retains a first loss position (FLP) as 
commitment device to mitigate default risk. In the first transaction type (traditional/true sale 
structure), we assume investor notes to amount to 96% of the transaction volume (with 92% senior 
notes and 4% mezzanine notes) and an FLP of 4% relative notional value. After completion o f off-
36 This assumption implies that the revised framework for the risk-sensitive treatment of credit risk exposures 
under the new agreement of International Convergence of Capital Measurement and Capital Standards is ignored and any 
collateral eligible for a risk weight reduction as well as transaction costs of securitisation are disregarded for the 
purposes of this analysis.
balance sheet refinancing through a true sale securitisation, a bank originator would have cut its 
regulatory capital requirement by half, as it is now required to hold equity o f only 4% of the 
securitised reference portfolio (according to 100% risk weighting o f outstanding liabilities from the 
retention o f FLP).
Transaction type FLP Reg. capital calculation Regulatory capital Reg. capital with 
interest sub-part.
W ithout transaction -
100% risk weight,
8%  capital ratio, no collateral. 8% N/A
True sale transaction 
(92%  senior notes, 4%  
mezzanine notes, 4%  FLP)
4 %
FLP is fully deductible (100%), 
which equates to 1250% risk 
weight at 8%  capital ratio
4%
(0.04x12.543.08)
N/A
Fully funded indirect synthetic 
trans. with 9 8%  CDS with OECD 
bank (FLP 2% see text)
2%
FLP is fully deductible; OECD 
bank CDS draws 20% risk 
weighting
3.568%
(0.02 + 
0.98x0.2x0.08)
1.728%
(1x0.0016 + 
0.98X3.2 X3.08)
Same as before with SPV and 
0% risk-based capital collateral
2%
FLP is fully deductible; 
collateralised CDS draws 0% 
risk weighting
2%
(1x0.02 + 
0.98X3)0.08)
0.16%
(1x0 0016 + 
0.98X3x0.08)
Partially funded indirect sy rthetic 
trans. with 9 8%  CDSs with OECD 
bank (90% super senior swap, 
10% junior swap)
2% FLP is fully deductible; both 
CDSs with 20% risk weight
3.568%
(1x0.02 + 0.98x  
(0.9X3.2+0.1X).2)x0.08
1.570%
(1x00016 + 0.98x 
(0.9X3.2+0.1X3.2)x0.08
Same as before but 10% junior 
swap is collateralised by 0% risk- 
weighted assets.
2%
FLP is fully deductible; SSS with 
20% risk weight and JS with 0% 
risk weight
3.411%
(1x0.02+ 0.98x 
(0.9x0.2+0.1x0) >0.08
1.413%
(1X3 0016+ 0.98x 
(0.9x0.2+0.1X3) X3.08
Same as before but both swaps 
are collateralised by 0% risk- 
weighted assets.
2%
FLP is fully deductible both 
swaps with 0% risk weight
2%
(1x0.02 + 0.98x  
(09x0+0.1X3)43.08
0.16%
(1X3.00 16 + 0.98x 
(0.9X3+0.1X3)X3.08
Interest sub-participation of FLP replaces 100% capital deduction of F LP by 8% capital requirement at 100% risk weighting, if interest 
income is used to compensate FLP holder in theeventof default loss. In our example, 0.02x1)0.08=0.0016.
Tab. 4. Effects of transaction structure on the regulatory capital requirement of securitised credit risk.
The fully funded synthetic equivalent o f this form of asset risk transfer (with a SPV) may even further 
reduce minimum capital requirements. For the same portfolio quality, the associated loss seventy37 in 
synthetic structures is considered smaller than in true sale transactions due to a more clear definition 
o f default events. With a fully deductible FLP of only 2% and 98% credit risk protection provided 
by an OECD bank (via a credit default swap (CDS) with 20% risk weighting), the overall capital 
charge o f this fully funded synthetic (indirect)38 transaction would drop to 3.568%
37 i.e. the aggregate loss o f  securitised loans after the enforcement o f  collateral used to secure these loans.
38 Synthetic transactions come in various structures o f security design, which can be specified along three major 
dimensions: (i) level o f funding: unfunded, (fully) funded or partially funded, (ii) involvement o f  a SPV as 
issuing agent (indirect or direct securitisation), (iii) degree o f  collateralisation o f funded elements (with or 
without collateral, e.g. government bonds, guarantees, letter o f credit, certificate o f indebtedness, Pfandbriefe). 
The classification o f indirect securitisation refers to the involvement o f a SPV as issuing agent. The funding level 
indicates the degree to which the notional am ount o f issued debt securities matches up with the volume of the
82
(2% x 100% + 98% x 20% x 8%) o f the notional amount of the securitisation transaction. If the CDS
was to be secured (“collateralised”) with 0% risk-weighted assets (e.g. government debt securities), 
the issuer would need to provide regulatory capital in the amount of FLP at only 2%. The same 
capital charge applies to the alternative construct o f a partially funded synthetic transaction, where the 
credit risk protection is tailored to cover 98% of the notional value o f the underlying reference 
portfolio, with 2% equity retention by the originator. In this case, 90% o f the remaining 98% of the 
portfolio value is hedged with a super senior swap (SSS) and 10% are refinanced by debt securities on 
the back o f a junior swap (JS) agreement, which results in a risk-weighted capital charge of 
2% x 100% + 98% x (90% -I-10%) x 20% x 8% = 3.568%. If the junior CDS was collateralised by 0% 
risk-weighted assets or supported by a quasi-govemment agency,39 the minimum capital requirement 
would decline to 3.411% (2% xl00%  + 98% x(90% x20%  + 10% x0% )x8% ). If both CDSs were 
to be collateralised in a similar fashion the capital charge would be merely 2% 
(2% x 100% + 98% x (90% +10%) 0% x 8%) of the notional value. This straightforward illustration
of changes in the computation of regulatory requirements due to different transaction structures has 
motivated the appellation o f securitisation as a regulatory arbitrage tool, which enables issuers to 
significandy alleviate their regulatory capital burden by means of sophisticated credit risk transfer.
If  asset originators and/or issuers should also decide to offer the FLP to capital market investors in a 
bid to further reduce capital requirements, they would do so by underwriting a so-called interest sub­
participation agreement as credit enhancement of the FLP as the most junior tranche o f the transaction 
(Bohringer et al., 2001). The interest sub-participation replaces the full capital deduction o f FLP at a 
capital ratio o f 8% and 100% risk weighting. In the event o f default loss, interest sub-participation 
requires the issuer to compensate any losses absorbed by FLP investors from generated interest 
income of the reference portfolio after more senior claims to interest and principal have been 
satisfied. Although junior noteholders of FLP would loose interest payments on defaulted loans, sub- 
participation guarantees the repayment of principal. For instance, if a securitised reference portfolio 
was to be hit by a loss given default o f 5% and the annual excess interest income would amount to 
0.5% of the original portfolio balance on average, investors would be fully reimbursed after 10 years. 
The effect o f incorporating interest sub-participation in securitisation structures is illustrated in the 
right-most column of Tab. 4. Note that all calculations above merely offer an indication o f the 
regulatory trade-off in securitisation and how regulatory optimisation translates into a lower capital
underlying reference portfolio of asset exposures. The term “fully funded” refers to a complete refinancing of 
securitised exposures by issued debt securities.
39 e.g. the KfW banking group in Germany or one of the federal/state mortgage corporations in the U.S..
charge. We have ignored any transaction costs incurred in the administration and underwriting of 
securitisation transactions, be they explicit (e.g. legal costs, structuring costs, payments to rating 
agencies and intermediaries/ agents, management fees) or implicit (e.g. funding cost after 
securitisation, reputation effects). Moreover, we have considered the level of FLP to be equal to the 
minimum capital requirement o f securitised credit risk, so that issuers and/or originators would not 
need to hold capital against securitised debt securities whose level of credit enhancement is smaller 
than the minimum capital requirement o f securitised credit risk.
5 CONCLUSION: THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE CURRENT 
REGULATORY TREATMENT OF ASSET SECURITISATION
The pathological evolution o f the securitisation framework under the revised Basle Accord reflects 
the successive steps the Basle Committee has taken over time to eliminate arbitrage opportunities 
from loan securitisation under existing provisions for the regulatory treatment o f credit risk under 
the old 1988 Basle Accord and later amendments. Prior to the recent agreement on new capital 
standards for credit risk, securitisation techniques remedied the glaring incompatibility between the 
regulatory capital charge and the actual economic cost of credit risk across the spectrum of varying 
rating grades (i.e. regulatory “mispricing” o f credit risk). In absence o f risk-sensitive capital adequacy 
requirements for credit exposures and with little regulatory guidance as to how banks should 
compute their capital charge for securitised exposures, asset securitisation has been labelled a sensible 
market reaction to inefficient regulatory governance o f credit risk in the banking system. So from a 
regulatory perspective, securitisation is essentially a child o f its own making due to anomalies in the 
regulatory system giving rise to regulatory arbitrage. Needless to say, this use o f securitisation aroused 
concern among regulators about the troubling prospect o f (i) an insufficient provision of minimum 
capital requirements to absorb actual default loss and (ii) an inadequate treatment o f unexpected risk. 
As regards the latter aspect, regulators specifically worried about the absorption o f unexpected losses 
by more senior tranches held by capital market investors in the event o f financial shocks, while 
originators held merely some concentrated risk exposure o f expected losses in the form of a junior 
claim as first loss position.
The new Basle Accord on the International Convergence of Capital Measurement and Capital Standards 
(“Basle 2”) restrains regulatory arbitrage through securitisation along two dimensions. On one hand, 
the capital charge for on-balance sheet credit exposures has been made more risk-sensitive, and, on 
the other hand, the regulatory treatment of securitisation transactions has been closely aligned to
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match the capital requirements for non-securitised credit exposures.40 In anticipation o f imminent 
regulatory change,41 asset securitisation no longer appears to deserve the now-hackneyed moniker o f 
a pure (regulatory) arbitrage tool, flaunting the gap between internal default provisions for default 
loss and external risk assessment methods of risk-weighted assets by offering “regulatory 
overcharged asset holdings/exposures” to capital market investors.
Given the implementation o f discriminatory risk-weightings in the revised Basle Accord and a 
separate regulatory framework for the treatment of asset securitisation, the prospective change of the 
current regulatory regime censures institutional arbitrage on regulatory capital requirements, which 
has hitherto motivated the securitisation of investment-grade loans (see section 2.1). Since a higher 
capital charge levied on risky assets will also carry larger risk-based capital haircuts contingent on the 
characteristics of collateralisation, the incentive for the securitisation of non-investment grade loans rises. The 
relationship between the risk level of non-investment grade loans and the associated economic 
capital cost will determine the extent to which banks and other financial institutions are prepared to 
substitute high-risk assets (i.e. non-investment grade loans with presumably high capital haircuts) for 
investment grade-related credit exposures on their loan books — a reversal o f the present drainage of 
low-risk loans off the balance sheet. Hence, loan securitisation, originally devised as a remedy to 
inflexible regulatory capital charges, will be instrumental in the efficient management of economic capital for 
purposes of adequate asset allocation.
With the arbitrage paradigm o f securitisation giving way to an envisaged reconciliation of economic 
and regulatory incentives, the role of securitisation as an efficient mechanism to optimise overall 
regulatory capital charge looks distinctly uncertain. This development begs the question o f whether 
the fundamental economic rationale o f asset securitisation does exist and, if so, whether it remains 
viable. However, the new reality of a more responsive regulatory setting does not invalidate, but rather
40 Giddy (1997) proffers a new approach to the regulatory treatment of asset securitisation in his definition of 
“perimeters of bank regulation in securitisation”. According to his view, the goal ought to be that the substance 
and not the form of the asset transfer is what governs capital requirements. Giddy notes in this respect that 
regulatory authorities may access capital or reserve requirements as if the financing was a secured borrowing in 
cases when the transfer of assets/asset risk (i) leaves the issuer open to recourse deemed risky by the 
authorities, and/or (ii) entails the potential for moral hazard, whereby a bank shores up potential or actual 
losses arising from the securitised exposures in order to protect its name even when not legally required to do 
so.
41 The new proposals for the revision of the Basle Accord remedy this shortcoming through the 
implementation of discriminatory risk-weightings across rating categories. Under this so-called “ratings-based 
approach” (RBA) risk weights will be more closely aligned to loan grades in the loan book. If the broad- 
brushed regulatory treatment of loans disappears, banks will increasingly resort to non-investment loan assets 
to support their securitisation transaction, and by doing so, they will put a premium on the adequate allocation 
of first loss provision as credit enhancement. Consequendy, the incentive to securitise non-investment grade
strengthens, the argument for risk-adjusted efficient^gains (of economic capital) from loan securitisation. In 
spite o f regulatory changes underway, securitisation markets betray no visible signs of change. The 
unfettered popularity of asset securitisation implies that issuers appropriate economic benefits from 
converting illiquid assets into tradable debt securities in the effort to economise on a predefined level 
o f acceptable first loss exposure. Securitisation also maintains its economic edge, as it enables banks 
and non-bank financial institutions to reap rewards from advanced approaches in controlling credit 
risk and reduce inessential non-interest rate expenses.
Additionally, recent empirical evidence about financial innovation in transaction structures testifies to 
the pervasive adaptability and systemic flexibility of asset securitisation. Although it has become a 
routine procedure o f structured finance, and informed investors have grown familiar with its 
structural characteristics, loan securitisation has preserved sufficient flexibility to absorb regulatory 
change. Hence, loan securitisation in its current state is not a permanent account of efforts to achieve 
marketability o f credit exposures, but an example o f structured finance o f its age (when regulatory 
arbitrage was possible), with properties that originally fed on the absence o f a fair internal ratings- 
based determination of loan default risk. The current regulatory reform simply inaugurates another 
round o f innovation in security design o f loan securitisation. The advocacy of securitisation on the 
grounds o f economic benefits makes this argument even more compelling and imminent. However, 
as risk-sensitive bank capital charges eliminate the regulatory capital arbitrage paradigm of 
securitisation, the security design of asset-backed securities can only be sufficiently accommodating 
o f these regulatory changes if the arguments for risk management and efficient asset funding as 
fundamental economic reasons for securitisation hold.
In a nutshell, it is fair to say that the supervisory responsiveness o f the Basle Committee to the 
accretion of structured finance has led to a more risk sensitive securitisation framework of the 
agreement on International Convergence of Capital Measurement and Capital Standards, which has all but 
eliminated the optimisation o f regulatory capital as an incentive of credit risk transfer through 
securitisation. Nonetheless, with the problem of insensitive regulatory treatment o f credit risk 
exposures curtailed in the wake o f the securitisation framework, the regulatory treatment o f 
securitised exposures falls short of satisfying regimented coherence. The persistent discrepancy o f the 
regulatory capital o f similar exposures o f securitised debt under the standardised and IRB 
approaches, and the strategic imbalance implied in the discriminatory derivation minimum capital 
requirements for credit risk and securitised positions of similar risk, remain sources o f continued
loans adds topical significance to the issue of credit enhancement, as the differences between collateral 
(reference portfolio) quality and desired structured rating is expected to widen in the future.
contention and scrupulous analysis. Given the significant cost o f synthetic securitisation, the 
relationship between security design and the economic cost o f securitised exposures as well as 
derivative elements will become more prominent considerations in structured finance transactions 
and warrant further regulatory progression.
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7 APPENDIX
7.1 Appendix 1: Definition of the effective number of exposures and loss-given default
The effective number o f exposures (N) and the exposure-weighted average loss-given-default (LGD) 
are defined as42
t2
and
N = (l,-fi4D,)7l,.a4D,2 
LGD = (L  LGD,- x RAD, )/£ , EAD, .
E A D i denotes the exposure-at-default of all exposures to the Mi obligor in keeping with the general 
concept o f a concentration ratio, where the scale of the weighting factor grows at a geometric rate, 
and LGD, denotes the average loss-given-default of all exposures to the /th obligor 43 The thickness 
o f exposures (T) is defined as the ratio of (i) the nominal size Ck of tranche k  to (ii) the notional 
amount o f securitised exposures C  in the underlying reference portfolio
Tt = C jJ S U C ,. ■
7.2 Appendix 2: Definition of the original Supervisoiy Formula (SF) and the credit enhancement level according to
the Second Working Paper on the Treatment of Asset Securitisation and the (Third) Consultative Paper 
(CP3)
The original “supervisory formula” (SF) j( .)  is defined as
L k f  A t — KIRB
= + if  Km  < L t < L k
+ K ( L : )  -  K ^ )  + ( d x  Km la>)[\ -  )
V ’ i f U > U
+ ( L m Floor
42 The Basle Committee also proposed simplified methods for computing N and LGD.
43 The Second Working Paper on the Treatment of Asset-Backed Securitisation also provides a simplified method of 
computing the effective number of exposures and the exposure-weighted average loss-given-default (Basle 
Committee, 2002, 36).
where
V  = Kr
c = Km / ( \ - h )  
b = ( i - K ml/ L G D f  
(LGD - K irb) + 0.25(1 -  LGD)
N
f  =
( L G D - K m 2)
~  C
Q ^ I R B  ) B  v  
(1 - h ) z1 - h
d = \ - ( \ - h ) ( \ -  Beta ; a, £])
K  (L a ) = (l — h) ((l -  Beta [L k ; a, b]) x L ^ +  Beta [Lk; a +1,  b\ x
The credit enhancement level (L) is measured (in decimal form) as the ratio of (i) the amount o f all 
securitised positions subordinate to tranche k  to (ii) the notional amount o f all securitised exposures, 
which could also expressed as44
Lk=\1 k
lim L k —\ for Tk > 0
ZA-1*=iT*_>0°
lim L k =0 for Tk > 0.
Z
A-1 _
The supervisory-determined parameters are defined as Floor = 0.0056 (lowest capital charge under 
the ratings-based approach (RBA)), r —1,000 and ft? = 20, and L*k solves for the non-linear
equation45
44 According to the Basle Committee banks will be required to determine the level of credit enhancement prior 
to any consideration of effects of any tranche-specific credit enhancements, such as third-party guarantees, 
which might benefit a single tranche only. Further stipulations exclude any gains-on-sale from the computation 
of the level of credit enhancement, whereas interest rate and currency swaps more junior than tranche k  may be 
only be considered at their current value or be ignored otherwise.
45 The specification Beta[L;a,b] refers to a cumulative beta distribution function with parameters a and b 
evaluated at L
Floor = (l -
<»{Km-Lk)
bi ( l- BetajL*i,;a,£j)+ d x e Kas
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7.3 Appendix 3: Definition of the new Supervisory Formula (SF) in the Changes to the Securitisation Framework 
(2004)
After elimination o f the optimal solution L*k to the non-linear definition o f some required Floor, the 
new Supervisory Formula (SF) according to the International Convergence of Capital Measurement and Capital 
Standards would have been defined as:
S ( L   ^-  i -  K-irb
7.4 Appendix 4: Definition of the Simplified Supervisory Formula (Simplified SF) in the Changes to the 
Securitisation Framework (2004)
The Simplified Supervisory Formula (“Simplified SF”) fundamentally relies on slicing securitisation 
exposures into infinite simally thin tranches (“ITTs”) and combines the 
RiskFactor(Lk )=  ( l2 .5 x K IRB) / L k as risk-weight for each ITT given K LM and
Discount F a c t o r , iV) = [(l — )/(l — )]2^  } So that the risk-weight for a securitised position
(tranche) [Lk , L k + T k ] can be approximately derived by averaging the risk-weights from the 
product o f the Risk Factor and the Discount Factor at the boundaries. The Simplified SF
0.5
12.5 x K 1RB
L ,
I z h
V ^ ~  K[RB j
.2 VN
+ 0.5
2 Vn
v + T k j 1 - K ir b  y
could further be extended to an infinite i number of ITTs by conditioning thickness TK by factor 
i / 1 . Note that this approach eliminates exposure-weighted average LGDs from the computation of 
the capital charge o f unrated positions, so that two pools with the same KIRB cannot potentially yield 
different capital requirements. Hence, in Changes to the Securitisation Framework the Basle Committee 
proposes subjecting N  to a cap on its maximum value, mainly because a large effective number N  of 
securitised exposures might yield substantially lower capital charges than the modified SFA; yet, this 
issue remains to be verified as to its material effects on actual transactions.
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1 ABSTRACT
Due to both inconsistencies in the regulatory definition o f capital adequacy for credit risk and the 
quest for more efficient refinancing sources collateral loan obligations (CLOs) have become a 
prominent securitisation mechanism. This chapter presents a single-factor, loss-based asset pricing 
model for the valuation of constituent tranches within a CLO-style security design. The model 
specifically examines how tranche subordination translates securitised credit risk into investment risk 
o f issued tranches as beneficial interests on a designated loan pool typically underlying a CLO 
transaction. We obtain the tranche-specific term structure from the simulation o f an i.i.d. sequence of 
pairwise correlated defaults under both robust statistical analysis and extreme value theory (EVT). In 
this way, we decompose the securitised default generating asset value prices into a collection of state- 
contingent debt securities with divergent risk profiles and return expectations. Our estimation results 
suggest a dichotomous effect of loss cascading, with the default term structure of the most junior 
tranche of CLO transactions (“first loss position”) distinctly different than that of the remaining, 
more senior “investor tranches”. The first loss position carries large expected loss (with high investor 
return) and low leverage, whereas all other tranches mainly suffer from loss volatility (unexpected 
loss). These findings might explain why issuers retain the most junior tranche as credit enhancement 
to attenuate asymmetric information between issuers and investors. We also find that the issuer
discretion in the configuration of loss subordination within particular security design might give rise 
to implicit investment risk in senior tranches in the event of a systemic shock.
Keywords: securitisation, CLO, CDO, structuredfinance, default term structure 
J E L  Classification: C15, C22, D82, F34, G13, G18, G20
2 INTRODUCTION
2.1 The nature of loan securitisation
Asset securitisation — the substitution of market-based finance for credit finance — has recently 
developed into an efficient funding and capital management alternative for financial institutions and 
corporations. Conceptually, issuers of a typical asset-backed securitisation (ABS) structure achieve 
gains by converting regular and classifiable cash flows from a diversified portfolio of illiquid present 
or future receivables (liquidity transformation and asset diversification process) o f varying maturity and quality 
(integration and differentiation process) into negotiable capital market paper (“tranches”) with varying risk 
sensitivity and funding levels.1 The tranches are sold to capital market investors either by the 
originator o f the securitised as sets/receivables or a non-recourse, single-asset finance company 
(“special-purpose vehicle” (SPV))2 as subordinated beneficial interests on repayment proceeds from 
the designated portfolio. The method o f payment and loss allocation to these contingent claims is 
subject to contractual risk sharing between the issuer and investors.
Both the ambivalence in the regulatory definition o f capital adequacy for credit risk and the quest for 
more efficient risk-adjusted refinancing has urged banks to securitise large loan exposures by means 
of collateral loan obligations (CLOs), which represent an expedient structured finance technology that 
allows issuers to manage economic and regulatory capital costs efficiently. CLOs represent a 
specialised form of ABS, where investors acquire a structured claim on the cash flows generated 
from the repayment o f interest and principal of a designated reference portfolio of bank loans 
(Herrmann and Tierney, 1999).3 While ABS transactions typically involve large reference portfolios 
o f fairly homogenous obligations, CLO transactions allow issuers to refinance large notional pools of 
a limited number o f highly concentrated and heterogeneous credit risk exposures that they have
1 These positions may take the form of fully/partially funded asset-backed securities or unfunded derivatives.
2 In the latter case, the securitisation structure involves transfer of assets or the assignment of equitable 
accessory rights by the sponsor (i.e. the asset originator) to a SPV.
3 See also Howard and Merritt (1997).
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either originated themselves (balance sheet CLO) or bought specifically for the purpose of profitable re­
packaging o f investment exposures (arbitrage CLO). Issuers value this type of loan securitisation not 
only as an alternative4 financing tool but also as an efficient structure o f credit risk transfer,5 for 
reasons mainly to be found in economic capital relief and increased liquidity through alternative 
market-based financing (financial objectives), improved diversification capabilities (hedging and risk 
management objectives), enhanced balance sheet management and restructuring opportunities (accounting 
objectives), optimisation of minimum capital requirements (regulatory capital) required bank regulators 
(regulatory objectives), mitigation o f agency costs o f asymmetric information between issuers and 
external financiers (capital structure choice), lower agemy costs of asymmetric information in external finance 
(e.g. “underinvestment” and “asset substitution”) and qualitative objectives, such as external effects 
on corporate ratings and reputation. Financial objectives, including tax optimisation, efficient 
refinancing cost, rating arbitrage as possible incentives, and hedging and risk management objectives, 
such as the diversification o f default risk, liquidity risk, interest rate risk and currency risk, are 
probably the most prominent motives o f loan securitisation. By subjecting bank assets to market 
scrutiny, loan securitisation also facilitates prudent risk management as an effective method of 
redistributing credit risks to investors and broader capital markets through issued debt securities 
(Morris and Shin, 2001).
However, since loan securitisation blends asset pricing features o f both securitised assets (“credit risk 
component”) and liquid fixed income securities (“security component”), lending relationships might 
imply private information o f asset originators. Issuers commonly adopt contractual measures to 
mitigate the agency cost of asymmetric information. In a typical CLO transaction structure, the loan 
originator or a non-recourse single-asset entity (SPV),6 issues two classes o f securities (tranches) 
through actual or synthetic credit risk transfer: debt securities and a first loss position (“equity 
piece”). While capital market investors receive subordinated debt-like notes as prior claims to the 
underlying reference portfolio, the issuer commonly retains a residual equity-like class as first loss 
position (credit enhancement) to avert ex ante moral ha2ard and possible adverse selection similar to the
4 Asset funding through loan securitisation frequently edges out over other funding options available to banks, 
as the flexible design of ABS structures affords issuers (i) to match the duration of their managed assets and 
liabilities more closely as well as (ii) customise the transaction structure in order to cater to different investment 
risk-retum appetites. See also Telpner (2003), Zweig (2002), Altrock and Rieso (1999), Everling (1999), Eck 
(1998), Kohler (1998), Kravit (1997), Cumming (1987), Kendall (1996) and Frankel (1991).
5 See Bank of England (1989) for an early assessment of risk transfer in asset securitisation and derivative 
transactions. See also Edwards (2001) and Bund (2000a and 2000b).
6 If no SPV is used in the administration of the securitisation transaction the sponsoring entity, i.e. the loan- 
originating financial institution, is also the issuer of the transaction. In the course of this chapter we make no 
distinction between different types of transaction structures with or without the involvement of an SPV.
“lemons problem” (Akerlof, 1970).7 Depending on the security design and the kind o f securitised 
asset type, rating agencies commonly require issuers to provide credit enhancement through first loss 
provisions and/ or other forms of credit support (e.g. default loss subordination) to cushion investors 
against potential ex ante moral hazard issuers might induce by including poorly performing loans in the 
transaction in absence of full investor information about securitised loans.8 Since credit enhancement 
mainly guards against adverse information constraints originating in the credit component o f loan 
securitisation, the risk sharing mechanism between the issuer and investors (security component) 
becomes the decisive element of investment risk in securitisation. Hence, the economic assessment 
o f loan securitisation primarily depends on how a given security design translates the performance o f 
securitised credit risk9 into the default term structure o f issued asset-backed securities. Since issuers 
choose from a vast variety of transaction structures10 to subdivide and redirect cash flows and losses 
from the repayment of securitised assets in a reference portfolio, the transmission between the 
securitised asset performance and investor returns as contingent claims is acutely relevant for the 
valuation of CLOs. Given increased regulatory interest in the degree o f unexpected risk (loss 
volatility)11 in leveraged structured finance investments, we offer a methodology to translate 
securitised credit risk into investment risk o f structured claims as a promising exercise to promote 
informed investment
7 Credit enhancement represents the varying willingness of issuers to securitise only part of the structured claim on 
the selected loan portfolio and retain a marginal equity claim on some portion to provide capital cover for all 
expected losses. Issuers buy back the most junior securities, while capital market investors hold the remaining 
tranches of the securitisation transaction. Alternatively, such credit enhancement could also take the form of a 
standby letter of credit to the securitisation conduit, or by the sponsoring bank. The provision of credit 
enhancement exposes issuers to some of the default risk of non-performing loans. Since issuers pass on 
remaining asset claims to capital market investors, any credit enhancement establishes a “collateralisation” of 
the securitisation transaction. Issuers bear some “sure loss” of concentrated credit risk in the form of credit 
enhancement, while the risk of corresponding changes in expected losses is implicitly transferred to 
outstanding claims on the loan portfolio held by outside investors. Hence, it is interesting to analyse the effect 
of the default term structure of the transaction (which in turn depends on the loss function of the underlying 
loan pool) on the investment risk securitised debt.
8 The Basle Committee on Banking Supervision (2002) defines credit enhancement as a contractual arrangement in 
which the bank retains or assumes a securitisation exposure and, in substance, provides some degree of added 
protection to other parties to the transaction. [...].” See also Basle Committee (2001, 2004a and 2004b). If credit 
enhancement is achieved through subordination, issuers retain the most junior tranche as “equity tranche”, 
which bears all first losses of the transaction.
9 Skora (1998) defines credit risk as the risk of loss on a financial or non-financial contract due to the 
counterparty’s failure to perform on that contract. Credit risk breaks down into default risk and recovery risk. 
Whereas default risk denotes the possibility that a counterparty will fail to meet its obligation, recovery risk is 
the possibility that the recovery value of the defaulted contract may be less than the promised repayment 
amount.
10 Note that the flexibility of issuers to devise a particular security design bears the risk of asymmetric 
information between issuers and investors as to the default term structure of issued tranches.
11 Especially since 2001 loan distress in the high-yield structured finance market has focused attention on the 
issuer’s ability to cover expected losses through credit enhancement and, at the same time, avert 
disproportionately high levels of loss volatility bome by capital market investors due to substandard asset 
performance.
2.2 Research objective
The main objective o f this chapter is to estimate the default term structure and the fair pricing o f 
default sensitive contingent (debt) claims (tranches) held by risk-neutral investors in a typical CLO- 
style loan securitisation transaction on a pooled multi-asset reference portfolio o f defaultable 
exposures. We evaluate, on the basis o f a common CLO security design, how the loss sharing effects 
between issuers and investors through tranche subordination transpose credit risk o f securitised 
assets into investment risk o f contingent debt.12 For this approach to be viable, we equally privilege 
both the accurate estimation o f portfolio credit risk and the distinctive security characteristics of 
securitisation. Although investors should expect the same returns for similar credit risk exposure in 
plain vanilla corporate bonds or securitised debt (i.e. tranches), these investment alternatives differ in 
the way they are valued in response to changes o f the underlying (reference) asset. Tranche 
subordination creates leveraged investment,13 which makes the risk-retum profile o f CLO investment 
different from direct investment in the underlying portfolio. Hence, the seniority and thickness of 
tranches according to a specific security design imply varying degrees o f credit risk leverage o f each 
constituent tranche. Since subordination renders leveraged securitised debt highly sensitive to value 
changes of a precisely defined reference portfolio (unlike corporate bonds, whose the underlying 
asset is far less scrutinisable),14 it is essential to evaluate securitised debt claims at higher confidence 
levels (i.e. extreme quantiles) of expected loss. Moreover, efforts to diversify as much idiosyncratic 
risk as possible within a reference portfolio of securitised exposures make CLO tranches (with 
substantial systematic risk exposure) highly vulnerable to extreme event scenarios associated with 
systemic shocks. Consequently, the analysis o f extreme loss quantiles registers as a vital step towards 
the accurate estimation of investment risk in loan securitisation. The approximation o f large losses at 
very low tail probabilities requires the specification o f a limit law that incorporates the occurrence of 
extreme values. General limit loss distributions in many existing credit risk models rely on imprecise 
information about tail properties and fail to capture the empirically stylised fact o f heavy-tailed loss
12 Asset pricing of securitised debt could be approached either from the perspective of (l) cash flows generated 
from the reference portfolio or (ii) expected losses from creditor default. Most models in the literature concentrate 
on the upside of loan securitisation, i.e. the cash flow modelling of distributable interest and principal proceeds 
to be had from the securitised loan pool (Childs et al., 1996). However, we choose to analyse the default term 
structure and the value of loan securitisation transactions from the perspective of credit risk by modelling the 
loss side. By extending accepted principles of asset pricing we derive a default term structure of expected 
losses, which entail certain credit spreads for the various tranches of a securitisation transaction as investment 
risk premium.
13 The lower the level of seniority the higher the ratio of relative (expected and unexpected) losses per tranche 
(for a given tranche size) to expected portfolio losses (for a given portfolio size) and the higher the portion of 
expected losses in overall tranche losses.
14 Payments on securitised debt come from the designated assets backing the debt and not the issuer and they 
do not capture gains from future investment unlike corporate (unsecured) debt.
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distributions.15 Extrem e value theory (EVT) is concerned with the modelling o f the limiting behaviour 
o f sample extremes beyond historical inference. EVT focuses exclusively on the asymptotic tail shape 
o f loss distributions as a canonical theory o f deriving parametric estimates as limit laws for 
standardised (ordered statistics) maxima o f loss generating asset value processes.16’17 Hence, we 
postulate E V T  as an appropriate complementary to the normality paradigm to gauge credit losses at 
very high levels o f confidence based on precise information about the tail behaviour. Moreover, due 
to the diversified nature o f securitised credit risk we couch extreme value analysis in a portfolio-based 
estimation o f loss quantiles in line with the recent credit risk models.
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Fig. 1. Em pirical cumulative distribution junction o f corporate credit portfolio losses.
Our single-factor, loss-based asset pricing model of CLO tranches as contingent claims held by risk- 
neutral investors on securitised credit exposures breaks down into three methodological steps. First, 
in keeping with the diversified nature o f securitised debt we generate Monte Carlo simulated random 
default losses from a pre-defined loss function of an infinitely granular reference loan portfolio with 
an i.i.d. periodic default process, where a single systematic risk factor drives aggregate (uniform)
lD If extreme loss quantiles of actual loss distributions suggest a higher frequency of extreme default losses than 
what could be inferred from the normality paradigm, greater loss volatility warrants an overhaul of 
conventional portfolio modelling techniques with robust statistical analysis on normally distributed credit 
losses. Extreme events enter very naturally for a proper understanding of the actual loss distribution function in 
keeping with the stylised facts of econometrics: market data returns tend to be uncorrelated but dependent at 
random volatility. Their distribution functions are heavy tailed, with extremes appearing in clusters (Embrechts 
et al., 2001b).
16 These maxima would be deemed insignificant outliers in robust statistics of limit distributions with 
exponentially declining tails.
17 EVT has claimed prominence in financial research as it complements Value-at-Risk (VaR) measures of risk 
by making specific assumptions about the tail properties of a loss distribution independent of the overall loss 
distribution. Note that EVT-based estimates of extreme quantiles should not be viewed in isolation of
default at constant between-asset default correlation.18 Second, we subject estimated losses to a 
simplified subordination mechanism commonly found as one form of credit enhancement in CLO 
transactions, which yields tranche-specific default term structures o f expected and unexpected losses 
over the specified lifetime of the transaction. This approach allows for the decomposition o f a CLO 
transaction into a collection o f simpler default sensitive debt securities with divergent risk profiles 
and expected investor returns. Since the size and seniority o f tranches constitutes the subordination 
routine of loss allocation, the estimated default term structure o f individual tranches reflects the 
transmission mechanism implied by the chosen security design of securitisation. We derive the 
default term structure under both robust statistics and extreme value analysis for converging tail 
behaviour o f loss severity distributions. This produces more reliable approximations o f investment 
risk o f asset-backed securities than previous studies. However, our analysis is not informed primarily 
by the comparative distinction o f different loss functions, but the leverage and transmission effect of 
subordination on the default term structure of securitised debt at time-varying portfolio quality. 
Third, the accumulated loss severity of each constituent tranche, discounted by some stochastic risk­
free interest rate, determines the return investors would expect as risk-neutral compensation for the 
estimated default term structure. Since we do not control for the market risk premium of defaultable 
debt under the risk-neutral measure, we compute “quasi risk-neutral” returns as physical discount 
measure for expected periodic credit loss.
Our findings suggest a dichotomous effect o f loss cascading on investment risk in loan securitisation, 
with the most junior tranche o f CLO transactions exhibiting a distinctly different default tolerance of 
unexpected losses than the remaining tranches, becoming more pronounced as the likelihood of 
extreme loss events increases. Based on this observation, our model delivers a plausible rationale as 
to why issuers generally retain the most junior tranche as credit enhancement. So far, none o f the 
existing models — even at a possibly more rigorous econometric level with time-varying asset and/or 
default correlation — have been able to explain the riskiness of first loss provision in response to 
variations in estimation parameters (e.g. varying portfolio quality, periodic and cumulative expected
estimates from robust statistics of limit distributions, so charges against EVT (Lucas et al., 2002) as an overly 
sensitive measure to rare events appear overdone.
18 Since we assume individual risk being perfecdy diversified in a pool of a sufficiently large number of 
independent risks, uniform credit loss exposures with constant pairwise correlation approximate loss estimates 
under any recent portfolio credit risk measure. Note that over the recent past a portfolio view on credit losses 
has evolved from the bulk of past research in credit risk management, which mainly concentrated on assessing 
credit risk of individual exposures in isolation without taking into account co-movement of changes in credit 
quality and default correlation (Caouette et al., 1998). In spite of the wide variety of portfolio (credit) risk 
models (see section 3), they all share a common framework of general dependencies of credit risk factors if we 
considered an infinitely granular portfolio with only one systematic risk factor (Gordy, 2000). See also 
Koyluoglu and Hickman (1998). We also use a normal inverse distribution (NID) as a conventional 
approximation for losses given these portfolio assumptions.
and unexpected losses, as well as constant vs. stochastic risk-free discount rates). Moreover, upon 
imminent changes to the Basle Accord on the regulatory treatment asset securitisation according to 
the so-called Securitisation Framework (Jobst, 2005; Basle Committee, 2004a and 2004b) in 2006,19 our 
methodology aids a reasonable estimation of investment risk implied in structured claims on 
defaultable assets.
3 LITERATURE REVIEW
3.1 Reasons for asset securitisation
Although there is not a single theory that exhaustively explains the economic nature o f loan 
securitisation, research in asset securitisation has so far entertained a diverse range of corporate finance- 
based arguments for securitisation as an efficient means o f external finance: (i) issuers exploit private 
information about securitised assets as a way to mitigate the regulatory capital charge and achieve 
greater specialisation in areas o f comparative advantage (Greenbaum and Thakor, 1987), (ii) issuers 
avoid asset substitution and underinvestment as they appropriate partial debtholder wealth by carving 
out a defined portion of pooled assets to satisfy securitised debt (James, 1988; Benveniste and Berger, 
1987; Stulz and Johnson, 1985), and (iii) issuers reduce the agency cost o f asymmetric information if 
securitised debt constitutes a safer claim than other forms of external finance (Barnea et al., 1981; 
Myers and Majluf, 1984). According to Greenbaum and Thakor (1987), private information held 
about the quality o f originated assets would induce financial institutions to prefer securitising better 
quality (but “regulatory overcharged”) assets to mitigate regulatory capital requirements, whilst 
retaining worse quality assets. For this selective bias to be economically sustainable, issuers must be 
able to extract positive payoffs from trading off the benefits o f securitising low-risk asset exposures 
with an ex ante increase of bankruptcy risk due to higher residual on-balance sheet risk. Private 
information might also find an oudet in securitisation if issuers aim to achieve greater specialisation 
in sourcing and monitoring as areas of comparative advantage (Millon and Thakor, 1985).
Asset securitisation might also redress conflicts of interest between creditors and shareholders of 
firms and associated agency cost induced by risky debt, which would otherwise result in suboptimal 
investment decisions. James (1988) as well as Benveniste and Berger (1987) show that securitisation 
tranches resemble secured debt, whose agency cost (from monitoring as well as underinvestment and
19 See also Basle Committee (2003, 2002a, 2002b, 2001a and 2001b).
asset substitution) may be lower than for unsecured debt (Stulz and Johnson, 1985).20 Similar to 
secured debt, securitisation allows issuers to appropriate partial debtholder wealth by carving out a 
defined portion o f pooled assets (i.e. the “reference portfolio”) to satisfy securitised debt claims. This 
prioritisation o f debtor claims potentially alleviates underinvestment and renders existing debt less 
inhibitive on the realisation of new investment opportunities.21 Since securitised debt does not 
capture gains from the firm’s future investments,22 it does not contribute to asset substitution unless 
the use of funds generated from the securitised debt increases the overall riskiness o f the issuer by 
more than what would be warranted to offset underinvestment. Hence, the possible resolution of 
agency problems of underinvestment and asset substitution in the capital structure choice need to bev
qualified as to whether securitised debt actually increases firm value and make existing bondholders 
better off.23 Any positive effect from the appropriation of debtholder wealth ultimately depends on 
the way the investment policy o f entrenched managers guides the riskiness o f the use o f securitisation 
proceeds relative to the ex ante riskiness of the issuer.
The use of securitised debt finance constitutes a “nested capital structure decision” whose possible 
effect on claimholder expropriation depends on the investment policy choice o f the issuer. O n one 
hand, the absence of bond covenants to restrict the use of proceeds from securitised debt allows 
issuers to extract debtholder wealth. Issuers could securitise low risk assets to (i) undertake riskier 
future investment activities or (ii) pay out securitisation proceeds directly to shareholders at the 
expense o f diluted bondholder claims (“asset substitution”). On the other hand, asset securitisation 
would put non-value-maximising issuers in a position to monetise balance sheet assets for negative 
present value investment projects without disciplinary effects o f poor performance. Aside from 
excessive asset substitution, debt repayment from securitisation proceeds further reduces shareholder 
wealth.24*25 Consistent with conventional thinking about the capital structure choice, issuers with high
20 See also Berkovitch and Kim (1990), who find that secured debt lowers the adverse effect of debt finance on 
firm value in terms of underinvestment.
21 Additionally, the agency cost of securitised debt might be lower than the cost of bank borrowing and bond 
debt, mainly because securitised debt does not carry restrictive bond covenants and might be easier to negotiate 
as it is removed from the conventional capital structure choice. Although reference portfolios underlying 
securitised debt are heavily scrutinised by rating agencies, with debt claims backed by payments from the 
reference portfolio backing the transaction and not the issuer, debt holders require less information about the 
issuing firm than unsecured debt holders of corporate bonds.
22 Nonetheless, the defined payment stream to investors of securitised debt could directly depend on the 
business performance of the issuer, such as in whole business ABS and captive finance ABS.
23 Stulz and Johnson (1985) find that existing debtholders can be made better off by the issuance of secured 
debt if the financing decision is accompanied by a positive change in investment policy.
24 See Lang et al. (1995), who argue that asset sales may allow managers to pursue poor projects by creating 
liquidity for investment. See also Pennacchi (1988).
25 Alternatively, issuers might also reduce capital market discipline by using securitisation proceeds to lower 
existing debt (to the detriment of future equity payouts), whose negative effect on shareholder value could be
agency costs o f debt (which implies high financial leverage and/or financial distress) and/or low 
growth prospects have higher incentives of asset substitution and a higher chance of 
underinvestment. They should be more likely to engage in asset securitisation. Any negative effect of 
shareholder expropriation by suboptimal investment should increase the higher (lower) the 
securitisation proceeds (growth prospects).
We also need to investigate the impact o f asset securitisation on the capital structure decision from a 
funding perspective under asymmetric information, which necessarily involves a closer inspection o f 
both the pecking order theory and the trade-off theory. The trade-off theoiy postulates that managers choose a 
leverage level where the marginal benefits o f debt, such as the interest tax shield, just about outweigh 
the costs of debt, including agency and financial distress costs (“optimal trade-off’).26 In contrast, the 
pecking order theory (Myers and Majluf, 1984), states that firms prefer internal to external finance due to 
adverse selection arising from information asymmetry in financial relationships between insiders and 
outsiders.27 If  external funds are needed to undertake a profitable investment project, firms choose 
the safest claim (which involves the lowest degree o f asymmetric information). Without asset 
securitisation, the pecking order theory suggests that firms with high internal refinancing cost and 
low bankruptcy cost generally prefer debt to equity because o f lower information costs from 
valuation uncertainty.28 However, this form of external finance increases both the balance sheet
exacerbated by less market monitoring of secured debt as opposed to unsecured debt. See also Lockwood et al. 
(1996).
26 Bamea et al. (1981) define this consideration as the optimal trade-off between the agency costs of debt and 
the benefits associated with different financial contracts in terms of their inherent capacity to resolve agency 
problems and tax exposure.
27 In Myers and Majluf (1984) managers have superior knowledge about the value of the firm and act to 
maximi2 e shareholder value. Due to asymmetric information rational potential investors (“outsiders”) would 
discount the value of any security issue. See also Myers (1977 and 1984).
28 Hence, rational investor behaviour compels managers to qualify their capital structure choice on actual firm 
value. Managers are more likely to prefer debt (equity) if they believe the firm to be undervalued (overvalued). 
In recognition of these strategic alternatives investors would perceive an equity issue an indication of poor 
quality, which increases the cost of issuing equity. So the hierarchy of funding alternatives in line with the 
pecking order theory would suggest that firm issue equity only after the chances of issuing debt or hybrid 
securities, such as convertible bonds, have been exhausted. In accordance with the modified pecking order 
theory (MPOT) the following empirically testable hypothesis for managerial capital structure decisions would 
ensue: (i) avoidance of external equity and risky debt, (ii) dividend policies which can be maintained by 
internally generated equity, (iii) the maintenance of financial slack, and (iv) the acquisition of additional funds 
with risky debt rather than new equity, given “sticky” dividend payout and variable investment opportunities. 
These ideas were later refined by Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999) into a key testable prediction, which states 
that the incidence of the pecking order in the capital structure decision of firms should yield a strong 
correlation between net debt issues and the financing deficit of firms.
volume and the debt-to-equity ratio,29 causing a higher financial distress cost and higher marginal 
cost of handing.30
If issuers face high capital costs of internal hinds and severe asymmetric information problems the 
issuance o f asset-backed debt securities registers as a viable source o f external refinancing, which 
comes closest to internal funds in terms of agency cost.31 Securitised debt may be considered safer 
than unsecured debt,32 since investors in securitisation transactions do not directly capture gains from 
the issuer’s reinvestment of funds received from the issue, but receive payment directly from a 
designated pool of asset exposures insulated from the issuer33*34 The trade-off theory would restrict the 
assumption o f external debt finance to those cases only where the issuer’s capital structure reflects an 
optimal balance of the benefits and drawbacks associated with the agency cost of debt under 
asymmetric information. So both the pecking order theory and the trade-off theory suggest that asset 
securitisation is the structured finance instrument o f choice for issuers with over-stretched internal 
funds, and whose high on-balance sheet handing costs, possibly substandard credit (ratings) and high 
agency costs o f asymmetric information debar them from other forms o f external finance.35
3.2 The valuation of CLO transactions: security design and credit risk 
management
Despite the abundance o f theoretical and empirical research on the motivation o f asset securitisation 
from a corporate finance perspective, gauging investment risk in structured finance has only recently 
engendered academic interest in the valuation of CLO transactions. The assessment o f investment
29 Furthermore, the credit rating of the newly issued securities may be capped at the issuer’s rating.
30 As existing creditors would command higher debt returns at a higher leverage ratio, the consolidated credit 
linkage of the unsecured debt to the originator (unlike in off-balance sheet transactions) raises the cost of 
handing.
31 Furthermore, the off-balance sheet characteristic of securitisation allows refinancing at a potentially lower 
cost than equity without attendant balance sheet growth.
32 This theoretical observation implies a property of securitised debt, which should be most attractive for small 
corporate and SME issuers, whose firm value is hard to assess.
33 The straightforward calculation of future cash flows from accrued repayment in a diversified asset portfolio 
replaces the assessment of the overall business risk and the income generating potential of the issuer.
34 Also the thorough scrutiny by rating agencies of securitised asset-backed debt claims adds to this assessment.
35 Issuers can refinance defined asset exposure at lower cost due to a possibly higher standalone rating of 
sectored debt. If the rating of asset-backed securities might supersede the issuer rating thanks to superior 
quality, securitisation tranches could be sold at tighter spreads and higher prices. This rating effect (“upgrading’), 
known as credit risk arbitrage (Bar, 1998 and 1997; Rochling, 2002), stems from mainly from two sources. For 
one, after issuers parcel out high quality assets or shed defined risk exposure from their risky core business, the 
issued debt securities are solely supported by the cash flow from underlying reference portfolio (and any asset 
protection if available) without interference on part of the asset originator, leaving the rating assessment largely 
unaffected by counterparty risk. Second, if assets are securitised through a true sale transaction, the legal title is 
irrevocably transferred to investors (via a SPV). This transaction structure precludes any recourse or economic 
interest on part of the originator. See also Cantwell (1996).
risk o f CLO transactions requires a closer inspection o f how security design and the risk o f 
securitised credit exposures affect beneficial investor interest. A comprehensive asset pricing 
methodology in this area would need to transcend three major areas of finance research:36 (i) 
estimation and pricing of (portfolio) credit risk (Jarrow et al., 1997; Jarrow, 1996; Zhou, 1997 and 2001; 
Lucas et al., 2001b; Lo and Davis, 2001),37 (ii) security design and asset liquidity (DeMarzo and Duffie, 
1997 and 1999; Bhasin and Carey, 1999),38 and (iii) information economics in asset securitisation (Jobst, 
2003b; Duffie and Garleanu, 2001 and 1999; Duffie and Singleton, 1999 and 1998; Riddiough, 
1997).39
In recognition o f agency costs from claimholder expropriation and asymmetric information in the 
capital structure choice, many theoretical models explain the economic rationale and pricing of asset 
securitisation on the grounds of an efficient risk sharing mechanism between issuers and investors on 
the performance of a predefined asset pool. Several asset pricing models have attempted to gauge 
investment risk o f asset-backed securities on the basis of an optimal security design. DeMarzo and 
Duffie (1999 and 1997) assert that issuers o f securitised debt can overcome the “lemons problem” 
(Akerlof, 1970) o f asymmetric information associated with the sale o f illiquid assets by bundling and 
re-packaging payment claims from asset exposures into a basket o f different classes of subordinated 
tranches as collateralised contingent claims (Jobst, 2003a).40 Riddiough (1997) confirms information 
benefits from subordinated security design on the grounds o f the non-verifiability o f liquidation 
motives if subordination allows issuers to internalise some or all o f the adverse selection risk, which 
would otherwise apply in a straightforward asset sale.41 Issuers would appropriate economic rents 
from their information advantage about asset quality depending on the degree o f subordination and 
their willingness to retain the most junior claim (credit enhancement) on the performance of securitised
36 Also fundamental principles of financial intermediation and underwriting (Diamond and Rajan, 1998; Gande 
et al., 1999; Gorton and Pennacchi, 1995; Diamond, 1991; Allen, 1990) are of tangential importance in this 
case.
37 see Caouette et al. (1998) for an overview. See also Allen and Gale (1995)
38 see also Clemenz (1986), Bolton and Scharfstein (1990), Rajan (1992), Holmstrom and Tirole (1998), Park 
(2000) and Wolfe (2000) in this regard.
39 In a more comprehensive approach also issues of market structure and competition (Oldfield, 2000) would 
need to be taken into account.
40 The par value of these tranches depends on designated coupon and pro-rated principal payments from 
expected cash flows of the securitised assets (“reference portfolio”) as well as the level of prepayments and 
asset default. Most asset securitisation transactions also include financial securities generating regular income or 
other financial commitments to additionally “collateralise” these proceeds from the reference portfolio.
41 Packaging strategies, such as pool diversification and loan bundling, amplify the subordination effect and 
increase “liquidation proceeds” from the reference portfolio (Riddiough, 1997). Additionally, further structural 
elements of the typical the CLO security design, such as early amortisation triggers and credit risk coverage, 
help avert possible mispricing of loan securitisation due to private information.
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assets.42 Childs et al. (1996) propose a structural model for pricing commercial mortgage-backed 
securities (CMBS) through Monte Carlo simulation o f a portfolio o f individually correlated 
mortgages in order to derive an optimal security with asset retention by the issuer.43
More recendy, the default-based valuation o f securitised debt has benefited from the emergence of 
portfolio credit risk models, which assume a stochastic process o f asset value change and default- 
correlated credit risk exposure. Past research in this area has generated a wide range of different 
structural approaches (Black and Cox, 1976; Brennan and Schwarz, 1978; Leland, 1994 and 1998), 
which can be broadly classified into three categories (by mathematical technique used): (i) standard 
intensity-based models,44 (ii) copula models and (iii) Markov chain46 and contagion models.47 Industrial 
applications have simplified these approaches into endogenous models (e.g. credit migration 
approach and structural approach), actuarial models and econometric models.48 Many o f these
42 Riddiough (1997) claims that a junior claim has a vital function as credit risk protection in the security 
governance of asset-backed securities, mainly because it allows issuers to use better asset value information 
about securitised asset exposure by retaining the credit enhancement to issue completely risk-free security on 
the proceeds of the reference portfolio. Moreover, this bid for an efficient design of asset-backed securities 
proves to be robust if junior security holders control the debt negotiation process with pooled debt structures.
43 Childs et al. (1996) aggregate the value of each mortgage in order to determine the available amount of asset 
proceeds supporting each class of debt securities issued as contingent claims on the performance of the 
reference portfolio.
44 Standard intensity-based models determine credit risk with conditionally independent defaults (Duffie and 
Singleton, 1999; Lando, 1998) or correlated defaults in the case of an intensity-based approximation of default- 
correlated assets as in Egami and Esteghamat (2003). See also Zhou (1997 and 2001) who proposes an 
analytical formula for calculating default correlations based on a “first-passage-time model” of correlated firm 
values. Lucas et al. (2001b) refine this stream of research by suggesting a factor model for an infinite number of 
individual exposures as an analytic characterisation of the credit loss distribution. See also Basle Committee 
(1999,1993 and 1991).
45 In copula models the marginal distributions of asset exposures and the dependence structure between them are 
specified separately in a multivariate distribution, i.e. the copula distribution function couples a joint 
distribution function with its univariate margins. Many useful properties of copulas include uniform continuity 
and existence of all partial derivatives. Nelsen (1999) provides a good introduction to the copula approach. See 
also Li (2001) and Embrechts et al. (2001a and 2001b). For instance, Schonbucher and Schubert (2001) present 
a copula-based model, which allows a specification of the joint dynamics of credit returns and default 
intensities beyond the assumption of normal (i.e. Gaussian) dependence. This approach also includes a 
specification of the infection dynamics which cause credit spreads to widen at defaults of other obligors.
46 M arkov (chain) models use the dynamics of credit ratings as an indicator of default probability. However, 
existing Markov models cannot be applied to the evaluation of credit-sensitive asset portfolios. Kijima et al. 
(2002) present a single-index, multivariate Markov chain model with counterparty risk to simulate default 
probabilities through the dynamics of correlated credit ratings of multiple firms. See also Jarrow et al. (1997) 
for a multivariate Markov model for the term structure of credit risk spreads.
47 Davis and Lo (2001) develop a multivariate Markov model for collateralised bond obligations (CBOs). They 
quantify default correlation in medium-sized bond portfolios in terms of contagion, which stems from an intra­
industry “infection mechanism”.
48 Endogenous credit risk models are specified either by the credit migration approach, which measures default risk by 
means of the rating transition probability of assets within a given time horizon (CreditMetrics by Gupton et al., 
1997), or the option pricing approach I  structural approach, which generates a “distance-to-default” measure from the 
probability of firm value to fill below some critical level. This asset value model originally proposed by Merton 
(1974) assumes that the capital structure of a given firm follows an endogenous default process. See also Wall 
and Fung (1987), Iben and Brotheron-Ratcliffe (1994) as well as Duffee (1996), who discuss credit risk as it
models have been used to derive a default-based valuation of asset securitisation transactions, such as 
an intensity-based approximation o f defaults within a jump-diffusion process o f a securitised loan 
pool (Egami and Esteghamat, 2003) or with default correlation from Moody’s diversity score (Duffie 
and Garleanu, 2001).49 Egami and Esteghamat (2003) approximate the value o f a basket of default- 
correlated debt assets in collateralised debt obligations (CDOs) by means o f calibrating a pricing model to 
a pure intensity-based simulation of defaults. Duffie and Garleanu (2001) employ the diversity score 
approach devised by rating agencies to calculate the default intensity processes for single debt 
obligations. They extend the estimation of individual asset exposure to obtain the aggregate default 
intensity of a portfolio of securitised assets in a similar analytical form before simulating efficient 
prices o f subordinated security classes (tranches). However, many straightforward loss-based pricing 
methodologies of collateralised debt obligations (CDOs) and alternative asset pricing techniques50 are 
scarce or at least contentious (Fidler and Boland, 2002), mainly because the valuation o f contingent 
claims on the performance o f multi-asset portfolios defies a closed-form solution in most cases. 
While analytically tractable pricing models with common risk factors (Gibson, 2004) tend to be 
overly simplistic, simulative robust statistical analysis (of standard intensity-based models) attributes 
little probability to extreme loss scenarios.
In this chapter, we offer a new contribution to traditional valuation models of asset-backed securities. 
We incorporate extreme loss events in a single-factor, default-based asset pricing method o f 
subordinated contingent claims on an infinitely granular multi-asset portfolio o f securitised assets 
with constant pairwise default correlation, assuming general dependencies o f credit risk factors. We 
depart from the normality paradigm and attach more weight to the limiting (tail) behaviour of 
extreme losses in order to account for the high risk sensitivity of leveraged investment in 
subordinated debt structures.51 We find that the analytical latitude o f estimating the sensitivity of the 
tranche-specific default term structure to changes in the periodic default rate under different limit
applies to portfolio risk management. The actuarial approach applied by Credit Suisse in CreditRisk+ (Credit 
Suisse Financial Products, 1997) only focuses on default for individual bonds or loans, which is assumed to 
follow an exogenous Poisson process. Finally, the econometric approach proposed in CreditPortfoUo View by 
McKinsey (Wilson, 1997a and 1997b) follows a discrete time multi-period model, where default probabilities 
are conditional on macroeconomic variables. See also Hamerle and Rosch (2004) for an interesting approach in 
how these industrial applications of structural credit risk models could be reconciled in new parametric credit 
risk model with maximum likelihood estimation.
49 Note that Gibson (2004) presents an analytical pricing model of synthetic CDOs without the use of Monte 
Carlo simulation of asset defaults by assuming asset default correlation to be driven by a known diffusion 
process of a single common factor.
50 Fidler and Boland (2002) issue critical comments on existing asset pricing methodologies of asset 
securitisation.
51 The reason for extreme value theory (EVT) as a methodology is straightforward. In the course of proper 
asset pricing of leveraged contingent claims on a defined loan pool with a defined credit event extreme value 
analysis enters very naturally in order to examine how security design provisions impact on investment risk.
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distributions (NID and EVT) in a simulative approach overwhelms the benefit o f analytical reliability 
of static, closed form pricing models (Gibson, 2004). For a given default profile o f tranche-specific 
expected losses, we compute the compensatory return of risk-neutral investors by reversing Jarrow 
and Turnbull (1995) and Leland and Toft (1996), who back out an arbitrage-free pseudo-probability 
o f default from the term structure o f credit spreads o f corporate bonds.52 In this way, we decompose 
subordinated claims into a collection o f simpler, state-contingent debt securities with divergent risk 
profiles and return expectations on the basis of fixed and stochastic53 risk-free discount rates.54
The rest o f the chapter is organised in six sections. We present the model specification of a loss- 
based valuation of subordinated CLO tranches as a phased integration of three analytical steps. First, 
we simulate aggregate default losses under extreme value analysis and robust statistical analysis based 
on a one-factor asset value model at constant and time-varying periodic default probability. 
Subsequently, we allocate the estimated default losses to constituent tranches according to the 
subordinated security design. In the third part, we derive tranche-specific default term structures, 
which imply the compensatory return risk-neutral investors would expect from holding these 
securities.55 Then we complete a “reality check” o f our estimation results. We draw on the “adjusted 
short rate approach” o f credit spread modelling (Duffie and Singleton, 1999) to benchmark the 
default term structure of CLO tranches to zero-coupon bonds at matched moments.56 In the 
penultimate section, we analyse the relationship of expected and unexpected losses as well as the 
leverage o f investment returns across tranches with different seniority. Finally, in a post-simulation 
assessment, we discuss incentives for both issuers and investors to acquire certain tranches on the
52 This approach is similar to, though econometrically different from, Jarrow et al. (1997), who introduce a 
univariate Markov model for the term structure of credit risk returns, where rating agencies’ default rates and 
bond prices serve as input variables, so that investors’ risk premium can explicitly estimated for static and 
variable risk-free interest rates. See also Arvanitis et al. (1999) as well as Madan and Unal (1998).
53 Das and Tufano (1996) price credit-sensitive debt on the basis of stochastic interest rates, credit ratings and 
credit spreads. See also Ramaswamy and Sundaresan (1986). In pricing contingent claims on default-correlated 
assets, we also incorporate specific considerations, which have emerged in discussions of credit risk modelling 
in Cossin (1997), Madan (1998) as well as Madan and Unal (1994). For further information in context of 
gauging the impact of credit risk on structured finance instruments, we refer readers to Hull and White (1995) 
as well as Cooper and Martin (1996), who make several important observations about credit risk and how it 
affects the price of over-the-counter derivatives. With respect to credit risk hedging, readers might find it 
worthwhile to consider Sorensen and Bollier (1994) for a practical explanation of pricing the credit risk in an 
over-the-counter swap.
54 Additionally, we rely on other research along the lines of the so-called “yield spread approach” by Litterman 
and Iben (1991), Das and Tufano (1996), Artzner and Delbaen (1994), Nielsen and Ronn (1996) as well as 
Duffee (1996).
55 We also use of a stochastic discount rate as an extension to the valuation of tranche returns for risk-neutral 
investors.
56 See also Bielecki and Rutkowski (2000), Pugachevsky (1999) as well as Balland and Hughston (2000). See also 
Duffie (1996).
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theory of information asymmetries. In conclusion, we revisit important findings and propose to 
possible extensions.57
4 MODEL
4.1 Loss distribution of a uniform reference portfolio
As the first component of the CLO pricing model, we specify the distribution function o f default 
losses in the securitised reference portfolio. For this purpose, we resort to a normal inverse 
distribution and a quasi-Pareto distribution from extreme value theory to simulate the loss profile o f 
a perfectiy diversified reference portfolio o f credit exposures. In keeping with past attempts to 
simulate the credit risk o f standard (bank) loan portfolios, we assume individual risk to be perfectly 
diversified in an infinitely granular portfolio, so that we can consider the reference portfolio to be of 
uniform credit risk with equal pairwise asset correlation. Once we have computed expected and 
unexpected losses, we determine the periodic default losses for the transaction and the constituent 
tranches by means o f a certain loss allocation routine.
4.1.1 Norma/ inverse distribution (NID)
Standard credit portfolio models suggest that, as the number of loans grows to infinity, credit 
portfolios o f independent samples and different granularity converge to a uniform portfolio with 
homogenous asset exposures and normally distributed losses. Vasicek (1987), Finger (1999) as well as 
Overbeck and Wagner (2001) derive default losses from a normal inverse distribution function 
N ID  ( p , p )  with default probability p  > 0 as mean and equal pairwise asset correlation p <  1 for a 
portfolio o f h loans with equal exposure 1/h  for h —> +oo and portfolio losses 0 < x  < 1 58 denoted 
by
N ID ( x ,p , p )  = N [ [ ^ p N - \ x )  -  N - \ p ) ) / J p )  (1)
with density function
57 See also Barnhill and Maxwell (2002).
58 In section 4.2.1 we estimate credit losses as uniformly distributed random variables by means of a Monte 
Cado simulation.
0(x ,p,p)  = ( \ - p ) / p x ( t l( N - \ x ) ) ) ~ ' x n ( ( j r ^ N - \ X) - N - \ p ) ) / ^ ) ,  (2)
where the standard deviation cr = ^ N 2^ N  1(/>),iV X{p) \p^~  p 2 is derived from the bivariate
normal distribution N 2( x , y ; p )  of correlated defaults with a zero expectation vector.59 However, 
since the occurrence of extreme events takes a pivotal role in the accurate approximation o f credit 
portfolio losses, we need to extend this approach to take account of the extreme tail behaviour of 
credit events. As an alternative to the normal inverse distribution of random variables on a uniform 
space, we propose extreme value theory (EVT) in the next section to model the loss distribution 
function of credit portfolios.
4.1.2 Extreme value theory (EVT)
Merton-based credit risk models rely on distributional assumptions60 that imply an underlying 
stochastic process o f reasonable asset volatility around some mean expectation, which covers the 
entire spectrum of likely asset outcomes. With the stochastic dynamics dV Q jV t -  pdt + adWt 
(where Wt is a standard Brownian motion) representing what is known to be the most familiar way 
o f modelling diffusion processes (Karatzas and Shreve, 1991), the discrete approximation of changes 
in the asset value V  supports the theory o f averages, where the frequency and size o f random 
observations Sn = X l +... + X n define quantiles as multiples o f standard deviations around the mean 
o f some probability distribution. The stochastic convenience o f generating limit distributions, comes 
at the cost of having only general knowledge about asymptotic tail behaviour (“dependent tail 
behaviour”) (Login, 1996).61 However, it has become a stylised fact that the tail behaviour o f an
59 The bivariate normal distribution has a symmetric covariance matrix displaying the correlation factor p  off 
and covariances on the diagonal. Even though the respective density function <f{x,p,p) of the NID could be 
calculated by product folding, a closed form display of the results does not seem possible and numerical 
computation is warranted (Overbeck and Wagner, 2001).
60 In the light of the empirically doubtful assumption of the probability of credit losses to follow the symmetric 
profile of a normal or quasi-normal distribution, Hull and White (1998) proffer a modification of standard 
distributional assumptions of the Value-at-Risk computation for high-frequency market variables. They 
propose a concrete functional transformation of measured returns, where at least one of the functional 
transformations is normal.
61 The methodological elegance of estimating extreme events by detaching the probability of extreme events 
from dependent tail behaviour of stochastic processes in turn also entails a critical drawback. For instance, 
EVT features substantial intrinsic model risk (Embrechts, 2000), because it requires mathematical assumptions 
about the tail behaviour, whose estimation beyond or at the limit of available data defies reliable verification in 
practice. The absence of an optimal canonical choice (as to the threshold above which data is to be used) 
imposes deliberate exogeneity, which could further limit EVT as regards non-linearities (Resnik, 1998). 
However, one common caveat to EVT, does not apply in our model. Since we model rare events of loan
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actual credit loss distribution significantly differs from the tail behaviour o f a normal distribution or 
similar limit distributions with identical mean and variance. Empirical evidence about the actual loss 
profile of credit exposures suggests a higher likelihood of extreme single loss events than what would 
be implied by normally distributed credit loss.62 In order to efficiently approximate the probability 
density at very high confidence levels (i.e. very low tail probabilities (Lucas et al., 2002)), we need to 
specify a limit law that incorporates the occurrence of extreme values. Instead of modifying the 
quantile calculations for an entire probability distribution to account for rare loss events,63 we resort 
to extreme value analysis, which allows the direct estimation o f the tail behaviour of portfolio 
distributions with observations in extreme quantiles. Extreme value theory (EVT) parametrically 
approximates the occurrence o f extreme events o f a specific asset process over time. For a given 
sample, EVT64 helps translate random phenomena into a tail shape, irrespective of the distribution 
function, by solving the right (or left) limit behaviour of scaled maxima M n = m ax(X 1,...,X„ ) (or 
minima M n = m in(X 1,...,X B)) drawn from positive (negative) random variables.65 While extreme
observations (outliers) are underestimated in robust statistics, they receive most of the attention in 
EVT. Since extreme loss events are acutely relevant to highly leveraged tranches, EVT claims 
methodological attractiveness due to ease of application and flexibility in model calibration.66 In the 
remainder o f this section, we exploit the stylised fact o f heavy-tailed credit losses to elicit a loss 
distribution with polynomial tail decay as a specialised form of a general Pareto distribution (GPD). This 
is an exceedance function within the domain o f attraction of the. generalised extreme value distribution (GEV). 
We thus improve on the normal inverse distribution (NID) as a basis for the estimation o f extreme
default in a uniform credit portfolio, high dimensional portfolios cannot impair the assessment of stochastic 
properties of extreme events (Embrechts et al., 1999a, 1999b and 1999c).
62 In other words, extreme loss quantiles are farther removed from expected losses than the standard deviation 
implied by a certain level of confidence under a normal loss distribution. Standard distributional assumptions 
based on tail probabilities of 5%, 1% or 0.5% fall short of properly measuring loss quantiles at extremely high 
levels of confidence.
63 As an alternative to EVT in the context of modelling credit loss distributions, one could derive a closed from 
solution to the credit loss limit law by Lucas et al. (2001b) based on the CreditMetrics setting, which would not 
only require assumptions about the probability distribution of the latent variable triggering credit migrations 
and defaults (Lucas et al., 2002), but also imposes computational burden for generating a sufficient number of 
simulation iterations to back out small tail probabilities. See also (Lucas et al., 2001a).
64 Embrechts (2000) describes EVT as a “canonical theory for the (limit) distribution of normalised maxima of 
independent, identically distributed random variables.” Although EVT has been used for many years in 
statistical analysis, it has been applied only several years ago in credit risk management.
65 Note here that multivariate EVT as an advanced form of estimating the extreme events in a random setting 
(Embrechts et al., 1999c), would translate the behaviour of such rare events into stochastic processes, evolving 
dynamically in time and space, by considering issues such as the shape of the distribution density function 
(skewness and kurtosis) and its variability in stress scenarios.
66 Nevertheless, EVT certainly falls short of representing the ultimate panacea of risk management due to a 
multitude of unresolved theoretical issues, such as multiple risk factors and possible computational instability, 
e.g. if maximum likelihood (ML) estimated parameters do not converge (Embrechts, 2000).
quantiles consistent with Lucas et al. (2001b), who have formally shown that credit loss distributions 
are fat-tailed.67
We define extreme value analysis as a general statistical concept o f deriving a limit law for sample 
maxima Rx e  IR (Fisher and Tippett, 1928), which prescribes a parametric fit to exceedances over a 
sufficiendy large threshold68 to characterise the tail behaviour of extreme order statistics (Vandewalle 
et al., 2004).69 This limiting behaviour establishes a general theorem on the convergence of 
asymptotic tail behaviour for observations beyond historical inference. The generalised extreme value 
distribution (GEV) ([enkinson, 1955)70 establishes the domain of attraction for three possible classes 
of limit distributions71 o f normalised maxima or minima drawn from random variables, whose 
limiting behaviour depends on the rate of estimated tail decay.72 Let X ], X 2, .. . ,XII be a sequence of 
i.i.d. random variables with a common unknown distribution function F(.) and the corresponding 
ascending order statistics X x n <... < X K n with normalised sample maxima 
X n H = m axjX j, X 2,..., X H } converging to a non-degenerate limit distribution73
^  < R ,
^ an (3)
67 i.e. they decline polynomially to zero and not at an exponential rate as a normal distribution tail would imply.
68 The characterisation of an EVT-based tail distribution, however, requires strong distributional assumptions. 
For loss of less presumptive models with equal predictive power the stochastic methodology of EVT comes to 
matter as it best describes the stochastic behaviour of extreme events in heavy tailed distributions.
69 For further references on the application of EVT in the estimation of heavy tailed financial returns and 
market risk see also Longin and Solnik (2001), Longin (2000), Embrechts, et al. (1999a, 1999b and 1999c), 
McNeil (1999), McNeil and Frey (1999), Adler et al. (1998), Diebold et al. (1998), Danielsson and de Vries 
(1997a and 1997b), Embrechts et al. (1997), Resnik (1992), Longin (1996) and Leadbetter et al. (1983).
70 We dismiss a normal (elliptic) distribution function f { x )  ~ iV(//, <x) for the estimation of extreme loss 
quantiles. We justify the application of EVT to model the tail behaviour on the grounds of periodic credit 
losses Xj yielding J” Xjf(x)dx  —» +oo for some positive integer a.
71 See Resnick (1992) for a formal proof of the theorem. See also Resnick (1998).
72 For statistical inference on extreme quantiles EVT assumes precise knowledge about the tail behaviour for 
extreme events. Since a wide class of distributional models coincide in their tail behaviour, the implementation 
of EVT is independent of the overall probability distribution of losses, i.e. we do not need to know the entire 
loss distribution but the existence of heavy tails of a stochastic process.
73 See also Vandewalle et al. (2004).
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for a sequence of constants an > 0 , bn e  R  and n —> oo . If  F(.) satisfies this expression, it falls 
within the maximum domain o f attraction o f H ^{ RX), s o  that F  e  d ( h ^ ). Assuming stationarity 
and ergodidty74 the limit distribution above transforms to the GEV distribution
« * ( « » ) =
exp - r 1 1 + £RX > 0, £ > 0
exp [~  exp (—Rx )]  Rx eIR ,£ = 0
(4)
where the location parameter (“tail index”) £ specifies the size and frequency o f extreme events of 
the asymptotic tail behaviour for the probability distribution, while £ > 0 and £ < 0 indicate heavy 
and light tails respectively. The limit distribution function is positively skewed and has a peak at 
x  = £  , which defines the velocity of the decreasing (asymptotic) probability density in the extreme 
end o f the tail — the heavier the tail the slower the speed at which the tail approaches its peak x  a t j-  
value of 0, and the smaller the absolute value o f the tail index parameter.75
A large class of limit distributions in excess o f a suffidendy high threshold conform to the limiting 
behaviour of GEV.76H^{RX) subsumes the different tail curvatures o f alternative distributions
{Gumbel/Fisher-Tippett, Frechet, Weibull and Pareto) and, by definition, almost all concrete probability 
distributions, since both normal and exponential distributions lie in the domain o f the attraction of 
the Gumbel function.77 Depending on the value of the tail index, the tail behaviour o f extreme events 
fits one of the three parametric models for £ = 1/k :
74 Ergodicity is an attribute of a stochastic system, which has a unique stationary distribution to which it will 
converge from any initial state; i.e. an ergodic system tends in probability to a limiting form (steady state) 
independent of the initial conditions, so that there is some time after which, whatever the initial state was, one 
has a non-zero possibility of being in any state.
75 The tail index parameter also indicates the number of moments of the distribution, e.g. if £ = 2 , the first 
moment (mean) and the second moment (variance) exist, but higher moments have a finite value.
76 This limiting behaviour is reminiscent of the Central Limit Theorem, which states that the average of a large 
enough number of independent samples of almost any limit distribution converges to normality.
77 Gnedenko (1943) establishes the necessary and sufficient conditions for this assertion of the generalised 
extreme value theory to capture the characteristics of each concrete probability distribution, i.e. the tail 
behaviour of all concrete distributions converges in one of the three limit distributions of GEV, with the tail 
index (and the implicit threshold level M) as the only distinguishing factor(s). The following matched pairs exist 
for the distribution of the tails: normal, lognormal, logistic, gamma and exponential distributions —* Gumbel 
distribution; Student's t, Pareto, loggamma, Burr and Cauchy distributions —► Frechet distribution (where the 
reciprocal of the tail index is equivalent to the degrees of freedom and the standard exponent respectively); 
uniform and beta distributions —> Weibull distribution (where we observe a finite upper limit on the range of 
variables).
for £ = 0: F  (R x ) = exp (— exp (—Rx )) [Gumbel/Fisher-Tippett (type 1) distribution] ,78 (5)
/  \  f  0  f or ^  -  0for ^  > 0: F (R X) = j / k \ , R n [Frechet (type 2) distribution], (6)
[exp\- R x } for R x > 0 , k > 0
for g < 0 : F (R x) = | CX^ ^ ( ) f i r R x <0-k < 0  ^ dhuU(type 3 ) distribution], (!)
[ 1 f o r R x > 0
where the Frechet (type 2) and Weibull (type 3) distributions approximate the Gumbel/Fisher-Tippett 
(type 1) distribution for small values o f the tail index, i.e. thick tails.
In absence of exploratory analysis from empirical credit loss data and for the sake o f simplicity, we 
use modified form of a generalised Pareto distribution (GPD)79 as the loss function instead o f a GEV 
distribution for purposes of extreme value analysis. GPD is an exceedance distribution within the 
maximum domain o f attraction F  e  d {h ^ ). In order to specify the tail behaviour o f standardised
maxima of potential loss levels capped at the asset portfolio size set to unity as upper bound, we re­
write H  ^  (Rx ) to
G ( x , £ , P )  =  \ X 0  +  ^  fo r  (8)
 ^  ^ | l - e x p ( - x / / ? )  for # = 0
with R x = — (x  — j~)fp , scale parameter (5 > 0 , as well as x > 0  for % > 0 and 0 < x  < — P H  for 
% < 0 .80 For loss distribution function L { x )  with the same tail behaviour, we allow for a non-zero 
peak by expanding the support of GPD to M , so that
78 with integrateable density function f ( x )  = ft 1 {— exp(— (x — £)/($)— (x — f )//?}.
79 Note that we derive GPD on the basis of the one-dimensional Pareto-like distribution
G(x,£,  /?) = 1 — (l + ^ x//?)-  ^ for £ ^ 0  and x  > 0 , with density function
Par{x, 0 ) = g(x) = ^ / P { f i / x f ^  O  cf/K/x^+1 , and P < x  < +oo, where /? > 0, £> 0  and distribution
function G{x ) = 1 — (P/ x Y . Please refer to Pickands (1975) for a first account of statistical inference testing 
using extreme order statistics based on GPD.
80 For the treatment of £ < 0 see Junker and Szimayer (2001).
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L ( x ,  s ,p)  = \ - 1 +
g x ^ ( x - p )  +  y j ( x - p ) 2 +
I P  x (l + exp ( - £  (*  -  p ) / p ) )
\~L'
(9)
In addition to the scale parameter s > 0 , we introduce p e l  as adjustment factor in the subsequent 
mapping procedure o f L  (x )  with portfolio losses 0 < a: < 1 .81 Mapping the loss distribution
function L(x) above onto the inverse uniform distribution U"/ (u) with random variable u e  [0,l]
and x e [ —d,d\  as upper and lower bounds (min = —d, max = d) o f U / ^ u )  yields
L (10)
p u =Udx(p)  is obtained through re-parameterisation, where both P  and /  depend on the level of 
d ,83 Our parameterisation,84 which will be used for the simulation in the next section, results in 
1 -  'L id) = 6 • 10~7, which leaves the loss tail shape unaffected by the truncation.85
4.2 Simulation model and loss allocation
We now simulate uniformly distributed random defaults to estimate expected and unexpected losses 
under both loss functions o f the securitised loans along two dimension -  time and security design. We 
derive periodic losses by “time slicing” estimated total default loss over a discrete time grid until 
maturity in order to determine the residual value of the securitised reference portfolio (and the 
principal value o f issued tranches) after periodic loan default at the end o f each period. These 
periodic losses are then allocated to the different tranches by order of seniority according to a 
subordination mechanism similar to the waterfall mechanism of damage claims in a sequence of default-
81 Neither the GDP nor the transformed GDP presented in this model are derived from a multi-dimensional 
distribution with dependent tail events (Embrechts, 2000), even though we value contingent claims on a multi­
asset portfolio of securitisable loans affected by default losses. This methodology is justified on the grounds of 
the stochastic characteristics of the reference portfolio. See also Embrechts et al. (1999a, 1999b and 1999c).
82 For the remainder of the chapter the EVT loss function carries no special marker indicating the mapping 
procedure.
83 e.g. for d ' we obtain /?' = /? x d'/d and s' = s x d ' / d  respectively.
84 The following parameters have been chosen: £ = 0.4 , P = 26 , s = 7.5 , pu = 10-4 and d  — 104 .
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correlated reinsurance contracts. The loss bearing capacity o f each tranche in relation to its level of 
subordination finally determines the tranche-specific default term structure over time.
4.2.1 Monte Carlo simulation
We Monte Carlo simulate the aggregate loss given default 0 < x  < 1 o f a equally-weighted pool with h 
number o f loans from an i.i.d. sequence o f correlated defaults with default probability p>  0 under 
both robust statistical analysis (NID) and extreme value theory (EVT). In the case o f NID, we derive 
the p-quantile estimate of periodic losses for each time step j  from the transformation
x  = NID-\z ,P ,P)  = N ( ( N - \ p i ) - f i ~ N - \ z j ) / J T ^ j . )  (11)
by drawing pairwise correlated uniformly distributed random variables Z~U(0,1) and choosing the 
parameters o f the loss distribution function such that the first two moments match the ones obtained 
from the NID. For EVT, the transformation and mapping procedure in section 4.1.2 applies 
analogously. We ignore the effects o f loss recovery, prepayments and amortisation on the notional 
amount o f portfolio value.86 Defaults are assumed to take place at the end o f each period j  to ensure 
consistency in the approximation of relative portfolio losses per period against the background of a 
declining principal balance. We let the default probability (PD)87 for each period be either constant or 
time-varying (increasing vs. declining). The latter assumption o f time-dependent risk exposure is 
fundamental to a dynamic estimation of the default term structure and its attendant effect on 
periodic loss cascading over the life of the securitisation transaction. The PD equates to expected 
loss given default with initial notional portfolio size set to unity.
4.2.2 Time slicing
85 Since L(—d) = 0.05 the density of L u does not revert to zero at point u = 0 , which corresponds to the 
practical intuition of portfolio losses (reality check of uniform mapping assumption for the distribution of 
random variables on the uniform interval [0,1]).
86 Amid this simplification of the actual accumulation of proceeds and default losses, this approach recognises 
the fact that prepayment speed higher than scheduled amortisation might not necessarily reduce aggregate 
losses, since loan claims with a high default probability are least likely to be prepaid.
87 In accordance with the weighted-average rating of the most recent CLO transactions by European issuers 
and default correlation in industrial application of intensity-based portfolio credit risk models we chose the 
portfolio parameters p = 0.0026 and p  = 0.17 in NID and the analogous representation through the size and 
shape parameters under EVT.
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Assuming a discrete time grid t0 < t x < t • <... < t tt_x </„ ,  losses are accumulated for h number of 
obligations in the portfolio to arrive at total estimated loss
£  = Z ' . , n « ( 1- ^ ) x y  (12)
over the time horizon n , where X  f ~ N I D ( x , p , p )  and X  J ~ L ( x , £ , /3,s,  p )  denote the relative
loss (on the residual exposure 1 — X t•) at time period j  € n for both loss distributions, after previous 
losses at / = j  — 1 have been subtracted from portfolio value.88
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Fig. 2. Volatility of credit losses as a measure of credit risk.
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88 This approach is in line with the determination o f the so-called conditional default rate (CDR) used by 
commercial banks to calculate the loss scenarios o f particular loan portfolios. They define periodic default loss 
as the product o f a certain default probability (according to some portfolio credit risk function) and the loss 
severity percentage (i.e. loss severity assumptions o f projected loan claims) that is incurred with respect to 
aggregate outstanding principal balance o f the securitised portfolio at the time o f default.
89 Amid this simplification of the actual accumulation o f proceeds and default losses, this approach recognises 
the fact that prepayment speed higher than scheduled amortisation might not necessarily reduce aggregate 
losses, since loan claims with a high default probability are least likely to be prepaid.
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principal balance. We let the default probability (PD)90 for each period be either constant or time- 
varying (increasing vs. declining). The latter assumption o f time-dependent risk exposure is 
fundamental to a dynamic estimation o f the default term structure and its attendant effect on 
periodic loss cascading over the life o f the securitisation transaction.
4.2.3 Lass cascading
Based on these aggregated losses we allocate periodic default losses to the different constituent 
tranches in order o f seniority. This subordination mechanism o f “loss cascading” is ffequendy found as 
one form of credit enhancement in CLO transactions and resembles the waterfall mechanism of 
damage claims in a sequence of default-correlated reinsurance contracts.91 Subordination in our 
model means that portfolio losses L  are allocated successively to the constituent tranches according 
to the level o f seniority, so that tranches more senior than the lowest (i.e. most junior) tranche only 
bear losses once the all tranches more junior have been holly wiped out by default losses.92 In our 
specification, investors in tranche k e rn  have to bear aggregate losses up to a k% of the total 
default losses on outstanding notional value of the transaction. Any remaining losses we allocated to 
the more senior tranche k  +1 up to the amount of (Xk+x % . So if the notional size (“tranche 
thickness”) o f tranche k  has been fully exhausted (denoted by the interval a k — a k_x as the loss 
bearing capacity o f tranche M),9i further losses are allocated to the subsequent, senior tranche. This 
bottom-up cascading process perpetuates until all losses for a certain period are allotted to the 
relevant tranches. This allocative routine94 determines the expected credit loss per tranche in time 
period/,
90 In accordance with the weighted-average rating of the most recent CLO transactions by European issuers 
and default correlation in industrial application of intensity-based portfolio credit risk models, we chose the 
portfolio parameters p  = 0.0026 (for a AAA-rated reference portfolio) and p  = 0.17 in NID and the 
analogous representation through the size and shape parameters under EVT.
91 Hence, tranche subordination would compare to a duration-matched set of reinsurance contracts on the 
same underlying risk.
92 The notional amount of all tranches junior to a certain tranche is commonly termed “enhancement level” 
(Basle Committee, 2004a and 2004b).
93 in terms of estimated losses as reflected in default tolerance of the structured rating.
94 See Overbeck and Wagner (2001) for an abridged representation of this method of loss cascading.
(13)
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where the meet ^X j — ak_x j  a  (ak — ak_x) denotes the periodic default loss in time step j  as the
proportional default loss o f the reference portfolio borne by tranche k. We consider the tranche sizes 
0 < a0 < Ctx < CCm as time-invariant boundaries (i.e. attachment points) of loss allocation,
which have been chosen on a historical basis from a weighted-average market benchmark o f the 
typical security design of CLO transactions since 1997. The “first loss position” has been set to the 
interval of [0-2.4%] (Tranche 1) of notional transaction value, while “investor tranches” are 
represented by [2.4-3.9%], [3.9-6.5%], [6.5-9.0%], [9.0-10.5%] and [10.5-100%] (Tranches 2-6). These 
boundaries are time-invariant and lack the notation j  for the time period. The issuer commonly 
retains the lowest, most junior tranche (commonly termed the “equity piece”) with a default loss 
tolerance o f aQ — a1 as “first loss position” as a commitment to bear part o f the losses due to expected 
non-performance o f the reference portfolio. This prioritisation o f structured claims reduces 
(increases) the default tolerance (investment leverage) o f the successive tranches, which will be 
discussed later in this chapter.95
5 ESTIMATION RESULTS
5.1 Default term structure of tranches
We derive the term structure o f expected losses from a Monte Carlo simulation with one million 
iterations of relative portfolio losses X j  for j  = 1,...,« on the basis of two loss distribution functions
— a normal inverse distribution (NID) (see section 4.1.1) and a GEV distribution from extreme value 
analysis (see section 4.1.2). Tabs. 11 and 14 (Appendix 1) exhibit how the subordinated transaction 
structure affects the development of the principal balance o f a securitised reference loan portfolio 
over time, as periodic default losses are allocated to tranches according to seniority and loss bearing 
capacity. The first column denotes the year and the second shows the respective (forward) default 
rate p, while the third and fourth columns list the mean and standard deviation o f the cumulative and 
periodic default loss o f all tranches (i.e. estimated expected loss JLj  and unexpected loss , see
Fig. 2 below). The remaining columns report relative and proportional expected default loss L kj  for
95 The mezzanine tranches with low and medium investment grade rating are usually sold to capital market 
investors as notes and commercial paper (in the case of highly rated senior notes). The most senior tranches are 
securitised in the form of a credit default swap with a equally or lower risk-weighted counterparty by means of 
a credit default swap or some other method of structural provision, such as a bilateral credit guarantee.
each o f the six different tranches with respect to their notional value and total periodic losses (see 
Tabs. 15-20, Appendix 1). We also provide the same breakdown for unexpected losses <J^ k .
Both loss functions yield similar approximations o f periodic portfolio losses (expected loss L* and
unexpected loss <7fi ). The first moment of estimated expected loss JS- per tranche (slope of
estimated losses) increases under both loss functions. The periodic loss o f the first loss piece [0- 
2.4%], though, flattens from the fifth year onwards as accumulated losses begin to exhaust the 
notional amount of the most junior tranche, (see section 4.2.3). As tranches gain in seniority, the 
default term structures under the chosen loss distributions deviate from each other at an increasing 
rate, especially in the mezzanine tranche [6.5-9.0%]. Although the cumulative tranche-based loss 
allocation increases monotonously, we observe a distinctive dichotomy of default tolerance between
the most junior (equity) tranche (reflected in the first tranche [0-2.4%] JJj) and the remaining
“investor tranches” (see Appendix 2, Fig. 5 for EVT and Fig. 6 for NID). While the expected loss for 
the first tranche follows a linear function, expected losses o f more senior tranches increase in an 
exponential fashion over time. The disparate loss profiles of tranches are attributable to the gradual 
erosion o f the loss absorbing capacity of the most junior tranche, which in turn is caused by the 
security design o f subordination and, to a lesser degree, by the distribution o f default losses. Since the 
cumulative incidence o f credit losses is skewed towards the extreme end of the distribution, an EVT- 
based loss function seems to reflect the “loss reality” more truthfully than the Gaussian assumptions 
o f generalised asymptotic tail behaviour in standard limit distribution functions.96’97 The proposed 
specialised form of a generalised extreme value distribution emphasizes extreme loss scenarios, which 
increase the default rates for more senior “investor tranches” . The first loss position under EVT is 
almost entirely exhausted by estimated default losses, while more moderate loss events under NID 
leave a good part o f the most junior tranche untouched.
96 See also Altman and Saunders (1998).
97 In Overbeck and Wagner (2001) the ^-^-plot of the beta distribution versus the negative binomial 
distribution tends to indicate a high degree of similarity on the basis of matched first two moments, with 
cumulative probabilities reaching levels in the tune of 99.995%, after discrete losses obtained from the 
negative-binomial distribution have been adjusted by the some large number s (e.g. s = 1,000 generated the 
parameter values a  = 0.323278 and /? = 80.4258 (Overbeck and Wagner, 2001). Note that the observations 
tend to fall slightly below the diagonal in the q-q-plot due to the cut-off value of s.
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5.2 Variable portfolio quality — default losses of all tranches
In cognisance o f time-dependent variation of default risk we also consider variable portfolio quality 
as a sequential upward and downward drift of one-year default probabilities under both distribution 
functions. These scenarios o f impetuously improving and decreasing portfolio quality have been 
modelled in a way that the weighted-average default probability matches the periodic default 
probability for the case of a constant rate of portfolio loss over the life o f the transaction. For a 
deteriorating (improving) portfolio quality the initial default probability is lower (higher) than in the 
case o f a constant default probability. In the following section we investigate the (tranche-specific) 
default term structure for a stricdy deteriorating asset portfolio (“back loaded”) and a stricdy 
improving portfolio (“front loaded”) as two extreme cases o f how changes in securitised asset risk 
translate into expected and unexpected losses. Tabs. 5-6 (EVT) and Tabs. 8-9 (NID) in Appendix 1 
and Figs. 10-13 in Appendix 2 display our estimation results and the corresponding plots o f a 
deteriorating and improving portfolio.
We saw in section 5.1 that periodic expected losses subside asymptotically for a constant default rate 
under both EVT and NID loss distributions, mainly because accumulated losses almost fully exhaust 
the notional amount o f the most junior tranche before subsequent tranches bear any losses. This 
property is reflected in the concave shape o f the default term structure curve for cumulative default 
losses. We find that a gradual increase of the periodic default rate partially reverses the term structure 
o f the most junior (equity) tranche during the first three periods in the case o f N ID , but finally 
follows the term structure for a constant default probability. Under EVT, periodic expected losses 
allocated to the equity tranche [0-2.4%] and the investor tranche [2.4-3.9%] are positively concave 
(but remain constant under NID) for an overall deteriorating portfolio quality. The main investor 
tranches [3.9-6.5%], [6.5-9%], [9-10.5%] and [10.5-100%] maintain an almost constant periodic 
default profile under both EVT and NID. In contrast, improving portfolio quality induces a 
negatively convex term structure of periodic losses for the most junior (equity) tranche [0-2.4%] 
under both loss distributions. The periodic default term structure o f the subsequent tranche [2.4- 
3.9%] changes from being positively convex to positively concave after three periods for NID, while 
it remains negatively convex for EVT throughout all periods of the simulation. We also observe a 
constant periodic default loss of more senior investor tranches [3.9-6.5%], [6.5-9%], [9-10.5%] and 
[10.5-100%] for a decreasing portfolio default rate, too.
These periodic loss profiles of constituent tranches for time-varying default rates translate into a 
default term structure o f cumulative losses, which differs significantly from our findings in the case
o f a constant annual default rate (see Appendix 2, Figs. 5-7). As cumulative losses borne gradually 
absorb the notional amount o f the first tranche, the more senior [2.4-3.9%] and [3.9-6.5%] tranches 
have to shoulder a disproportionately higher degree o f default loss under both EVT and NID. The 
rapid increase o f expected losses carried by the [3.9-6.5%] tranche compared to the next senior [6.5- 
9%] tranche (particularly for NID-distributed losses, less so for E V I) warrants particular attention, 
with potential insights into the implications of a varying default rate for the simulated term structure.
A t a continuously decreasing loan default rate, high initial cumulative loss burden by the first loss 
tranche precludes high loss allocation during later periods, so that the default term structure begins to 
flatten half way through the life o f the transaction. At the same time, the [2.4-3.9%] tranche in 
particular picks up most of the loss exposure, leaving less expected losses for more senior [3.9-6.5%] 
and [6.5-9%] tranches.
Generally, relatively high (low) levels of early (late) loss absorption for a “front loaded” (“back 
loaded”) default profile of improving (deteriorating) and deteriorating time-varying portfolio quality 
induce negative second moments o f cumulative expected loss allocated to the most junior (equity) * 
tranche. In both cases o f varying portfolio quality we discern a stark contrast between the lowest 
tranche and more senior investor tranches, which is explained by rapid exhaustion o f limited loss 
absorbing capacity of the former. Although varying periodic default drives a wedge between the loss 
tolerance o f the issuer and investors, it is less pronounced in the case o f a varying periodic default 
rate than with a constant default rate over the life of the transaction (see section 5).
5.3 Leverage effect
The estimated default term structure testifies to the structural risk sharing arrangement of loss 
allocation through subordinated tranches in CLOs and other types o f ABS transactions. This security 
design concentrates expected losses in a small first loss position, which bears the majority o f the 
credit exposure, and shifts most unexpected risk to larger, more senior tranches, which display 
distinctly different risk profiles. Such a leverage effect assumes a typical three-tier securitisation structure 
o f junior, mezzanine and senior tranches, where senior tranches represent about 80-90% o f the entire 
notional amount of securitised debt. Most importantly, security design-induced leverage imposes 
distinct risk-retum profiles on constituent tranches, which differs from direct investment in the 
underlying portfolio of securitised exposures. On a notional basis investors should expect the same 
returns for CLOs as for similar credit risk exposure in plain vanilla debt. However, the risk profile of 
CLOs tranches varies dramatically in response to changes in the valuation o f the underlying 
(reference) asset depending on individual “tranche thickness” (i.e. notional size). We define the
leveraged exposure by tranche seniority as the ratio of relative expected and unexpected losses per 
tranche to relative portfolio losses for each period. The relative (expected and unexpected) losses of 
the most junior tranches are higher than relative overall portfolio losses, which imply a 
disproportionately large exposure. As opposed to a static closed-form CDO pricing model (with one 
common risk factor-based default) in Gibson (2004), our approach is not limited to a one-period loss 
scenario o f expected and unexpected losses. Under the assumption of time-varying portfolio quality 
of securitised assets we analyse the time dimension of leveraged exposure for both a cumulative and 
periodic default term structure based on the reduced-form simulation o f two different loss 
distributions (EVT and NID). Since most o f the investment in the loan securitisation is “buy and 
hold”, the time variation o f leverage to portfolio losses is highly relevant to investors and regulators 
alike. We find that tranche leverage decreases (increases) by absolute measure the higher (lower) the 
level of seniority, with all tranches but the most junior tranche exhibiting higher multiples for 
unexpected losses than for expected losses (see Tabs. 10-15 (Appendix 1)). At a constant default 
probability over time, the leverage ratio of unexpected and expected losses increases over time across 
all tranches but the most senior and junior tranches. The multiples o f unexpected and expected 
losses decrease in the case o f the lowest tranche and remain nearly constant for the most senior 
tranche. If  we let the default probability vary, all “investor tranches” but the most senior tranche gain 
appreciably in expected loss leverage (and less so for unexpected losses leverage). The expected loss 
leverage o f the most junior and senior tranches are close to invariant to either a deteriorating or 
improving portfolio quality. This also applies to unexpected loss leverage o f the most senior tranche, 
but not to the most junior tranche. Mezzanine investors, then, seem to bear the brunt of adverse 
effects on investment leverage from varying portfolio quality. Interestingly, “investor tranches” 
exhibit a higher first moment of leverage for periodic expected losses than periodic unexpected 
losses. The computation o f investment risk in contingent claims becomes more intricate for senior 
tranches with lower loss sensitivity, if we consider the relative importance o f loss volatility at each 
tranche level as the ratio o f unexpected to expected losses. Loss volatility contributes the lion’s share 
to total investment risk in more senior tranches, which exhibit higher relative exposure to unexpected 
loss. Their large tranche size o f senior tranches also generates low notional exposure to expected 
loss, which camouflages leveraged exposure to almost pure risk volatility.98 If  marginal increases in 
asset correlation induce a higher conditional probability of default within the securitised asset pool, 
only a slight change o f the default term structure increases total losses of senior tranches
98 The development of periodic loss leverage over time qualifies our earlier observation of leveraged 
unexpected loss exposure in more senior tranches. An optimal low risk volatility strategy would prescribe 
short-term investment in more junior tranches (due to low absolute expected losses during the initial 
investment periods and a higher portion of expected losses than unexpected losses) until a higher first moment
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disproportionately by absolute measure the higher the share o f unexpected risk borne by investors." 
This makes senior tranches highly risk-sensitive, particularly in times of appreciable market volatility 
and escalating exposure to unexpected losses during changes in the credit cycle. Hence, our findings 
suggest that a notional-sized based valuation o f leveraged exposures poorly informs a fair assessment 
of the actual the risk profile o f senior tranches and fosters dangerously improvident investment in 
CLO tranches.
6 PRICING OF CLO TRANCHES FOR RISK-NEUTRAL 
INVESTORS
In the first part of this section, we propose a simple pricing method to value CLO tranches at a 
riskless term structure. Based on the simulation results o f various default term structures o f CLO 
tranches (see section 4), this pricing model allows us to compute quasi risk-neutral spreads over the 
risk-free reference rate investors would expect as compensation for expected default losses. We do 
not take into account risk premia for market risk. In the second part, we compare this required 
internal rate o f return of each tranche to the risk-neutral prices o f bonds o f comparable quality and 
maturity for matched first moments.
Despite major advances in credit risk modelling from a portfolio view (e.g. copula-dependent default 
risk estimation in Schonbucher and Schubert (2001), credit risk analytics have only recently been 
transposed into the context of loan securitisation, such as the intensity-based approximation of 
portfolio defaults, through either a jump-diffusion process of a securitised loans (Egami and 
Esteghamat, 2003) or the degree of diversification, e.g. the diversity score approach devised by rating 
agencies for single debt obligations (Duffie and Garleanu, 2001). The absence of a longstanding 
record o f tried and tested analytical approaches of CLO structures may leave leveraged investment in 
securitisation transactions subject to notorious mispricing if securitised asset exposures are 
underestimated. We derive risk-adjusted returns from the default term structure as a sensible 
approach to the pricing of CLO tranches in order to foster informed investment about this 
structured finance technology.
Based on the simulated default term structures under different default scenarios, we propose a simple 
pricing method to value CLO tranches at a riskless term structure in order to foster informed
of expected loss leverage warrants switching the investment to more senior tranches, where unexpected losses 
claim a greater share of investment risk and their leverage is subject to lower periodic changes over time.
99 The impact of tranche leverage confirms that extreme value analysis is most amenable for modelling the 
highly risk-sensitive nature of securitised debt as leveraged investment.
investment about this structured finance technology. In keeping with Jarrow et al. (1997), we 
compute the hypothetical spread over the risk-free rate that risk-neutral investors would normally 
expect as compensation for expected default losses allocated periodically to each tranche according 
to the designated subordination mechanism. The expected loss associated with a time-varying, 
physical default probability reduces the notional tranche amount (i.e. expected cash flows) over time. 
The risk premium of each individual tranche solves for the rate o f return that offsets periodic losses 
of a certain default term structure, so that the net present value o f the residual principal portfolio 
balance discounted at a (fixed and stochastic) risk-free rate yields the riskless term structure100 that 
satisfies
where ^  JLy denotes the accumulated expected loss in the tranche k  up to year j  — 7 and risk­
free forward rate ry (fixed or stochastic). Note that our calculated return for risk-neutral investors is
not inclusive o f a market risk premium and only represents the fair rate o f return as compensation 
for the physical default term structure of securitised tranches. Since our tranche returns are not 
derived as risk premia under the risk-neutral measure, we will use the term “quasi risk-neutral 
returns” for the remainder of the chapter. Tab. 1 below reports tranche-specific risk-adjusted returns 
under both NID- and EVT-based loan default at constant, gradually increasing and decreasing 
periodic default rates according to our estimated default term structures in Tabs. 4-9 (see Appendix 
1) and constant risk-free rate rj = /y = 5.0%. The most junior [0-2.4%] tranche absorbs most of the
periodic losses over the life o f the transaction and commands quasi risk-neutral return of 21.35% 
(EVT) and 20.56% (NID) for cumulative average annual losses with constant periodic default 
probability. Successive tranches claim lower investment returns as their decreasing default tolerance 
of accumulated credit loss induces quasi risk-neutral returns ranging from 6.29% (EVT) and 6.79% 
(NID) for the [2.4-3.9%] tranche to almost the risk-free rate of return for the most senior [10.5- 
100%] tranche.101
100 This approach reverses the methodologies in Jarrow and Turnbull (1995) as well as Leland and Toft (1996), 
who derive an arbitrage free pseudo-probability of default from a given the term structure of credit spreads.
101 According to Burghardt (2001) especially senior tranches of CLOs are regarded as virtually risk-free.
= 1, (14)
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We find that the estimated investor returns vary significandy by type o f loss function. Since extreme 
value theory assigns higher probability to rare events with high loss severity (“thick tail”), EVT- 
simulated losses yield higher quasi risk-neutral returns than NID-based credit losses at a constant 
forward rate o f default in the most senior “investor tranches” [6.5-9.0%], [9.0-10.5%] and [10.5- 
100%]. Conversely, the equity tranche [0-2.4%] and the mezzanine “investor tranches” [2.4-3.9%] 
and [3.9-6.5%] exhibit lower returns under the EVT approach than under the N ID  approach due to 
high initial loss absorption o f the most junior tranches. However, we cannot infer a higher degree o f 
estimated default for the first loss position under the EVT approach than under the N ID  approach 
unless we extend the exposition o f expected quasi risk-neutral returns per tranche to the cases o f 
deteriorating and improving portfolio quality.
Distribution and collateral performance Quasi risk-neutral returns per tranche(constant discount rate)
Allocated
tranche
losses
Reference
portfolio
quality
Loss
distribution 0-2.4% 2.4-3.9% 3.9-6.5% 6.5-9% 9-10.5% 10.5-100%
cumulative
4
constant EVT 21.34747% 6.28610% 5.25952% 5.06849% 5.03009% 5.00145%NID 20.56017% 6.79431% 5.33870% 5.05067% 5.01109% 5.00011%
deteriorating EVT 37.49613% 10.81930% 5.69241% 5.11364% 5.03974% 5.00167%NID 30.43862% 11.19511% 6.78903% 5.39333% 5.10093% 5.00127%
improiing EVT 49.12123% 9.87893% 5.60218% 5.10820% 5.03821% 5.00157%NID 42.75610% 10.94419% 6.00440% 5.06577% 5.00648% 5.00004%
T ab. 1. Q uasi risk-neutral returns fo r  the various tranches under two different default distributions (E V T  and 
N I D )  at cumulative constant, increasing and decreasingforward rates o f loan default.
The stark contrast between quasi risk-neutral returns o f the most junior tranche retamed by issuers 
and mezzanine and senior tranches held by outside investors also persists for varying portfolio 
quality. A varying periodic forward rate o f defaults entails higher returns for almost all tranches,102 
irrespective o f whether the first moment o f the term structure is positive or negative, and decreases 
in the seniority o f a tranche. The equity tranche commands quasi risk-neutral returns well beyond 
30% (40%) per period for a deteriorating (improving) portfolio quality, which reduces the yield 
associated with lower default exposure by mezzanine and senior tranches accordingly.103 Returns for 
mezzanine and senior tranches are lower under improving rather than deteriorating portfolio quality 
(under both EVT and NID), as expected.
102 Only the most senior “investor tranches” tranches [9.0-10.5%] and [10.5-100%] for NID-based losses 
exhibit lower spreads for a decreasing forward rate of default rather than a constant periodic rate of default.
103 The high level of early loss absorption (at a low discount rate) of the most junior tranche in the case of 
improving portfolio quality results in a higher return overall compared to the case of decreasing portfolio 
quality.
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Although the level o f quasi risk-neutral returns (especially the equity tranche) is mainly driven by 
design o f the securitisation transaction (i.e. the relative thickness and seniority o f constituent 
tranches), the specification o f the loss profile for varying portfolio quality explains the plausibility of 
this counterintuitive result. As opposed to constant portfolio quality, our simulated default term 
structure o f an improving portfolio involves a higher than average default probability (and higher 
quasi risk-neutral returns) during the initial periods. This relationship gradually reverses as the 
transaction matures. The same logic applies to deteriorating portfolio quality. Since the high initial 
default rate o f an improving portfolio is not discounted less heavily during the initial periods, the 
early exhaustion of the most junior tranche translates into higher quasi risk-neutral returns104 in all 
junior and mezzanine tranches up to the [6.5-9.0%] tranche. Conversely, a low initial default rate in 
the case o f increasing default should result in quasi risk-neutral returns similar to those observed in 
the case o f a constant default rate. This is mainly because increased default loss goes hand in hand 
with higher periodic discounting. Since higher back-loaded default losses for a deteriorating portfolio 
are subject to higher discount rates than front-loaded default losses o f similar degree for an 
improving portfolio, a deteriorating portfolio produces lower compensation for default losses over 
time and, thus, should display lower quasi risk-neutral returns than an improving portfolio. 
Nonetheless, both cases induce a higher quasi risk-neutral premium than a constant rate of decline in 
portfolio quality according to our model set-up. According to these specifications, deteriorating 
portfolio quality is more favourable for bearers of the most junior tranche,105 which requires a lower 
default tolerance (and lower quasi risk-neutral returns per period) for a deteriorating than for an 
improving portfolio. This effect is pronounced by the tail behaviour of the EVT-based loss function, 
which attributes higher probability to extreme losses and increases the chances of the equity tranche 
becoming fully exhausted by default loss early on. Overall, the returns o f the small equity tranche are 
most sensitive to changes in the portfolio quality and stochastic interest rates, whereas the largest 
nominal share o f the transaction held by the most senior [10.5-100%] tranche is hardly sensitive to 
varying levels o f periodic default loss.
104 This means that the second moment of the default rate of an improving portfolio is smaller than the second 
moment of the periodic discount rate. The first period default rate establishes an initial portfolio quality such 
that a declining rate of default over the life of the transaction is insufficient to offset past losses in order reach 
the same discounted default term structure as a constant default rate.
105 At the same time, the returns of the equity tranche would be less sensitive to a reduction in the portfolio 
default rate.
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7 REALITY CHECK
7.1 Ratio of estimated and unexpected losses
u n exp ect/ 
expect, losses
°L* /
y  per tranche/  L j
cum./per. Yr Pu % /
Zlj 0-2.4% 2.4-3.9% 3.9-6.5% 6.5-9% 9-10.5% 10.5-100%
cumulative 1 0.0026 0.763279 0.255607 16.263974 28.619048 48.085333 69.218085 152.600000
periodic 0.763279 0.255607 16.263974 28.619048 48.085333 69.218085 152.600000
cumulative 2 0.0026 0.228911 0.859840 10.230629 18.791386 33.048934 47.305970 98.304348
periodic 0.714920 0.459298 6.133831 10.981481 19.687204 28.056075 56.538462
cumulative 3 0.0026 0.022952 0.675790 7.315276 14.005584 25.507508 37.172840 73.972973
periodic 0.586400 0.297389 4.078485 7.770894 14.272897 20.613821 34.000000
cumulative 4 0.0026 0.887564 0.557873 5.532941 10.073340 20.854564 30.547269 62.568627
periodic 0.481139 0.186807 2.970847 5.970406 10.492447 16.424342 32.428571
cumulative 5 0.0026 0.794226 0.470644 4.309588 9.041288 17.595607 26.108359 53.970149
periodic 0.419977 0.093721 2.244714 4.734199 9.296296 13.679412 26.562500
cumulative 6 0.0026 0.722162 0.399835 3.416399 7.486572 15.254047 23.085506 48.500000
periodic 0.360865 0.001989 0.723790 3.812629 7.762673 12.145658 24.066667
cumulative 7 0.0026 0.666226 0.339409 2.741779 6.277775 13.313522 20.677388 43.887755
periodic 0.329339 -0.093422 0.329880 3.190448 6.678236 10.823821 20.250000
Tab. 2. <rL> / L )  ratio for each tranche based on simulated constant forward probability rates (E V T  distribution 
of portfolio losses).
Empirical evidence indicates that CLO tranches actually offer investors higher returns and defy the 
above assumption o f a risk-free term structure o f CLO tranches (Batchvarov et al., 2000). This 
observation is not too surprising given the inherent complexity o f securitisation structures and the 
degree o f simplification used in the proposed pricing model. For instance, investors might command 
higher returns for CLO tranches as liquidity premium or as premium for the leveraged exposure of 
tranches to changes in underlying portfolio quality as the degree o f unexpected loss increases at a 
higher rate relative to expected loss (see section 5.3).106
106 Synthetic bank CLOs feature even higher spreads than traditional CLOs. This pricing disparity is frequently 
attributed to the fact that lower secondary liquidity, a less receptive investor base for credit derivative based 
products and additional risk arising from the increased leverage of the senior tranches in partially funded 
structures are prime characteristics bearing additional exposure for investors in synthetic CLOs.
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In this section, we investigate one aspect o f investment risk that might cause generic asset-backed 
structures to usually be priced cheaper than plain vanilla corporate bonds. We regard the relationship
between unexpected and expected loss (ratio of cr^k jL f) ) as a margin o f error in the estimation of
default losses. If applied to each level of tranche seniority under both loss functions for cumulative as 
well as periodic losses, this measure coraid possibly serve as a reality check of quasi risk-neutral 
returns.
unexpect./ex  
pect. losses
aLk / per tranche
cum./per. Yr Pu % /
Zlj 0-2.4% 2.4-3.9% 3.9-6.5% 6.5-9% 9-10.5% 10.5-100%
cumulative 1 0.000100 0.763279 0.255607 16.263974 28.619048 48.085333 69.218085 152.600000
periodic 0.763279 0.255607 16.263974 28.619048 48.085333 69.218085 152.600000
cumulative 2 0.001231 0.051203 0.704859 9.838950 18.219563 32.094838 46.721550 99.869565
periodic 0.287503 0.882510 15.965496 27.951550 48.636612 67.781726 139.500000
cumulative 3 0.001945 0.748019 0.470625 6.449506 13.138343 24.876912 37.061256 79.911765
periodic 0.019617 0.729154 15.505726 28.742072 53.073955 74.791139 147.111111
cumulative 4 0.002469 0.590130 0.327399 4.196237 9.579945 19.604386 30.192623 65.836735
periodic 0.928408 0.645643 15.242741 28.180797 50.666667 72.567251 153.900000
cumulative 5 0.002771 0.495414 0.218772 2.644871 6.944703 15.613388 24.977401 55.088235
periodic 0.888280 0.604602 14.944818 27.693204 48.589041 69.369792 144.363636
cumulative 6 0.002954 0.432260 0.124650 0.597561 4.951671 12.406935 20.858994 47.307692
periodic 0.866515 0.581594 14.912923 27.253534 48.254011 68.587629 140.750000
cumulative 7 0.003055 0.383209 0.049212 0.918913 3.444438 9.855055 17.573901 40.622807
periodic 0.798923 0.568850 14.858882 27.277831 49.988473 72.104046 130.250000
Tab. 3. (Tt J L kj  ratio for each tranche based on simulated increasing forward probability rates of a deteriorating 
portfolio (E V T  distribution of portfolio losses).
EVT estimates o f expected losses seem to reduce their margin of error much faster than estimates 
based on N ID  (see Appendix 2, Fig. 4). The different results for EVT and NID in Tabs. 11-16 
(Appendix 1) and Fig. 4 (Appendix 2) derive from the EVT-based emphasis on the limiting 
behaviour o f normalised maxima, which assigns more weight to credit losses o f extreme events to be 
absorbed by the most junior tranche, which reduces the default risk of more senior “investor 
tranches”. The asymptotic development of unexpected losses bome by the most junior tranche 
complements a strong decrease of unexpected losses relative to expected losses and a flattening of
the default term structure. As shown in Tabs. 2-4 and Fig. 4 (Appendix 2), all cr^k jL*) ratios 
decrease over time but differ considerably in orders of magnitude o f decline. In contrast to the whole
portfolio and the first loss position [0-2.4%], which yield a balanced ratio o f (T^k j l } j  in the order of
one on the basis of cumulative losses, the second tranche [2.4-3.9%] exhibits a C^k jL*) ratio in the
order o f 10, while in the remaining, more senior tranches, <r^ k grows roughly twice as fast as U) 
over time.
unexpect./ 
expect, losses
aLk /
y _ £  per tranche/  Lj
cum./per. Yr Pu % /
Zlj 0-2.4% 2.4-3.9% 3.9-6.5% 6.5-9% 9-10.5% 10.5-100%
cumulative 1 0.003673 0.753206 0.506580 14.352758 26.824931 47.851852 69.401099 190.555556
periodic 0.753206 0.506580 14.352758 26.824931 47.851852 69.401099 190.555556
cumulative 2 0.002669 0.574541 0.357976 7.715834 15.906011 30.903587 45.892601 109.900000
periodic 0.884208 0.618676 14.844493 26.840553 49.311111 70.421348 139.222222
cumulative 3 0.001945 0.503138 0.280376 4.807617 10.152034 23.062020 35.704185 83.000000
periodic 0.019617 0.729154 15.505726 28.742072 53.073955 74.791139 147.111111
cumulative 4 0.001538 0.463234 0.218916 3.163151 8.202436 17.983011 29.099426 65.085106
periodic 0.140216 0.810642 15.621353 27.935294 49.544928 72.911243 142.555556
cumulative 5 0.001231 0.439645 0.164063 2.161659 6.233524 14.607002 24.314133 54.969697
periodic 0.287503 0.882510 15.965496 27.951550 48.636612 67.781726 139.500000
cumulative 6 0.000940 0.422698 0.116298 0.534117 4.837969 12.123443 20.791274 48.581395
periodic 0.393729 0.963640 15.829859 27.698656 48.480769 70.579545 176.000000
cumulative 7 0.000834 0.407827 0.075640 0.113930 3.803633 10.217695 18.053308 43.813084
periodic 0.435650 0.992830 16.071904 28.449848 49.002740 68.743590 157.727273
T ab. 4. crLi j  L kj  ratio for each tranche based on simulated decreasing forward probability rates of an improving 
portfolio (E V T  distribution of portfolio losses).
In general, we find that the impact o f <J^ k on the default term structure declines as the CLO
transaction matures, whereas the variation of unexpected losses around the expected value increases 
with seniority. The term structure of unexpected losses vis-a-vis expected losses has critical 
implications for the analysis of the security design of securitisation transactions. Our results support 
the notion that issuers, who usually retain the most junior tranche as a first loss position in the 
transaction, are only exposed to a constant first moment o f expected losses, while investors holding 
mezzanine (and senior) claims on the reference portfolio might face the prospect o f a non-linear 
increase o f losses over time due to an “implicit transfer” of unexpected losses by issuers.
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7.2 Comparison to zero-bonds
A disproportionate development of unexpected losses (loss volatility) in relation to expected defaults 
(average losses) of the reference portfolio (cr^ j L kj  , i.e. the ratio o f unexpected to expected losses)
per period might be indicative of abnormal returns on CLO tranches over risk-neutral returns. 
However, as any difference between the observed returns in the CLO market and the calculated 
quasi risk-neutral returns depends on the assumptions entering the loss function, the default rates per 
tranche and the corresponding quasi risk-neutral returns should be subjected to pseudo-empirical 
scrutiny. Since the calculation of quasi risk-neutral returns on CLO tranches rekindles the derivation 
o f the yield-to-maturity o f equally-rated zero-coupon bonds, we benchmark the term structure o f 
periodic default probabilities o f selected tranches to comparable zero-bonds, whose internal rate o f 
return is calibrated based on the default rates for rating classes published in the rating reports o f 
Moody’s Investor Services. This is accomplished by matching the first moments o f either the one-year 
default probability (“lower boundary”) or the accumulated seven-year default probability (“upper 
boundary”) assigned ^ by Moody’s to a suitable corporate bond107 with the expected loss of the 
respective CLO tranche according to the following scaling (see Appendix 2, Figs. 9-10).
Bond benchmarks for CLO tranche returns
Rating category 
[Moody’s rating]
Quasi risk- 
neutral return
Bond benchmark for upper/ lower bound of 
tranche-based default term structure
Aaa 5.00074%
Aal 5.00771%
Aa2 5.01596%
Aa3 5.03278% upper bound Tranche 4 [6.5-9%]
Al 5.05892% upper bound Tranche 4[6.5-9%]
A2 5.10357%
A3 5.16282% upper bound Tranche 3 [3.9-6.5%]
Baal 5.24663%
Baa2 5.35818% lower bound Tranche 3 [3.9-6.5%] & Tranche 4 [6.5-9%]
Baa3 5.65911%
Bal 6.10601% upper bound Tranche 1 [0-2.4%]
Ba2 6.73539% lower bound Tranche 2 [2.4-3.9%]
Ba3 7.47054%
B1 8.41114%
B2 9.52890%
B3 11.33656% upper bound Tranche 1 [0-2.4%]
Caa 20.15625% lower bound Tranche 1 [0-2.4%]
Tab. 5. Quasi risk-neutral returns on ^ero-coupon bonds with a common rating-specific default term structure 
(Moody’s Investor Services), matched with the CLO tranches at the first moment in either the first or seventh period.
107 See also Wilson and Fabozzi (1995).
The bond default rate per period matched to the one-year-default rate as lower boundary
A/A*" 'dw xl l j nd and the bond default rate per period matched to the seven-year-default rate as
upper boundary /  f ^ ond^  x l f j nd, where the exponential growth of default losses allocated to CLO
tranches suggests to use the high expected loss of a lower rated bond as a matching first moment for 
the seven-year-default rate and the low default rate o f a higher rated bond as a matching first 
moment for the one-year-default rate. The approximation o f default rate patterns of zero-bonds and 
CLO tranches establishes an orientation as to the lower and upper boundaries o f the CLO term 
structure if it had the same expected loss properties as zero-bonds. Hence, the following steps have 
been completed:
(i) a comparison o f default term structure o f varying rating classes o f zero-bonds 
(according to Moody’s) and the estimated expected default term structure based on NID 
and EVT distributions (for constant, deteriorating and improving reference portfolio quality), and
(ii) a comparison o f calculated quasi risk-neutral returns o f both zero-bonds and different 
CLO tranches (and consideration of deteriorating and improving reference portfolio quality).
Figs. 9 and 10 (Appendix 2) illustrate the term structure o f expected default loss allocated to CLO 
tranches, with first moments matched to the default term structure o f comparable zero-bonds 
according to Tab. 5. This comparison captures both the equity tranche [0-2.4%] and the “investor 
tranches” [2.4-3.9%], [3.9-6.5%], [6.5-9.0%] for an EVT-based loss function with a constant forward 
default rate. The same methodology has been extended for an increasing and decreasing forward 
default rate.
Benchmark
boundaries
Quasi risk-neutral zero-bond returns
0-2.4% 2.4-3.9% 3.9-6.5% 6.5-9%
Zero-bond
benchmarks
upper bound of returns 
(rating class)
20.15625%
[Caal
6.73539%
[Ba2]
5.35818%
[Baa2]
5.05892%
[Al]
lower bound of returns 
(rating class)
11.33656%
[B3]
6.10601%
Pal]
5.16282%
fA3]
5.03278%
[Aa3]
T ab. 6. Zero-bond benchmarks of quasi risk-neutral returns of CLO tranches.
Tab. 6 exhibits the upper and lower boundaries o f quasi risk-neutral returns with matched first 
moments to selected zero-coupon bonds (which have been chosen as close matches to the default 
term structures in Appendix 2, Figs. 5-7). These boundaries allow for a comparative analysis o f the 
term structure of CLO tranches and zero-bonds of similar quality. In contrast to zero-bonds, whose 
periodic default rate increases linearly over time, structured default tolerance rises exponentially over
time for all tranches but the most junior (first loss position) [0-2.4%]. The “investor tranches” display 
a similar degree o f convexity for both loss distributions, which contrasts sharply with the linear (and 
in some cases concave) increase of cumulative expected losses o f the first loss provision held by the 
sponsor o f the CLO transaction.
Once suitable “benchmark” zero-bonds have been identified, we can examine the implications of the 
divergent default structures o f CLO tranches and zero-bonds on the derivation of quasi risk-neutral 
returns (see section 6). Tab. 6 (above) matches the default term structure o f selected “benchmark” 
zero-coupon bonds as the upper and lower boundaries to estimated CLO tranche returns.
It appears that the observed difference between quasi risk-neutral returns o f CLO tranches and 
suitable zero-coupon bonds reflects the exponential nature of expected losses associated with the 
loss cascading effect as a pars pro toto o f subordination in structured finance transactions ex ceteris 
paribus (see Appendix 2, Fig. 9-10). In the case o f a constant forward rate, simulated quasi-risk-neutral 
returns display the smallest degree o f deviation from return expectations for linearly increasing 
cumulative defaults o f zero-coupon bonds, where EVT commands higher returns for the first loss 
position [0-2.4%] and the most senior “investor tranche” [6.5-9.0%] than NID. This difference 
increases as we introduce a varying periodic default rate to take account of either a deteriorating or 
improving portfolio quality over time.
8 EXTENSION: INTRODUCTION OF STOCHASTIC RISK-FREE 
INTEREST RATES
In this section we allow for a varying risk-free interest rate per period. In simulation o f the interest 
rate , we need to distinguish between two cases: (i) a variable (stochastic) risk-free interest rate
based on the fitted distribution of observed LIBOR rates and (ii) a constant risk-free rate as a 
stochastic average (level) across time. Since the United Kingdom has left the European Monetary System 
(ELMS) as o f 16 September 1992 (Jorion, 2001),108 we restrict the database o f interest rates to 12- 
month LIBOR rates quoted at the daily market’s closing from 4 January 1993 to 2 October 2001 (see
108 One could also argue in favour of using observations only after the Madrid Summit in December 1995, 
mainly because it was then that a concrete timetable for the introduction of the euro was agreed upon and 
much of the detailed preparatory work was set in motion. At this point in time, some have argued, the 
convergence process of European monetary policy commences, as the implications of the 1992 ERM crisis 
gradually began to be offset by visible evidence of practical advances in the introducing the euro.
Fig. 3) in order to avoid the distortionary effect o f a structural break in the time series o f observed 
daily interest rates.109
The observed data points do not display significant historical bias (“momentum effect”) and 
heteroskedasticity is low, such that they can be safely regarded i.i.d. With only the first 1,000 
observations containing 460 zero returns, the simulation o f stochastic interest rates for the given 
investment horizon requires the transformation of daily LIBOR rates to end-of-the week quotes. 
Since intra-week rates do not fluctuate, a particular end-of-week effect o f daily 12-month LIBOR 
rates can be confidendy ruled out and the statistical validity of extrapolating future interest rates is 
not impeded. After this conversion of daily rates will are still left with 447 observations to 
substantiate the simulation.
| 12-monfri LIBOR (LN) |
2.6
2.4 _
2 .0 .
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Fig. 3. Time series of daily LIBOR interest rates (logarithmic scale).
Generally speaking, interest rate models focus on forecasting returns on fixed income securities in 
relation to their maturity. The most common approach would assume one or more factors to explain 
the interest rate term structure. After the time-varying dynamics of a single- or multi-factor model 
have been specified, the imposition o f certain expectation hypotheses yields an explicit result for 
future interest rates. Thus, we employ the interest rate model
^ ln r  = \6{t) —a\nr\dt  + crd% , (15)
109 This starting date of the time series was chosen insofar as some time is needed for the event — the U.K. left 
the European Monetary System (EMS) on 16 September 1992 — to manifest itself in the new model.
proposed by Hull and White (1995),110 where mean reversion is permitted for a> 0 in the above 
specification of the stochastic differential equation of interest rate dynamics. Logarithmic interest 
rates ^ ln r  instead o f nominal r prevent negative interest rates. We substitute the constant jJ, for 
the term structure parameter 6{t), given that the objective o f this exercise is predicated on the 
simulation o f the 12-month interest rate at a certain point rather than an entire yield curve. This 
discretisation yields the AR(1) process
lnr/+1 — In/} =0{t) — a\nrt +<JSt — fJ — a \nre + as(
lnr/+1 = ju — a lnr, + as, + In/} = //  + (l — a) In rt + as, (16)
<=> lnr/+1 = //  + a\cir, + as, ,
where /},£} ( /  = 1,...,T) are i.i.d. with expected mean value o f 0, standard deviation a  and a> 0 .ni
Visual inspection o f logarithmic end-of-week LIBOR interest rates above exhibits only weak level 
stationarity.112 The parameter estimate of the return time series of 12-month LIBOR rates
-  £ - i) / hr  ^ = ( \  + fi + as) , (17)
borders to non-stationarity with coefficient value a close to 0, indicating low mean reversion o f 
LIBOR rates over a sample period T  o f almost nine years (see Fig. 2). The maximum likelihood (ML) 
estimation of the probability distribution for AR(1) residuals of logarithmic LIBOR interest rates 
proves to be inconclusive due to weak mean reversion, which is affirmed by
E a |a  -  a|* —> 0 (T  —>oo) \jm  > 1 o f the Yule Walker starting estimator for a  :113
=^(XL1]nr'+ilnr')/2 ,T=ilnr'2 ’ (18)
110 At this point one could certainly consider more advanced interest rate models, such as the Cox-Ingersoll-Ross 
(CIR) model (1985). See also Hull (1993 and 1997).
111 We abstain from imposing normality on uniformly distributed values of St , because no option prices are 
determined in the course of this analysis.
112 It takes about two years on average until the level of LIBOR rates has returned to the original base level.
113 The Yule Walker starting estimator (Miyata, 2001; Nakatuka, 1978) is bounded at |aj < 1, where
a  — a  = — o r ^ l n a —>a follow from
(1/ T) 2 /r=i ln? -»o-2/ ( l - o r 2)and ( l / T ^ ^ l n r , * ,  -> 0 .
parameter a a
estimator 0.977686 0.022314
std. error 0.027836 0.027836
t-value 35.12 0.80
Tab. 7. Yule Walker estimation results for mean reversion.
The residuals of R, = In r, — a  In rt_x are clearly heavy tailed, as the q-q plot (Fig. 4 below) 
demonstrates. Since positive and negative deviations of observed LIBOR rates from the standard 
normal distribution appear to be symmetric at the extreme quantiles, we fit a /-distribution on mean- 
adjusted and scaled residuals o f the observed data points (Sandmann, 1999; Campell et al., 1997), 
such that
R  = /j + <JSe io t£ t ~ t v . (19)
The estimated parameters for the 12-month LIBOR interest rate are listed in Tab. 8 below, where the 
estimated chi-square statistic is 24.52 (p-value o f 0.1769). We simulate one million paths of 
estimated 12-month LIBOR interest rates over seven years, i.e. 350 time increments, based on the 
presented model. Given the estimated default term structure in section 4, we estimate the quasi risk- 
neutral returns per tranche (see Tab. 9 below) if stochastic stochastic risk-free interest is applied to 
the quasi risk-neutral pricing method in section 6 for both loss distributions (EVT and NID) and all 
three possibilities of portfolio quality (constant, deteriorating, improving). For illustrative purposes, 
quasi risk-neutral returns per tranche have also been computed at the average stochastic interest-rate 
exp(,w/tf) = 6.174769% as constant risk-free rate (see Tab. 10). As opposed to the case of a fixed 
risk-free rate r^ per period (see section 6), we now introduce stochastic interest rates. Although the
summation o f stochastic interest rates equates to the summation o f constant risk-free interest rates 
due to mean reversion for / —> oo in general and m —> oo in our model, the variation o f stochastic 
interest rates over time results in /y ^  i . If
constant risk-free interest rates ry , the discount factor j^_j(l + ry ) is generally smaller for 
stochastic interest rates and yields lower quasi risk-neutral investor returns.
we substitute stochastic periodic interest rates for
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Fig. 4. q-q plot of observed distribution of LIBO R rates and a standard normal distribution.
The effect o f a lower periodic discount rate will also become more pronounced as the CLO 
transaction matures. This has a significant bearing on the distinctive term structures o f tranches, 
where the first loss position displays constant expected losses per period, as opposed to “investor 
tranches”, which exhibit a non-linear increase o f expected losses per period. In the case o f stochastic 
interest rates, returns for the first loss position will decline more than for mezzanine and senior 
tranches. Since we benchmark the default term structure o f each CLO tranche to comparable zero 
bonds, we might also enlist the pricing behaviour o f bonds to explain the difference in returns by the 
choice o f constant or stochastic risk-free interest rates as periodic discount rate. Investment in bonds 
is safer (and generates lower returns) at constant periodic discount rates as opposed to time-varying 
interest rates due to the intrinsic value o f volatility. Consequently, a stochastic interest rate, be it 
periodic or average-weighted, would lead to a marginal decrease o f the periodic discount rate and 
higher calculated returns o f tranches than in the case o f constant interest rates.
A £7 V
estimator 0.040622 0.011517 2643781
std error 0.000674 0.000791 0.419292
t-value 60.26 14.55 3.92
Tab. 8. Estimation of residuals for a fitted t-distribution on 12-month LIB O R
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Distribution and collateral performance Quasi risk-neutral returns per tranche(at average stochastic risk-free rate as discount rate)
Allocated
tranche
losses
Reference
portfolio
quality
Loss
distribution 0-2.4% 2.4-3.9% 3.9-6.5% 6.5-9% 9-10.5% 10.5-100%
cumulative
L k
constant
EVT 22.39463% 7.30974% 6.29268% 6.10283% 6.06451% 6.03589%
NID 21.62188% 7.81517% 6.37059% 6.08477% 6.04547% 6.03454%
deteriorating
EVT 38.26656% 11.74418% 6.71721% 6.14718% 6.07401% 6.03609%
NID 31.38123% 12.15254% 7.79993% 6.42232% 6.13398% 6.03570%
improring
EVT 50.15165% 10.84695% 6.63082% 6.14206% 6.07255% 6.03599%
NID 43.89018% 11.92903% 6.92431% 6.09964% 6.04086% 6.03446%
Tab. 9. Expected quasi risk-neutral returns per tranche based on the average variable (stochastic) risk-free rate 
as constant discount rate.
Distribution and collateral performance Quasi risk-neutral returns per tranche
(at stochastic risk-free rate as discount rate)
Allocated
tranche
losses
Reference
portfolio
quality
Loss
distribution 0-2.4% 2.4-3.9% 3.9-6.5% 6.5-9% 9-10.5% 10.5-100%
cumulative
constant
EVT 22.62031% 7.45478% 6.43406% 6.24347% 6.20499% 6.17623%
NID 21.84458% 7.96229% 6.51219% 6.22531% 6.18585% 6.17488%
deteriorating
EVT 38.56835% 11.90002% 6.85962% 6.28793% 6.21451% 6.17644%
NID 31.65209% 12.31435% 7.94590% 6.56384% 6.27462% 6.17605%
improring EVT 50.54813% 11.00315% 6.77326% 6.28283% 6.21305% 6.17634%NID 44.25293% 12.09255% 7.06783% 6.24022% 6.18122% 6.17480%
Tab. 10. Expected quasi risk-neutral returns per tranche based on the periodically variable (stochastic) risk-free rate.
9 CONCLUSION
The main objective o f this chapter was the development of a single-factor asset pricing model o f 
subordinated, default-sensitive debt claims (tranches) in CLO-style securitisation from a simulated 
default term structure, under both robust statistical analysis and extreme value theory (EVT). In a 
general valuation model, we investigated how loss sharing between issuers and investors through 
subordination effects the way securitisation translates securitised credit risk exposure into leveraged 
investment risk o f issued debt securities. We first completed a Monte Carlo simulation of random 
default losses from two distinct loss functions o f an infinitely granular reference loan portfolio with 
an i.i.d. periodic default process, where a single systematic risk factor drives aggregate (uniform) 
default at constant between-asset default correlation. Subsequently, we allocated estimated losses 
according to tranche subordination to derive the periodic and cumulative default term structure o f 
each tranche over the specified lifetime o f the transaction and the corresponding rates o f return o f 
risk-neutral investors. This approach allowed us to decompose the default-generating asset value 
process o f securitised loans into a collection o f default sensitive debt securities with divergent risk 
profiles and expected investor returns. The estimated default term structure o f individual tranches 
reflected the transmission mechanism implied by the chosen security design o f securitisation. The
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combination of robust statistics and extreme value analysis for the estimation of the default term 
structure yielded insights about both the sensitivity o f estimation results to the limiting behaviour of 
extreme events and the leverage effect from subordinated investment at a certain default term 
structure for different loss profiles and time-varying portfolio quality.
Our findings clearly flag a dichotomy of expected losses per tranche (and associated quasi risk-neutral 
returns) between the first loss position (equity tranche) and more senior “investor tranches,” mainly 
because the subordination o f tranches concentrates expected losses in the small first loss position, 
shifting most unexpected risk to the larger, more senior tranches. The default term structure of 
cumulative loan loss allocated to the first tranche increases linearly and appears to be more sensitive 
to varying default rates o f the underlying reference portfolio than the more senior “investor 
tranches”, whose expected losses increase in a non-linear fashion over time. The most junior tranche 
of CLO transactions also exhibits a distinctly different default tolerance o f unexpected losses 
compared to the remaining tranches, which is even more pronounced as the likelihood o f extreme 
loss events increases. Hence, relative loss volatility increases exponentially for tranches beyond the 
first loss position, where lower unexpected losses imply a more accurate calculation o f quasi risk- 
neutral tranche returns. As unexpected risk becomes a more important component o f investment 
risk than expected losses, more senior investors also experience higher leveraged exposure from 
unexpected losses than they would on expected losses. We find that as the level o f seniority decreases 
(i) the leverage o f relative expected and unexpected losses per tranche to relative portfolio losses 
increases, (ii) the ratio of unexpected to expected losses decreases, and (iii) the share o f expected 
losses out o f overall portfolio losses carried by the respective tranche increases. Against the 
background o f potential agency problems between issuers and investors in securitisation structures, 
our observations might explain why issuers generally retain the most junior tranche as credit 
enhancement. The retention o f the lowest tranche is tantamount to the acceptance o f a calculable 
“sure loss”, which allows issuers to implicitly transfer most o f the loss volatility associated with 
securitised loans to investor tranches.
Since empirical evidence suggests higher stochastic weight associated with extreme events, the gulf 
between the default term structures of the most junior tranche and the remaining tranches is 
expected to widen in stress scenarios. Hence, in the context o f leveraged investment, the need for 
precise knowledge about the tail behaviour of default losses makes the case for using an EVT-based 
approach even more compelling vis-a-vis standard limit distributions, which merely assume moderate 
deviations around expected losses. Although the effect of subordination rem ains most distinctive for 
the most junior tranche irrespective o f the type of loss function used to simulate the default term
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structure, EVT concentrates more expected cumulative losses on the most junior tranche (especially 
for a changing default rate to reflect time-varying reference portfolio quality) than a normal 
distribution function, with marginal periodic losses declining asymptotically. So, if issuers properly 
account for expected losses by providing optimal first loss protection at a certain projected default 
profile, they benefit from an almost complete removal o f unexpected losses from securitised loans. 
Since our estimation results suggest that 60% to 98% of expected losses are concentrated in the most 
junior tranche, issuers could potentially offload most unexpected losses to investors.
The impact of tranche subordination on investment risk in our analysis underscores the significance 
of the transaction structure for the marketability o f credit risk exposures via loan securitisation. The 
retention o f first losses from securitised loans seems to be largely motivated by incentives that extend 
beyond an effort to mitigate the agency cost of asymmetric information associated with the “credit 
component” o f loan securitisation (e.g. information constraints o f lending relationships). A 
subordinated security design supports an efficient placement o f debt securities, while the significant 
decline of marginal unexpected losses of the first loss position over time affords issuers more 
predictable investment risk than capital market investors, who hold the mezzanine and senior 
tranches (“investor tranches”). Conversely, careless management o f unexpected risk o f securitised 
loans would curtail the issuer’s structural discretion to assign specific loss tolerance to each 
constituent tranche within a particular security design.
Given the inherent ambiguity of the securitised asset quality in CLO markets (especially in bank- 
based financial systems with relationship lending characteristics) due to insufficient standardisation of 
accounting practices and reporting standards, our analysis highlights the importance o f a careful 
review of the loss sharing provisions between issuers and investors o f securitised debt for the risk 
assessment o f securitised loans.
Our loss-based pricing methodology for securitised tranches presents an instructive blueprint for the 
estimation o f the default term structure of securitised loans. A more comprehensive asset pricing 
model might also allow for variations in the security design of CLO transactions. Further extensions 
might include the substitution of time-varying variance and autocorrelation modelling for the 
simplifying assumption of an infinitely granular portfolio and an i.i.d. sequence of periodic default 
losses from a single macro-economic risk factor. So far, the presented model has been confined to 
different periodic default rates with constant pairwise default correlation. The assumption of 
intertemporal changes o f between-asset correlation would provide another contingency on the 
variation of leveraged exposure of subordinated tranches in loan securitisation, which would certainly
guide investor understanding o f loss sharing in structured finance products further and promote 
informed investment.
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11 APPENDIX
11.1 Appendix 1: Tables
Expected and 
unexpected losses Ly per tranche (in % of tranche volume) L kj  per tranche (abs. share of total exp. losses per period)
cum./per. Yr Pu LJ ^ j 0-2.4% 2.4-3.9% 3.9-6.5% 6.5-9% 9-10.5% 10.5-100% 0-2.4% 2.4-3.9% 3.9-6.5% 6.5-9% 9-10.5% 10.5-100%
cumulative 1 0.0026 0.002598 0.004581 0.104285 0.003095 0.000987 0.000375 0.000188 0.000010 0.002503 0.000046 0.000026 0.000009 0.000005 0.000009
periodic 0.002598 0.004581 0.104285 0.003095 0.000987 0.000375 0.000188 0.000010 0.002503 0.000046 0.000026 0.000009 0.000005 0.000009
cumulative 2 0.0026 0.005299 0.006512 0.207327 0.007653 0.002229 0.000797 0.000402 0.000023 0.004976 0.000115 0.000058 0.000020 0.000010 0.000020
periodic 0.002701 0.001931 0.103042 0.004558 0.001242 0.000422 0.000214 0.000013 0.002473 0.000068 0.000032 0.000011 0.000005 0.000012
cumulative 3 0.0026 0.007799 0.007978 0.308168 0.014546 0.003940 0.001332 0.000648 0.000037 0.007396 0.000218 0.000102 0.000033 0.000016 0.000033
periodic 0.002500 0.001466 0.100841 0.006893 0.001711 0.000535 0.000246 0.000014 0.002420 0.000103 0.000044 0.000013 0.000006 0.000012
cumulative 4 0.0026 0.010397 0.009228 0.406098 0.024665 0.006204 0.001994 0.000952 0.000051 0.009746 0.000370 0.000161 0.000050 0.000024 0.000045
periodic 0.002598 0.001250 0.097930 0.010119 0.002264 0.000662 0.000304 0.000014 0.002350 0.000152 0.000059 0.000017 0.000008 0.000012
cumulative 5 0.0026 0.012990 0.010317 0.500079 0.039278 0.009131 0.002777 0.001292 0.000067 0.012002 0.000589 0.000237 0.000069 0.000032 0.000059
periodic 0.002593 0.001089 0.093981 0.014613 0.002927 0.000783 0.000340 0.000016 0.002256 0.000219 0.000076 0.000020 0.000009 0.000014
cumulative 6 0.0026 0.015581 0.011252 0.589083 0.060005 0.012995 0.003645 0.001649 0.000082 0.014138 0.000900 0.000338 0.000091 0.000041 0.000073
periodic 0.002591 0.000935 0.089004 0.020727 0.003864 0.000868 0.000357 0.000015 0.002136 0.000311 0.000100 0.000022 0.000009 0.000013
cumulative 7 0.0026 0.018168 0.012104 0.671323 0.088676 0.018083 0.004711 0.002052 0.000098 0.016112 0.001330 0.000470 0.000118 0.000051 0.000087
periodic 0.002587 0.000852 0.082240 0.028671 0.005088 0.001066 0.000403 0.000016 0.001974 0.000430 0.000132 0.000027 0.000010 0.000014
Expected and 
unexpected losses
a  f t  per tranche (in % of tranche volume) a  fk  per tranche (abs. share of total exp. losses per period)
cum./per. Yr Pu LJ % 0-2.4% 2.4-3.9% 3.9-6.5% 6.5-9% 9-10.5% 10.5-100% 0-2.4% 2.4-3.9% 3.9-6.5% 6.5-9% 9-10.5% 10.5-100%
cumulative 1 0.0026 0.002598 0.004581 0.130941 0.050337 0.028247 0.018032 0.013013 0.001526 0.003143 0.000755 0.000734 0.000451 0.000325 0.001351
periodic 0.002598 0.004581 0.130941 0.050337 0.028247 0.018032 0.013013 0.001526 0.003143 0.000755 0.000734 0.000451 0.000325 0.001351
cumulative 2 0.0026 0.005299 0.006512 0.178268 0.078295 0.041886 0.026340 0.019017 0.002261 0.004278 0.001174 0.001089 0.000659 0.000475 0.002001
periodic 0.002701 0.001931 0.047327 0.027958 0.013639 0.008308 0.006004 0.000735 0.001136 0.000419 0.000355 0.000208 0.000150 0.000650
cumulative 3 0.0026 0.007799 0.007978 0.208257 0.106408 0.055182 0.033976 0.024088 0.002737 0.004998 0.001596 0.001435 0.000849 0.000602 0.002422
periodic 0.002500 0.001466 0.029989 0.028113 0.013296 0.007636 0.005071 0.000476 0.000720 0.000422 0.000346 0.000191 0.000127 0.000421
cumulative 4 0.0026 0.010397 0.009228 0.226551 0.136470 0.068699 0.041584 0.029081 0.003191 0.005437 0.002047 0.001786 0.001040 0.000727 0.002824
periodic 0.002598 0.001250 0.018294 0.030062 0.013517 0.007608 0.004993 0.000454 0.000439 0.000451 0.000351 0.000190 0.000125 0.000402
cumulative 5 0.0026 0.012990 0.010317 0.235359 0.169272 0.082556 0.048863 0.033732 0.003616 0.005649 0.002539 0.002146 0.001222 0.000843 0.003200
periodic 0.002593 0.001089 0.008808 0.032802 0.013857 0.007279 0.004651 0.000425 0.000211 0.000492 0.000360 0.000182 0.000116 0.000376
cumulative 6 0.0026 0.015581 0.011252 0.235536 0.205001 0.097288 0.055601 0.038068 0.003977 0.005653 0.003075 0.002529 0.001390 0.000952 0.003520
periodic 0.002591 0.000935 0.000177 0.035729 0.014732 0.006738 0.004336 0.000361 0.000004 0.000536 0.000383 0.000168 0.000108 0.000319
cumulative 7 0.0026 0.018168 0.012104 0.227853 0.243130 0.113521 0.062720 0.042430 0.004301 0.005468 0.003647 0.002952 0.001568 0.001061 0.003806
periodic 0.002587 0.000852 -0.007683 0.038129 0.016233 0.007119 0.004362 0.000324 -0.000184 0.000572 0.000422 0.000178 0.000109 0.000287
Tab. 11. Simulation of constant forward probability rates (EVT loss function as distribution ofportfolio losses) of default losses on a cumulative and periodic basis — losses per tranche with 
either the tranche % or the absolute value of losses per period as reference base.
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Expected and 
unexpected losses L kj  per tranche (in % of tranche volume) I f )  per tranche (abs. share of total exp. losses per period)
cum./per. Yr Pn h % 0-2.4% 2.4-3.9% 3.9-6.5% 6.5-9% 9-10.5% 10.5-100% 0-2.4% 2.4-3.9% 3.9-6.5% 6.5-9% 9-10.5% 10.5-100%
cumulative 1 0.00010 0.002598 0.004581 0.104285 0.003095 0.000987 0.000375 0.000188 0.000010 0.002503 0.000046 0.000026 0.000009 0.000005 0.000009
periodic 0.002598 0.004581 0.104285 0.003095 0.000987 0.000375 0.000188 0.000010 0.002503 0.000046 0.000026 0.000009 0.000005 0.000009
cumulative 2 0.00123 0.006191 0.006508 0.248098 0.008190 0.002382 0.000833 0.000413 0.000023 0.005954 0.000123 0.000062 0.000021 0.000010 0.000020
periodic 0.003593 0.004626 0.145561 0.003188 0.001032 0.000366 0.000197 0.000012 0.003452 0.000076 0.000036 0.000011 0.000006 0.000012
cumulative 3 0.00195 0.010473 0.007834 0.416846 0.018131 0.004431 0.001373 0.000653 0.000034 0.010004 0.000272 0.000115 0.000034 0.000016 0.000030
periodic 0.004282 0.004366 0.174498 0.003318 0.000946 0.000311 0.000158 0.000009 0.004050 0.000149 0.000053 0.000014 0.000006 0.000010
cumulative 4 0.00247 0.015278 0.009016 0.598044 0.039707 0.007968 0.002189 0.000976 0.000049 0.014353 0.000596 0.000207 0.000055 0.000024 0.000043
periodic 0.004805 0.004461 0.196124 0.003444 0.000979 0.000316 0.000171 0.000010 0.004349 0.000324 0.000092 0.000020 0.000008 0.000013
cumulative 5 0.00277 0.020389 0.010101 0.770975 0.088717 0.014413 0.003391 0.001416 0.000068 0.018503 0.001331 0.000375 0.000085 0.000035 0.000060
periodic 0.005111 0.004540 0.208625 0.003570 0.001030 0.000365 0.000192 0.000011 0.004150 0.000735 0.000168 0.000030 0.000011 0.000017
cumulative 6 0.00295 0.025679 0.011100 0.908023 0.195662 0.026506 0.005249 0.002007 0.000091 0.021793 0.002935 0.000689 0.000131 0.000050 0.000081
periodic 0.005289 0.004583 0.215965 0.003606 0.001061 0.000374 0.000194 0.000012 0.003289 0.001604 0.000314 0.000046 0.000015 0.000020
cumulative 7 0.00306 0.031064 0.011904 0.981059 0.389878 0.049962 0.008072 0.002774 0.000114 0.023545 0.005848 0.001299 0.000202 0.000069 0.000101
periodic 0.005386 0.004303 0.220174 0.003614 0.001051 0.000347 0.000173 0.000008 0.001753 0.002913 0.000610 0.000071 0.000019 0.000020
Expected and 
unexpected losses
O' fk per tranche (in % of tranche volume) a r k  per tranche (abs. share of total exp. losses per period)
r /
cum./per. Yr Ph LJ % 0-2.4% 2.4-3.9% 3.9-6.5% 6.5-9% 9-10.5% 10.5-100% 0-2.4% 2.4-3.9% 3.9-6.5% 6.5-9% 9-10.5% 10.5-100%
cumulative 1 0.00010 0.002598 0.004581 0.130941 0.050337 0.028247 0.018032 0.013013 0.001526 0.003143 0.000755 0.000734 0.000451 0.000325 0.001351
periodic 0.002598 0.004581 0.130941 0.050337 0.028247 0.018032 0.013013 0.001526 0.003143 0.000755 0.000734 0.000451 0.000325 0.001351
cumulative 2 0.00123 0.006191 0.006508 0.174874 0.080581 0.043399 0.026735 0.019296 0.002297 0.004197 0.001209 0.001128 0.000668 0.000482 0.002033
periodic 0.003593 0.004626 0.128459 0.050898 0.028846 0.017801 0.013353 0.001674 0.001054 0.000454 0.000394 0.000218 0.000157 0.000682
cumulative 3 0.00195 0.010473 0.007834 0.196178 0.116936 0.058216 0.034156 0.024201 0.002717 0.004708 0.001754 0.001514 0.000854 0.000605 0.002405
periodic 0.004282 0.004366 0.127236 0.051448 0.027190 0.016506 0.011817 0.001324 0.000511 0.000545 0.000385 0.000186 0.000123 0.000372
cumulative 4 0.00247 0.015278 0.009016 0.195799 0.166620 0.076333 0.042914 0.029468 0.003226 0.004699 0.002499 0.001985 0.001073 0.000737 0.002855
periodic 0.004805 0.004461 0.126626 0.052496 0.027589 0.017024 0.012409 0.001539 -0.000009 0.000745 0.000471 0.000219 0.000132 0.000450
cumulative 5 0.00277 0.020389 0.010101 0.168668 0.234645 0.100094 0.052945 0.035368 0.003746 0.004048 0.003520 0.002602 0.001324 0.000884 0.003315
periodic 0.005111 0.004540 0.126135 0.053353 0.028524 0.017735 0.013319 0.001588 -0.000651 0.001020 0.000618 0.000251 0.000148 0.000460
cumulative 6 0.00295 0.025679 0.011100 0.113185 0.312582 0.131249 0.065124 0.041864 0.004305 0.002716 0.004689 0.003412 0.001628 0.001047 0.003810
periodic 0.005289 0.004583 0.125604 0.053776 0.028916 0.018047 0.013306 0.001701 -0.001332 0.001169 0.000810 0.000304 0.000162 0.000495
cumulative 7 0.00306 0.031064 0.011904 0.048280 0.358264 0.172091 0.079550 0.048750 0.004631 0.001159 0.005374 0.004474 0.001989 0.001219 0.004098
periodic 0.005386 0.004303 0.125246 0.053700 0.028669 0.017346 0.012474 0.001050 -0.001558 0.000685 0.001062 0.000361 0.000172 0.000289
Tab. 12. Simulation of increasingforward probability rates (EVT loss function as distribution ofportfolio losses) of default losses on a cumulative and periodic basis — losses per tranche with 
either the tranche % or the absolute value of losses per period as reference base.
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Expected and 
unexpected losses L )  per tranche (in % of tranche volume) i f j  per tranche (abs. share of total exp. losses per period)
cum./per. Yr Pu L J % 0-2.4% 2.4-3.9% 3.9-6.5% 6.5-9% 9-10.5% 10.5-100% 0-2.4% 2.4-3.9% 3.9-6.5% 6.5-9% 9-10.5% 10.5-100%
cumulative 1 0.00367 0.006005 0.004523 0.245673 0.003844 0.001091 0.000378 0.000182 0.000009 0.005896 0.000058 0.000028 0.000009 0.000005 0.000008
periodic 0.006005 0.004523 0.245673 0.003844 0.001091 0.000378 0.000182 0.000009 0.005896 0.000058 0.000028 0.000009 0.000005 0.000008
cumulative 2 0.00267 0.011014 0.006328 0.445650 0.012637 0.003011 0.000892 0.000419 0.000020 0.010696 0.000190 0.000078 0.000022 0.000010 0.000018
periodic 0.005009 0.004429 0.204375 0.003659 0.001085 0.000360 0.000178 0.000009 0.004799 0.000132 0.000050 0.000013 0.000006 0.000010
cumulative 3 0.00195 0.015296 0.007696 0.608457 0.030299 0.005900 0.001564 0.000693 0.000032 0.014603 0.000454 0.000153 0.000039 0.000017 0.000028
periodic 0.004282 0.004366 0.174498 0.003318 0.000946 0.000311 0.000158 0.000009 0.003907 0.000265 0.000075 0.000017 0.000007 0.000011
cumulative 4 0.00154 0.019189 0.008889 0.742734 0.063996 0.010507 0.002531 0.001046 0.000047 0.017826 0.000960 0.000273 0.000063 0.000026 0.000042
periodic 0.003894 0.004440 0.158171 0.003325 0.001020 0.000345 0.000169 0.000009 0.003223 0.000505 0.000120 0.000024 0.000009 0.000013
cumulative 5 0.00123 0.022782 0.010016 0.846424 0.121583 0.017450 0.003799 0.001493 0.000066 0.020314 0.001824 0.000454 0.000095 0.000037 0.000058
periodic 0.003593 0.004626 0.145561 0.003188 0.001032 0.000366 0.000197 0.000012 0.002489 0.000864 0.000181 0.000032 0.000011 0.000017
cumulative 6 0.00094 0.026099 0.011032 0.917378 0.206659 0.027686 0.005460 0.002017 0.000086 0.022017 0.003100 0.000720 0.000137 0.000050 0.000076
periodic 0.003317 0.004623 0.134103 0.003262 0.001042 0.000364 0.000176 0.0000)0 0.001703 0.001276 0.000266 0.000042 0.000013 0.000018
cumulative 7 0.00083 0.029309 0.011953 0.961671 0.318082 0.042558 0.007584 0.002645 0.000107 0.023080 0.004771 0.001107 0.000190 0.000066 0.000095
periodic 0.003209 0.004607 0.129703 0.003157 0.000987 0.000365 0.000195 0.000011 0.001063 0.001671 0.000387 0.000053 0.000016 0.000019
Expected and 
unexpected losses
a  f t  per tranche (in % of tranche volume) a  f t  per tranche (abs. share of total exp. losses per period)
‘- j
cum./per. Yr Pit L j % 0-2.4% 2.4-3.9% 3.9-6.5% 6.5-9% 9-10.5% 10.5-100% 0-2.4% 2.4-3.9% 3.9-6.5% 6.5-9% 9-10.5% 10.5-100%
cumulative 1 0.00367 0.006005 0.004523 0.124453 0.055172 0.029266 0.018088 0.012631 0.001715 0.002987 0.000828 0.000761 0.000452 0.000316 0.001518
periodic 0.006005 0.004523 0.124453 0.055172 0.029266 0.018088 0.012631 0.001715 0.002987 0.000828 0.000761 0.000452 0.000316 0.001518
cumulative 2 0.00267 0.011014 0.006328 0.159532 0.097505 0.047893 0.027566 0.019229 0.002198 0.003829 0.001463 0.001245 0.000689 0.000481 0.001945
periodic 0.005009 0.004429 0.126442 0.054316 0.029122 0.017752 0.012535 0.001253 0.000842 0.000635 0.000484 0.000237 0.000165 0.000427
cumulative 3 0.00195 0.015296 0.007696 0.170597 0.145666 0.065797 0.036069 0.024743 0.002656 0.004094 0.002185 0.001711 0.000902 0.000619 0.002351
periodic 0.004282 0.004366 0.127236 0.051448 0.027190 0.016506 0.011817 0.001324 0.000266 0.000722 0.000466 0.000213 0.000138 0.000405
cumulative 4 0.00154 0.019189 0.008889 0.162596 0.202429 0.086183 0.045515 0.030438 0.003059 0.003902 0.003036 0.002241 0.001138 0.000761 0.002707
periodic 0.003894 0.004440 0.128220 0.051941 0.028494 0.017093 0.012322 0.001283 ■0.000192 0.000851 0.000530 0.000236 0.000142 0.000357
cumulative 5 0.00123 0.022782 0.010016 0.138867 0.262821 0.108775 0.055492 0.036301 0.003628 0.003333 0.003942 0.002828 0.001387 0.000908 0.003211
periodic 0.003593 0.004626 0.128459 0.050898 0.028846 0.017801 0.013353 0.001674 -0.000569 0.000906 0.000587 0.000249 0.000147 0.000504
cumulative 6 0.00094 0.026099 0.011032 0.106689 0.317039 0.133944 0.066194 0.041936 0.004178 0.002561 0.004756 0.003483 0.001655 0.001048 0.003698
periodic 0.003317 0.004623 0.129227 0.051637 0.028862 0.017647 0.012598 0.001760 -0.000772 0.000813 0.000654 0.000268 0.000141 0.000487
cumulative 7 0.00083 0.029309 0.011953 0.072741 0.354321 0.161875 0.077491 0.047751 0.004688 0.001746 0.005315 0.004209 0.001937 0.001194 0.004149
periodic 0.003209 0.004607 0.128773 0.050739 0.028080 0.017886 0.013405 0.001735 -0.000815 0.000559 0.000726 0.000282 0.000145 0.000451
Tab. 13. Simulation of decreasing forward probability rates (EVT loss function as distribution ofportfolio losses) of default losses on a cumulative and periodic basis — losses per tranche with 
either the tranche % or the absolute value of losses per period as reference base.
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Expected and 
unexpected losses L kj  per tranche (in % of tranche volume) Lk per tranche (abs. share of total exp. losses per period)
cum./per. Yr P L J % 0-2.4% 2.4-3.9% 3.9-6.5% 6.5-9% 9-10.5% 10.5-100% 0-2.4% 2.4-3.9% 3.9-6.5% 6.5-9% 9-10.5% 10.5-100%
cumulative 1 0.0026 0.002593 0.004588 0.104352 0.004135 0.000830 0.000157 0.000041 0.000001 0.002504 0.000062 0.000022 0.000004 0.000001 0.000001
periodic 0.002593 0.004588 0.104352 0.004135 0.000830 0.000157 0.000041 0.000001 0.002504 0.000062 0.000022 0.000004 0.000001 0.000001
cumulative 2 0.0026 0.005186 0.006491 0.206350 0.010987 0.002129 0.000389 0.000110 0.000001 0.004952 0.000165 0.000055 0.000010 0.000003 0.000001
periodic 0.002593 0.001903 0.101998 0.006852 0.001299 0.000232 0.000069 0.000000 0.002448 0.000103 0.000034 0.000006 0.000002 0.000000
cumulative 3 0.0026 0.007771 0.007921 0.304995 0.021439 0.004068 0.000683 0.000177 0.000002 0.007320 0.000322 0.000106 0.000017 0.000004 0.000002
periodic 0.002585 0.001430 0.098645 0.010452 0.001939 0.000294 0.000067 0.000001 0.002367 0.000157 0.000050 0.000007 0.000002 0.000001
cumulative 4 0.0026 0.010356 0.009126 0.399452 0.036819 0.006922 0.001108 0.000261 0.000003 0.009587 0.000552 0.000180 0.000028 0.000007 0.000003
periodic 0.002585 0.001205 0.094457 0.015380 0.002854 0.000425 0.000084 0.000001 0.002267 0.000231 0.000074 0.000011 0.000002 0.000001
cumulative 5 0.0026 0.012934 0.010181 0.488493 0.058068 0.010884 0.001691 0.000392 0.000004 0.011724 0.000871 0.000283 0.000042 0.000010 0.000004
periodic 0.002578 0.001055 0.089041 0.021249 0.003962 0.000583 0.000131 0.000001 0.002137 0.000319 0.000103 0.000015 0.000003 0.000001
cumulative 6 0.0026 0.015500 0.011127 0.570866 0.086047 0.016401 0.002502 0.000559 0.000006 0.013701 0.001291 0.000426 0.000063 0.000014 0.000005
periodic 0.002566 0.000946 0.082373 0.027979 0.005517 0.000811 0.000167 0.000002 0.001977 0.000420 0.000143 0.000020 0.000004 0.000002
cumulative 7 0.0026 0.018059 0.011991 0.645940 0.121363 0.023847 0.003575 0.000777 0.000008 0.015503 0.001820 0.000620 0.000089 0.000019 0.000007
periodic 0.002559 0.000864 0.075074 0.035316 0.007446 0.001073 0.000218 0.000002 0.001802 0.000530 0.000194 0.000027 0.000005 0.000002
Tab. 14. Simulation of constant forward probability rates (NID) of default losses on a cumulative and periodic basis — losses per tranche with either the tranche % or the absolute value of 
losses per period as reference base.
Expected and 
unexpected losses I f j  per tranche (in % of tranche volume) L kj  per tranche (abs. share of total exp. losses per period)
cum./per. Yr P LJ % 0-2.4% 2.4-3.9% 3.9-6.5% 6.5-9% 9-10.5% 10.5-100% 0-2.4% 2.4-3.9% 3.9-6.5% 6.5-9% 9-10.5% 10.5-100%
cumulative 1 0.0026 0.002593 0.004579 0.104369 0.004101 0.000831 0.000147 0.000039 0.000001 0.002505 0.000062 0.000022 0.000004 0.000001 0.000001
periodic 0.002593 0.004579 0.104369 0.004101 0.000831 0.000147 0.000039 0.000001 0.002505 0.000062 0.000022 0.000004 0.000001 0.000001
cumulative 2 0.0026 0.006178 0.007552 0.241895 0.016947 0.003589 0.000685 0.000200 0.000004 0.005805 0.000254 0.000093 0.000017 0.000005 0.000004
periodic 0.003585 0.002973 0.137526 0.012846 0.002758 0.000538 0.000161 0.000003 0.003301 0.000193 0.000072 0.000013 0.000004 0.000003
cumulative 3 0.0026 0.010451 0.010198 0.393470 0.045190 0.010055 0.001928 0.000516 0.000008 0.009443 0.000678 0.000261 0.000048 0.000013 0.000007
periodic 0.004273 0.002646 0.151575 0.028243 0.006466 0.001243 0.000316 0.000004 0.003638 0.000424 0.000168 0.000031 0.000008 0.000004
cumulative 4 0.0026 0.015207 0.012650 0.542116 0.096050 0.023047 0.004522 0.001182 0.000016 0.013011 0.001441 0.000599 0.000113 0.000030 0.000014
periodic 0.004756 0.002452 0.148646 0.050860 0.012992 0.002594 0.000666 0.000008 0.003568 0.000763 0.000338 0.000065 0.000017 0.000007
cumulative 5 0.0026 0.020238 0.014826 0.673930 0.172279 0.044946 0.009036 0.002325 0.000030 0.016174 0.002584 0.001169 0.000226 0.000058 0.000027
periodic 0.005031 0.002176 0.131814 0.076229 0.021899 0.004514 0.001143 0.000014 0.003164 0.001143 0.000569 0.000113 0.000029 0.000012
cumulative 6 0.0026 0.025426 0.016816 0.780726 0.271508 0.078663 0.016656 0.004250 0.000054 0.018737 0.004073 0.002045 0.000416 0.000106 0.000048
periodic 0.005188 0.001990 0.106796 0.099229 0.033717 0.007620 0.001925 0.000024 0.002563 0.001488 0.000877 0.000191 0.000048 0.000021
cumulative 7 0.0026 0.030681 0.018618 0.860469 0.386342 0.125166 0.028539 0.007366 0.000094 0.020651 0.005795 0.003254 0.000713 0.000184 0.000083
periodic 0.005255 0.001802 0.079743 0.114834 0.046503 0.011883 0.003116 0.000040 0.001914 0.001723 0.001209 0.000297 0.000078 0.000035
Tab. 15. Simulation of increasing forward probability rates (NID) of default losses on a cumulative and periodic basis — losses per tranche with either the tranche % or the absolute value of 
losses per period as reference base.
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Expected and 
unexpected losses Lkj  per tranche (in % of tranche volume) Lkj  per tranche (abs. share of total exp. losses per period)
cum./ per. Yr P LJ % 0-2.4% 2.4-3.9% 3.9-6.5% 6.5-9% 9-10.5% 10.5-100% 0-2.4% 2.4-3.9% 3.9-6.5% 6.5-9% 9-10.5% 10.5-100%
cumulative 1 0.0026 0.005992 0.006269 0.241622 0.010208 0.001379 0.000144 0.000023 0.000000 0.005799 0.000153 0.000036 0.000004 0.000001 0.000000
periodic 0.005992 0.006269 0.241622 0.010208 0.001379 0.000144 0.000023 0.000000 0.005799 0.000153 0.000036 0.000004 0.000001 0.000000
cumulative 2 0.0026 0.010961 0.008220 0.431596 0.032250 0.004144 0.000389 0.000061 0.000000 0.010358 0.000484 0.000108 0.000010 0.000002 0.000000
periodic 0.004969 0.001951 0.189974 0.022042 0.002765 0.000245 0.000037 0.000000 0.004559 0.000331 0.000072 0.000006 0.000001 0.000000
cumulative 3 0.0026 0.015214 0.009431 0.580569 0.068669 0.008830 0.000719 0.000097 0.000001 0.013934 0.001030 0.000230 0.000018 0.000002 0.000000
periodic 0.004253 0.001211 0.148973 0.036419 0.004686 0.000330 0.000037 0.000000 0.003575 0.000546 0.000122 0.000008 0.000001 0.000000
cumulative 4 0.0026 0.019060 0.010333 0.698890 0.121829 0.016286 0.001245 0.000147 0.000001 0.016773 0.001827 0.000423 0.000031 0.000004 0.000001
periodic 0.003846 0.000902 0.118321 0.053160 0.007456 0.000526 0.000050 0.000000 0.002840 0.000797 0.000194 0.000013 0.000001 0.000000
cumulative 5 0.0026 0.022595 0.011046 0.790304 0.190679 0.027340 0.002020 0.000225 0.000001 0.018967 0.002860 0.000711 0.000051 0.000006 0.000001
periodic 0.003535 0.000713 0.091414 0.068850 0.011054 0.000775 0.000078 0.000000 0.002194 0.001033 0.000287 0.000019 0.000002 0.000000
cumulative 6 0.0026 0.025819 0.011616 0.857477 0.270135 0.042336 0.003105 0.000323 0.000001 0.020579 0.004052 0.001101 0.000078 0.000008 0.000001
periodic 0.003224 0.000570 0.067173 0.079456 0.014996 0.001085 0.000098 0.000000 0.001612 0.001192 0.000390 0.000027 0.000002 0.000000
cumulative 7 0.0026 0.028936 0.012125 0.907148 0.359962 0.062859 0.004687 0.000454 0.000002 0.021772 0.005399 0.001634 0.000117 0.000011 0.000002
periodic 0.003117 0.000509 0.049671 0.089827 0.020523 0.001582 0.000131 0.000000 0.001192 0.001347 0.000534 0.000040 0.000003 0.000000
Tab. 16. Simulation of decreasing forward probability rates (NID) of default losses on a cumulative and periodic basis — losses per tranche with either the tranche % or the absolute value of 
losses per period as reference base.
Expected and 
unexpected losses
EL leverage: relative tranche loss to relative portfolio 
i f  J  L ,j multiple
UL leverage: relative tranche loss to relative portfolio
a Lk Ja Z. mu t^*P^ e
cum./per. Yr Pn LJ % 0-2.4% 2.4-3.9%
3.9-
6.5%
6.5-
9.0%
9.0-
10.5%
10.5-
100% 0-2.4%
2.4-
3.9%
3.9-
6.5%
6.5-
9.0%
9.0-
10.5%
10.5-
100%
cumulative 1 0.0026 0.002598 0.004581 40.140 1.191 0.380 0.144 0.0T2 0.004 28.583 10.988 6.166 3.936 2.841 0.333
periodic 0.002598 0.004581 40.140 1.191 0.380 0.144 0.072 0.004 28.583 10.988 6.166 3.936 2.841 0.333
cumulative 2 0.0026 0.005299 0.006512 39.126 1.444 0.421 0.150 0.076 0.004 27.375 12.023 6.432 4.045 2.920 0.347
periodic 0.002701 0.001931 38.1 SO 1.688 0.460 0.1 S6 0.079 O.OOS 24. S09 14.479 7.063 4.302 3.109 0.381
cumulative 3 0.0026 0.007799 0.007978 39.514 1.865 0.505 0.171 0.083 0.005 26.104 13.338 6.917 4.259 3.019 0.343
periodic 0.002500 0.001466 40.336 2.757 0.684 0.214 0.098 0.006 20.456 19.177 9.070 5.209 3.459 0.325
cumulative 4 0.0026 0.010397 0.009228 39.059 2.372 0.597 0.192 0.092 0.005 24.550 14.789 7.445 4.506 3.151 0.346
periodic 0.002598 0.001250 37.694 3.895 0.871 0.255 0.117 0.005 14.635 24.050 10.814 6.086 3.994 0.363
cumulative 5 0.0026 0.012990 0.010317 38.497 3.024 0.703 0.214 0.099 0.005 22.813 16.407 8.002 4.736 3.270 0.350
periodic 0.002593 0.001089 36.244 5.636 1.129 0.302 0.131 0.006 8.088 30.121 12.725 6.684 4.271 0.390
cumulative 6 0.0026 0.015581 0.011252 37.808 3.851 0.834 0.234 0.106 0.005 20.933 18.219 8.646 4.941 3.383 0.353
periodic 0.002591 0.000935 34.351 8.000 1.491 0.335 0.138 0.006 0.189 38.213 15.756 7.206 4.637 0.386
cumulative 7 0.0026 0.018168 0.012104 36.951 4.881 0.995 0.259 0.113 0.005 18.825 20.087 9.379 5.182 3.505 0.355
periodic 0.002587 0.000852 31.790 11.083 1.967 0.412 0.156 0.006 -9.018 44.752 19.053 8.356 5.120 0.380
Tab. 17. Leveraged expected and unexpected loss exposure of constituent tranches through time for constant forward probability rates (E V T loss function of 
default losses on a cumulative and periodic basis, see Tab. 11).
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Expected and 
unexpected losses
EL leverage: relative tranche loss to relative portfolio 
i f )  J  L j  multiple
UL leverage: relative tranche loss to relative portfolio 
<Jjy jc r ^  multiple
cum./per. Yr Pu LJ % 0-2.4% 2.4-3.9%
3.9-
6.5%
6.5-
9.0%
9.0-
10.5%
10.5-
100% 0-2.4%
2.4-
3.9%
3.9-
6.5%
6.5-
9.0%
9.0-
10.5%
10.5-
100%
cumulative 1 0.00010 0.002598 0.004581 40.140 1.191 0.380 0.144 0.072 0.004 28.583 10.988 6.166 3.936 2.841 0.333
periodic 0.002598 0.004581 40.140 1.191 0.380 0.144 0.072 0.004 28.583 10.988 6.166 3.936 2.841 0.333
cumulative 2 0.00123 0.006191 0.006508 40.074 1.323 0.385 0.135 0.067 0.004 26.871 12.382 6.669 4.108 2.965 0.353
periodic 0.003593 0.004626 40.512 0.887 0.287 0.102 0.055 0.003 27.769 11.003 6.236 3.848 2.887 0.362
cumulative 3 0.00195 0.010473 0.007834 39.802 1.731 0.423 0.131 0.062 0.003 25.042 14.927 7.431 4.360 3.089 0.347
periodic 0.004282 0.004366 40.752 0.775 0.221 0.073 0.037 0.002 29.142 11.784 6.228 3.781 2.707 0.303
cumulative 4 0.00247 0.015278 0.009016 39.144 2.599 0.522 0.143 0.064 0.003 21.717 18.480 8.466 4.760 3.268 0.358
periodic 0.004805 0.004461 40.817 0.717 0.204 0.070 0.036 0.002 28.385 11.768 6.184 3.816 2.782 0.345
cumulative 5 0.00277 0.020389 0.010101 37.813 4.351 0.707 0.166 0.069 0.003 16.698 23.230 9.909 5.242 3.501 0.371
periodic 0.005111 0.004540 40.819 0.698 0.202 0.071 0.038 0.002 27.783 11.752 6.283 3.906 2.934 0.350
cumulative 6 0.00295 0.025679 0.011100 35.361 7.620 1.032 0.204 0.078 0.004 10.197 28.161 11.824 5.867 3.772 0.388
periodic 0.005289 0.004583 40.833 0.682 0.201 0.071 0.037 0.002 27.407 11.734 6.309 3.938 2.903 0.371
cumulative 7 0.00306 0.031064 0.011904 31.582 12.551 1.608 0.260 0.089 0.004 4.056 30.096 14.457 6.683 4.095 0.389
periodic 0.005386 0.004303 40.879 0.671 0.195 0.064 0.032 0.001 29.107 12.480 6.663 4.031 2.899 0.244
Tab. 18. Leveraged expected and unexpected loss exposure of constituent tranches through time for increasingforward probability rates (EVT loss function of 
default losses on a cumulative and periodic basis, see Tab. 12).
Expected and 
unexpected losses
EL leverage: relative tranche loss to relative portfolio 
i f j  j  L j  multiple
UL leverage: relative tranche loss to relative portfolio 
°I?  / ° L  mu t^'P*e
cum./per. Yr Pu LJ % 0-2.4% 2.4-3.9%
3.9-
6.5%
6.5-
9.0%
9.0-
10.5%
10.5-
100% 0-2.4%
2.4-
3.9%
3.9-
6.5%
6.5-
9.0%
9.0-
10.5%
10.5-
100%
cumulative 1 0.00367 0.006005 0.004523 40.911 0.640 0.182 0.063 0.030 0.001 27.516 12.198 6.470 3.999 2.793 0.379
periodic 0.006005 0.004523 40.911 0.640 0.182 0.063 0.030 0.001 27.516 12.198 6.470 3.999 2.793 0.379
cumulative 2 0.00267 0.011014 0.006328 40.462 1.147 0.273 0.081 0.038 0.002 25.210 15.409 7.568 4.356 3.039 0.347
periodic 0.005009 0.004429 40.802 0.730 0.217 0.072 0.036 0.002 28.549 12.264 6.575 4.008 2.830 0.283
cumulative 3 0.00195 0.015296 0.007696 39.779 1.981 0.386 0.102 0.045 0.002 22.167 18.927 8.550 4.687 3.215 0.345
periodic 0.004282 0.004366 40.752 0.775 0.221 0.073 0.037 0.002 29.142 11.784 6.228 3.781 2.707 0.303
cumulative 4 0.00154 0.019189 0.008889 38.706 3.335 0.548 0.132 0.055 0.002 18.292 22.773 9.695 5.120 3.424 0.344
periodic 0.003894 0.004440 40.619 0.854 0.262 0.089 0.043 0.002 28.878 11.698 6.418 3.850 2.775 0.289
cumulative 5 0.00123 0.022782 0.010016 37.153 5.337 0.766 0.167 0.066 0.003 13.865 26.240 10.860 5.540 3.624 0.362
periodic 0.003593 0.004626 40.512 0.887 0.287 0.102 0.055 0.003 27.769 11.003 6.236 3.848 2.887 0.362
cumulative 6 0.00094 0.026099 0.011032 35.150 7.918 1.061 0.209 0.077 0.003 9.671 28.738 12.141 6.000 3.801 0.379
periodic 0.003317 0.004623 40.429 0.983 0.314 0.110 0.053 0.003 27.953 11.170 6.243 3.817 2.725 0.381
cumulative 7 0.00083 0.029309 0.011953 32.811 10.853 1.452 0.259 0.090 0.004 6.086 29.643 13.543 6.483 3.995 0.392
periodic 0.003209 0.004607 40.419 0.984 0.308 0.114 0.061 0.003 27.952 11.013 6.095 3.882 2.910 0.377
Tab. 19. Leveraged expected and unexpected loss exposure of constituent tranches through time for decreasingforward probability rates (E V T loss function of 
default losses on a cumulative and periodic basis, see Tab. 13).
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Expected and 
unexpected losses
EL leverage: relative tranche loss to relative portfolio 
i f  j  L j  multiple
cum ./per. Yr P L J % 0-2.4% 2.4-3.9%
3.9-
6.5%
6.5-
9.0%
9.0-
10.5%
10.5-
100%
cumulative 1 0.0026 0.002598 0.004581 40.244 1.595 0.320 0.061 0.016 0.000
periodic 0.002598 0.004581 40.244 1.595 0.320 0.061 0.016 0.000
cumulative 2 0.0026 0.005299 0.006512 39.790 2.119 0.411 0.075 0.021 0.000
periodic 0.002701 0.001931 39.336 2.642 0.501 0.089 0.027 0.000
cumulative 3 0.0026 0.007799 0.007978 39.248 2.759 0.523 0.088 0.023 0.000
periodic 0.002500 0.001466 38.161 4.043 0.750 0.114 0.026 0.000
cumulative 4 0.0026 0.010397 0.009228 38.572 3.555 0.668 0.107 0.025 0.000
periodic 0.002598 0.001250 36.540 5.950 1.104 0.164 0.032 0.000
cumulative 5 0.0026 0.012990 0.010317 37.768 4.490 0.842 0.131 0.030 0.000
periodic 0.002593 0.001089 34.539 8.242 1.537 0.226 0.051 0.000
cumulative 6 0.0026 0.015581 0.011252 36.830 5.551 1.058 0.161 0.036 0.000
periodic 0.002591 0.000935 32.102 10.904 2.150 0.316 0.065 0.001
cumulative 7 0.0026 0.018168 0.012104 35.768 6.720 1.321 0.198 0.043 0.000
periodic 0.002587 0.000852 29.337 13.801 2.910 0.419 0.085 0.001
T ab. 20. leveraged expected loss exposure of constituent tranches through time for constant forward 
probability rates (NID loss function of default losses on a cumulative and periodic basis, see Tab. 14).
Expected and 
unexpected losses
EL leverage: relative tranche loss to relative portfolio 
i f  j  L j  multiple
cum ./per. Yr P L J % 0-2.4% 2.4-3.9%
3.9-
6.5%
6.5-
9.0%
9.0-
10.5%
10.5-
100%
cumulative 1 0.0026 0.002598 0.004581 40.250 1.582 0.320 0.057 0.015 0.000
periodic 0.002598 0.004581 40.250 1.582 0.320 0.057 0.015 0.000
cumulative 2 0.0026 0.005299 0.006512 39.154 2.743 0.581 0.111 0.032 0.001
periodic 0.002701 0.001931 38.362 3.583 0.769 0.150 0.045 0.001
cumulative 3 0.0026 0.007799 0.007978 37.649 4.324 0.962 0.184 0.049 0.001
periodic 0.002500 0.001466 35.473 6.610 1.513 0.291 0.074 0.001
cumulative 4 0.0026 0.010397 0.009228 35.649 6.316 1.516 0.297 0.078 0.001
periodic 0.002598 0.001250 31.254 10.694 2.732 0.545 0.140 0.002
cumulative 5 0.0026 0.012990 0.010317 33.300 8.513 2.221 0.446 0.115 0.001
periodic 0.002593 0.001089 26.200 15.152 4.353 0.897 0.227 0.003
cumulative 6 0.0026 0.015581 0.011252 30.706 10.678 3.094 0.655 0.167 0.002
periodic 0.002591 0.000935 20.585 19.127 6.499 1.469 0.371 0.005
cumulative 7 0.0026 0.018168 0.012104 28.046 12.592 4.080 0.930 0.240 0.003
periodic 0.002587 0.000852 15.175 21.852 8.849 2.261 0.593 0.008
Tab. 21. leveraged expected loss exposure of constituent tranches through time for increasing forward 
probability rates (NID loss function of default losses on a cumulative and periodic basis, see Tab. 15).
Expected and 
unexpected losses
EL leverage: relative tranche loss to relative portfolio 
if j j  L j  multiple
cum ./per. Yr P L J % 0-2.4%
2.4-
3.9%
3.9-
6.5%
6.5-
9.0%
9.0-
10.5%
10.5-
100%
cumulative 1 0.0026 0.002598 0.004581 40.324 1.704 0.230 0.024 0.004 0.000
periodic 0.002598 0.004581 40.324 1.704 0.230 0.024 0.004 0.000
cumulative 2 0.0026 0.005299 0.006512 39.376 2.942 0.378 0.035 0.006 0.000
periodic 0.002701 0.001931 38.232 4.436 0.556 0.049 0.007 0.000
cumulative 3 0.0026 0.007799 0.007978 38.160 4.514 0.580 0.047 0.006 0.000
periodic 0.002500 0.001466 35.028 8.563 1.102 0.078 0.009 0.000
cumulative 4 0.0026 0.010397 0.009228 36.668 6.392 0.854 0.065 0.008 0.000
periodic 0.002598 0.001250 30.765 13.822 1.939 0.137 0.013 0.000
cumulative 5 0.0026 0.012990 0.010317 34.977 8.439 1.210 0.089 0.010 0.000
periodic 0.002593 0.001089 25.860 19.477 3.127 0.219 0.022 0.000
cumulative 6 0.0026 0.015581 0.011252 33.211 10.463 1.640 0.120 0.013 0.000
periodic 0.002591 0.000935 20.835 24.645 4.651 0.337 0.030 0.000
cumulative 7 0.0026 0.018168 0.012104 31.350 12.440 2.172 0.162 0.016 0.000
periodic 0.002587 0.000852 15.936 28.818 6.584 0.508 0.042 0.000
Tab. 22. Leveraged expected loss exposure of constituent tranches through time for decreasingforward 
probability rates (NID loss function of default losses on a cumulative and periodic basis, see Tab. 16).
11.2 A ppendix 2: Figures
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Fig. 5. D efault term structure o f cumulative and periodic expected losses o f constituent tranches (based on E V T  loss 
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1 ABSTRACT
Asset-backed securitisation (ABS) is a refinancing technique that involves the issuance o f state 
contingent claims on the cash flow performance of a designated pool of asset exposures. Efficient 
risk management and asset allocation o f ABS obligations requires both investors and issuers to 
thoroughly understand the inherent spread dynamics in this growing segment o f fixed income 
markets. We present a multi-factor GARCH process in order to model the heteroskedasticity of 
secondary market spreads for valuation and forecasting purposes on the basis of CDO, MBS and 
Pfandbrief transactions as the most important asset classes o f off-balance sheet and on-balance sheet 
securitisation in Europe. We find that expected spread changes tend to be level stationary with model 
estimates indicating asymmetric mean reversion depending on the direction of past innovations 
(errors) and past spread change. Also, conditional spread volatility follows an asymmetric stochastic 
process contingent on the value o f past residuals. This ABS spread behaviour implies negative 
investor sentiment during cyclical downturns, which is likely to escape stationary approximation in 
the long run.
Keywords: Securitisation, MBS, CDO, CLO, CBO, ABS, Pfandbrief, G ARCH  model, structuredfinance, spread 
dynamics
J E L :  C 1 2 , C 3 2 , C 5 3 , G 1 2 , G 2 1
2 INTRODUCTION
2.1 Objective
Securitisation seeks to substitute capital market-based finance for credit finance by sponsoring 
financial relationships without the lending and deposit-taking capabilities o f banks
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(disintermediation). Generally, securitisation represents a structured finance transaction, where 
receivables from a designated asset portfolio are sold as contingent claims on cash flows from 
repayment in the bid to increase the issuer’s liquidity position and to support a broadening of lending 
business (refinancing) without increasing the capital base (funding motive). Aside from being a funding 
instrument, securitisation also serves (i) to reduce both economic cost o f capital and regulatory 
minimum capital requirements as a balance sheet restructuring tool (regulatory and economic motive), (ii) 
to diversify asset exposures (especially interest rate risk and currency risk) as issuers repackage 
receivables into securitisable asset pools (collateral) underlying the so-called asset-backed securitisation 
(ABS) transactions (hedging motive). Also the generation of securitised cash flows from a diversified 
asset portfolio represents an effective method of redistributing credit risks to investors and broader 
capital markets. These issuer incentives correspond to certain investment appetites in ABS. As 
opposed to ordinary creditor claims in lending relationships, the liquidity o f a securitised contingent 
claim on a promised portfolio performance in a structured transaction affords investors at low 
transaction costs to quickly adjust their investment holdings due to changes in personal risk 
sensitivity, market sentiment and/or consumption preferences.
Over the last ten years asset-backed securitisation (ABS) has established itself as the premier segment of 
European structured finance. Efficient risk and asset allocation through seasoned trading in this 
relatively young fixed income market requires both investors and issuers to thoroughly understand 
the longitudinal properties of ABS spread prices (over some benchmark risk-free market interest 
rate) o f traded securities, which reflect various risk factors o f a transaction. Spreads are closely 
watched by investors and issuers alike, and by doing so, they create efficient primary and secondary 
markets of informed investment. For loss of any technical study on secondary pricing in structured 
finance markets outside the U.S., examining the spread development o f European structured 
transactions proves particularly interesting. While recent research has generated a host of models to 
determine ABS spreads (Goodman and Ho, 1997 and 1998; Arora et al., 2000), the time series 
properties o f ABS transactions have yet been insufficiently addressed. Although research by 
Koutmos (2001 and 2002) addresses the spread dynamics o f U.S. MBS transactions, it falls short o f 
considering other forms o f ABS transactions (CDO) and quasi-ABS transactions (Pfandbriefe), a 
prominent on-balance sheet MBS-type deal structure in Europe, which matches the importance o f 
U.S. MBS by any standard of comparison, be it market volume, trading activity or historical track 
record.
In the following chapter we conduct an empirical analysis o f the spread change behaviour o f 
European ABS transactions in order to assess the robustness o f findings in previous studies about
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certain time series properties o f U.S. spread data on securitisation transactions. Moreover, by using 
secondary market trading data we expand the existing empirical horizon o f previous time series 
analysis o f structured finance products. So far no study on the term structure o f ABS spreads has 
been completed on European secondary market trading data. We develop a technical pricing and 
forecasting approach for the estimation of secondary market spreads of ABS transactions as a 
discrete approximation of a multi-factor continuous time model. We enlist two multi-factor GARCH 
processes (GARCH(1,1) and GARCH(2,1)) in order to model the heteroskedasticity o f secondary 
market spreads as a way to examine any volatility-induced future spread movements as well as their 
degree o f symmetry and time variation. In particular, accounting for the variance o f errors is 
instrumental in deriving more accurate estimators o f time-varying forecast confidence intervals. We 
extend earlier approaches by Koutmos (2002) as well as Longstaff and Schwartz (1992) in order to 
find out (i) whether spread volatility is constant or time-varying and (ii) whether observed spreads are 
mean reverting or stochastic at level and first differences. Finally, we apply various statistical 
diagnostics to ensure correct model specification o f the presented model for forecasting purposes. 
Our findings could provide useful insights for adequate secondary market pricing o f ABS issues with 
varying credit quality and an efficient management of ABS portfolios with respect to risk-retum 
considerations.
The rest o f the chapter is organised as follows. After a definition of asset securitisation and a brief 
review of the literature, we present the data set and examine selected statistical diagnostics of linear 
regression analysis upon the completion of an exhaustive set of descriptive statistics. In the 
subsequent section, we discuss the effects o f data transformation on time series dynamics and the 
presence of level stationarity as an important requirement for simple inference testing. Then we 
specify two GARCH processes of the heteroskedasticity for selected spread series o f CDO, MBS and 
Pfandbrief transactions. Finally, we present the estimation results and verify the correct model 
specification by means o f residual and coefficient tests. We finally discuss the econometric 
implications o f our findings before we conclude in the last section.
2.2 Securitisation background
The flexible security design o f asset-backed securitisation allows for a variety of asset types to be 
used in securitised reference portfolios. Mortgage-backed securities (MBS), real estate and non-real estate asset- 
backed securities (ABS) and collateralised debt obligations (CDO) represent the three main strands o f asset- 
backed securitisation in a broader sense. All ABS structures engross different criteria o f legal and
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economic considerations, which ail converge upon a basic distinction of security design: traditional vs. 
synthetic securitisation.
Traditional (true sale) securitisation involves the legal transfer o f assets or obligations to a third party 
that issues capital market paper on the back of these assets (“asset-backed securities*) to investors via 
private placement or public offering. This transfer of title can take various forms (novation, assignment, 
declaration of trust or subparticipation), which ensures that the securitisation process involves a “clean 
break” (true sale, bankruptcy remoteness or credit de-linkage in loan securitisation) between the 
sponsoring bank (which originated the securitised assets) and the securitisation transaction itself. In 
most cases, however, the sponsor retains the servicing function o f the securitised assets. Traditional 
securitisation mitigates regulatory capital requirements by trimming the balance sheet volume. In 
synthetic securitisation only asset risk (e.g. credit default risk, trading risk, operational risk) is 
transferred to a third party by means of derivatives without change o f legal ownership, i.e. no legal 
transfer o f the designated reference portfolio of assets.1 Any resulting regulatory capital relief and/or 
lower cost o f economic capital do not stem from the actual transfer of assets off the balance sheet 
but the acquisition o f credit protection against the default o f the underlying assets through asset 
diversification and hedging.2 Commonly, sponsors of synthetic securitisation issue debt securities 
supported by credit derivative structures, such as credit-linked notes (CLNs),3 whose default tolerance 
amounts to total expected loan losses in the underlying reference portfolio. Hence, investors in 
CLOs are not only exposed to inherent credit risk of the reference portfolio but also operational risk 
of the issuer.4 Recently, traditional securitisation transactions also included elements o f synthetic 
securitisation (such as credit derivatives) in order to preserve the credit-linkage of issued securities to 
the originator and realise on-balance sheet financing to fund assets.5
1 For instance, sellers of credit default swaps (CDS) receive a premium for their state-contingent obligation of 
compensating buyers of credit protection for any default losses up to a specified amount. Since the 
compensation payment through credit default swaps (CDS) is contingent on a certain credit event, derivative 
components in the security design of synthetic transactions are termed “unfunded”, while bonds directly issued 
to investors as “credit-linked notes” (CLN) are “funded”.
2 This property of synthetic CLOs is attractive to large banks, which tend to have access to on-balance sheet 
assets at competitive spreads.
3 “Credit linkage” signifies credit risk transfer without a corresponding change of title (legal ownership) of the 
underlying asset claims.
4 The absence of asset transfer to a special purpose vehicle (SPV) as in traditional CLOs aids the cost efficient 
administration of synthetic securitisation. Synthetic structures also gamer issuers with a wider choice of 
leveraging the underlying reference portfolio, so that on average the nominal total value of issued debt 
securities of such transactions is significantly outstripped by the nominal tranche volume in conventional 
securitisation.
5 The marginal difference in senior risk exposure between partially funded synthetic securitisation and 
traditional securitisation does not extend to junior noteholders with subordinated security interest. While partial 
funding structures bear more risk emerging from the sponsor’s role, the credit enhancement (first loss 
provision) and subsequent junior tranches (the second loss position) are no more exposed to credit risk in 
synthetic deals than they are in traditional CLOs.
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In contrast to the U.S., where the market for ABS has had a longstanding tradition since the first half 
o f the 1980s6 (Klotter, 2000), European ABS has gained popularity only over the last several years — 
notwithstanding the fact that Pfandbrief structures7 (“on-balance sheet mortgage-backed securities”) 
have been an established method of securitising homogenous mortgage portfolios for more than two 
centuries.8 Actually, the Pfandbrief market has developed into one o f the largest fixed income 
markets in Europe. Recendy, the issue volume of both mortgage-backed securities (MBS) and 
collateralised debt obligations (CDO) has surged at an impressive scale despite depressed 
expectations from interest-based income and the search for alternative asset funding mechanisms. 
Both types of ABS transactions have become an important segment o f the European bond market as 
banks, non-bank financial intermediaries (NBFIs) and corporations favour more flexible funding 
mechanisms. Hence, ABS issues have caught up with Pfandbrief transactions as one of the largest (by 
outstanding volume) fixed income markets in Europe.
The distinct track record o f on-balance sheet securitisation in European structured finance on the 
basis o f the Pfandbrief scheme prohibits a comparison o f European and U.S. asset-backed 
securitisation without consideration of the Pfandbrief market as a control factor. Since a nascent 
European ABS market falls short o f attracting large secondary trading activity, only the Pfandbrief 
market in Europe seems to match U.S.-based securitisation in liquidity and maturity. Hence, any 
analysis of ABS markets in Europe also needs to account for the existing investment behaviour of 
the Pfandbrief market.9
6 The first asset-backed securitisation issue in its modem form was completed by Sperry Corporation, which 
issued computer lease-backed notes in 1985 (Kendall, 1996).
7 See also Bohringer et al. (2001).
8 The first Pfandbrief instrument was created by the executive order of Frederick the Great of Prussia in 1769 
(Skarabot, 2002; Anonymous, 1999).
9 Although MBS transactions and Pfandbrief transactions share the same type of reference assets, upon closer 
inspection several structural differences between these fixed income investments emerge. While the Pfandbrief 
is a classical on-balance sheet refinancing tool (with both origination and issuance are completed by one and 
the same entity), MBS transactions involve at least one more party (besides the mortgage originator), which 
sells contingent claims on asset cash flows, so that the reference portfolio underlying the securitised assets is 
removed from the balance sheet and legally segregated (bankruptcy remote). Pfandbrief transactions lack a 
direct relationship between mortgage cash flows and the promised repayments to investors, who rank pari passu, 
whose claims may be junior to other creditors of the Pfandbrief issuer. In comparison, MBS transactions solely 
return cash flows generated from the pool performance of the designated reference portfolio. Investor claims 
rank either pari passu to each other in the sense of pass-through (PC) or are prioritised through subordination 
(but no other parties can declare a moratorium on assets). Hence, Pfandbrief ratings include an implicit 
financial strength rating of issuers, which are fully liable with their registered capital if the designated asset 
pools fail to generate sufficient cash flows for repayment of investors. Given this institutional guarantee and 
(legally defined) overcollateralisation, Pfandbrief transactions generally receive high ratings. The downside of this 
legal arrangement is the fact that investors in Pfandbrief transactions are not insulated from an “originator 
event” (insolvency and bankruptcy), whereas MBS investors in a dedicated mortgage loan pool are. At the same 
time, MBS transactions are devoid of any institutional guarantee. So issuers of MBS transactions compensate
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2.3 Characteristics of spreads
The pricing o f fixed income instruments requires investors to measure the yield-to-maturity (YTM) 
or even the entire term structure yield curve from the current spot rate, depending on the nature of 
the obligation, in order to discount future cash flows from holding such assets. Various factors 
influence the pricing o f fixed income securities, such as the interest rate term structure, the current 
market interest rate (“market spot rate”), the maturity o f the obligation, the liquidity of the 
obligation, the current credit risk, and the credit outlook o f the obligation (“rating grade”) and its 
volatility within a risk classification grade, asymmetric information, imbedded options, the notional 
amount and the tax treatment o f the issued security. The market term structure (of key interest rates) 
enters the calculation of YTM as some benchmark yield curve or spot rate curve (e.g. the LIBOR or 
EURIBOR rate), which reflects the general maturity dependence o f interest rates. The (yield) spread 
over the benchmark yield captures the (idiosyncratic) risk contribution o f other factors in addition to 
the market interest rate, which have to be taken into account for the mean-variance efficient pricing o f 
fixed income securities. For instance, bonds could be structured so as to include redemption criteria 
and early amortisation features as options, which benefit issuers and/or investors but at the same 
time constitute a source o f uncertainty. Also, the lack of liquidity contributes to higher market risk 
from investment. We commonly observe that instruments with imbedded optionality and low 
verification o f trading motives10 are priced lower and trade at higher spreads than comparable 
securities without any option components (“option-adjusted spread analysis”).
issuers for the higher asset exposure due to deficient institutional protection by including various kinds of 
internal and external liquidity and credit support, such as bridge-over facilities, surety bonds, third-party 
guarantees, yield spreads/excess spreads, overcollateralisation and reserve accounts. Finally, Pfandbrief issues 
are subject to stringent federal laws (requiring a weighted average loan-to-market or appraised value (LTV) of at 
least 60% as a statutory benchmark), whilst “private-label” MBS are free from these legal requirements, except 
in so-called “agency-MBS” in the U.S., where the quasi-govemment agencies Fannie Mae (FNMA), Freddie 
Mac (FHLMC) and Ginnie Mae (GNMA) provide institutional guarantees in return for certain restrictions 
imposed on mortgages eligible for purchase in MBS structures. In general, Pfandbrief transactions represent a 
very secure and liquid asset class of fixed income instruments with an established track record and cyclical 
resilience. MBS issues are equally liquid (at least in the U.S. market) and feature an unchallenged degree of 
flexibility allowing for customised features and investor arrangements, such as variations to amortising 
repayment (in contrast to bullet repayment structures of Pfandbrief issues). Pfandbriefe serve primarily as 
funding instruments, whereas MBSs are also employed for credit risk transfer and balance sheet restructuring, 
with the aim of efficient management of economic and regulatory capital.
10 Highly liquid, recendy issued securities are said to be “on-the-run” in a liquid secondary market, whereas 
“off-the-run” issues have less of a secondary market low and attract higher liquidity spread.
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3 LITERATURE REVIEW
Recent research (Goodman and Ho, 1998; Koutmos, 2002) indicates that the shape o f the yield curve 
plays an important role in the determination of fixed-rate MBS yields in the U.S.11 In their study on 
the determinants o f MBS spreads on treasury bond yields, Goodman and Ho (1998) also consider 
the five-year cap volatility and the ten-year swap spreads to identify some LIBOR interest rate effect 
on MBS spreads. They find that MBS yields are by and large explained by the yield on government 
securities and the shape o f the yield curve, even though the prepayment o f principal and interest by 
mortgagors induces greater variation o f duration (compared to government bonds) due to an 
uncertain timing of cash flows. Arora et al. (2000) propose a five-factor model that explains nearly 
60% of mortgage spreads. Koutmos (2002) showed that in an extended version of the term structure 
model by Longstaff and Schwartz (1992), U.S. MBS spreads over the maturity-matched U.S. treasury 
rate follow an asymmetric mean-reverting stochastic process, which behaves asymmetrically in 
response to the direction o f past spread changes (“asymmetric mean reversion”).
In the following chapter we conduct an empirical analysis o f the spread change behaviour of 
European securitisation transactions in order to ascertain previous studies about certain time series 
properties o f U.S. MBS spread data. We expand the empirical scope o f previous studies by using a 
data set o f European secondary market trading quotes of MBS, CDO and Pfandbrief transactions. 
Our multi-factor specification o f time-varying spread variance specifically tests for asymmetric mean 
reversion and builds on the factor approximation of spread dynamics proposed by Koutmos (2002) 
as well as Longstaff and Schwartz (1992). In line with Goodman and Ho (1998) we control for 
LIBOR effects in both the mean and the conditional variance o f spread change. Our findings suggest 
almost all spread series are mean-reverting. In contrast to Koutmos (2002), we find no statistically 
significant asymmetry of mean reversion during spread increases and decreases. However, the mean- 
reverting trend following spread decreases is economically stronger than the influence o f past spread 
increases. The conditional variance o f spread change behaves largely asymmetric, which increases 
more after positive past innovations relative to negative past innovations.
11 Bhasin and Carey (1999) were the first to present an empirical study, which analysed — although in an 
admittedly rudimentary fashion — the trading behaviour of bank loans. In contrast to conventional wisdom of 
fixed income securities research, credits with a low rating grade were traded the most. This liquidity effect 
would of course affect the market price (i.e. the spread over some benchmark yield) ex ceteris paribus and its 
attendant volatility. However, it does not account for the pricing behaviour in ABS markets.
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4 DATA DESCRIPTION
The primary data consists o f aggregated secondary market spreads (with respect to the 3-month 
LIBOR rate) o f European ABS transactions (Residential Mortgage-Backed Securities (RMBS),12 
Collateralised Debt Obligations (CDO) and Pfandbrief transactions) over almost two years (see Tab. 
1). The spread series of RMBS and CDO transactions stems from the structured finance trading desk 
of a major European commercial bank, which generates an end-of-week indicative secondary spread 
benchmark from all traded transactions (classified by ABS type, rating and maturity) with the highest 
market quotes. The time series data of European Pfandbrief spreads are based on the Merrill Lynch 
Pfandbrief database (see Appendix, Tab. 14). In Tab. 13 (Appendix) we spell out the nomenclature 
of the various time series in our ABS spread data base.
4.1 Further specification
The data set underlying the aggregate secondary spreads (denominated in basis points above LIBOR) 
includes the majority o f European ABS transactions classified as synthetic and traditional (true sale) 
CDO or RMBS with floating rate tranches o f varying rating grades and maturities o f 3, 5 and 7 years 
from 5 January 2001 to 18 October 2002 (93 weekly observations). As opposed to CDO spreads, 
MBS time series data does not consider synthetic and traditional structures individually but 
represents the weighted-average, aggregated spreads of both classifications. The dominance o f 
traditional transactions in MBS spreads reflects the observed market preference for true sale 
structures o f this kind of ABS. We chose the Merrill Lynch (ML) EM U  Pfandbrief Index (via 
Bloomberg) as a benchmark roughly matched in maturity (1-3 years, 3-5 years and 5-7 years) to the 
time series data of the selected CDO and RMBS tranches. Originally, daily Pfandbrief spreads were 
obtained for the time period from 13 April 1998 to 29 March 2002, which were later transformed 
into weekly spreads and shortened to fit the time period o f observed CDO and RMBS spreads in 
order to ensure a reliable statistical analysis, whose results remain unaffected by disparate sample 
periods or higher data frequency of observations (see Fig. 1 in the Appendix). We replaced two 
missing observations on 14 April 2001 and 29 March 2002 (bank holidays) by the spreads o f the 
previous day. The majority o f Pfandbrief issues entering each maturity-based index benchmark were 
originated by German banks. Since the Pfandbrief indices contained different proportions of rating 
classes at the beginning and the end o f the sample periods (see Tab. 14) -  on 5 January 2001 all 
Pfandbrief indices included more than 80% AAA-rated issues compared to 18 October 2002 when
173
roughly 75% of all issues were rated AAA — we computed a mean weighted-average o f rating classes 
for each maturity o f Pfandbrief index and derived daily spreads according to this distribution of 
rating classes for each maturity classification of Pfandbriefe. We discarded the possibility of 
calculating the index composition for each daily spread observation due to short-term volatility 
jumps and level effects induced by the accounting scandals surrounding the U.S. corporations Enron 
and WorldCom.
4.2 Statistical descriptives
The quality o f our time series estimation results fundamentally depends on the statistical properties 
of the ABS spread series in our data set, especially the distribution of the spreads and the degree of 
autocorrelation, if applicable. We extract preliminary information about the descriptive statistics of 
the given spreads as a crucial piece o f information for modelling the dynamics o f spread changes in 
structured finance transactions (see Tab. 1, and Appendix, Tab. 16-Tab. 20).13 On first inspection, 
infrequent changes o f spread data on level and first difference bears out strong evidence of distinct 
illiquidity in European MBS and CDO markets, which are commonly characterised as buy-and-hold 
markets. Moreover, in some cases the given spread time series of these asset types do not reflect 
actual transaction data but conflated bid/ask spreads. Pfandbrief spreads reflect reasonable 
statkfnarity o f periodically mean-reverting cycles. In contrast, sporadically occurring spikes in level 
spread series o f CDO and MBS transactions hint to arguably higher illiquidity of these markets 
compared to the Pfandbrief market. Although some interspersed idle periods in these spread series 
might jeopardise the appellation of even weak level stationarity, the frequently occurring volatility 
peaks in the first differences o f spreads (both original and transformed) make a strong case for 
autoregressive constant heteroskedasticity models (ARCH). Nonetheless, bearing in mind the hazards 
of “stale time series”, we attach great importance to a robust preliminary analysis before we proceed 
to develop the proposed GARCH approach (see section 6.2 below). Tab. 1 reports several 
descriptive statistics o f logarithmic and Johnson Fit-adjusted spread series (see Appendix, Tab. 16- 
Tab. 20 for a complete overview of all spread series — actual spread, logarithmic spreads and adjusted 
spreads). It can be seen that average spreads decrease with higher ratings and maturity. Relative 
spread volatilities (relative variation) are modest, ranging from 1.6% to 7% for the logarithmic spread 
series of asset classes in the data set. However, the relative variation o f actual spreads in Appendix, 
Tab. 16-Tab. 20 of up to 25.8% suggests considerable risk in the spread structure across all asset
12 We will use the generic expression of mortgage-backed securities (MBS) as short-hand for this asset class in 
the remainder of the chapter.
13 See also Fig. 1.
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classes. The]arque-Bera test statistic (defined in section 4.3 below) shows that most spread series (with 
the exception o f CSAAA3, CSBBB7, PAAA5 and PAAA7) reject the null hypothesis o f normal 
distribution, given their values of skewness and kurtosis. The Doomik-Hansen diagnostic (see section
4.3 below) confirms this result about the spread process o f observed data. All spread series fail to 
adhere to normality in their first differences.
According to the Llung-Box Q-statistic (defined in section 4.4 below) significant and high levels of 
autocorrelation exist in both observed spreads (up to 26 lags) and logspreads (up to 28 lags). The first 
difference of spreads sheds most of the serial correlation, with only some spread series flagging 
autocorrelation at up to two lags (e.g. PAAA3 and PAAA5). Nonetheless, autocorrelation remains a 
pressing issue that needs to be addressed in the course of our preliminary statistical analysis. Even 
though autocorrelation is close to unity and fails to drop off quickly — hinting at non-stationarity — 
we will later see that the unit root hypothesis can be rejected for most spreads at level and first 
difference.
4.3 Test of normality
Aside from time-varying heteroskedasiticity, the proposed GARCH(1,1) and GARCH(2,1) models 
largely rely on the statistical assumptions of linear multivariate analysis for the coefficient estimates to 
be valid.14 Although endogenous variables are not required to fit certain distributional characteristics, 
robust parametric testing of the statistical significance of coefficients infers normally distributed
residuals according for £ ~ Jv[o,<T2l]  (Greene, 1993), which implicitly applies to dependent variables 
as well. Otherwise any resulting estimates would not be independent o f the residuals and the critical 
values for parametric tests, such as the t-statistic, would lose their significance (Hair et al., 1998). 
However, countless empirical studies about investment instruments document that financial time 
series are hardly normally distributed -  a common feature frequently ignored. Various kinds o f 
transformations have been suggested in past research in order to adjust observed data to fit desired 
distributional assumptions. For instance, Hartung (1987) suggests the logarithmic transformation, 
<g ( x )  = ln (x  + ^ ) , the reciprocal transformation, ^ (> r )  = x -1 , and the square root transformation,
which comes in various forms, such as g { x )  = yjx + c . Alternatively, more complex ways o f
14 Assumptions for linear multivariate regression estimation (Greene, 1993) in matrix algebra: (i) linear 
relationship between exogenous and endogenous variables: Y = \J3 + £ , (ii) zero expected residuals:
E (s)  = 0, (iii) homoskedasticity: E(es')  = cr2I , (iv) independence of residuals: E (f |X ) = 0 , and (v) X
represents a non-stochastic n x k matrix of rank k.
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transformation exist, which promise higher flexibility at the loss o f straightforward application, such 
as the so-called Johnson Fit (1949), which allows for transformation o f any continuous distribution 
into a normal distribution. We apply both the logarithmic transformation and a statistical adjustment 
according to the Johnson algorithm to improve the distributional properties o f the time series of our 
data set for robustness o f inference procedures.
First, we conduct the test o f normality on non-transformed data. In our preliminary descriptive 
statistics we first apply the Jarque-Bera (JB) test diagnostic to examine whether the null hypothesis of 
normally distributed spreads holds. The Jarque-Bera test statistic
measures the degree to which a time series is normally distributed based on the difference of the
the likelihood of the JB statistic to exceed (in absolute value) the observed value o f a normal
observations suggests an alternative test procedure, which promises greater certainty as regards to the 
normal distribution assumption. We apply the test procedure o f Doomik and Hansen (1994), which
(1)
skewness S  and kurtosis K  between the normal distribution and the spread series, where k  represents 
the number of estimated coefficients used to create the series. The probability o f the JB test indicates
distribution. Since the JB statistic is particularly suitable for large samples, our limited number of
was developed for small sample sizes. Similar to the Jarque-Bera test statistic, the Doornik-Hansen 
diagnostic (Ep) computes the deviations from the normal distribution on the basis o f transformed 
higher moments of skewness ^  and kurtosis %2:
T7 2 . 2  2~K 1 + K\ ~ Xdf=2 •
F “PP
(2)
Doomik and Hansen define the transformation of skewness S  and kurtosis K  for n number of
observations as
(3)
where 8  =
1
{n -  2)(» + 5)(» + 7)(» + 9)
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and
( /  \ -  , ^
y /9 a , (4)
( .  ' ^ 
x > - 1+ J _
2 a  )  9a
\  y
, (» + 5)(« + 7)(»3 +37«2 + l l» -3 1 3 )
where /  = 2^ ( K - l - i ’2) ,  a  = * + J 2<-, £ = -     v  L ,
w  w  , x ( » - 2 ) («  + 5)(» + 7)(«2 + 27» —70)
< M * - 3 ) ( *  + l) (* 2 + 1 5 * -4 ) ,  * = ^ ^ ^
6S
(« — 7)(« + 5)(» + 7)(«2 + 2« — 5)
6£  '
Based on the Doomik-Hansen test the hypothesis o f normally distributed spreads is rejected as the 
approximate x\= i -distributed test statistic is significantly different from zero (see Tab. 1).
Surprisingly, non-normality, which persists even after transformation, does not seem to stem from 
poor data quality in general and low levels o f market liquidity in particular, e.g. if we contrast the 
spread distribution and the associated JB statistic and Ep statistic for PAAA2 and CSBBB7. Despite 
markedly higher liquidity of Pfandbriefe, the former time series deviates more from the normal 
distribution assumption than an illiquid, low-rated synthetic CDO tranche.
The normality assumption under both the Jarque-Bera statistic and the Doornik-Hansen 
approximation is also not satisfied for logarithmically15 transformed time series, regardless o f further 
adjustment by means o f the Johnson Fit (marked by the acronym “AD”). The descriptive statistics 
show that the suggested transformation is successful in doing little more than improving the JB- 
statistic for some cases of extreme deviations from the normal distribution only, such as BBB-rated, 
traditional CDOs with maturity o f seven years (CTBBB7_L) and AAA-rated Pfandbriefe with 
maturity o f three years (PAAA3_L). On average the Doomik-Hansen test indicates a worsening of 
the distributional properties o f spreads after logarithmic transformation. Although the logarithmic 
transformation does not improve the spread distribution across the board o f all time series, we find 
evidence that extreme deviation from the normal distribution can be mitigated, whilst logspreads16 
generally tend to be more dissimilar to normality in the given data set.
15 These time series are marked by the acronym “L” added to the tranche specification.
16 Moreover, the additivity of logarithmic returns proves beneficial for our economic analysis.
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Collateralised Debt Obligations (CDO)
synthetic traditional
CSAAA3_AD_L CSA5_AD_L CSBBB7_AD_L CT A A A3_AD_L CTA5_AD_L CTBBB7 AD L
Mean 3.7314 4.8060 5.5049 3.3846 4.5263 5.2839
Median 3.8192 4.8697 5.5449 3.3769 4.5700 5.2672
Maximum 4.3118 5.3492 6.0047 3.6240 5.0782 5.6205
Minimum 3.2583 4.1993 5.0301 3.0413 4.2178 4.9377
Std. Dev. 0.2617 0.2447 0.2236 0.1313 0.2284 0.1428
Rel. Variation 7.01% 5.09% 4.06% 3.88% 5.05% 2.70%
Skewness -0.0914 0.0461 0.0972 -0.2280 0.2781 0.0360
Kurtosis 3.2128 3.5767 3.3628 2.7507 2.2272 3.0430
Jarque-Bera 0.3051 1.3359 0.6636 1.0582 3.5511 0.0276
Prob.JB 0.8585 0.5128 0.7176 0.5891 0.1694 0.9863
Ep 1.1243 3.1429 1.8504 1.0287 5.4736 0.4472
Prob. E 0.5700 0.2077 0.3965 0.5979 0.0648 0.7996
LB-Q (lags)* 437.37 (14) 587.16 (26) 609.65 (25) 420.4 (13) 655.46 (16) 739.28 (28)
AC value 0.1990 0.1980 0.1980 0.1790 0.1840 0.1690
Observations 93 93 93 93 93 93
Mortgage-Backed Securities (MBS)
MAAA3 AD L MAAA5A D L MA7_AD_L MBBB7 AD L
Mean 3.0217 3.1244 4.1751 4.9367
Median 2.9947 3.0854 4.1829 4.9514
Maximum 3.2047 3.3879 4.3678 5.2871
Minimum 2.7988 2.8285 4.0988 4.4829
Std. Dev. 0.1404 0.1446 0.0673 0.1207
Rel. Variation 4.65% 4.63% 1.61% 2.44%
Skewness -0.1348 0.0701 0.3847 0.1279
Kurtosis 2.0911 3.3462 2.5218 7.3745
Jarque-Bera 3.5201 0.5463 3.2142 75.2062
Prob. JB 0.1720 0.7610 0.2005 0.0000
Ep 4.6662 1.7428 4.9582 49.1697
Prob. E 0.097 0.4184 0.0838 0
LB-Q (lags)* 164.22 (7) 35.073 (3) 645.58 (19) 22.393 (2)
AC value 0.1270 0.1410 0.1760 0.1300
Observations 93 93 93 93
Pfandbriefe
PAAA3 AD L PAAA5_AD_L PAAA7 AD L
Mean 2.9268 3.2045 3.4437
Median 2.9571 3.2111 3.4540
Maximum 3.2652 3.6690 3.9766
Minimum 2.5928 2.8406 2.9558
Std. Dev. 0.1065 0.1691 0.1819
Rel. Variation 3.64% 5.28% 5.28%
Skewness -0.1098 0.0258 0.0599
Kurtosis 3.6506 2.8617 3.0421
Jarque-Bera 1.8466 0.0854 0.0631
Prob.JB 0.3972 0.9582 0.9689
Ep 3.6514 0.0657 0.469
Prob. E 0.1611 0.9677 0.791
LB-Q (lags)* 226.06 (12) 410.94 (14) 543.62 (17)
AC value 0.1090 0.1950 0.2130
Observations 93 93 93
Tab. 1. Statistical descriptives of secondary market spreads of CDO, M BS and Tfandbrief transactions (only 
tranformed and Johnson Fit adjusted spreads).
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Besides improved distributional properties, logarithmic transformation also harmonises the spread 
variation coefficient V  = <Ts / S  , i.e. the ratio between standard deviation and mean of spreads, for 
all time series of weekly spreads. The variation coefficient also reveals the level effect of given ABS 
spreads — the standard deviation of spreads increases in the level o f spreads. For non-transformed 
spreads we compute an average S  = 16.67% and a standard deviation crs = 5.66%, which are highly 
correlated at Pj ff = 0.947 . Logarithmic transformation would mitigate this level effect and stabilise
the variance o f the entire spread sample for comparative analysis. The correlation of standard 
deviation and mean of weekly logspreads drops to P j a =0.289. Furthermore, we apply the
Johnson Fit adjustment to align the continuous distribution o f logspreads closer to normality. This 
transformation procedure is based on three kinds o f distribution functions (Johnson curves) — an 
unbounded ( ) ,  a bounded (S B) and a lognormal distribution ( J L) — each associated with 
transformation function u = y + T]ki (x ;A ,^ ), where u denotes a standard normal target variable and 
x  represents the original variable. One of the three distribution functions
Sv : k ^ ( x ; X ^ )  = sinh 1 -  ■ — | , (5)
SB : k2(x;X ,$) = ]n. ■ *  j , and (6)
 ^A  + £  — X  J
SL : k,(X;X,4) = ]n (x -4 ) ,  (!)
is selected according to its suitability to best transform the original variable to fit a normal 
distribution, with y,7J,X and £ as known parameters. Parameters y  and 7f define the shape o f the 
fitted curve, the scale factor X defines the variance and £ the expected value of the distribution, 
respectively. Slifer and Shapiro (1980) propose a simplified estimation procedure for all four 
parameters in each distribution function (SV,SB,SL} . First, the original variable data has to be 
assigned one o f the three types o f distribution functions. To this end, we pick four values £ > 0 from 
a standard normal distribution, where —3^;,—^ ,^ and 3^ constitute three intervals of equivalent 
distance. Commensurate to the cumulative densities o f —3^,—^ ;,^ and 3^;, we determine the 
corresponding values x_iz , x_z , and x iz for the distribution o f the original variable x. These 
values are not equidistant, because they stem from the original, non-normal distribution function to 
be transformed. Depending on the relationship between the values x _iz, and x 3? we
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determine the appropriate transformation function according to the following selection criteria: 
Sv : mn x p~2 > 1 , SB : mn x p~2 < 1 and SL : mn x p~2 = 1 ,17 where m = — x  , n — x_z — x_2z
and p  = x z ~ x_z . Once we have determined the adequate distribution function from the set of 
SV,SB and SL , we introduce a system of equations for each type of function in order to compute the 
four parameters y,?],X and £ , with ^ small enough for small sample sizes,18 so that the value of 
can easily be calculated:
For Sv : u = /  + 77sinh-1^(x — £)X  —
y  = 77sinh"
X = -
(n - m ) p
/ o \ 0--2\mn x yT — 1 j  
2 p{mny. p ~2 — l j
, *7 =
cosh 1 (o.5 (/» + «) ^ >
for 77X ) ,
((w + »)^> 1 — + ») ^ T1 + 2^
*„+*_„ p i i n - ^ p 2)
for A>0 , and % — — ------   +
2 2^(m — ») 1 — 2)
For : u = y  + !7 ln ^ (x -£ ) (A  + £  — x )  1 j —
/ = 7sinh-1^(y>»-1 -/wrl)((l + /vw"1)(l + />/f1)--4) j^ 2^ 2(w») 1 -l)J j, 
//= ^ c o s h -1 |o.5((l + pm~')(l +p n '1)') for /7X ) ,
A = ^ | ( ( l  + ^w-1) ( l  + />«-1) —2  ^ — 4-j ^y>2 (w«) 1 — 1J for X > 0 , and
■ —  j  ■+ p{pn~x -  pm~x )\_2(p(^y' - 1 )• v ^ .  X 
2 2
For SL : u = y* + rj\n(x  — —
/  = '7ln f (“ ?‘I - l ) [ ^ ( '^ ‘') 05 ^ ~ ~  2Z7 = _ ^ >and
In {mp~x) 2 mp — 1
17 Since the probability of mnjp1 = 1 to occur borders to zero, it seems reasonable to use certain tolerance 
levels around the critical value 1 for this selection process.
18 Slifker and Shapiro (1980) recommend % = 0.5.
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The application of the Johnson Fit routine on our data set o f weekly spread series indicates that the 
quality of the desired adjustment to normality is highly sensitive to the choice of the ^-value. Hence, 
we resort to an iterative procedure to determine the optimal ^-value at six decimals. First, we 
compute a preliminary ^-value (preliminary optimal) for the best approximation o f the original 
distribution to the normal distribution, measured by the Jarque-Bera statistic, as we count from 0 to 2 
by staggered increments of 0.02. We refine the preliminary ^-value through another cycle of 
increments o f 0.001 within a band o f + / -0.02 around its value in order to determine the optimal 
value o f % This iterative procedure continues until the parameterisation of £ is sufficiendy accurate 
for an optimal approximation o f the normal distribution measured by the Jarque-Bera statistic o f the 
original distribution after transformation. In our data, set the transformation of the original spread 
time series via the Johnson Fit merely nears the standard normal. Moreover, the first two moments, 
fj  and <T, o f the adjusted spreads — which would describe a standard normal distribution under 
optimal transformation — deviate significandy from the original spread series across the sample. 
Consequendy, we further adjust the Johnson-fitted spread series by matching mean and standard 
deviation to the original distribution; at the same time, however, we preserve the approximative 
normal distribution in the transformed spread series. In order to reinstate the variance o f each 
original spread series we recalibrate the differences between fitted spreads and original spreads by 
means o f multiplication with an adequate scaling factor. We also adjusted the mean of the fitted 
spread distribution to the original mean value by conditioning the new starting value.19 The new 
adjusted spread series (marked by the acronym “_AD_L” in the rest of the chapter) bear great 
resemblance to the original spread series for all asset classes in our data set. The correlation 
coefficient between both exceeds 90% in most cases. Only the matched pairs of one issue type of 
traditional CDOs (CTA5) and three out o f four MBS time series (MAAA3, MAAA5 and MBBB7) 
exhibit weak correlation effects due to distorting effects by the transformation procedure. In 
Appendix, Tab. 15 we illustrate the chosen ^-values, the type o f distribution underlying the 
transformation function, the correlation between the fitted spread series and the original spread 
series as well as the indicators o f the normal distribution assumption, which include the Jarque-Bera 
statistic and the estimation results for the Doornik-Hansen test. We will consider these results when 
carrying out the GARCH estimation procedure.20 We particularly address the violation o f the 
normality assumption as we compute the heteroskedasticity consistent (quasi-maximum likelihood)
19 Both optimisations were conducted via the “goal seek” function supplied by the Microsoft Excel software 
package.
20 Please note that we have not applied the Johnson Fit to LIBOR rates. So the LIBOR rates in later GARCH 
estimations with adjusted and Johnson Fit-adjusted spread series include logarithmic LIBOR rates only.
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covariance matrix according to White (1980),21 which is also needed for several model diagnostics 
(coefficient and residual tests) at a later stage o f this chapter.
Due to the disparate distributional characteristics and the varying goodness o f adjustment through 
the Johnson Fit, we continue to apply the proposed GARCH models on all spread series, i.e. non­
adjusted spreads, logarithmic spreads and Johnson-fitted and adjusted logspreads. We postpone the 
conscious choice o f eliminating certain spread data from our analysis at this stage, as the trade-off 
between lower levels of normality in all spread series (by retaining non-transformed time series) and 
sporadic distortions o f actual spread change (in some Johnson-fitted spread series, e.g. CSAAA3) is 
not straightforward to this point.22
4.4 Test of autocorrelation
The main statistical diagnostic for autocorrelation in time series is the Llung-Box test. Llung-Box Q- 
statistic at lag k  represents the test statistic for the null hypothesis o f i.i.d. variables (i.e. no 
autocorrelation) up to order k  for
a u .  = T ( r  + 2 ) X ‘__,0 (T  -  J ) - ' , (8)
where r. is the autocorrelation and T is the number of observations. The Q-statistic is
asymptotically distributed as %2 with the degrees o f freedom equal to the number o f 
autocorrelations, since the observations are not the result o f an ARIMA estimation. We augment this 
test statistic by the AC-value o f autocorrelation (with the null hypothesis o f no autocorrelation). The 
AC-value confirms the Q-statistic of absent serial correlation if it cannot be rejected at the 5% level, 
i.e. falls within the two standard error bounds o f ±2T~°5. We assume 36 lags as the default test 
setting for all test statistics of autocorrelation for the given time series. We estimate the 
autocorrelation o f series y  with lag k  and sample mean y  as the correlation coefficient over k  
periods
21 The heteroskedasticity consistent covariance matrix proposed by White (1980) estimates coefficient 
covariances in the presence of heteroskedasticity of unknown form. The White covariance matrix is defined by
= ———(XX) 1 ^ufxtx't j(X X), where T  is the total number of observations, k denotes the
number of regressors and u, is the error term.
22 Solely the MBBB7_AD_L spread series constitutes a strong case for disregarding the Johnson Fit of spreads 
and subsequent scaling, since this adjustment effects both a significant distortion of spread dynamics and a 
lower degree of normality.
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EL+iU - j ) h t-k - j t-k ) l (T-*)  
Z l O < - j ) 2/ T
(9)
where y t_k = ^ Jt-k X {T — k)  1 j relies on the same overall mean y  as the mean of both y t_k
and y t (which would bias the result towards 2ero for finite series) for matters of computational 
simplicity. Hence, rk ^  0 means that the series is first order serially correlated. A geometric decrease 
of rk in an increase o f k  lags would constitute a low-order autoregressive (AR) process, whereas as 
rapid decline of rk to zero flags a low-order moving average (MA).
We determine the degree o f autocorrelation at the statistical threshold o f significant Q-statistics (p- 
value) and AC values (together with the partial correlation measure PAC) for the null hypothesis o f 
no autocorrelation. This threshold level entails the maximum number o f lags until either the 
associated AC value or the Q-statistic no longer indicate a rejection of the null hypothesis at the 5 % 
level or higher -  whichever occurs first, with the Q-statistic being the primary criterion. For the given 
spread series the Llung-Box statistics and the AC-values of the correlogram (Tab. 1 and Appendix, 
Tab. 21-24) indicate high levels o f autocorrelation for at least twenty lags, which abate as the spread 
series are transformed into logspreads with/without the Johnson Fit procedure. The correlogram- 
generated partial correlation coefficients (PAC) between the current spread levels and past spread 
levels of up to five lags together with the associated Q-statistics for each period for non-transformed 
and transformed logspreads confirm this assessment. While partial correlation decreases substantially 
after one lag for synthetic and traditional CDO and MBS spread series (with the Johnson Fit 
reducing some of the correlation), in some instances Pfandbrief spreads retain partial correlation 
values o f more than 20% for up to three lags.
We attempt to strip all spread series o f any autocorrelation effects by using the residuals of an AK(p) 
estimation of past spreads for up to p  number of (autocorrelative) lags. In an ordinary least squares 
regression (OLS) o f lagged spreads (in keeping with the computation o f abnormal returns in financial 
research), the residuals should not be correlated if past spreads, as exogenous regressors, absorb all 
serial correlation effects. We estimate
~ a  +  + -  +  P p S t - p  + s t  ( 1 0 )
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for observed spreads and transformed spreads J”, where we choose p  — 2 for PAAA3 and PAAA5 
series (given high partial correlation coefficients for up to at least lag two for these spread series in 
original and adjusted form) and p  = 1 for the spread time series o f all other asset types.23 Since the
regression coefficients J3X to p p would normally take up all autoregressive effects, the residuals
should be independent from each other. They serve as new spread differences o f the new spread 
series, which are conditioned on the starting level of the original spread series in order to establish 
comparability across the various spread series of asset types. We find that autocorrelation persists in 
the new spread time series of residuals (see Tab. 21-22), with autocorrelation and partial correlation 
test diagnostics only marginally different from the original spread series. Hence, we abstain from 
using new autocorrelation-adjusted spread series o f AR estimated residuals. Nonetheless, the later 
GARCH estimation will include correction terms, which control for autoregressive effects up to lag 
two (see GARCH(2,1) model in section 6.2.2).
In some cases for CDO and MBS data this result might be primarily attributable to level effects as 
well as spread dynamics with “stale data” properties, where slight changes over time generate 
significant autocorrelation, which, at the same time, sustains a mean reverting process. However, in 
this case, “stale data” would mimic mean reversion, which would normally be a result of level 
stationarity in very liquid and volatile markets. This observation has important consequences for the 
later formulation o f the multi-factor term structure model of structured spreads, where we control 
for past changes in LIBOR as the spread reference base (so we could view the spread series as 
“excess returns” over LIBOR). We particularly take account of autocorrelation in the later GARCH 
estimation by computing heteroskedasticity consistent (quasi-maximum likelihood) covariance 
matrices, which are needed for several model diagnostics (coefficient and residual tests).
5 TIME SERIES DYNAMICS
5.1 Stationarity tests
In this section we examine the time series dynamics o f the different asset class spreads o f our sample 
as to whether, and if so, at what order o f integration, they obey by the stationarity condition o f 
inference procedures. Level stationary series exhibit time-invariant mean and autocovariance. The 
canonical example o f a non-stadonary series (with a stationary random disturbance term) is a random
23 We could have generated even better indications of residual autocorrelation if we had introduced further lags 
in the OLS estimation. However, in view of the small number of observations in the data set, we disregard this
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walk, which can be integrated at first order (difference stationary series). The random walk has a 
constant forecast value, conditional on time, and associated variance increasing over time. In order to 
investigate the order of integration, we conduct both a mean reversion regression as well as unit root 
tests before we specify a multi-factor model to estimate asymmetric spread dynamics with stochastic 
variance (GARCH specification), while controlling for level effects induced by past spreads and 
changes in the base rate (LIBOR).
Collateralised Debt Obligations (CDO)
synthetic traditional
CSAAA3_AD_L CSA5_AD_L CSBBB7 AD L CTAAA3 AD L CTA5_AD_L CTBBB7_AD_L
n 0.0811 0.13182 0.0808 0.2382* -0.0705 0.2279
(t-stat.) (0.4613) (0.7595) (0.8063) (1.4590) -(0.5424) (0.9830)
Y -0.0195 -0.0251 -0.0129 -0.0698* 0.0164 -0.0422
(t-stat.) -(0.4264) -(0.7021) -(0.6973) -(1.4712) (0.5551) -(0.9646)
Adj. R2 -0.0068 0.0003 -0.0067 0.0320 -0.0058 0.0165
F-stat. 0.3813 1.02956 0.3861 4.0454 0.4679 2.5474
(p-value) (0.5385) (0.3130) (0.5359) (0.0473) (0.4957) (0.1139)
0 4.1497 5.2527 6.2838 3.4144 4.2987 5.3997
35.4696 27.6198 53.9246 9.9367 -42.2445 16.4202
e/^i 51.1718 39.8470 77.7968 14.3357 -60.9459 23.6894
Mortgage-Backed Securities (MBS)
MAAA3 AD L MAAA5 AD L MA7 AD L MBBB7_AD_L
n -0.5959** -1.8904*** 0.2182* 2.6557**
(t-stat.) -(2.2887) -(3.5561) (1.4033) (2.0783)
Y 0.1977** 0.6049*** -0.0526* -0.5377**
(t-stat.) (2.3133) (3.5717) -(1.4011) -(2.0810)
Adj. R2 0.0824 0.2948 0.0151 0.2635
F-stat. 9.2631 39.4681 2.4147 33.9136
(p-value) (0.0031) (0.0000) (0.1237) (0.0000)
0 3.0135 3.1248 4.1458 4.9392
b -3.5053 -1.1458 13.1704 1.2892
0/n -5.0571 -1.6530 19.0009 1.8599
Pfandbriefe
PAAA3 AD L PAAA5 AD L PAAA7 AD L
n 1.16206*** 0.5525*** 0.4476***
(t-stat.) (4.8191) (3.5922) (26783)
Y -0.3975*** -0.1734*** -0.1316***
(t-stat.) -(4.8838) -(3.6002) -(2.7277)
Adj. R2 0.1949 0.0933 0.0920
F-stat 23.2714 10.4697 10.3186
(p-value) (0.0000) (0.0017) (0.0018)
0 2.9238 3.1870 3.4018
n 1.7440 3.9982 5.2678
0/ja 2.5160 5.7682 7.5998
We define the level o f mean reversion as 0 =-y/(j. and the speed of mean reversion as ri=ln(0.5)/y.
Tab. 2. Test of mean reversion — OLS regression of secondary market spreads of CDO, MBS and Pfandbrief
transactions (only transformed and Johnson Fit adjusted spreads).
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Various financial studies (such as Goodman and Ho, 1997 and 1998) have shown that interest rates 
follow a random walk and, hence, do not succumb to a mean-reverting process of level stationarity 
(Nelson and Plosser, 1982). According to Koutmos (2001), U.S. MBS price quotes and government 
bond yields each have unit roots, while U.S. MBS spreads and U.S. Treasury spreads appear co­
integrated, i.e. both share a long-term relationship.24 Koutmos (2002), however, finds that the unit 
root tests confirm stationarity of MBS spreads on a sample of weekly spreads o f U.S. MBS 
transactions with maturities o f five, seven and ten years over a time period o f more than 30 years. 
Furthermore, his analysis concludes that spread changes exhibit asymmetric mean reversion, i.e. the 
first difference o f spreads is strongly mean-reverting following spread decreases, but non-stationary 
following spread increases. Two conventional approaches for the investigation of mean reversion in 
stochastic processes with drift and time trend are the correlogram and the unit root test. Since the 
correlogram testing procedure is imprecise in cases when autocorrelation o f a data generating process 
converges to zero for k  elements in a finite sample series, even under non-stationary, we choose the 
classical unit root testing procedures by Dickey-Fuller (1979 and 1981) and Phillips-Perron (1987) — 
the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) and the Phillips-Perron (PP) test statistics (Greene, 1993) to 
determine the presence o f mean reversion in all CDO, MBS and Pfandbrief spread series (actual, 
adjusted and with/without Johnson Fit) 25
Since unit root tests examine the existence of a random walk based on a linear AR(£) model with p  
number of lags with shift and deterministic time trends, we first examine the degree of mean 
reversion in a simplified fashion by starting from principles on the basis o f inference procedures 
through ordinary least squares regression (OLS) with heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors 
and covariance (White, 1980) 26 This analysis indicates the level and the speed o f mean reversion, as 
well as their consistency across the spread series o f various asset classifications that are examined. 
The level of mean reversion represents the long-term mean, which stationary spreads ought to 
converge upon to match the sample mean value o f the respective spread series. The speed of mean
24 If observed variables grow together, spurious correlation might be measured erroneously. However, in the 
presence of co-integration they might share a fundamental economic driver that gives rise to a long-term 
relationship.
25 In a finite data sample the correlogram testing procedure is imprecise, because sample autocorrelation will 
converge to zero for k  elements (and indicate mean reversion) even if the time series is non-stationary. In 
practice it is difficult to tell whether a time series is non-stationary or slowly converging stationary. If values for 
autocorrelation drop to zero after some periods we can reject the random walk hypothesis (unit root).
26 We use heteroskedasticity consistent covariance estimators for all OLS regressions, so that the estimated 
standard errors are robust even if the assumption of homoskedastic residuals in linear OLS-estimations is not 
satisfied for equation Yt — X;Y + e  for i = 1,...,n , where X; and y are k x l  -vectors. Yi and ei are scale 
variables. White (1980) proposes the following estimator for a heteroskedasticity consistent covariance matrix:
(x'x/»)-1 ■wheie 4 = i: - x , f .
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reversion is defined as the average time (in number of cycles, i.e. weekly observations in our case) 
needed for spreads to reverse an upward or downward spread change by half its amplitude.
We complete a hypothesis test for H 0 : y  < 0 for mean reversion o f logarithmic spreads of asset class 
tranches in the estimation equation
Aln(i’/ ) = fi  + / l n ( i ’/_1)+  £t where £t ~  N (0 ,(t ), cov(£‘/ , f /_1) = 0 . (11)
Tab. 2 shows the OLS estimation results o f the regression parameters for all spread series and the 
values for the level of mean reversion, 9  = — fj,jy , and the speed o f mean reversion, rj = In 0.5J y , as
well as the correlation of the sample mean S  and the level o f mean reversion.
We find that all the estimated coefficients for MBS and Pfandbrief spread series are highly 
significant, especially highly liquid Pfandbrief transactions with a positive constant and a negative 
mean reversion coefficient. No CDO classification yields estimated coefficients at common levels of 
statistical significance. The OLS estimation output of each spread series substantiates our initial 
prediction about stationary series with the level o f mean reversion 9  closely associated with sample 
mean S  for almost all types o f spread data (actual, transformed, Johnson Fit-adjusted). Hence, we 
would expect the subsequent unit root test (which also considers a shift and time trend) to be 
negative. The positive correlation coefficient between 9  and S  across all types o f spread series (see 
Tab. 3) implies that the level of mean reversion varies by rating grade, maturity and asset 
classification and increases with the sample mean of the time series in question. The absolute 
difference between 9  and S  , however, is slighdy higher for CDO tranches than for MBS and 
Pfandbrief tranches, where we also observe low correlation coefficients o f these values for synthetic 
and traditional CDOs. This could hint at a weaker degree of mean reversion over the sample period 
(e.g. the time series of low frequency observations has not fully traversed an entire stationary cycle). 
To the contrary, in the case o f Pfandbrief spread series, the level o f mean reversion squares up with 
the sample means at a very high correlation in all cases, which ascertains almost complete mean- 
reversion over the given sample time period. The deviation of 9  from S  in the case o f traditional 
and synthetic CDOs, but also for MBS transactions, clearly points to high illiquidity o f those ABS 
transactions relative to Pfandbrief deals. Closer inspection of the relationship between the level of 
mean reversion and the sample mean of all spread series offers one possible explanation for the low 
correlation coefficients o f CDO — and to some extent MBS transactions. Low-rated CDO
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transactions (CSBBB7 and CSA5) display a sustained upward trend over the sample period that the 
linear specification o f the OLS regression estimation fails to capture.
We also compare the level o f mean reversion 9  to the constant jj. o f each spread series. If  the 
constant, rather than the degree o f mean reversion, influences the heteroskedasticity o f spread levels 
(“level effect”), high correlation between both values should exist. Tab. 3 shows that the degree of 
mean reversion indeed increases with a higher estimated intercept. However, the CDO spread series 
lose the level effect once adjusted by the Johnson Fit procedure.
The estimation results for the speed of mean reversion defy a reliable general interpretation due to 
the inconsistent coefficient values for mean reversion o f one CDO and two MBS spread series 
(CTA5, MAAA3, MAAA5). We find that MBS and Pfandbrief transactions show short mean- 
reverting cycles from slightly less than two weeks to almost eight weeks, while CDO spreads take 
from almost 10 to 78 weeks to recover previous upward or downward movements by half. 
Moreover, we find a clear relationship between the speed o f mean reversion and the maturity o f a 
certain tranche type only for Pfandbrief and CDO spreads — the longer the maturity o f a certain 
transaction, the slower any mean-reverting adjustment through stationarity. We explain the slow 
speed of mean reversion for CDO transactions of up to 53 weeks on the grounds o f low data 
frequency and insufficient market illiquidity, mainly because most o f these transactions feature 
above-sample average maturities and, hence, entail a long reaction time to underlying spot rate 
changes. For more liquid Pfandbrief transactions the speed o f mean reversion is far higher, ranging 
from 2.5 weeks (PAAA3_AD_L) to 7.6 weeks (PAAA7_AD_L).
Correlation Coefficient (Psmg.fi) Correlation Coefficient (Pft,o)
Asset Class
"AD_L"
(fitted
logspreads)
"L"
(logspreads)
actual
spreads
"ADJL"
(fitted
logspreads)
"L"
(logspreads)
actual
spreads
CDO, synthetic 0.3732 0.6196 -0.9989 0.0140 -0.3805 0.8570
CDO, traditional 0.4531 0.4983 0.6359 0.0337 -0.1183 0.9603
MBS 0.5229 0.4208 0.8197 0.9255 0.4655 0.8238
Pfandbriefe 0.9999 0.9998 0.9995 -0.9465 -0.9379 -0.9242
Tab. 3. Correlation of sample mean and level of mean reversion as well as correlation of estimated constant and level 
of mean reversion of all secondary market spreads of CDO, MBS and Pfandbrief transactions.
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5.2 Test of unit root
We need to augment the inference procedure of simple OLS hypothesis testing by alternative cases
Y to past mean prices and the significance of some resilient price level as drift p  (intercept term): 
We consider all combinations of spread sensitivity y  (time trend) to past mean spreads and the 
significance o f some resilient level o f spreads as drift fl (intercept term): (i) 1(1) process without drift
Y = 0, //  = 0 , (ii) 1(1) process with drift y  ~ 0>/^  ^  0 , (iii) stationarity 1(0) with mean y  < 0, / /  ^  0 , (iv) 
stationarity 1(0) without mean y < 0,/J. = 0 . In a mean reversion test based on OLS in section 5.1 we 
would be able to reject Ho for case (iii) only. So prior to the estimation o f a factor model to draw 
statistical inferences from the time series dynamics for forecasting purposes, we need to consider a 
shift and time trend in the given spread series at level and first differences to examine whether 
estimated residuals testify to serial correlation as a unit root in violation o f stationarity by means of 
the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) and the Phillips-Perron (PP) unit root tests. In this way we can 
explore the degree o f mean reversion in weekly spreads and their first differences over the given 
sample time period. In our case the autoregressive ADF test (with deterministic time trend) is 
defined as
with the one-sided hypothesis test H 0 : y = 0 vs. H , : y < 0 (since the differences from the null 
hypothesis are unidirectional ex ante), where A is the difference operator, p  (i.e. the long run mean)
test for the specification A ln ( j ,)  = / /  + /? (/ — T j i )  + y]n.(St_x} + £t with H 0 :y  = \v s .H i : y < l  in 
our case also corrects the t-statistic o f the y  coefficient of the AR(1) process by the serial correlation 
of residuals £t . This non-parametrical correction computes the spectrum of £t at frequency zero 
under the Newey-West (1987) heteroskedastic and autocorrelation consistent estimator to
to determine the order of integration for stochastic processes for all combinations o f price sensitivity
fo(St ) = n  + p t  + y ln (S t_i) + ) + et wrt*1 H 0 : p  = lv s .H l : p < l ,  (12)
and y are the test parameters and i.i.d. residuals as white noise error term £ ~ N\0,cr2j . If  y = 0 , 
ln ( j ,)  follows a random walk with drift (non-stationarity), i.e. the variance o f the spread process 
increases steadily with time and goes to infinity, else for y > 0 , ln ( i) )  is an explosive series. The PP
2co&
(13)
0)
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where 6)2 = y 0 + 2^ * =i (l -  7/ (q + l ) ) / j , y . = T ~ ^ Ti=.+1£t£t_j » lag test regression
standard error & , and and sh as t-statistic and standard error o f j3 . We run the ADF test with a 
constant and a linear trend on level and first differences o f spreads o f up to two lags in order to 
control for serial correlation. We also complete the PP test diagnostic, corrected by the Newey-West 
autocorrelation consistent variance estimator, which accounts for the number of periods o f serial 
correlation through three truncation lags. For both tests we employ MacKinnon (1996) critical values 
for (one-sided) rejection of the unit root null hypothesis.
Similar to earlier studies with respect to U.S. MBS spreads (Koutmos, 2002) we reject the unit root in 
most weekly spread time series for level data (Tab. 4 and Appendix, Tab. 25). Merely PAAA5 and 
PAAA7 spreads seem to be non-stationary (according to the ADF test statistic), while MAAA5 
spreads yield inconclusive results. Autocorrelation effects can be almost entirely eliminated at a test 
specification of up to four lags. For the first difference of spreads both ADF and PP test diagnostics 
strongly reject the null hypothesis o f a unit root in all cases. Hence, all spread series are at least 
integrated at the order of one. Generally, we find that LIBOR rates and CDO, MBS and Pfandbrief 
spreads share unique co-integration vectors, indicating difference stationarity of most individual 
spread series.
We identify two possible causes for divergent stochastic properties across level spread series: liquidity 
and data frequency. First, our results are less homogenous compared to Koutmos (2002), which 
could be attributed to the poor data quality.27 Whereas Koutmos (2002) used time series data o f more 
than 30 years to substantiate his findings on the level stationary o f U.S. MBS spreads, our limited 
number of observations over a time period of barely two years does not invite the same degree o f 
measurability for long range cycles o f mean-reversion.
27 Higher ADF and PP test statistics of daily Pfandbrief spreads over the originally generated time period from 
September 1998 to October 2002 (not reported) indicate that better data quality, with respect to data frequency 
and time period of observations, support the rejection of a unit root. Moreover, the spread series of Pfandbrief 
spreads over a four-year period include spread quotations of summer 2000, when some German Pfandbrief 
issues — for the first time in recent history — were downgraded amid the massive liquidity crises in global 
financial markets. While almost all German Pfandbrief transactions were AAA-rated and regarded as safe an 
investment as government bonds, a re-assessment of credit risk in Pfandbrief transactions sent spreads 
markedly higher during the second half of 2000. Also the shorter series of weekly Pfandbrief spreads used in 
this analysis might still suffer from lagged effects on spread volatility from January 2001 onwards.
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Augm ented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) Phillips-Perron (PP)
level on first difference level on first difference
Asset Class 
Spread Series
#
test stat. F-stat. test stat. F-stat. test stat. F-stat. test stat. F-stat.
Collateralised Debt Obligations (CDO), synthetic
CSA5_AD_L -3.367652*** 2.8945 -6.253208*** 23.6575 -2.727887*** 3.5594 -9.919613*** 49.1234
CSAAA3_AD_L -2.115569** 1.3658 -5.439055*** 21.9381 -2.104623** 2.4597 -9.574888*** 45.8374
CSBBB7_AD_L -2.152063** 1.2455 -5.886175*** 23.3047 -2.338996** 2.5349 -9.590928*** 45.9627
Collateralised Debt Obligations (CDO), traditional
CTA 5_A D _L -1.4271 1.0235 -4.934276*** 17.2697 -1.3810 1.1353 -8.614782*** 36.8747
CTA A A 3_A D _L -1.807324* 1.0596 -7.036044*** 26.7650 -1.85988* 2.0212 -8.925047*** 39.9795
CTBBB7_AD_L -3.868666*** 3.8989 -7.199525*** 28.3019 -3.507903*** 5.2950 -8.927302*** 39.9059
Mortgage-Backed Securities (MBS)
M A 7_A D JL -2.293844** 4.1190 -6.616401*** 21.2514 -2.71831*** 3.6791 -8.431175*** 35.9602
M AAA3_AD_L -2.669565*** 2.3823 -5.624701*** 27.9576 -4.066767*** 7.6201 -11.7885*** 68.7735
M AAA5_AD_L -3.9070 13.6306 -7.060149*** 70.6754 -6.408603*** 19.6483 -18.23404*** 144.1522
M BBB7_AD_L -6.035035*** 10.9508 -7.239436*** 35.9587 -5.76176*** 16.8164 -12.14478*** 68.2325
Pfandbriefe
PA A A 3_A D _L -2.526267** 10.6802 -7.223362*** 66.8306 -5.418308*** 14.5363 -18.02513*** 127.5861
PA AA5_AD_L -1.5908 3.8489 -7.114721*** 43.7777 -2.82416*** 5.4351 -13.8917*** 85.7927
PA AA7_AD_L -1.5950 2.0476 -6.467876*** 32.5846 -2.995738*** 5.5289 -11.63695*** 63.6673
Sample (adjusted): 21/01/2001-18/10/2002; 92 weekly observations; constant and linear time trend (shift) included in the text as exogenous 
variables.# MacKinnon (1996) critical values for rejection o f hypothesis of a unit root based on one-sided p-values. Significance: * significant 
at 10% level, ** significant at 5% level, *** significant at 1% level. PP test completed with three-lag truncation for Bartlett (1981) kernel given 
Newey-West (1987) test.
Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test is based on: Ayx=n+y1t+y2y^i+8iAyt-i+S2Ayt.2+et with Ho:y2=0 vs. H, :y2<0 
Phillips-Perron (PP) test is based on: Ayt= p+ P 1(t-T/2)+P2yt-i+Et with H 0:P2=1 vs. Hj:P2<1
T ab. 4. Test of unit root — adjusted OLS regression of secondary market spreads of CDO, MBS and Pfandbrief 
transactions (only tranformed and Johnson Fit adjusted spreads).
Moreover, we need to view cases o f level stationary spreads with great caution, given the quality of 
the data series. MBS and CDO markets differ from the Pfandbrief market in investment liquidity. We 
also recognise that persistent stochastic processes over long spans of time with a small autoregressive 
component (due to low liquidity and infrequent trading activity) could bias the ADF and PP tests 
towards rejecting the unit root, in the absence of strong statistical power against the alternative o f 
level stationarity (Papell and Prodan, 2003a and 2003b).28 The “stale” nature of spread movements o f
28 The danger of type II error misspecification, which also operates in the presence of a nonlinear data 
generating process, has critical implications on the interpretation of ADF results: the linear specification biases
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MBS and CDO spreads, together with a persistent autoregressive effect in spread residuals for up to 
at least 20 lags (see Tab. 1) might fit this caveat. However, strong autocorrelation does not apply for 
first differences of spreads, so at least first order integration (as suggested in the later model 
measuring spread dynamics on the basis o f spread changes) yields satisfactory characteristics of mean 
reversion. If  spreads are stationary, standard statistical hypothesis testing is appropriate.
6 MODEL
6.1 Model specification
The following model aims to describe the distribution and volatility o f ABS spreads (CDO, MBS) 
and Pfandbrief spreads in Europe. Like the equilibrium models o f the term structure o f interest rates, 
with a stochastic process followed by a small number o f state variables,29 ABS spreads St follow a 
standard geometric Brownian motion (GBM),
St = i '0exp{(^-<T2/ 2) /  + crV /^ } , (14)
where the volatility process -  which could also be written in a discrete sense as
— contains a Wiener process with zero mean change and variance proportional to t, 
so that ~ (0, A /). The dynamics of St , i.e. the instantaneous value, are identified by the stochastic 
differential equation
dSt /S t = ndt + (Tdti?t , (15)
of the Ito process dSt = n ( S n t)dt  + cr{Sl ,t}dWl (generalised Wiener process), whose trend and 
volatility depend on the current spread level S t and time /.30 This approach assumes that normalised 
spread changes d S j S e follow a standard normal distribution JV(0,1). We measure the spread 
dynamics of dSi t j S it = fid t + adW t on the basis of a GARCH multi-factor term structure model as
the unit root test into failing to reject the unit root hypothesis (Taylor, 2001, Taylor et al., 2001; Taylor and 
Peel, 2000).
29 These models are represented by Ito equations, as in Hull (1995 and 1993) and others.
30 In the case of the GBM, the drift fi and the volatility <7 are proportional to the current value of S t . Wt is 
a standard Brownian motion, whose infinitesimal increment is denoted by a standard Wiener process 
d^x t = Sj \[dt and £j as a standard normal random variable.
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a discrete approximation o f spread change, provided that the spread change follows a stationary 
process (see section 5). For this purpose, we modify the approximative GARCH(1,1) model of U.S. 
MBS yields (over government bonds) by Koutmos (2002),31 and we describe the dynamics o f spread 
change, on the basis of additional endogenous factors, in a refined GARCH model.
Generally, a GARCH(p,^) process models the heteroskedasticity o f a given time series x T , whose
distribution — conditionally on past observations o f x t — is specified by F(x ,/ /o ’/ )~ (0 ,l) .  The
conditional variance of the mean value follows a GARCH process defined by the volatility from the 
previous period(s), measured as the q lag(s) of the squared residual(s) from the mean equation 
(ARCH term(s)), and the forecast variance(s) of the last p  periods (GARCH term(s)). Hence, this 
specification o f conditional variance in a GARCH model, if applied to spread movements over time, 
can be easily interpreted in a practical context, where an agent predicts the periodic variance based on 
a weighted average of a long term mean (the constant), the forecasted variance from the last period 
(GARCH term(s)) and the information about the volatility observed in the previous period(s) 
(ARCH term(s)). An adapted version of the original two-factor GARCH(1,1) model by Longstaff 
and Schwartz (1992) as discrete approximation of continuous spread change would read
A, -  S,_x = AS, = a 0 + a xS,_x + a 2crf + e, (16)
af -  A ) +  P\e]-\ + Pts + A 0-/ - i» ( i 7)
for F^AS, (0,l). The equations of the mean and the conditional variance o f spreads above
capture any past influence on both spread change AS, (mean equation) and conditional variance er f . 
If the mean reversion parameter a x < 0 , the spread series is considered level stationary. The 
conditional mean o f the spread change is dependent on the past spread level and the level of the 
conditional variance, with error term £,. The conditional variance follows a GARCH(1,1) process, 
which is defined by one lag squared errors sf_x in the mean equation, the autocorrelation term 
(forecast variance o f the previous period) crf_x and the past spread level (as extension to the standard 
GARCH(1,1) model).
31 Building on the two-factor model by Longstaff and Schwartz (1992) and the work by Bali (2000), Koutmos 
(2002) considers frequendy observed volatility clusters of yield curves (GARCH effect) in the context of 
asymmetric mean reversion. He finds that spreads commonly behave non-stationary if a positive spread change 
in the past had preceded an external shock, whilst mean reversion is statistically significant after a negative 
spread change.
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Since both equations do not recognise asymmetric spread dynamics, Koutmos (2002) proposes a 
two-factor model, which accommodates mean reversion in U.S. MBS yields after positive and 
negative past spread changes in line with Bali (2000). We break down the mean reversion term a x
(mean equation) into a x pl tSt_x + a Xn{\ — by imposing the indicator function
[1 if St - S t_x > 0
I  = < on the first difference of spreads. Moreover, we also introduce asymmetry
[0 if St -  St_x < 0
in to the conditional variance equation by discriminating between the coefficient value o f the positive 
and negative squared residuals o f the previous period, by means o f an extended ARCH term 
Pxzf_x + P2uf-\ for ut_x = m in(0, St_x} instead of using only Pxsf_x (ordinary ARCH term). Here, f3x 
measures any general sensitivity of the conditional variance erf to past squared residuals, while the 
coefficient value of P2 is limited to the contribution of negative past errors et_x < 0 to the variance 
and, hence, reflects any degree of potential asymmetries. This approach differs only formally from 
the so-called “threshold ARCH” (TARCH) process developed independendy by Glosten et al. (1993) 
and Zakoian (1990), which allows asymmetric shocks to volatility through the ARCH term
Pxef_x + yef_xdt_, for d = \ I-1 • t i^e original TARCH setting introduced by Engle and Ng
[1 if sf_x < 0
(1993) in their research on the impact of news on volatility (asymmetric News Impact Curve), good 
news et_x < 0 and bad news s t_x > 0 have different effects on the conditional variance. Good news 
has an impact o f Px, while bad news has an impact of Px+ y . I f  y  ^  0 the news impact is 
asymmetric, where y  > 0 signifies a “leverage effect”.
6.2 GARCH specification
In this chapter we explain the heteroskedasticity spread change behaviour (term structure o f spreads) 
by a multi-factor asymmetric GARCH process on the basis of two equations for the mean and 
conditional variance. In extension to Koutmos’ (2002) adaptation o f Longstaff and Schwartz (1992), 
the conditional mean o f spread changes is influenced by past spread levels, the past LIBOR rate and 
the conditional variance. The latter follows a GARCH process defined by past variance (GARCH 
term), past squared residuals of the mean equation (ARCH term) as well as the LIBOR rate and past 
spreads as variance regressors. We find both the level and the first differences o f LIBOR rates as an
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appropriate reference base for the given spread series.32 In contrast to Koutmos, however, our 
sample size is limited to 93 weekly observations of actual secondary market spread data for traded 
tranches o f these asset types. In order to improve the statistical properties o f the analysis, we 
adjusted the spread series and transformed them, so that the subsequent examination could be 
completed on “raw” data, logarithmic spreads and spreads adjusted by the Johnson Fit. We abstained 
from the Johnson Fit procedure for LIBOR rates, i.e. the spread series o f LIBOR enters the 
estimation only as observed spot rates and logarithmic spot rates without the Johnson Fit.
We propose two GARCH specifications, GARCH(1,1) and GARCH(2,1), with one variation each. In 
the GARCH(1,1) model we incorporate (i) first differences of LIBOR (with indicator function) in the 
mean equation and (ii) the past LIBOR rate as variance regressors. As a variation to this specification 
we include past LIBOR rates as either level data or first differences. In the alternative GARCH(2,1) 
process, we refine the GARCH(1,1) model as we (i) introduce a new set of mean reversion 
coefficients o f lag two for the positive and negative past spread levels mean equation (with a 
corresponding indicator function) and (ii) extend the past forecast variance to two lags in the 
estimation o f conditional variance. Overall, we consider asymmetric effects o f explanatory factors 
through (i) indicator functions for past spreads and past LIBOR rates in the mean equation as well as 
(ii) two coefficients for positive and negative errors in the expression for conditional variance.
6.2.1 GARCH(1,1) model specification
We specify the GARCH (1,1) model by the following mean equation and conditional variance 
equation:
~ St-\ — =ao+ +
■*" 0  ~  ) a 2,2^/-l ■*" £t
and
= 0 0  + A  + + A S 1 -1  + A A -i + » 0 -9)
which transform to
AlnJ) = 0Cq +  ^InSt_^  + (l -  It ) cc^  2 I n +
(2°)
Ktct2^  In L t_x + (1 -  Kt J # 2,2 k* A -i ^ 3
and
32 See also Goodman and Ho (1998).
-  A0 + P\s]-\ + Piu)-1 + A3 i^ -i + A4^ l,^ + A5°'/2-i » (2i)
for LIBOR sport rates as well as
(22)
A lnJ, = a 0 + I ta iA In + (l - 1t ) a X2 In St_x +
Kta 2A A In L t + (l — Kt ) a 2<2& In L t + a ,a f  + s ,
and
= Ao + A<i + A2V 1 + A3 + A4AlnL/ + As^ -i C23)
for the first differences o f LIBOR. J, denotes the secondary market spreads o f a certain asset class — 
either CDO, MBS or Pfandbrief — and L t is the 3-month-LIBOR rate, both at time t. The indicator 
function o f past innovations (negative and positive) is expressed as ut_x = min(0,£,/_1) . The indicator
1 if St — St_) > 0
fimctions for the first difference of spreads S, and LIBOR rates L, are I, = ,
F ' [0 if
f l  if L t -  L t_x > 0 
and K = <  respectively.
r (0 if L, -  L t_x < 0 F y
In the above GARCH(1,1) expression the first order spread change depends on the spread level of 
the previous period (conditional on the direction of change), the change of the sport rate (LIBOR) of 
the previous period as a reference base and the conditional variance with a past volatility forecast 
(GARCH term) and lagged squared residuals from the mean equation (ARCH term). The use o f one 
lag spreads captures first-order autocorrelation. The inclusion o f the LIBOR rate (at level and first 
difference) as a proxy for the general interest rate level is a crucial control factor o f our analysis, 
because a statistically significant LIBOR effect as the most prominent fixed income benchmark helps 
specify the nature o f spread changes due to idiosyncratic effects in the ABS market. The squared 
residuals measure the part of spread changes that escape the explanatory power o f independent 
factors in the mean equation. Hence, they measure mainly those parts o f changes in the spread over 
time, which are common to the pricing of structured debt.
Moreover, the model allows the examination o f asymmetric effects o f past spread levels and squared 
errors on future spread dynamics. If  the conditions ^  <2 , 2 and a x x + a x 2 < 0 for the regression 
coefficients hold, the given spread series is level stationary with asymmetric mean reversion at lag 
one. Analogously, the same applies for the relationship between a 2 x and ct2 2 in the context o f lag
196
two. Moreover, past errors have different effects on the conditional variance. Px measures any 
general sensitivity o f the conditional variance to past errors, whereas /?2 measures the impact o f 
negative past error et_x < 0 on the conditional variance, and hence, reflects any degree o f potential 
asymmetries for P2 ^  0. The contribution of an (overall) positive error et_x > 0 will be equal to 
f ix+ P2. If  P2 > 0 , the conditional variance of spread change is more sensitive to positive past 
errors (i.e. spread increases) than negative past errors (i.e. spread decreases). However, if P2 < 0 , 
negative residuals precipitate a negative reaction in spread change. /?3 and /?4 measure the sensitivity 
o f variance to the spread level and the LIBOR rate (or the change thereof, depending on whether JLt 
or AL, is used in the specification of the GARCH model), while fis represents its persistence.
6.2.2 GARCH(2,1) model specification
In extension to the GARCH(1,1) model we allow for a greater explanatory power by past volatility in 
a GARCH(2,1) process, as we expand the forecast variance o f the conditional variance (GARCH 
term) to the last two periods, matched by two lag spreads as additional independent variables in the 
mean equation to control for second-order autocorrelation. Squared errors in the conditional 
variance expression are kept at one lag. Hence, building on the GARCH(1,1) specification above, this 
extension yields
depending on whether the LIBOR spot rates are considered on level or first differences. The
AinS( (Xq + I,ocxx In J)_j + (l 11')ccx2 h* A_i + Jt&2,1 ^ ^ - 2  
(l — J t ) # 2,2 2 ■ * " 3 ,11*1 A -j + ( l — Kt ) # 3 2 h* A -i + oc3crt + st
(24)
and
(25)
as well as
Ain CIq + ltaxx l n J ^  + (l I( 2 h1 A-i J/&2,1 A- 2
(l — Jt) ^ 2,2 ^  A - 2  Ktcc3>1 A In L,( + (l — Kt ) oc32 A In L f_x + oc3c t + s t
(26)
and
~  A  +  P \£]-\ + P zu)-\ + A ^ - i  + P4A \n L t + A 0 " /-!  + A  1 -2  > (27)
indicator function for second differences of spreads S( is Jt
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6.2.3 'Estimation procedure
The estimation of the presented GARCH models requires a non-linear solution algorithm for 
conditional maximum likelihood (CML). We apply two kinds of maximum likelihood iterative 
estimation procedures -  Bemdt-Hall-Hall-Hausman (BHHH)/Gauss-Newton (1974)33 and Marquardt 
(1963).34 Since the first difference of logarithmic spreads o f most time series in our data set does not 
follow a normal distribution (see Tab. 1), with the exception o f some Pfandbrief issue spreads, we 
use the heteroskedasticity consistent covariance method by Bollerslev and Wooldridge (1992), which 
is needed for several model diagnostics (coefficient and residual tests). In this way, we derive robust 
estimators for quasi-maximum likelihood (QML) covariance and standard errors (Bollerslev and 
Woolridge, 1992), even in the absence of normally distributed spread differences.
Since both the maximum-neighbourhood procedure o f the Marquardt ML algorithm and the 
approximation o f the negative Hessian by the sum of the gradient vectors o f the Bemdt, Hall, Hall, 
and Hausman (BHHH) algorithm use random iterative components, the estimation for one and the 
same spread series could yield different results each time. This holds true especially for short time 
series, such as in our case o f CDO, MBS and Pfandbrief spreads, where disparate local optima 
misrepresent the overall estimation result. In order to reduce parameter uncertainty and derive 
estimation results at parameter values that maximise the objective function (global optimum), we 
devise a specific estimation procedure. After N  iterative cycles generate preliminary estimation
33 The shared underlying approximative estimation algorithm is referred to as Gauss-Newton for general 
nonlinear least squares problems, and Bemdt, Hall, Hall, and Hausman (BHHH) for maximum likelihood 
problems. For both types of problems this estimation routine represents the substitution of the negative 
Hessian by an approximation derived from the summed outer product of the gradient vectors of each 
observation’s contribution to the objective function. It is asymptotically equivalent to the actual Hessian when 
evaluated at the parameter values that maximise the objective function. Advantages of Gauss-Newton/BHHH 
are that only the first derivatives need to be evaluated and the outer product is necessarily positive. However, 
this approximation algorithm might provide poor guidance concerning the overall shape of the function, when 
evaluated at parameter values away from the maximum, so that more iterations may be needed for 
convergence.
34 The Marquardt ML algorithm is based on a maximum-neighbourhood procedure, which combines the 
benefits of both Gauss algorithms and gradient procedures. According to Marquardt (Marquardt, 1963) pure 
Gaussian estimation procedures frequently fail due to the divergence of successive iterative steps, whereas 
gradient procedures only gradually reach the necessary level of convergence if the approximate optimum 
solution has been determined already. The Marquardt ML estimation procedure does not share these drawbacks. 
Its algorithm quickly converges to the optimum solution (similar to Gauss algorithms) and pushes the updated 
parameter values in the direction of the gradient. Like in gradient procedures, the Marquardt estimation aims to 
find the optimum based on random solution values far removed from the area of convergence of other 
iterative estimation procedures (Marquardt, 1963). The Marquardt algorithm modifies the Gauss-Newton 
algorithm in exactly the same manner as quadratic hill climbing modifies the Newton-Raphson method (by adding 
a correction matrix (or ridge factor) to the Hessian approximation). Note that in the Marquardt estimation we 
compute asymptotic standard errors from the unmodified (Gauss-Newton) Hessian approximation once 
convergence is achieved.
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results, we perpetuate the estimation process until the adjusted R2-measure and the significance of 
estimators square up with the best results after the first N  number o f estimations. The determination 
o f N  represents a trade-off between computational time and the consistency o f the successive 
estimations given the length o f the time series. We set N  = 1,000 for the short time series o f weekly 
spreads. The estimation procedure is conducted with starting values different from 1 (i.e. 
x0.7,x0.5,x0.3 or xO) for the OLS estimation in cases where the estimation algorithm encountered 
a singular matrix due to multicollinearity of model factors.35
Upon estimation o f the two specifications of GARCH models, we examine the statistical significance 
o f the degree of level stationarity contingent on past positive and negative spread change (coefficient 
test). In order to attest overall mean reversion to the given spread dynamics, and possible asymmetric 
effects on past spread levels, we validate the hypotheses for the coefficient values ccxx+ a X2< 0 in
GARCH(1,1) and a x 1 + a x 2 < 0 and a 2X+ a 22<0 in GARCH(2,1), respectively. Each hypothesis is
comprised o f two sub-hypotheses: H 0 x: a x, + ccx2 = 0 and H 0 2 : a x x + a x 2 = a u  + a x2 for both
GARCH models as well as H 0x: a 2 l + a 22 = 0 and H 0 2 : a 2x + a 2 2 = ce2x + ot22 for GARCH(2,1)
in order to account for past spread levels of up to lag two. The time series is stationary overall, if (i) 
we cannot reject the second null hypothesis, i.e. the sum o f the coefficient values is not significantly 
different from the sum of the calculated test estimators, and (ii) the sum of the coefficients is smaller 
than zero, so that the first null hypothesis is rejected. Furthermore, in the context of measuring the 
heteroskedasticity o f spreads, we can also assess any asymmetry o f spread dynamics. If 
H 0 : a xx = a x 2 for GARCH(1,1) as well as H 0 \ a x l = a X2 and H Q: a 2x= a 22 for GARCH(2,1) can
be rejected, past spread change influences the sensitivity of future spread change to past spread 
levels.
Both tests are completed by means of the Wald coefficient test,, which computes the test statistic by 
estimating an unrestricted regression without imposing the coefficient restrictions specified by the 
null hypothesis. The Wald test diagnostic is calculated from
35 We apply SQR-GARCH estimation in cases when multicollinearity of estimation yields a singular matrix for 
any starting value of simple OLS-estimators. Alternatively, we could have also omitted the intercept term a 0 
(i.e. the constant of spread differences) from the estimation equation. This remedial procedural, however, 
would only be commendable if the statistical significance of the intercept term is negligible for the 
interpretation of the estimation results. Particularly in the case of the GARCH(2,1) specification, high levels of 
significance of the intercept prohibit this approach.
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IF = (R/? -  r) x (<72R (X X )-' R ') ' ' (Rp  -  r) ~ X\ „ ,» (28)
where <J2 is the variance of unrestricted residuals. It tests the validity o f linear coefficient restrictions 
as it measures how close the unrestricted estimates come to satisfying the restrictions under the null 
hypothesis. In matrix algebra the null hypothesis is generally written as H 0 : R/? = r , where r denotes 
the m x l  vector of the required results of the testable restrictions and m is the number of 
restrictions. The matrix R^*^ represents the linear combinations of the restrictions, with p  as the
coefficient vector with k  coefficients.37
Finally, we impose robustness tests on the simulation results o f specific model specifications in order 
to address contingencies of both estimation risk and state variable uncertainty. We determine the 
correct specification o f both GARCH models on the basis of three standard residual tests (TJung-Box 
(LB) ^statistic and Jarque-Bera statistic) and three model specific residual tests (sign bias test, negative 
size bias test and positive size bias test). The Uung-Box (LB) Q-statistic for standardised and squared 
standardised residuals o f the estimation process can detect any remaining serial correlation in the 
mean equation and any remaining ARCH effect in the conditional variance equation respectively. If 
the mean equation is correcdy specified, all Q-statistics o f standardised residuals should be 
insignificant with no observable autocorrelation. Analogously, the same applies to the LB Q-statistic 
o f squared standardised residuals for a correctly specified conditional variance. Moreover, we resort 
to the Jarque-Bera statistic for standardised residuals as a statistical diagnostic in order to test the null 
hypothesis o f a normal distribution assumption of errors. As standard residual tests fail to address 
asymmetric mean reversion and heteroskedasticity o f spread series, we need to consider possible 
biased effects o f past errors. The sign bias test, the negative size bias test and the positive size bias 
test generate OLS estimates o f squared standardised errors, whose statistical significance help 
indicate whether the model estimates are influenced by the size and the sign o f past errors (ARCH 
terms) in a systematic way.
36 Under the assumption of independent and normally distributed residuals s , we calculate the F-statistic 
F  = (Rp - r )  x (r2R(X'X)_1 R ') '’ x(R/? — r) x m 1, where m = 1 is equal to the value of W  and s2 poses as 
estimator of <x2 (Hamilton, 1994).
37 For instance, the validity of the joint hypotheses of Px+ P2—\ and /?3 = /?4 would require the following
i A
1 1 o o '  1
specification of the Wald test for m — 2 and k = 4 : H0 :
0 0 1 - 1
Pi
A
A
(Hamilton, 1994).
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7 ESTIMATION RESULTS
Tabs. 5-8 report the Bemdt-Hall-Hall-Hausman (BHHH) estimation results for the multi-factor 
GARCH(1,1) and GARCH(2,1) models with asymmetric mean reversion (at level or first difference 
o f LIBOR spot rates) on the basis of Johnson-Fit-adjusted and logarithmic spreads. Comprehensive 
estimation results for non-transformed and unadjusted spreads and for both conditional maximum 
likelihood estimation algorithms -  Marquardt (“M”) and Bemdt-Hall-Hall-Hausman (“BHHH”) — are 
found in Appendix, Tabs.26-33 for GARCH estimations with LIBOR at level and Appendix, Tabs. 
43-49 for GARCH estimations with LIBOR at first differences. Both GARCH models produce 
heterogeneous ML estimation results rather different from the simple OLS regression model, which 
only captures symmetric mean reversion (see Tab. 2). Generally, the specified factors have relatively 
weak influence on the conditional spread differences (mean equation) and conditional variance of 
low-rated, long maturity CDOs spread series in GARCH(1,1) — for both level or first difference 
LIBOR spot rates — and on the spread change under the GARCH(2,1) specification for level LIBOR 
spot rates. We also find low levels o f significance for the specified conditional variance equation for 
high-rated MBS in GARCH(1,1) with LIBOR at first difference and MBS in GARCH(2,1) with 
LIBOR at level, as well as Pfandbrief spread series in GARCH(2,1) with LIBOR at first difference. 
The spread series o f all other asset classes confirm the high degrees of explanatory power to 
designated model factors in both the GARCH(1,1) and the GARCH(2,1) specification. Generally, the 
GARCH(2,1) model yields feature parameter significance more than the GARCH(1,1) specification, 
especially with regards to GARCH effects, whereas ARCH effects claim stronger explanatory power 
for conditional variance in the GARCH(1,1) setting -  with the use of LIBOR rates at first differences 
(instead o f level data o f LIBOR rates) intensifying this observation. In the following discussion o f the 
estimation results, we concentrate on those GARCH model specifications, where the first difference 
of the LIBOR spot rate is used as regressor in the mean and the conditional variance equations, as 
these model specifications generally perform better (at least for GARCH(2,1)) than model 
specifications with LIBOR at level. However, whenever the use o f level data o f LIBOR spot rates 
appreciably changes the economic and statistical significance of model parameters, for better or 
worse, we incorporate these findings in the discussion of the model estimates.
The intercept coefficient is significant for all spread series under the GARCH (2,1) specification, with 
the exception o f all Pfandbrief tranches and MA7. Similar results are found for GARCH (1,1) if we 
substitute the first difference o f LIBOR rates for level spot rates. Only CTAAA3, CTA5, CTBBB7, 
MA7 and PAAA5 are insignificant. For level LIBOR rates, however, the picture in the GARCH(1,1)
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model reverses, where the constant is only significant for CSAAA3, MAAA5, PAAA3 and PAAA7. 
The number of significant values o f a 0 is limited to only two series (CSAAA3 and MAAA3) for 
GARCH(2,1) with the first difference of LIBOR rates as regressor. The influence o f past spreads on 
future spread change at lag one {oci l , a l2) i11 both GARCH models clearly supports the degree o f
mean reversion observed in the preceding OLS regression and the unit root test (see section 5.2) for 
the given coefficient values and the level of statistical significance. In some spread series (CSAAA3, 
CSBBB7 and CTAAA3 in GARCH(1,1) with LIBOR at first difference, CTAAA3 and MAAA5 in 
GARCH(2,1) with LIBOR at first difference and CTAAA3 and CTBBB7 in GARCH(2,1) with 
LIBOR at level) the coefficients for past spreads levels associated with subsequent negative and 
positive spread change sum up to negative values, indicating level stationarity. Moreover, asymmetric 
mean reversion is more pronounced for low-rated MBS transactions and all Pfandbrief time series, 
whose spread development and pricing pattern might be attributable to higher market liquidity and 
different asset-specific investor sentiment, compared to CDO deals. Considering -  where 
appropriate and statistically significant — the null hypothesis o f future spread change, irrespective o f 
whether past spreads increased or declined, we find higher spread sensitivity to past spread levels 
associated with negative first differences (negative asymmetric mean reversion). All cases in 
GARCH(1,1) show this pattern o f asymmetric mean reversion. The time series of all asset classes in 
both models (with the exception o f the spread series o f traditional CDO transactions and one 
synthetic CDO spread series for GARCH(2,1)) exhibit higher effects of negative spread change at lag
one yet, the coefficients (Xx x and a l2 in both GARCH models share similar significance
across the given spreads series, so that first order stationarity follows both negative and positive past 
spread change. As we extend the influence of past spread levels contingent on the direction o f spread
change (i.e. second differences) to two lags (ar21,tf22) in GARCH(2,1) the stochastic time series
properties alter dramatically. For one, the coefficients {cc2, ,cc22} are positive for all spread series
(with the exception of CTAAA3 and CTBBB7 with LIBOR at first difference and CTBBB7 and 
MA7 with LIBOR at level), limiting stationarity to first differences of spread change. Furthermore, 
the asymmetric effect o f past spread change reverses for second differences o f past spread levels (at 
lag two), where the spread reaction after positive shocks is more pronounced. In the GARCH(2,1) 
model we detect exactly the opposite effect o f two lag spread change compared to the first difference
of spread change -  the response to a positive direction o f past spread change (# 21) dominates
negative changes (a 2 2) . This positive pricing bias (i.e. positive trend) might be attributable to the 
depressed economic outlook and cautious investor behaviour during the time the sample was taken.
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Their statistical significance is the same for each type o f spread series. However, two out o f three 
traditional CDO series (and all three spread series for LIBOR at level) and two out of four MBS 
spread series (and three out o f four spread series for LIBOR at level) in GARCH(2,1) do not 
generate significant a 2, and a 2 2 coefficients. Level effects in a 0 seem to be confined to synthetic
CDOs and MBSs in the GARCH(1,1) model (and also traditional CDOs for GARCH(2,1) if level 
data for LIBOR spot rates are taken into account), and go hand in hand with first-order mean 
reversion, so that spread change remains almost unaffected by the LIBOR rate of the previous 
period (except for some MBS and Pfandbrief spread series in GARCH(1,1) and all CDO spread 
series in GARCH(2,1) for LIBOR at level spot rates), as documented by coefficients a 2, and a 22 in
GARCH(1,1) and tf31 and a i 2 in GARCH(2,1).
The coefficients a 3 in GARCH(1,1) and cc4 in GARCH(2,1), which measure the direct influence of 
the conditional variance on spread change, are significant for all Pfandbrief and some CDO spreads 
in GARCH(1,1), whilst all other model specifications, i.e. the variation on the properties of LIBOR 
rates as regressors or the extension o f the forecasting power o f the GARCH term in GARCH(2,1), 
do not produce similar parameter significance. Surprisingly, neither the short time series nor the 
relative illiquid nature of CDO and MBS transactions in our data set induce pseudo-causalities of 
spread dynamics — a situation that might reasonably explain why the 2 -statistics o f MA7 in 
GARCH(1,1), all traditional CDO spread series in GARCH(2,1) and generally all CDO spread series 
with LIBOR rates at first differences are shy of reaching the 10% significance threshold by only a 
margin. No conclusive assessment can be made with regard to the coefficient values o f a 3 and OC4, 
whose signs do not seem to be associated with either a certain rating quality, maturity or asset class o f 
the tranches (spread series).
We do not obtain homogenous estimation results for the constant /?0 o f the conditional variance 
equation in either GARCH model. While most spread series generate positive intercept values 
(except for synthetic CDOs and some MBS spread series, especially if level data is used for the 
LIBOR regressor), significant estimators are found for almost all CDO spreads and the two lowest 
rated MBS tranche spreads in both GARCH models, with Pfandbrief spreads faintly revealing some 
level effect.
The coefficients yS, and /?2 measure the general sensitivity of the conditional variance to past 
residuals (ARCH effects) of estimated spread change. We reject the null hypothesis that the
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conditional variance of spread changes is not dependent on past errors Px (general ARCH term), as 
spreads increase only for Pfandbrief spreads and two out of four MBS spreads in the GARCH(1,1) 
model and CSAAA3 and CTBBB7 in the GARCH(2,1) model. Negative past errors P2 (ARCH 
term) for spread decline (negative ARCH effect) are significant in further spread series, e.g. synthetic 
CDOs for GARCH(1,1) and traditional CDOs, if the LIBOR parameter is kept to level data as well 
as highly rated MBSs, for GARCH(2,1). Since Px + p 2 measures the dependence on positive past 
errors and P2 measures the influence of negative past errors only, P2 ^  0 reflects potential 
asymmetries o f how past errors generally affect conditional variance. We find p 2 > 0 in most spread 
series (with negative signs only for all Pfandbrief spreads and two out o f four MBS spreads in 
GARCH(1,1) and CTA5, CTBBB7, MBBB7 and PAAA3 in GARCH(2,1), with all o f them but one 
being insignificant), where significant P2 are always positive (the only exception is PAAA7 in 
GARCH(1,1)). Since negative effects o f past squared residuals dominate the general effect of 
residuals by absolute value for both GARCH models, the conditional variance erf o f spread change 
is more sensitive to negative past errors (i.e. spread declines) (Bali, 2000). The predominantly positive 
influence (i.e. positive coefficient value /?2) of negative innovations (i.e. spread declines) on the 
conditional variance in both GARCH specifications documents that volatility is asymmetric. i.e. 
negative past errors increase spread volatility more than positive innovations (i.e. spread increases) — 
similar to stock price volatility. Apparently, the asymmetry of spread dynamics for the given time 
period captured by the sample size is not only limited to the mean equation alone but extends to the 
conditional variance, too. In our specific case, nearly all spread series exhibit an increase o f 
conditional variance after a spread decrease associated with negative past innovations. Since longer 
time series o f Pfandbrief spreads (from 1998 to 2002) confirm these results to the extent that past 
errors (i.e. spread changes) have a positive and significant effect or no effect at all on the conditional 
variance, we can rule out that asymmetric spread volatility reflects a specific pattern o f spread 
dynamics o f merely transitory (and spurious) validity.
As we define positive contribution of past errors as P1 + P2, the degree o f the asymmetric effect o f 
past errors on spread volatility is captured by the metric (/^  + fi2 ) / p x (asymmetry factor o f conditional
variance), which should ideally range between -1 and 1 for a balanced effect o f past innovations on 
conditional volatility. An asymmetry factor o f more than two in many spread series o f our estimation 
indicates that negative past errors o f spread estimates (negative innovations/spread decline) increase 
the spread volatility twice as much as positive past errors (spread increase). Across many ARCH 
terms in both GARCH models, the absolute value o f the asymmetry factor is greater than one, with
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the exception o f all (in GARCH(1,1) with LIBOR at first differences) or most (in GARCH(1,1) and 
GARCH(2,1) with level data o f LIBOR) MBS spread series, two out three Pfandbrief spread series in 
GARCH(2,1) with LIBOR at first differences and CTBBB7 spreads in both GARCH models, which 
feature acceptable values o f ( +  /?2) / A  • Overall, asymmetric sensitivity to past innovations seems 
most pronounced for CDO spreads, but the incorporation of LIBOR at first differences and 
controlling for second moment GARCH effects in GARCH(2,1) diminishes the degree of 
asymmetry. It also decreases the longer the maturity and the lower the rating grade o f the given 
spread series (in all but the CDO spread series). Nonetheless, the GARCH(1,1) specification seems 
to produce a more consistent degree of asymmetry for each asset class (CDO, MBS and Pfandbrief 
spreads) than the GARCH(2,1) model.
The coefficient /?3 measures the sensitivity o f the conditional variance to the spread level o f the 
previous period (“level effect”). We find no coherent results for a significant level effect. /?3 carries a 
negative sign for the majority o f spread series in both GARCH models (especially traditional CDO 
and Pfandbrief spreads), irrespective of the configuration o f the LIBOR regressor. Moreover, the 
parameter estimates have hardly any economic significance; yet, if they do, their value increases in 
rating quality and maturity of the asset class of the respective spread series. The level effect is most 
significant for CDO and Pfandbrief transactions in both GARCH models and MBS in GARCH(2,1). 
Incorporating LIBOR rates as level data lessens the statistical significance, while leaving the 
economic significance nearly unchanged. In all but synthetic CDO spreads, negative economic 
significance and statistical significance of at least 10% coincide.
The coefficient /?4 measures the level effect o f the underlying reference spot rate (LIBOR rate) of 
the previous period on the conditional variance of spreads. Past LIBOR rates seem to play some role 
only for synthetic CDOs and, to some extent, MBS spreads in both GARCH models, whereas 
evidence o f possible influence on traditional CDO structures and Pfandbrief transactions is 
inconclusive. As the first differences of LIBOR spot rates are replaced by level data, absolute 
parameter values generally decrease in either GARCH specification, with most parameter estimates 
for CDO transactions losing their negative sign. Generally, the statistical significance o f the 
coefficient /?4 rises for the entire dataset. Finally, we estimate the coefficients f3s for both GARCH 
specifications and /?6 for GARCH(2,1) in order to control the estimation of the conditional variance 
for the forecast variance (GARCH effect) at lag one (and lag two for GARCH(2,1)).
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Collateralised Debt Obligations (CDO)
Synthetic Traditional
CSAAA3# CSA5 CSBBB7 CTAAA35'* CTA5 CTBBB7
do 0.5673** 0.8561 1.0612 0.2943 0.1866 0.4390
(13169) (0.6994) (0.9432) (1.0250) (0.7681) (0.6291)
d l.l -0.0861** -0.1161 -0.1325 -0.0511 -0.0280 -0.0769
-(2.1500) -(0.8382) -(1.0774) -(0.7022) -(0.7225) -(0.6902)
d l.2 -0.1069** -0.1266 -0.1404 -0.0758 -0.0391 -0.0892
-(2.4369) -(0.9098) -(1.1281) -(1.0653) -(0.9835) -(0.7861)
<*2,1 -0.1686** -0.1990 -0.2061 -0.0813** -0.0369 -0.0196
-(2.2832) -(0.5777) -(0.7286) -(23773) -(0.7351) (0.2799)
<*2,2 -0.1554** -0.1812 -0.1955 -0.0762** -0.0362 -0.0178
-(2.3193) -(0.5291) -(0.6962) -(2.3188) -(0.7214) -(0.2563)
a 3 2.4101 -0.5681 -9.0706 11.7871 2.5065 7.9509
(1.3336) -(0.0374) -(1.1289) (1.0322) (1.0794) (0.9429)
Po 0.0036 0.0402** 0.0212 0.0012 0.0243** 0.0129
(0.0560) (10382) (0.6551) (0.1793) (2.4426) (0.7765)
Pi -0.0224 -0.0026 0.0744 -0.0246 0.1741 0.3558*
-(0.6368) -(0.1131) (1.1934) -(1.2860) (0.9792) (1.6544)
P2 0.1569 0.5707 0.0623 0.2851 -0.6778** -0.1365
(0.6341) (0.3310) (0.1393) (1.3934) -(2.5173) -(0.4364)
Pa -0.0005 -0.0047** -0.0026 -0.0008 -0.0036** -0.0020
-(0.0424) -(1.9611) -(0.7561) -(0.5056) -(2.4146) -(0.7841)
P4 0.0001 -0.0110** -0.0041 0.0013 -0.0046** -0.0014
(0.0114) -(2.0897) -(0.4896) (0.9064) -(2.3085) -(0.7085)
Ps 0.5772 0.5468** 0.5387*** 0.5115* 0.5237** 0.4624
(0.8391) (2.0165) (2.8658) (1.8500) (2.2190) (1.2741)
asymmetiy effect (ff /  +fi 2 ) $  1
Mortgage-Backed Securities (MBS)________   Pfandbriefe
MAAA3# MAAA5 MA7§,# MBBB7 PAAA3 PAAA5# PAAA7#
0.3424 1.13716*** -0.0068 1.5360** 0.3371* 0.1029 0.8264***
(1.1870) (4.2574) -(0.0403) (2.2702) (1.9480) (0.7087) (3.5174)
-0.18967** -0.4084*** -0.0047 -0.3043** -0.1328** -0.0562 -0.3019***
-(10648) -(4.1699) -(0.1170) -(13303) -(21319) -(1.5046) -(3.5624)
-0.1916** -0.4302*** -0.0104 -0.3270** -0.1576** -0.0936** -0.3270***
-(10874) -(4.4030) -(0.2618) -(14617) -(2.5466) -(2.5064) -(3.8437)
0.1656 0.0951 0.0185 -0.0193 0.0439 0.0787 0.2143
(1.4387) (1.4032) (0.3221) -(0.2680) (1.4013) (0.9720) (1.5737)
0.1630 0.1006 0.0210 -0.0219 0.0483* 0.0849 0.2277*
(1.4285) (1.4829) (0.3683) -(0.3031) (1.6853) (1.0786) (1.6733)
-8.5146 -0.1351 -0.0001 1.7645 0.1799 -0.0091 -43.8189**
-(1.3835) -(0.9746) (0.0000) (0.8142) (0.0838) -(0.0014) -(1.8944)
-0.0104* -0.1489** -0.0006** -0.0776** 0.0128* -0.0001 0.0045***
-(1.6789) -(2.3609) -(1.9298) -(22549) (7.2262) -(0.0276) (3.6997)
-0.0013 0.3987* 0.1401 0.2669 0.1103 -0.0367 0.0446
-(0.0077) (1.8461) (0.6356) (1.2400) (0.8971) -(0.2232) (1.0182)
0.0494 1.4608* 0.0509 0.4774 2.2513*** -0.0728 0.14646*
(0.2688) (1.8608) (0.0550) (0.5279) (17118) -(0.5866) (1.6698)
0.0005 0.0457** -0.0001*** 0.0145** -0.0020* 0.0000 -0.0020***
(1.3507) (2.1344) -(7.3532) (2.2189) -(1.9074) (0.0526) -(10.2139)
0.0006** 0.0061 0.0008*** 0.0041*** -0.0038*** 0.0001 0.0018**
(1.8720) (0.8620) (2.8981) (2.7368) -(3.2261) (0.0273) (2.3578)
0.3978*** -0.0122 0.5962*** 0.3891** 0.0428 1.0295*** 0.6096***
(19750) -(0.7778) (4.6666) (1.8906) (0.4804) (3.0848) (6.5966)
1.3634 4.6639 1.3634 2.7886 21.4040 2.9852 4.2837-6.0065 -220.1977 1.8377 -10.6029 -2.8923 0.6164
Time series are transformed by the Johnson Fit over logarithmic ("AD_L") basis point spreads of ABS tranche indices, where M="Residential Mortgage-Backed Securities (RMBS)", P '^Pfandbrief", CS="Synthetic Collateralised 
Debt Obligation (synthetic CDO)" and CT="Traditional/True Sale Collateralised Debt Obligation (traditional CDO)"; letters "AAA" to "BBB" reflect the Standard&Poor's investment grade rating system The number associated 
with each time series reflects the maturity in years. Z-statistics in parentheses; ***=1% significance, **=5% significance, *=10% significance; * no Bollerslev-Woolridge robust standard errors and variance. All GARCH (1,1) 
parameters have been estimated according to the Bemdt-Hall-Hall-Hausman algorithm, except in cases marked * (Marquardt quasi-maximum likelihood estimation procedure); * no Bollerslev-Woolridge robust standard errors and
Tab. 5. Estimation Results of GARCH(1,1) model (only transformed and Johnson Fit adjusted spreads) — LIBOR at level data.
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Collateralised Debt Obligations (CDO) Mortgage-Backed Securities (MBS) Pfandbriefe
Synthetic________________  Traditional
CSAAA3 CSA5 CSBBB7 CTAAA3 CTA5 CTBBB7# MAAA3* MAAA5 MA7 MBBB7# PAAA3 PAAA5* PAAA7#
«0 -0.3359*** 0.1323*** -0.0297*** -0.1968 0.1112 0.0468 0.5348*** 2.1303*** 0.0515 -0.5993*** 0.6466** 0.2456 0.1436*
-(3.3259) (205.4196) -(2.9629) -(0.6718) (0.6731) (0.3555) (2.5633) (6.3509) (0.1996) -(14.8031) (2.0686) (1.5503) (1.7794)
“ 1,1 0.0891*** -0.0249*** 0.0071*** 0.0534 -0.0227 -0.0087 -0.1828** -0.6812*** -0.0122 -0.6014*** -0.1954* -0.0512 -0.0317
(2.9162) -(14207.8800) (3.8994) (0.6599) -(0.6256) -(0.3519) -(2.4703) -(6.2183) -(0.1973) -(14.8182) -(1.8981) -(1.0806) -(1.3121)
<*1,2 0.0598* -0.0360*** -0.0031*** 0.0288 -0.0335 -0.0219 -0.2256*** -0.7325*** -0.0178 -0.2156 -0.2328** -0.0891* -0.0632***
(1.9246) -(15.7886) -(2.9980) (0.3705) -(0.9477) -(0.8794) -(2.6568) -(6.8095) -(0.2875) -(1.2432) -(2.2827) -(1.9260) -(2.65325
<*2,1 -1.6439 -1.1522 -0.2637 1.0116 -0.2453 0.0762 1.4318 2.0532 0.7260 -0.1725* -2.8504* -0.9247 -2.7918***
-(1.3817) -(1.6226) -(0.7213) (1.5034) -(0.1584) (0.2273) (0.85125 (1.2231) (0.9759) -(1.8021) -(1.6531) (0.5431) -(2.6031)
2,2 -1.6393 -0.0550 -0.5683*** -0.3110 -0.0663 -0.2355 -0.6449 -3.4029*** -0.6688** 0.0000 0.2487 -1.6499 -0.6465***
-(0.9808) -(0.1485) -(4.1118) -(0.6428) -(0.0546) -(0.7941) -(0.6854) -(3.5324) -(2.4369) (0.0000) (0.1668) -(0.9689) -(3.2229)
<*3 2.0765 14.945*** 4.2287 17.844* -6.6773 14.2827** 5.9111 -0.8505 -26.8013 2.9657*** -7.9308* -9.4603* 6.8546*
(0.4274) (5.41221 (0.6065) (1.6697) -(0.6684) (2.3327) (0.9384) -(0.4761) -(0.9588) (14.7673) -(1.8327) -(1.9187) (1.9447)
Po -0.0120 -0.0056*** -0.0021*** -0.0201 0.0021* 0.0005*** 0.0043 -0.0432 0.0009*** 0.7880*** 0.0295*** 0.0145*** 0.0052
-(1.3781) -(216.9990) -(21.7155) -(0.3914) (1.8218) (32.6239) (0.2351) -(1.0739) (28.4730) (5.6708) (4.8383) (61.6143) (1.1709)
Pi 0.0003 -0.0308 -0.0059 0.3203** 0.0167 0.2020 0.2535 0.3087** 0.1363 -0.5056*** 0.1006* 0.0518** 0.4051***
(0.0161) -(0.5067) -(0.6064) (2.0288) (0.8621) (1.5809) (0.8003) (2.0863) (0.8727) -(3.4664) (1.7348) (2.1670) (3.2857)
P i 0.2444 0.6496*** 0.4211** 0.3782*** 0.0112 0.0908 -0.3176 0.4484 -0.2383 0.1516*** -0.1881 -0.2147 -0.3755***
(1.2922) (2.9599) (2.2967) (3.5246) (0.0342) (0.3364) -(0.9157) (1.1253) -(0.7476) (3.2581) -(0.5438) -(1.3852) -(3.1800)
P3 0.0047* 0.0012*** 0.0004*** 0.0000 -0.0004* -0.0001*** -0.0006 0.0145 -0.0002*** 0.0000 -0.0098*** -0.0042*** -0.0006
(1.8499) (145.1169) (3.53E+101) (0.0000) -(1.7410) -(5.6946) -(0.0929) (1.1208) -(23.4736) (0.0000) -(5.0589) -(123.9026) -(0.5019)
P4 -0.2075** -0.0043 0.0004*** -0.0018 -0.0226 -0.0130 -0.0003 -0.0720 -0.0033*** -0.0009*** -0.0974** -0.1010 0.0297***
-(2.3513) -(0.1624) (2.6800) -(1.3512) -(1.3443) -(0.9388) -C0005I) -(0.8909) -(4.0140) -(26.6370) -(2.1245) -(1.2116) (3.3916)
P5 -0.1685 0.4014*** 0.8667*** -0.0338*** 0.8015*** 0.4764*** 0.4093 0.2605* 0.7180*** 0.0005 0.6548*** 0.6171*** -0.4841***
-(0.7951) (2.8251) 
asymmetry effect (P i - p 2)Pi
(9.8654) -(3.0594) (5.9026) (3.6227) (1.3163) (1.7464) (6.8271) (0.7430) (6.3602) (5.7479) -(3.1267)
837.8767 -20.0991 -70.3487 2.1808 2.0020 1.4493 -0.2528 -0.2538 -0.7487 0.7002 -0.8698 -3.1448 0.0731
Time series are transformed by the Johnson Fit over logarithmic ("AD_L") basis point spreads of ABS tranche indices, where M="Residential Mortgage-Backed Securities (RMBS)", P="Pfandbrief", CS="Synthetic 
Collateralised Debt Obligation (synthetic CDO)" and CT="Traditiona]/True Sale Collateralised Debt Obligation (traditional CDO)"; letters "AAA" to "BBB" reflect the Standard&Poor's investment grade rating system. 
The number associated with each time series reflects the maturity in years. Z-statistics in parentheses; ***=1% significance, **=5% significance, *=10% significance. All GARCH (1,1) parameters have been estimated 
according to the Bemdt-Hall-Hall-Hausman algorithm, except in cases marked # (Marquardt quasi-maximum likelihood estimation procedure); * singular covariance coefficients are not unique.
T ab. 6. Estimation Results of GAR.CH(1,1) model (only tranformed and Johnson Fit adjusted spreads) — LIBOR atfirst differences.
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______________ Collateralised Debt Obligations (CDO)_______________________ Mortgage-Backed Securities (MBS)______   Pfandbriefe__________
_____________Synthetic______________   Traditional_____________________________________________________________ ____________________________________
CSAAA3 CSA5# CSBBB7 CTAAA3 CTA5 CTBBB7 MAAA3 MAAA5 MA7# MBBB7# PAAA3 PAAA5# PAAA7
<Xo 0.4512* 0.9770** 1.1291** -1.3025*** 0.4565*** 0.9452* 0.3194*** 1.2504*** -0.0001 0.7650** -0.1462 -0.0888 0.0688
(1.7998) (2.0314) (2.0673) -(2.5877) (3.2101) (1.7063) (2.8108) (28365) (0.0000) (2.0976) -(0.4601) -(0.8203) (0.7261)
“ 1,1 -0.5265*** -0.1521*** -0.3345*** 0.2034* -0.1127 0.1230 -0.1772*** -0.6625*** -0.0052 -0.2182* -0.4316*** -0.1856*** -0.2950***
-(3.3951) -(2.6568) -(3.2618) (1.7791) -(1.0673) (0.4810) -(2.8007) -(6.1594) -(0.0389) -(1.7698) -(5.4273) -(2.7298) -(4.0992)
“ 1,2 -0.5232*** -0.1541*** -0.3362*** 0.1891* -0.1256 0.1139 -0.2051*** -0.6949*** -0.0018 -0.2313* -0.4636*** -0.2155*** -0.3139***
-(3.4540) -(2.7158) -(3.2779) (1.6724) -(1.2021) (0.4452) -(3.3320) -(6.6998) -(0.0108) -(1.9069) -(6.0432) -(3.2446) -(4.4373)
“ 2,1 0.4876*** 0.0398** 0.2047*** 0.1029 0.0494 -0.2595 0.0630 0.2645** -0.0067 0.0429 0.4935*** 0.2231*** 0.2860***
(2 8917) (2.5641) (3.7188) (1.1419) (0.5199) -(1.1244) (0.9134) (2.2946) -(0.0413) (0.6068) (5.6383) (2.8094) (3.8173)
“ 2,2 0.4675*** 0.0364** 0.1979*** 0.0957 0.0435 -0.2601 0.0400 0.2355** -0.0039 0.0376 0.4677*** 0.2084*** 0.2669***
(2.8508) (24113) (3.5631) (1.0706) (0.4661) -(1.1316) (0.6480) (20586) -(0.0253) (0.5317) (5.4355) (2.7004) (3.6558)
“ 3,1 -0.2089*** -0.2695** -0.2557** 0.1374* -0.0991*** -0.1412** 0.0223 0.0292 -0.0052 0.0710 0.0206 0.0112 -0.0023
-(2.6787) -(2.0732) -(2.2377) (1.8453) -(3.1577) -(2.2327) (0.6670) (0.3767) -(0.0338) (1.2623) (0.5280) (0.1851) -(0.0449)
a 3,2 -0.1718*** -0.2629** -0.2506** 0.1479** -0.0957*** -0.1340** 0.0390 0.0370 0.0211 0.0728 0.0219 0.0266 0.0090
-(2.2718) -(2.0562) -(2.2008) (1.9641) -(3.1995) -(22001) (1.2150) (0.4998) (0.4219) (1.3155) (0.5753) (0.4511) (0.1774)
a 4 0.2385 -t0.6189 -8.8101 32.3039*** -1.6554 -10.3923 -0.7260 -1.2715 0.0000 3.5558** -2.3015 -0.1315 7.1095
(0.1367) -(1.5540) -(1.5093) (2.7027) -(0.4600) -(1.1939) -(0.3230) -(0.5421) (0.0000) (2.3450) -(0.2789) -(0.0680) (0.9129)
Po 0.0918** 0.0032 0.0067 0.0222*** 0.0237*** 0.0171 -0.0181 -0.0458 -0.0004 0.0026 0.0062 -0.0097 0.0070*
(2.1182) (0.5237) (0.7215) (140.1111) (2.5758) (1.2880) -(0.6834) -(1.3632) -(0.7429) (0.2307) (1.1436) -(0.7166) (1.8599)
Pi 0.4130 -0.0319 0.0611 -0.0285 0.1772 0.2941* 0.1647** 0.0841 0.1268 0.2877*** -0.0030 0.0785 0.0441
(1.2536) -(1.4870) (0.6275) -(1.4088) (1.3784) (1.6461) (2.4651)1 (1.1114) (0.6495) (5.8947) -(0.0499) (1.2205) (1.0463)
p 2 -0.4774 0.3497 0.1205 0.2067*** 0.9762 -0.2284 -0.0970 0.4669* 0.0472 0.0589 0.4379 0.2777* 0.0408
-(1.4226) (0.7898) (0.3837) (2 5649) (1.2649) -(0.7793) -(1.0344) (1.8585) (0.0452) (0.5145) (1.5409) (1.8896) (0.9146)
P 3 -0.0133** -0.0003 -0.0007 -0.0051*** -0.0037** -0.0026 0.0033 0.0135 -0.0001** -0.0006 -0.0030 -0.0006 -0.0032***
-(2.0757) -(0.8885) -(0.6463) (-1468.42) -(2.5371) -(1.2705) (0.481Q) (1.1257) -(2.3959) -(0.2911) -(1.4466) -(0.5880) -(3.5052)
p 4 -0.0254** -0.0010 -0.0017 -0.0028*** -0.0047** -0.0020 0.0100 0.0040 0.0006 0.0006 0.0018** 0.0092 0.0037***
-(2.1487) -(0.4001) -(0.8310) -(28.4047) -(2.5382) -(1.3047) (1.0364) (0.8448) 1.1075 (0.4473) (1.8611) (1.1068) (3.0172)
P s -0.0053 0.7662*** 0.6896 0.5079** 0.11379*** 0.5414 -0.9052*** 0.8476*** 0.5337 0.4136*** 0.2033 0.6453*** 0.8942***
-(0.0209) (3.7768) (0.4944) (2.0074) (3.7852) (0.8417) -(4.8651) (5.0418) (0.5510) (3.5039) (0.8088) (2.7110) (11.1602)
p 6 0.1209 0.2048** 0.1188 0.0224 0.6477*** -0.0211 0.0736 -0.3504*** 0.0423 -0.1178*** 0.5787** -0.4895*** -0.7964***
(0.9002)
asymmetry effect (P /
(2.0187)
+P 2 ) $  1
(0.0953) (0.1435) (6.2909) -(0.0464) (0.3962) -(27044) (00691) -(3.6302) (2.5586) -(2.6539) -(10.2685)
-0.1558 -9.9508 2.9744 -6.2412 6.5096 0.2233 0.4114 6.5542 1.3722 1.2049 -145.5082 4.5299 1.9249
Time series are transformed by the Johnson Fit over logarithmic ("AD_L") basis point spreads of ABS tranche indices, where M= "Residential Mortgage-Backed Securities (RMBS)", P="Pfandbrief", 
CS="Synthetic Collateralised Debt Obligation (synthetic CDO)" and CT^'Traditional/True Sale Collateralised Debt Obligation (traditional CDO)"; letters "AAA" to "BBB" reflect the Standard&Poor's 
investment grade rating system. The number associated with each time series reflects the maturity in years. Z-statistics in parentheses; ***=1% significance, **=5% significance, *=10% significance. All 
GARCH (2,1) parameters have been estimated according to the Bemdt-Hall-Hall-Hausman algorithm, except in cases marked # (Marquardt quasi-maximum likelihood estimation procedure); * no Bollerslev- 
Woolridge robust standard errors and variance.
T ab. 7. Estimation Results of GARCH(2,1) model (only transformed and Johnson Fit adjusted spreads) — LIBOR at level data.
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Collateralised Debt Obligations (CDO)
Synthetic Traditional
CSAAA3 CSA5 CSBBB7 CTAAA3 CTA5 CTBBB7*
do -0.3359*** 0.1323*** -0.0297*** -0.1968 0.1112 0.0468
-(3.3259) (205.4196) -(2.9629) -(0.6718) (0.6731) (0.3555)
a t,t 0.0891*** -0.0249*** 0.0071*** 0.0534 -0.0227 -0.0087
(2.9162) -(14207.8800) (3.8994) (0.6599) -(0.6256) -(0.3519)
a l,2 0.0598* -0.0360*** -0.0031*** 0.0288 -0.0335 -0.0219
(1.9246) (15.7886) -(2.9980) (0.3705) -(0.9477) -(0.8794)
a 2,l -1.6439 -1.1522 -0.2637 1.0116 -0.2453 0.0762
-(1.3817) -(1.6226) -(0.7213) (1.5034) -(0.1584) (0.2273)
«2.2 -1.6393 -0.0550 -0.5683*** -0.3110 -0.0663 -0.2355
-(0.9808) -(0.1485) -(4.1118) -(0.6428) -(0.0546) -(0.7941)
<*3 2.0765 14.945*** 4.2287 17.844* -6.6773 14.2827**
(0.4274) (5.4122) (0.6065) (1.6697) -(0.6684) (2.3327)
Po -0.0120 -0.0056*** -0.0021*** -0.0201 0.0021* 0.0005***
-(1.3781) -(216.9990) -(21.7155) -(0.3914) (1.8218) (32.6239)
P. 0.0003 -0.0308 -0.0059 0.3203** 0.0167 0.2020
(0.0161) -(0.5067) -(0.6064) (2.0288) (0.8621) (1.5809)
P2 0.2444 0.6496*** 0.4211** 0.3782*** 0.0112 0.0908
(1.2922) (2.9599) (2.2967) (3.5246) (0.0342) (0.3364)
P3 0.0047* 0.0012*** 0.0004*** 0.0000 -0.0004* -0.0001***
(1.8499) (145.1169) (3.53E+101) (0.0000) -(1.7410) -(5.6946)
P4 -0.2075** -0.0043 0.0004*** -0.0018 -0.0226 -0.0130
-(2.3513) -(0.1624) (2.6800) -(1.3512) -(1.3443) -(0.9388)
P 5 -0.1685 0.4014*** 0.8667*** -0.0338*** 0.8015*** 0.4764***
-(0.7951) (2.8251) (9.8654) -(3.0594) (5.9026) (3.6227)
Mortgage-Backed Securities (MBS) Pfandbriefe
MAAA34 MAAA5 MA7 MBBB7# PAAA3 PAAA5* PAAA7#
0.5348*** 2.1303*** 0.0515 -0.5993*** 0.6466** 0.2456 0.1436*
(2.5633) (6.3509) (0.1996) -(14.8031) (2.0686) (1.5503) (1.7794)
-0.1828** -0.6812*** -0.0122 -0.6014*** -0.1954* -0.0512 -0.0317
-(24703) -(6.2183) -(0.1973) -(14.8182) -(1.8981) -(1.0806) -(1.3121)
-0.2256*** -0.7325*** -0.0178 -0.2156 -0.2328** -0.0891* -0.0632***
-(2.6568) -(6.8095) -(0.2875) -(1.2432) -(2.2827) -(1.9260) -(2.6532)
1.4318 2.0532 0.7260 -0.1725* -2.8504* -0.9247 -2.7918***
(0.8512) (1.2231) (0.9759) -(1.8021) -(1.6531) -(0.5431) -(2.6031)
-0.6449 -3.4029*** -0.6688** 0.0000 0.2487 -1.6499 -0.6465***
-(0.6854) -(3.5324) -(2.4369) (0.0000) (0.1668) -(0.9689) -(3.2229)
5.9111 -0.8505 -26.8013 2.9657*** -7.9308* -9.4603* 6.8546*
(0.9384) -(0.4761) -(0.9588) (14.7673) -(1.8327) -(1.9187) (1.9447)
0.0043 -0.0432 0.0009*** 0.7880*** 0.0295*** 0.0145*** 0.0052
(0.2351) -(1.0739) (28.4730) (5.6708) (4.8383) (61.6143) (1.1709)
0.2535 0.3087** 0.1363 -0.5056*** 0.1006* 0.0518** 0.4051***
(0.8003) (2.0863) (0.8727) -(3.4664) (1.7348) (2.1670) (3.2857)
-0.3176 0.4484 -0.2383 0.1516*** -0.1881 -0.2147 -0.3755***
-(0.9157) (1.1253) -(0.7476) (3.2581) -(0.5438) -(1.3852) -(3.1800)
-0.0006 0.0145 -0.0002*** 0.0000 -0.0098*** -0.0042*** -0.0006
-(0.0929) (1.1208) -(23.4736) (0.0000) -(5.0589) -(123.9026) -(0.5019)
-0.0003 -0.0720 -0.0033*** -0.0009*** -0.0974** -0.1010 0.0297***
-(0.0051) -(0.8909) -(4.0140) -(26.6370) -(2.1245) -(1.2116) (3.3916)
0.4093 0.2605* 0.7180*** 0.0005 0.6548*** 0.6171*** -0.4841***
(1.3163) (1.7464) (6.8271) (0.7430) (6.3602) (5.7479) -(3.1267)
-0.2528 -0.2538 -0.7487 0.7002 -0.8698 -3.1448 0.0731
asymmetry effect (p  j + f }  2 ) /f i i
837.8767 -20.0991 -70.3487 2.1808 2.0020 1.4493
Time series are transformed by the Johnson Fit over logarithmic ("AD_L") basis point spreads of ABS tranche indices, where M="Residential Mortgage-Backed Securities (RMBS)", P="Pfandbrief", CS="Synthetic 
Collateralised Debt Obligation (synthetic CDO)" and CT="Traditional/True Sale Collateralised Debt Obligation (traditional CDO)"; letters "AAA" to "BBB" reflect the Standard&Poor's investment grade rating system. 
The number associated with each time series reflects the maturity in years. Z-statistics in parentheses; ***=1% significance, **=5% significance, *=10% significance. All GARCH (1,1) parameters have been estimated 
according to the Bemdt-Hall-Hall-Hausman algorithm, except in cases marked * (Marquardt quasi-maximum likelihood estimation procedure);& singular covariance coefficients are not unique.
T ab. 8. Estimation Results of GARCH(2,1) model (only tran formed and Johnson Fit adjusted spreads) — LIBOR atfirst differences.
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Past variance levels at lag one (o ^ i)  are almost always positive (with the exception of the spread
series for CSAAA3, CTAAA3 and PAAA7 in GARCH(1,1) and CSAAA3 and MAAA3 in 
GARCH(2,1)) and highly significant for almost all time series in both GARCH models, especially for 
CDO and Pfandbrief transactions. The economic significance o f /?5 improves as we (i) extend the 
GARCH effect two lags in GARCH(2,1) and (ii) specify the influence o f LIBOR based on first 
differences. The latter modification, however, improves the statistical significance of the parameter 
estimates in the context of GARCH(1,1) only. The coefficient values of /?6 document that most of 
the explanatory power o f the GARCH term carries over even into the second lag variance forecast in 
GARCH(2,1). Our estimation fails to reject the null hypothesis at the 10% significance level that /?6 
has no effect on the conditional variance for only two Pfandbrief and two MBS spread series 
(PAAA3, PAAA7, MA7 and MBBB7) as well as one CDO spread series (CSAAA3). In contrast to 
G2t_x, evidence o f how past forecast variance af_2 at lag two influences the conditional variance in 
GARCH(2,1) is mixed.
Most Pfandbrief and CDO spreads exhibit negative GARCH effects for J36, whereas positive 
GARCH effects dominate for MBS transactions. Hence, both /?5 and J36 point to the fact that the 
direction and the significance o f any GARCH effect might depend on the liquidity o f the transaction 
type (with Pfandbrief transactions being the most liquid and CDO tranches the most illiquid) and, to 
some extent, data frequency — the degree of significance and coefficient values o f J3S and /?6 
increase for an extended series of Pfandbrief spreads (results are not reported in this chapter; see also 
section 4). Generally, the ARCH and GARCH effects o f the conditional variance seem to have 
greatest statistical significance for Pfandbrief and high-rated CDO transactions (low-rated CDO 
traditional transactions for LIBOR spot rates at level), while the mean equation with asymmetric 
effects o f past spreads and LIBOR levels generates the closest estimation for the time series o f 
synthetic CDOs, Pfandbriefe and some MBS spread series.
We further need to verify the statistical classification of spread dynamics (in the mean equation). We 
examine (i) the specification of level stationarity as well as (ii) the statistical validity o f asymmetric 
mean reversion for the coefficients a 1}, a l2 (ARCH terms) in GARCH(1,1) as well as a }1, a 12 and
cc21,a 22 in the GARCH(2,1) model. To this end, we resort to the Wald coefficient test to first
examine the null hypothesis H 0 : a t , + a x 2 = 0 (H 0 : a 21 + cx2 2 = 0 for GARCH(2,1) only) for
overall mean reversion o f the GARCH models. If a ^ + a l 2 =0  the trend has a unit root (random
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walk) and if a x 1 + a x 2 > 0 the spread development would be explosive. So spread change is level 
stationary if we can reject Ho. We validate the assumption of a x 1 + a x 2 < 0 on the basis o f two 
separate sub-hypotheses H 0 l : a u + a i 2 =0  and H 02:al i + a i2 — ccx  ^ + a x 2 (for both GARCH 
models) as well as H Q]: a 2^ + a 22 = 0 and H 02 : a 21 + a 2 2 = a 2 x + a 22 (for GARCH(2,1) only). 
For coefficients ,a 12 almost all spread series in GARCH(1,1) (see Tabs. 5-6) and most
Pfandbrief and MBS spread series (but only two CDO spread series (CSAAA3 and CSBBB7)) in 
GARCH(2,1) (see Tabs. 7-8) generate Wald test statistics of at least 10% statistical significance. The 
rejection o f the null hypothesis H 01: a u  + CKj 2 = 0 at high levels of significance means that the sum
of the coefficients a , , 2 equals the sum of their estimators ^H02:a u  + 2 = 2 ) at a
90% confidence level and differs (statistically significant) from zero. Moreover, the trend o f each 
spread series can be determined based on the sign of d 11+ d J2. Since the sum of estimators
2 is negative for all spread series but CTAAA3, CSBBB7 and CSAAA3 in GARCH(1,1) and 
CTAAA3 and MAAA5 in GARCH(2,1) (Appendix, Tabs. 7-8), they clearly exhibit negative (and 
statistically viable) mean reversion coefficients at lag one.38 The modification o f the GARCH models 
by using LIBOR level data as a reference base compromises the well-specified parameter values o f 
the mean reversion coefficients. Hence, the Wald test for mean reversion for both GARCH models 
at lag one confirms our results obtained from the unit root test and least squares regression (see Tab. 
2 and Tab. 4)39, which generate the most robust results for Pfandbrief and MBS spreads. The degree 
o f statistically valid mean reversion weakens for the coefficients a 2 u a 22 at lag two o f past spread 
levels as reported in the results of the Wald-testing procedure o f a 2Ua 22 for the GARCH(2,1) 
model (see Tabs. 9-12). In comparison to the coefficient values ocl i ,oc12, the significance o f mean 
reversion at lag two proves to be robust in the unrestricted regression procedure o f the Wald 
coefficient test only for one CDO, one Pfandbrief, and two MBS spread series (CSAAA3, PAAA3, 
MAAA5 and MA7)., where f i 01 :or21 +cx22 = 0  can still be rejected. Moreover, the sum of
estimators a 2X+ a 22 is positive for most spread series (Appendix, Tabs. 9-12). Hence, the Wald
coefficient tests for both GARCH models indicate that CDO spreads fail to unequivocally support 
the statistical significance o f mean reversion coefficients obtained in the estimation procedure, i.e. 
mean reversion at lag one and non-stationarity at lag two (only in GARCH(2,1) by definition) for 
first and second spread differences. In contrast, MBS and Pfandbrief spread series show significant
38 For the Wald test statistics of unadjusted spread series please refer to Appendix, Tabs. 34-42 and Tabs. 50- 
57.
39 See also Appendix, Tabs. 23-25 for a detailed overview.
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and valid level stationarity in tz1J+ a i2 < 0 and, to a lesser degree, for a 2J + a 22 <0  (with the first
differences o f LIBOR rates as regressor in GARCH(2,1) generating Wald test statistics indicating 
slighdy better (worse) results for Pfandbrief (MBS) spreads).
We also assess the degree o f asymmetry of spread dynamics in context of measuring the 
heteroskedasdcity o f spreads. We test the null hypothesis of no asymmetry for the spread differences
at lag one (H 0 : a u  = <z12) for both GARCH models and at lag two (H 0 : a 2l = # 22) for
GARCH(2,1) only. The results o f both tests are reported in Tabs. 9-12 (and more detailed in 
Appendix, Tabs. 34-42 for LIBOR at level data and Appendix, Tabs. 50-57 for LIBOR at first
differences). The null hypothesis o f no statistically valid asymmetry at lag one ( H 0 : = a li2) , i.e.
future spreads are equally sensitive to positive ( # n )  or negative 2) first differences of past
spreads (spread declines/spread increases), can be rejected in the unrestricted Wald testing procedure 
at high confidence intervals for all asset classes in GARCH(1,1) and all but three asset classes (CSA5, 
CSBBB7 and MA7) in GARCH(2,1), which generate sufficiently low probability values o f Ho as 
coefficient restriction.40 These results hold by and large regardless o f the configuration o f LIBOR in 
each GARCH model. The valid significance o f asymmetric effects o f previous spread change also 
persists for past spread levels at lag two in GARCH(2,1) — although at an admittedly lower degree of 
significance, especially for traditional CDO and MBS spread series, compared to the case o f spread
differences at lag one ( H 0 : a , , = a x 2) .
Our estimation results for the mean equation are in general agreement with the findings by Koutmos 
(2002) on U.S. MBS spreads. Future spreads show varying sensitivity to the direction o f past spread 
change, be it for first or second differences; yet, spreads exhibit mean reversion in almost every case. 
However, in contrast to Koutmos (2002), we find that all spread time series (with the exception of 
CSAAA3, CSBBB7 and CTAAA3 in GARCH(1,1) and CTAAA3 and MAAA5 in GARCH(2,1)) 
generate negative a , , and a x 2 coefficients of past spread levels (one lag) o f different explanatory 
power (with greater effects o f negative past spread changes compared to positive changes). 
Consequently, overall mean reversion for both t and Otx 2 is maintained in line with our estimation
results o f least squares regressions in Tab. 3 (see also Appendix, Tabs. 23-24). Interestingly, each time 
series exhibits the same direction of asymmetric spread response to first differences of past spreads 
in both GARCH models. This observation also holds true for two lags (with second differences as
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direction) in GARCH(2,1). However, whilst the absolute coefficient values for negative past spread 
change (<z12) are consistently higher than for positive past spread change (<zn ) in both GARCH 
models (except for two CDO spread series), the asymmetric direction o f spread change at two lags 
indicates significant positive bias if we compare the absolute values o f a 2 , and a 2 2 'm GARCH(2,1).
We also observe a complete sign reversal — the a 2, and (X2 2 coefficients carry positive signs in all
cases (excluding the CTAAA3 and MBBB7 spread series), which defies the appellation o f mean 
reversion. Considering the high speed o f mean reversion at lag one (see Tab. 2), this result seems 
plausible. The estimation results o f the Wald coefficient test for asymmetric mean reversion of 
Pfandbrief spreads are contradictory, given the strong evidence of mean reversion in the estimation 
o f the GARCH model, while the ADF test (see Tab. 4 and Appendix, Tab. 25) indicates the 
existence o f a unit root in level data, limiting co-integration to the order of one (1(1) process). If we 
abandon the first difference o f LIBOR rates as model regressors in favour o f LIBOR at level data, 
evidence o f asymmetric spread dynamics is indistinct. The estimation results in both GARCH 
models also affirm the high significance o f the previous period’s variance forecast (GARCH term) 
for the conditional variance (/?5) . The extended approach of GARCH(2,1) hints to an even stronger
historical effect o f past volatility, where two lag past variance (/?6) exerts a durable influence on
future spread change. Judging by the estimation results for Pfandbriefe, market liquidity apparently 
facilitates this effect, although less liquid CDO transactions also feature strong GARCH effects o f up 
to at least lag two.
By and large our estimation results o f the conditional variance of selected European ABS spread 
series corroborate the findings in Koutmos (2002) about comparable U.S. structured finance 
products. Although we find that negative past errors (/?2) at lag one increase the volatility of spread
series more than positive past errors (Z^),  in contrast to Koutmos (2002) asymmetric squared
residuals from the mean equation (ARCH terms) -  as an indication of the goodness o f fit o f the
mean equation — are mostly significant for negative past errors (/?2) only, such as in the
GARCH(2,1) specification (with LIBOR rates at first differences) and the GARCH (1,1) model (with 
LIBOR rates at level). Only in the GARCH(1,1) model for Pfandbrief spreads do we actually observe 
a tendency towards significant positive ARCH effects at lag one. In the remaining GARCH models 
the statistical significance of past errors, contingent on the direction of past spread change, divides
40 The /»-value indicates the probability of the tested restriction to be significant for the estimation. In this case, 
the x 2 -distributed Wald-statistic would not deviate from zero at a commonly accepted level of significance.
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equally into statistically positive and negative coefficient values of the ARCH terms (/?, and /?2) .
The statistical irrelevance of past positive errors (as spreads increase) — particularly for CDO spreads 
in GARCH(1,1) and Pfandbrief spreads in GARCH(2,1) -  is striking, and leads to reservations 
regarding preliminary statistical interpretation of these asset classes that have particularly low t- 
statistics o f coefficient estimates (also with respect to the specification o f the mean equation). The 
model specification in the following section will address this issue in detail. If  we take into account all 
estimation results, only coefficient values /?, and /?2 for synthetic CDOs in both GARCH models, 
highly-rated traditional CDOs in GARCH(1,1) as well as highly-rated MBS in GARCH(2,1) deliver 
clear support for asymmetric effects of past errors. Also, for Pfandbrief spread series in both 
GARCH specifications with LIBOR rates at level, the effect of negative past errors (in cases o f 
spread decline) is more prevalent than any positive past errors. Moreover, despite their strong 
significance for CDO spreads in both GARCH models (with LIBOR at level), MBS spreads in 
GARCH(1,1) and traditional CDO spreads (in both GARCH models with LIBOR at first 
differences), the coefficient values o f spread levels and LIBOR rates o f the previous period play a 
modest economic role in explaining conditional variance as variance regressors. Only in the 
GARCH(1,1) model do our estimation results for MBS transactions tally with the findings by 
Koutmos (2002).
8 MODEL SPECIFICATION
The correct (model) specification of the mean and conditional variance o f spread dynamics shows in 
the time series characteristics of standardised residuals, i.e. the volatility not explained by the model. 
Due to its vital importance for forecasting purposes and the management of spread risk, we apply 
residual-based model diagnostics to both GARCH specifications. Hence, by doing so, we aim (i) to 
detect any remaining non-linear structure/autocorrelation (Llung-Box (LB) Q-statistic) o f estimated
standardised errors ) and squared standardised errors E^€t fcrt Y , and (ii) to test the
normality (Jarque-Bera statistic) of standardised residuals (with first and second moments equal to 
zero and unity respectively).
We start with the examination of any non-linear effects in the standardised residuals. Both LB(x) and 
L& fx) denote the Llung-Box Q-statistics for standardised errors and for squared standardised errors 
up to x  lags, at which the Q-statistic no longer indicates statistically significant observations o f 
autocorrelation in the given time series, leading to the rejection o f the null hypothesis o f no 
autocorrelation. High LB Q-statistics o f low statistical significance with a small number o f lags in
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Tabs. 9-12 testify to an almost complete absence o f higher order serial correlation in the time series 
of both standardised residuals o f the mean equation (i.e. specification o f mean equation) and squared 
standardised residuals o f conditional variance (i.e. specification o f conditional variance equation). In 
fact, all spread series -  except MBBB7 (in all GARCH specifications) and MAAA3 (only in 
GARCH(2,1) for squared standardised errors with LIBOR rates at first differences), which retain 
statistically significant serial correlation -  do not exhibit any autocorrelation beyond one lag. Since 
the LB Q-statistics for standardised residuals indicate no significant autocorrelation, the inclusion of 
one lag spread levels in the in the mean equation o f the GARCH(1,1) model and spreads up to two 
lags as regressors in the mean equation o f GARCH(2,1) model prove sufficient for the correct 
specification o f the mean equation. No further inclusion of appropriate lagged endogenous variables 
in the equation, at the cost of losing degrees of freedom, is warranted. Also in the specification of 
conditional variance, we can rule out ARCH effects (significant Q-statistics) in squared standardised 
residuals for all asset types. With regard to the Jarque-Bera statistic, we find that the null hypothesis 
o f normally distributed standardised residuals is rejected for the estimation results of all time series, 
with the exception of PAAA7 in all GARCH specifications (see Tabs. 9-12). This observation 
complies with the descriptive statistics of non-transformed spread time series (see Appendix, Tabs. 
34-42 and Tabs. 50-57), where the majority of all cases do not uphold a normal distribution o f 
spreads over time.
Although the Llung-Box (LB) and Jarque-Bera (JB) statistics are commonly accepted and well 
established model diagnostics to examine the degree o f autocorrelation and normality o f standardised 
residuals,41 they fail to test how well the proposed GARCH models capture the asymmetric effects 
on spread volatility, i.e. the contribution of positive and negative past estimation errors/innovations 
to changes in conditional variance (Koutmos, 2002). Since the GARCH processes explain the 
heteroskedasticity o f observed spread behaviour, the correct specification o f the conditional variance 
equation and any patterns o f asymmetric change is imperative. In the spirit of the diagnostics 
developed by Engle and Ng (1993) to test asymmetric effects in the news impact curve implied by 
the model estimates of conditional variance, we examine the correct specification o f asymmetric 
spread heteroskedasticity, i.e. the volatility process of spread dynamics, by means o f three different 
testing procedures: (i) the (negative) sign bias test, (ii) the negative size bias test and (iii) the positive 
sign bias test. All three tests assume that the conditional variance is correcdy specified only if the 
squared standardised residuals escape any predictability through observed variables, i.e. positive and
41 The Llung-Box Q-statistic of standardised residuals is deemed sufficient for the correct specification of the 
mean equation at this point, as it merely confirms the estimation results obtained from the OLS regression and 
the Wald coefficient statistics. However, the correct specification of conditional variance requires a further 
refinement of autocorrelation tests.
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negative past errors (null hypothesis). Hence, if the t-statistics o f these tests are statistically 
insignificant, the estimated volatilities from the GARCH models fully incorporate past information 
(at one lag). Conversely, any residual values generated by the conditional variance equation would not 
follow a stochastic pattern. Like in the estimation of the GARCH models, the three bias tests are 
based on heteroskedasticity consistent covariance according to White (1980). The negative sign bias
test {st /(Tt Y  = ju + y K  + e, measures any statistically significant influence o f negative past errors
£t_x (at one lag) on squared standardised residuals (f , /<T, )2 , which is the volatility that is not 
predicted by conditional variance o f the model estimation. Since we define the dummy variable 
K  = 1 for s t_x < 0 else K -  0 to capture asymmetric influences o f past errors, a significant t-statistic 
o f the regression coefficient o f K  signifies that the impact o f positive and negative past errors on 
spread volatility is not fully specified in the asymmetric ARCH terms o f the conditional variance 
equation, i.e. unexplained spread volatility would still contain some positive/negative effect by past 
errors. The negative size bias test extends this sensitivity analysis to negative past errors to include 
the size o f past estimation errors. This means that we regress the squared standardised residuals on 
past residuals conditioned by the dummy variable K. Significant t-values for the regression coefficient 
y  mean that the specification of the conditional variance does not account for the asymmetric effect 
o f small or large negative errors. The same logic applies analogously to the positive size bias test 
(s t /<7,)2 = pi + y { \  — K ) e t_x +et . In all three residual tests we find strong evidence that the number
of explanatory variables generating the GARCH model estimates for spread heteroskedasticity 
correctly specify asymmetric influence on conditional variance. We cannot reject the null hypothesis 
that past errors do not influence the spread volatility (squared standardised residuals) not predicted 
by the GARCH models. Nonetheless, one or more residual tests o f CTBBB7 and MAAA5 in both 
GARCH models, CTAAA3 and MBBB7 in GARCH(1,1) as well as PAAA3, MAAA3 and MA7 in 
GARCH(2,1) indicate that some explanatory power o f past errors is not captured by the conditional 
variance equation and, hence, contributes to the coefficient values o f standardised squared residuals. 
All o f the aforementioned spread series (except MAAA3 spreads) confirm statistically significant 
negative size bias of past errors on squared standardised residuals. Most of them also show 
significant sign bias and/or positive size bias. While standardised residuals o f CTBBB7 and MAAA5 
spreads in GARCH(1,1) flag significant sign bias and positive size bias o f past innovations, the 
specification o f conditional variance seems to be particularly insufficient for the spread volatility of 
MBBB7 spreads in GARCH(1,1) and CTBBB7, PAAA3 and MA7 in GARCH(2,1), where all residual 
bias tests o f estimation errors reveal significant t-statistics.
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Collateralised Debt Obligations (CDO)
synthetic traditional
CSAAA3# CSA5 CSBBB7 CTAAA3S># CTA5 CTBBB7
Wald-test Hq: a li|= a 1>2 (t-stat.) 4.4406** 12.7732*** 13.3682*** 83.3839*** 15.2958*** 15.7247***
Wald-test H q: a ^ + C t j  ^O (t-stat.) 5.3525** 0.7641 1.2165 0.7777 0.7311 0.5455
LB-Q Statistic (lags) 0.0055 (1) 0.0226 (1) NA 2.009 (1) 0.0994 (1) NA
LB2-Q Statistic (lags) 0.0411 (1) 0.0202 (1) NA 0.2317 (1) 0.0209 (1) NA
Jarque-Bera 2759.87*** 2346.54*** NA 660.55*** 5902.84*** NA
Sign Bias Test 0.4877 0.9000 1.3179 -0.7553 0.3191 0.5642
Hq: (s/CTt)2=p+yK+et (t-stat.) (0.5726) (1.3202) (1.0990) -(0.7636) (0.5286) (0.9857)
Negative Size Bias Test -0.8180 -0.4823 -0.6458 1.1579 -0.0844 -0.3431
Hq: (E/CTt)2=p-pyKet.i+et (t-stat.) -(0.5443) -(0.4299) -(1.1442) (2.5419) -(0.2548) -(0.7493)
Positive Size Bias Test -0.1375 -0.1162 -0.1833 0.1769 -0.0966 -0.2733
Hq: (e/CTt)2=p+Y(l-K)Et.1+et (t-stat.) -(0.7542) -(0.5758) -(0.6505) (0.5453) -(0.5688) -(1.5163)
Pfandbricfc Mortpayc-Backcd Securities (MBS)
PAAA3 PAAA5# PAAA7# MAAA3* MAAA5 MA7S,# MBBB7
Wald-test Ho: otI>i=oti>2 (t-stat.) 109.4263*** 164.5061*** 101.6267 1.4256 11.6254*** 22.3917*** 8.4351***
Wald-test Hq: Oti^+a^M) (t-stat.) 5.4711** 4.0279** 13.7176 4.3106*** 18.3921*** 0.0356 5.7481**
LB-Q Statistic (lags) 8.8087 (1) 0.3085 (1) NA 0.0378 (1) 0.1214 (1) 0.0036 (1) 1.4258 (1)
LB2-Q Statistic (lags) 0.7654 (1) 0.0016 (1) NA 0.4199 (1) 0.0753 (1) 0.0163 (1) 7.2609 (3)
Jarque-Bera 145.98*** 3635.51*** NA 329.03*** 93.28*** 18763.83*** 78.90***
Sign Bias Test -0.2359 -0.1875 0.3252 -0.7118 -0.3354 0.7185 -0.7211**
Hq: (e/a ,)2=p-PyK-t-et (t-stat.) -(0.5517) -(0.4716) (0.9111) -(0.4282) -(0.4370) (0.9667) -(2.0195)
Negative Size Bias Test 0.0401 -0.1123 -0.0787 -0.1684 0.1982 -2.7148 -0.7957**
Ho: (e /a t)2=p+yK.et.1+et (t-stat.) (0.0734) -(0.2738) -(0.2175) -(0.0855) (0.6784) -(0.8831) -(2.2343)
Positive Size Bias Test 0.0266 0.3220 0.1145 0.6560 0.2845 -0.1416 0.4474
H q: (e/ct,)2=p-Py( 1 -K )st., +et (t-stat.) (0.1353) (1.7332) (0.4593) (1.0222) (0.8404) -(1.0055) (1.5544)
All GARCH (1,1) parameters have been estimated from the time series - transformed by the Johnson Fit and the natural logarithm ("AD_L") -
according to the Bemdt-Hall-Hall-Hausman algorithm, except in cases marked * (Marquardt quasi-maximum likelihood estimation procedure); * no 
Bollerslev-Woolridge robust standard errors and variance; ***=1% significance, **=5% significance, *=10% significance. N A  indicates that no 
results could be generated by the statistics software due to data overflow. The estimated values (t.xlo() and (e/ct,)2 are the mean and the conditional 
variance of standardised residuals obtained from the GARCH (1,1) model. LB(x) denotes the Llung-Box Q-statistic (autocorrelation) for standardised 
errors up to x  lags and LB 2 (x) denotes the Llung-Box Q-statistic for squared standardised errors up to x  lags at which the Q-statistic does no longer 
indicate statistically significant observations of autocorrelation in the given time series different from the null hypothesis o f no autocorrelation. The 
computation of the three bias tests was completed at heteroskedasticity consistent covariance according to White (1980). Number of observations: 93. 
In the sign bias and si2e bias tests we included 91 observations (instead of 93) after adjusting for endpoints.
Tab. 9. Coefficient and residual tests of GARCH (1,1) model (only tran formed and Johnson Fit adjusted spreads) — 
LIBOR at level data.
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Collateralised Debt Obligations (CDO)
synthetic traditional
CSAAA3 CSA5 CSBBB7 CTAAA3 CTA5 CTBBB7#
Wald-test Ho: (t-stat.) 7.5655*** 23.8282*** 49.3522*** 38.1184*** 24.9706*** 2.9836***
Wald-test Ho: Cti -^KXj^O (t-stat.) 6.0161** 712.6768*** 2.3971 19.2352*** 0.1244 0.3817
LB-Q Statistic (lags) 0.0494 (1) 0.3783 (1) 0.1617 (1) 0.1069 (1) 7.1395 (3) 0.3129 (1)
LB2-Q Statistic (lags) 0.0909 (1) 0.0692 (1) 0.0352 (1) 0.0128 (1) 0.1359 (1) 0.0014 (1)
Jarque-Bera 2206.44*** 3449.73*** 6709.17*** 234.93*** 5771.945*** 149.09***
Sign Bias Test -0.6351 1.3575 1.257 -0.3306** -0.611 0.314
Hq: (E/a^p-FyK+e, (t-stat.) -(0.5143) (1.5682) (1.0607) -(2.1300) -(1.0143) (1.4513)
Negative Size Bias Test 0.2629 -4.5647 -1.777 4.4133** -0.033 -0.4986**
Ho: (E/CT^p-FyKen+e, (t-stat.) (0.1543) -(1.2439) -(1.0671) (2.1300) -(0.1324) -(2.1544)
Positive Size Bias Test -0.2542 -0.2637 -0.314 0.209 0.031 -0.2067*
Hq: (e/aJ^p+YO-KjEj.j+e, (t-stat.) -(0.3707) -(0.4137) -(1.0077) (1.0298) (0-2195) -(1.6609)
Pfandbriefe Mortgage-Backed Securities (MBS)
PAAA3 PAAA5& PAAA7# MAAA3# MAAA5 MA7 MBBB7#
Wald-test Hq: <*1,1=011.2 (t-stat.) 79.7204*** 180.2684*** 72.2650*** 114.4901*** 16.0829*** 19.4155*** 20.5709***
Wald-test Ho: a i i+ a 12=0 (t-stat.) 4.3676** 1.0605 3.1330* 4.5068** 42.5402*** 0.0587 219.3632***
LB-Q Statistic (lags) 0.0100 (1) 0.6945 (1) 0.2286 (1) 0.0029 (1) 0.0015 (1) 0.9923 (1) 31.0600 (20)
LB2-Q Statistic (lags) 0.0341 (1) 0.0007 (1) 0.2203 (1) 0.0105 (1) 145.5700 (1) 0.0311 (1) 24.2910 (15)
Jarque-Bera 139.52*** 1263.37*** 1.8746 365.36*** 10.9757*** 5119.85*** 121.25***
Sign Bias Test 0.754 -0.236 0.118 -0.352 -0.339 0.883 -3.1102*
Ho: (e /a t)2=p-FyK+et (t-stat.) (1.2033) -(0.8684) (0.5305) -(0.7644) -(0.8901) (0.6674) -(1.7690)
Negative Size Bias Test -1.006 0.336 -0.430 0.138 -1.6038*** -1.432 -0.6751*
Ho: (E/cr^p-FyKen+e, (t-stat.) -(1.0768) (0.5956) -(1.0065) (0.8021) -(2.8301) -(0.9214) -(1.7838)
Positive Size Bias Test -0.292 0.108 0.001 0.029 0.7295*** 0.064 2.1154*
Hq: (£/a,)2=p-Fy( 1 -K )£M +e, (t-stat.) -(1.0799) (0.8157) (0.0092) (0.1797) (3.4061) (0.2479) (1.8194)
All GARCH (1,1) parameters have been estimated from the time series - transformed by the Johnson Fit and the natural logarithm ("AD_L") - 
according to the Bemdt-Hall-Hall-Hausman algorithm, except in cases marked # (Marquardt quasi-maximum likelihood estimation procedure); * 
singular covariance coefficients are not unique. ***=1% significance, **=5% significance, *=10% significance. N A  indicates that no results could be 
generated by the statistics software due to data overflow. The estimated values (£,/<*,) and ( z j c f  are the mean and the conditional variance of 
standardised residuals obtained from the GARCH (1,1) model. LB(x) denotes the Llung-Box Q-statistic (autocorrelation) for standardised errors up to 
x  lags and LB2 (x) denotes the Llung-Box Q-statistic for squared standardised errors up to x  lags at which the Q-statistic does no longer indicate 
statistically significant observations of autocorrelation in the given time series different from the null hypothesis o f no autocorrelation. The 
computation of the three bias tests was completed at heteroskedasticity consistent covariance according to White (1980). Number of observations: 93. 
In the sign bias and si2e bias tests we included 91 observations (instead of 93) after adjusting for endpoints.
Tab. 10. Coefficient and residual tests of GARCH(1,1) model (only tranformed and Johnson ¥  it adjusted spreads) 
— LIBOR at first differences.
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Collateralised Debt Obligations (CDO)
synthetic traditional
CSAAA3 CSA5# CSBBB7 CTAAA3 CTA5 CTBBB7
Wald-test Hq: (t-stat.) 0.1271 6.8480** 0.0491 5.4014** 39.6823*** 7.1080***
Wald-test H0: a ii+ a i^ O  (t-stat.) 11.7339*** 7.2158*** 2.6887 2.981473* 1.2868 0.2144
Wald-test H0: ct2,i:=a2,2 (t-stat.) 4.2960** 3.6399* 0.9576 2.2902 7.8005*** 0.0748
Wald-test Hq: ot2,i+a2,2=0 (t-stat.) 8.2510*** 6.2133** 0.6819 1.2250 0.2433 1.2723
LB-Q Statistic (lags) 0.5394 (1) 1.4055 (1) NA NA 100.8400 (6) NA
LB2-Q Statistic (lags) 0.0067 (1) 1.3667 (1) NA NA 11.9350 (2) NA
Jarque-Bera 1712.16*** 1339.42*** NA NA 808.52*** NA
Sign Bias Test 0.0194 0.5735 1.4148 -0.4545 -0.2699 0.4362
H0: (e/crJ2= p+yK+e, (t-stat.) (0.0259) (0.5362) (1.3862) -(0.8517) -(0.3664) (0.7818)
Negative Size Bias Test -0.0647 -0.8217 -2.4588 -0.0181 0.0869 -0.6148
Hq: (e/CtT^+yKEj.j+e, (t-stat.) -(0.1715) -(0.7401) -(1.5519) -(0.0747) (02050) -(1.3185)
Positive Size Bias Test 0.1299 -0.0501 -0.1188 -0.0801 0.0376 -0.1937
Hq: (eyCTt)2=n+y(l-K)£t.i+et (t-stat.) (0.3714) -(0.2870) -(0.4077) -(0.6775) (0.1489) -(0.8053)
Pfandbriefe Mortgage-Backed Securities (MBS)
PAAA3 PAAA5# PAAA7 MAAA3 MAAA5 MA7# MBBB7#
Wald-test Hq: (t-stat.) 72.0880*** 60.2948*** 82.7466*** 10.8572*** 5.1387** 14.7772*** 11.7910***
Wald-test Hq: a 1i+a12=0 (t-stat.) 32.8384*** 8.9119*** 18.2086*** 6.0724** 41.4529*** 0.0007 3.3781*
Wald-test H0: 0C2j 1= 012 ,2  (t-stat.) 65.6099*** 18.6160*** 52.9039*** 0.0965 22.7569*** 0.4792 4.8648**
Wald-test Hq: a 21+a22=0 (t-stat.) 30.6751*** 7.5959*** 13.9719*** 0.0000 4.7428** 0.0009 0.3241
LB-Q Statistic (lags) 0.4320 (1) 0.8496 (1) 0.3850 (1) 12.7390 (1) 2.0220(1) 0.0004 (1) 0.4099(1)
LB2-Q Statistic (lags) 0.0292 (1) 1.1775 (1) 1.2235 (1) 13.0250 (1) 0.1321(1) 0.0139 (1) 11.2830(6)
Jarque-Bera 603.62*** 1557.34*** 4.25 72.17*** 20.32*** 21186.81*** 92.30***
Sign Bias Test 0.5495 0.0120 -0.0768 0.0809 0.0080 1.1401 0.0875
Hq: (e/(T,)2=p+yK+et (t-stat.) (1.0683) (0.7392) -(0.6710) (0.2427) (0.0197) (0.9996) (0.1188)
Negative Size Bias Test 0.1477 -3.6352*** -0.1000 0.0369 -0.3294 -2.7874 -0.9478
H0: (e/a^n+yKEt.j+e, (t-stat.) (0.4088) -(11.5813) -(0.5797) (0.1673) -(0.7366) -(0.8883) -(1.3440)
Positive Size Bias Test -0.2574 -0.1133 0.0922 0.0927 0.2827 -0.1565 1.1591
H0: (E/ot)2=n+y(l -K)Et.,+et (t-stat.) -(1.1594) -(0.6068) (0.2397) (0.4533) (0.9361) -(1.0206) (1.4578)
All GARCH (2,1) parameters have been estimated from the time series - transformed by the Johnson Fit and the natural logarithm ("AD_L") - 
according to the Bemdt-Hall-Hall-Hausman algorithm, except in cases marked # (Marquardt quasi-maximum likelihood estimation procedure); 
***=1% significance, **=5% significance, *=10% significance. N A  indicates that no results could be generated by the statistics software due to data 
overflow. The estimated values (&,/o,) and (et/crt)2 are the mean and the conditional variance of standardised residuals obtained from the GARCH 
(2,1) model. LB(x) denotes the Llung-Box Q-statistic (autocorrelation) for standardised errors up to x  lags and LB 2 (x) denotes the Llung-Box Q- 
statistic for squared standardised errors up to x  lags at which the Q-statistic does no longer indicate statistically significant observations of 
autocorrelation in the given time series different from the null hypothesis of no autocorrelation. The computation of the three bias tests was 
completed at heteroskedasticity consistent covariance according to White (1980). Number of observations: 93. In the sign bias and size bias tests we 
included 91 observations (instead of 93) after adjusting for endpoints.
Tab. 11. Coefficient and residual tests of GARCH(2,1) model for all spread series (only tranformed and Johnson 
Fit adjusted spreads) — LIBOR at level data.
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Collateralised Debt Obligations (CDO)
synthetic traditional
CSAAA3 CSA5# CSBBB7 CTAAA3# CTA5 CTBBB7
Wald-test H0: j (t-stat) 2.7887* 0.0081 0.0338 11.9642*** 24.9096*** 16.2930***
Wald-test H0: ot^i+a^O (t-stat.) 3.4511* 0.0708 17.2446*** 0.0500 0.2732 0.4454
Wald-test H0: 1=02,2 (t-stat) 10.0836*** 0.0031 0.8336 0.2597 0.0658 1.7833
Wald-test H0: o^i+o^^O (t-stat) 4.4756* 0.0125 0.0620 0.2925 0.2196 0.4849
LB-Q Statistic (lags) 0.8522 (1) 0.0011 (1) 5.6452 (2) 0.2555 (1) 0.0728 (1) 24.6870 (15)
LB2-Q Statistic (lags) 0.0411 (1) 0.0365 (1) 0.4504 (1) 0.0021 (1) 0.0870 (1) 5.1869 (2)
Jarque-Beia 444.50*** 4101.14*** 7155.60*** 696.64*** 8004.54*** 156.61***
Sign Bias Test 0.059 -0.354 1.289 0.115 -0.147 -0.5264***
H0: (6/CTt)2=p+yK+e, (t-stat.) (0.0715) -(0.2857) (1.0082) (0.3073) -(0.5864) -(5.7286)
Negative Size Bias Test 0.053 -2.622 -1.484 -0.510 -0.058 0.3447***
H0: (Et/<Tt)2=|r+YKst.1+et (t-stat.) (0.1319) -(0.6303) -(0.9179) -(1.1867) -(0.2865) (5.7286)
Positive Size Bias Test -0.142 -0.223 0.325 -0.062 -0.039 0.3974**
H0: (e/cft)2=p-PKl-K)et.1+et (t-stat.) -(0.7323) -(1.2217) (0.9464) -(0.5693) -(0.4909) (Z0832)
Pfandbriefe Mortgage-Backed Securities (MBS)
PAAA3* PAAA5* PAAA7 MAAA3 MAAA5 MA7 MBBB7*
Wald-test Hq: a 1 ]= a i i2  (t-stat) 40.9130*** 95.7934*** 52.2577*** 13.0022*** 6.2115** 2.6785 3.3301*
Wald-test H0: ot11-Hx1>2=0 (t-stat.) 10.9676*** 0.5399 11.7751*** 2.4650 65.6843*** 115.8702*** 0.0757
Wald-test Hq: 02,1=02,2 (t-stat.) 44.1682*** 14.0902*** 35.8244*** 1.0149 18.9879*** 0.0047 0.188452
Wald-test H  ^c^i+cta^O (t-stat.) 34.0455*** 0.652934 12.3520*** 0.7886 6.3620** 124.1782*** 0.1426
LB-Q Statistic (lags) 11.4420(1) 0.2058 (1) 0.1635 (1) 0.6578 (1) 0.2708 (1) 1.6291 (1) 7.1643 (3)
LB2-Q Statistic (lags) 25.6920 (1) 0.0301 (1) 0.1961 (1) 0.1050 (1) 98.7080 (8) 0.2007 (1) 1.1795 (1)
Jarque-Bera 667.74*** 1799.2100*** 0.91 112.1410*** 18.8417*** 14168.17*** 382.03***
Sign Bias Test -0.2694** -1.651 -0.294 -1.5201** 0.273 -0.6340*** -1.024
H0: (E/ot)2=p+yK+et (t-stat) -(2.3049) -(0.9761) -(0.8689) -(2.0417) (0.5912) -(3.1092) -(1.3543)
Negative Size Bias Test 1.1131*** -0.204 0.118 9.301 -1.8095*** 16.0479*** -0.949
H0: (£/(Tt)2=p+yK£t.1-t-et (t-stat) (4.7225) -(0.8534) (0.5305) (1.1671) -(3.0014) (3.1092) -(0.7905)
Positive Size Bias Test 0.1792* 0.368 0.160 0.726 0.282 0.2547*** 0.698
H0: (E/CT^ 2=n+y(l-K)Et_i-t-et (t-stat) (1.8682) (0.5612) (0.5978) (1.3255) (0.9228) (3.3344) (0.9915)
All GARCH (2,1) parameters have been estimated from the time series - transformed by the Johnson Fit and the natural logarithm ("AD_L") - according to the Bemdt 
Hall-Hall-Hausman algorithm, except in cases marked # (Marquardt quasi-maximum likelihood estimation procedure);& singular covariance coefficients are not unique. 
***=1% significance, **=5% significance, *=10% significance. NA indicates that no results could be generated by the statistics software due to data overflow. The 
estimated values (e/ct,) and (z-Jaf are the mean and the conditional variance of standardised residuals obtained from the GARCH (2,1) model. LB(x) denotes the 
Llung-Box Q-statistic (autocorrelation) for standardised errors up to x lags and LB2(x) denotes the Llung-Box Q-statistic for squared standardised errors up to x  lags 
at which the Q-statistic does no longer indicate statistically significant observations of autocorrelation in the given time series different from the null hypothesis of no 
autocorrelation. The computation of the three bias tests was completed at heteroskedasticity consistent covariance according to White (1980). Number of observations: 
93. In the sign bias and size bias tests we included 91 observations (instead of 93) after adjusting for endpoints.
Tab. 12. Coefficient and residual tests of GARCH(2,1) model for all spread series (only tran formed and Johnson 
Fit adjusted spreads) — LIBOR atfirst differences.
220
Note that the GARCH model specification of spread heteroskedasticity seems to improve as we 
replace the first difference o f LIBOR spot rates by level data as regressor of both the mean and 
conditional variance equations of the GARCH models.
Overall, the model diagnostics based on common coefficient and residual tests as well as sign bias 
and size bias testing procedures for asymmetric conditional variance suggest that the specification of 
spread volatility in either a GARCH(1,1) or GARCH(2,1) process generates adequate results of 
relatively high statistical validity, which could be relied upon for forecasting purposes. The maximum 
likelihood estimated, multi-factor model approximation o f the given spread series describe the spread 
dynamics particularly well for Pfandbriefe and, to a lesser extent, for CDOs. However, while 
asymmetric mean reversion and the asymmetric impact o f past errors on conditional variance are 
statistically and economically significant in most cases, the model specification under GARCH(2,1) 
seems to leave doubts as to its appropriateness for mortgage-backed securities (MBS).
9 DISCUSSION
After logarithmic transformation in combination with the Johnson Fit procedure, all CDO, MBS and 
Pfandbrief spread series in the data set exhibit strong mean reversion in both the simple OLS 
regression analysis and unit root tests (Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) and Phillips-Perron (PP)) — 
except for CTA5, MAAA5 and two out of three Pfandbrief spread series (PAAA5 and PAAA7).42 
Hence, hypothesis testing is statistically viable. We also found a level effect in the degree of mean 
reversion, where higher mean spreads o f a certain asset time series would entail higher levels of mean 
reversion than for spread series with lower sample means. Although the unit root tests explain any 
serial correlation in spread dynamics on the basis o f only some shift and time trend without 
recognition of level effects, the model diagnostic of general level stationarity is consistent with later 
estimation results of the multi-factor GARCH models.
Although the significance of the estimated maximum-likelihood parameters varies among the series 
o f asset types, we can clearly identify a strong statistical influence o f endogenous factors on the mean 
and conditional variance specifications of all spread series, especially for synthetic CDO and 
Pfandbrief spreads in GARCH(1,1), as well as all CDO and MBS spreads in GARCH(2,1). In both 
GARCH processes, model diagnostics indicate asymmetric spread change behaviour, i.e. divergent
42 The non-stationary of the latter two spread series can only be eliminated by using daily observations over the 
original time period of four years (with the exclusion of all observations during the second half of 2000 in order 
to control for exogenous distortions to any mean-reverting trend due to the financial crises in summer 2000).
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effects o f past spreads on future spread change, with MBS spread series generating economically 
stronger results (i.e. level o f mean reversion) than CDOs in spite o f lower average mean spreads. All 
spread series exhibit asymmetric mean reversion at lag one to the extent that spread changes are 
mosdy level stationary irrespective o f the direction o f first differences of spreads. However, the 
effect of negative first differences o f spreads is economically and statistically stronger. We find no 
statistically significant asymmetry o f mean reversion during spread increases and decreases. This 
observation runs counter to findings about non-stadonary behaviour o f MBS spreads by Koutmos 
(2002), who breaks down overall asymmetric mean reversion into stationary spread change after 
spread decreases and random spread change after spread increases, with the former effect 
dominating the latter. However, we find that the mean-reverting trend following spread decreases is 
economically stronger than the influence o f past spread increases. Our model estimates also consider 
asymmetries o f expected future spread change for more than one period. If we extend the 
asymmetric effects o f past spread levels to two lags (in GARCH(2,1)), we find that the observation o f 
varying degrees o f mean reversion completely reverses and spread change — regardless o f whether the 
direction o f second spread differences is positive or negative -  follows a random walk. The statistical 
diagnostics (Wald test) o f estimated coefficients in both the GARCH(1,1) and GARCH(2,1) 
processes confirm mean reversion. Hence, the mean equation seems to be correctly specified and 
hypothesis testing can be justifiably applied. The spread volatility is time-varying, depending on past 
variance forecasts, past squared errors of the mean equation (innovations) as well as past levels o f 
spreads and the reference sport rate (LIBOR). We observe significant asymmetric effects o f past 
errors on spread volatility. Past negative innovations (associated with spread decline) seem to have a 
greater effect on the conditional variance than positive past errors.
Standard residual tests for normality (Jarque-Bera statistic) and autocorrelation (Lung-Box Q- 
statistic) confirm reliable model specification of the mean and the conditional variance of 
standardised residuals of most spread series. However, theses tests fail to measure how well the 
proposed GARCH models capture the asymmetric nature o f spread volatility. We examine the 
contribution o f variation of past innovations to squared standardised residuals by means o f sign bias 
and size bias test statistics. In almost all cases, past innovations fail to have an effect on estimation 
errors, i.e. spread volatility not explained by the specification o f the model. Hence, the specification 
o f conditional variance in both GARCH model estimations incorporates all explanatory power o f 
past innovations.
Although we do not entertain the idea o f a “horse-race” o f GARCH model specifications, judging by 
the derived model estimates, the GARCH(2,1) process seems superior to the GARCH(1,1)
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specification. N ot only do we find economically and statistically stronger asymmetric contributions of 
past changes in spreads and LIBOR rates to the mean equation of GARCH(2,1), but also more 
profound and consistent asymmetric effects of past errors on spread volatility (conditional variance). 
Despite the attendant loss o f degrees of freedom, the inclusion o f more explanatory factors in 
GARCH(2,1) estimation promotes higher levels o f significance for almost all spread series o f CDO 
and MBS transactions. In contrast, the GARCH(1,1) model only succeeds in generating significant 
estimation results for most mean equations o f synthetic CDO and Pfandbrief spread series. The 
modification o f both GARCH models by a different specification of the LIBOR rate yields an even 
greater difference o f overall parameter significance.
The proof o f the pudding o f whether such different levels o f statistical significance actually matter 
lies in the correct model specification. Standard residual diagnostics for the detection o f any 
remaining non-linear structure and non-normality in estimation errors (normalised residual spreads) 
indicate that the GARCH (2,1) model offers more reliable model estimates for the mean and the 
conditional variance o f spread dynamics. The estimation errors in GARCH(2,1) exhibit little or no 
serial correlation (and do not follow a normal distribution). Also, statistical tests o f a correct 
specification o f asymmetries in the volatility process — asymmetries in conditional variance (sign bias 
test) and the influence of varying degrees o f positive and negative past errors on spread volatility 
(size bias test) -  attest lower influence of past errors on standardised residuals in the GARCH(2,1) 
compared to the GARCH(1,1) process, with all but one CDO spread series showing no bias o f past 
errors (i.e. sign or size effects). Again, the use o f level data of LIBOR spot rates improves overall 
model specification for both GARCH processes. Hence, the inclusion o f an asymmetric GARCH 
term with lag two is a statistically preferable extension to the GARCH(1,1) specification.
However, we need to interpret the estimated results of both GARCH models with caution due to the 
low data frequency and short time period o f our data set, compared to more than 30 years o f U.S. 
MBS trading data used as spread history in Koutmos (2002). Since the European ABS market has 
seen active secondary trading for only a little more than three years, the data history o f this study is 
limited by systemic constraints. The results o f the unit root test and GARCH models are certainly 
influenced by the data quality o f the sample. Additionally, the relative illiquidity of CDO and MBS 
transaction tranches in Europe exacerbates any distorting effect induced by data limitations. 
Nonetheless, the presented GARCH models yield estimation results with fairly robust model 
estimators. The quality of the data sample and the authenticity o f the spread series in the data set 
could also be compromised by the rating volatility and asset liquidity included in the composition o f 
the secondary spread benchmarks. Some GARCH effects o f spreads might be induced by varying
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rating volatility between spread series, e.g. AAA ratings show less volatility than BBB ratings. 
Furthermore, our data set of secondary market prices does not control for liquidity, because only the 
transactions with the “tightest” spreads are routinely selected to make up the benchmark for the 
secondary market prices for each asset class.43 Hence, the combination o f rating volatility and 
liquidity considerations distort actual spread dynamics.
10 CONCLUSION
In this chapter we explained the spread dynamics o f European ABS transaction classes by 
augmenting the mean specification o f stationary spreads by stochastic conditional variance in a multi- 
factor GARCH process for valuation and forecasting purposes. In particular, accounting for the 
variance o f errors is instrumental in deriving more accurate estimators o f time-varying forecast 
confidence intervals in inference tests of parametric specifications. We estimated the asset and 
volatility processes (heteroskedasticity) of secondary market spreads by means o f modified GARCH 
multi-factor models (GARCH(1,1) and GARCH(2,1)) on four different asset types o f structured 
finance transactions (synthetic and traditional CDO, MBS and Pfandbrief transactions). Our model 
specification assumes that spread change behaviour over time represents a weighted measure o f the 
observed long-run average, past estimation errors and the volatility forecast from the previous 
period(s).
We found that expected spread changes tend to be level stationary with model estimates indicating 
asymmetric mean reversion with a positive trend depending on the direction o f past innovations and 
spread changes. We observed asymmetric mean reversion for past spread changes at one lag, with the 
contribution o f negative first moments of past spreads being economically and statistically stronger 
than o f positive first moments. We found no evidence o f non-stationary spread dynamics specific to 
either negative or positive first moments (Koutmos, 2002). Although economic asymmetry still 
remained once we extended spread sensitivity to two lags o f past spread changes, the stationarity o f 
spreads, however, did not. We observed significant asymmetric effects o f past errors on spread 
volatility. Also, conditional spread variance followed an asymmetric stochastic process biased towards 
negative past residuals associated with spread declines, which inflated time-varying heteroskedasticity.
43 The creation of secondary spread benchmarks also smoothes out price variations across different 
transactions in the same rating category. Ideally, one would wish to control for liquidity by setting the trading 
volume of transactions entering the secondary market spread benchmark each week in relation to the total 
volume of outstanding transactions in the same asset class, which have not been traded. We also do not control 
for jumps/level effects in the spread series beyond the inclusion of the LIBOR rate as regressor in the 
conditional variance equation.
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These spread dynamics o f ABS imply that negative investor sentiment during persistent spread 
increases causes spreads to escape stationary approximation in the long run, especially for unexpected 
downward price corrections. Standard residual model diagnostics testified to a correct specification 
o f the mean and the conditional variance o f spread change. The autoregressive examination o f past 
errors through sign and size bias tests confirmed that the model specification o f conditional spread 
volatility captured almost all explanatory power of past innovations, leaving no influence of the latter 
on standardised (squared) residuals in any statistically meaningful way.
Our findings on the heteroskedasticity o f European ABS spreads largely corroborates previous 
findings about the spread behaviour o f U.S. MBS transactions. In our case, spread changes behave 
asymmetrically in response to negative spread changes and innovations in the past. Moreover, the 
consideration o f (i) level effects induced by changes in the LIBOR interest rate (at level and first 
differences), and (ii) a longer history o f past variance forecasts (GARCH effect) o f conditional spread 
volatility yields more reliable approach forecasts o f spread dynamics o f the analysed asset classes. The 
presented analysis presented results o f the first empirical investigation o f market pricing for ABS 
transactions in Europe on the basis o f actual trading data. However, a longer sample period and a 
higher data frequency of deal-based secondary market trading data would be desirable avenues of 
extension in an effort to further refine the presented model estimates to control for cyclical effects in 
spread dynamics in the long run.
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Fig. 1. Data overview of selected spread series.
Acronym ABS Type
R ating Class 
(S&P) M aturity Deal S tructure
CSAAA3 C D O AAA 3 years synthetic
CSA5 C D O A 5 years synthetic
CSBBB7 C D O BBB 7 years synthetic
C TA A A 3 C D O AAA 3 years traditional, balance sheet
C TA 5 C D O A 5 years traditional, balance sheet
CTBBB7 C D O BBB 7 years traditional, balance sheet
MAAA3 RMBS AAA 3 years synthetic & trad.
MAAA5 RMBS AAA 5 years synthetic & trad.
MA7 RMBS A 7 years synthetic & trad.
MBBB7 RMBS BBB 7 years synthetic & trad.
PAAA3 Pfandbrief AAA 3 years on-balance
PAAA5 Pfandbrief AAA 5 years on-balance
PAAA7 Pfandbrief AAA 7 years on-balance
Tab. 13. Definition of nomenclature for the spread series associated with a certain asset 
type in the data set.
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05-]a n -01 18-O c t-02
Pfandbrief (Rating Grade)
Mean Weighted- 
Average Index 
Portion
Weighted- 
Average Index 
Portion
No. o f 
Issues
Weighted- 
Average Index 
Portion
No. o f 
Issues
w ith  m a tu r ity  1-3 years
AAA 78.11% 81.51% 989 74.39% 815
AA 20.81% 17.91% 191 23.71% 180
A 1.08% 0.45% 10 1.71% 29
C ash 0.12% 0.19%
Total 100.00% 100.00% 1190 100.00% 1024
w ith  m a tu r ity  3-5  years
AAA 79.63% 82.78% 722 76.48% 536
AA 19.76% 17.04% 126 22.48% 144
A 0.61% 0.18% 4 1.04% 15
C ash 0.00% 0.00%
Total 100.00% 100.00% 852 100.00% 695
w ith  m a tu r ity  5 -7  years
AAA 81.03% 87.07% 431 74.91% 329
AA 18.31% 12.72% 53 23.90% 83
A 0.67% 0.22% 2 1.11% 11
Cash 0.00% 0.07%
Total 100.00% 100.00% 486 100.00% 423
Tab. 14. Definition of the Merrill Lynch EM U  Ifandbrief Index and its rating class composition over 
time.
Asset Class Spread 
Series z-value
Selected
distribution
p with 
original Skewness Kurtosis J B PlB EP Pe
C SA A A 3_AD_L 0.9515 Sb 0.9597 0.0461 3.5767 1.3359 0.5128 3.1429 0.2077
CSA5_AD_L 0.8292 Sb 0.9173 -0.0914 3.2128 0.3051 0.8585 1.1243 0.5700
C SBBB7_AD_L 0.8341 Sb 0.9679 0.0972 3.3628 0.6636 0.7176 1.8504 0.3965
CTAAA3_AD_L 0.3029 Su 0.4504 0.2781 2.2272 3.5511 0.1694 5.4736 0.0648
CTA5_AD_L 0.4108 SB 0.9330 -0.2280 2.7507 1.0582 0.5891 1.0287 0.5979
C TBBB7_A D_L 0.9119 Sb 0.9317 0.0360 3.0430 0.0276 0.9863 0.4472 0.7996
MAAA3_AD_L 0.2864 Sb 0.9912 0.3847 2.5218 3.2142 0.2005 4.9582 0.0838
MAAA5_AD_L 0.2765 Su 0.2511 -0.1348 2.0911 3.5201 0.1720 4.6662 0.0970
MA7_AD_L 0.0902 Su 0.2592 0.0701 3.3462 0.5463 0.7610 1.7428 0.4184
MBBB7_AD_L 0.1507 Su -0.0331 0.1279 7.3745 75.2062 0 .0 0 0 0 49.1697 0 .0 0 0 0
PAAA3_AD_L 0.8342 Sb 0.9808 -0.1098 3.6506 1.8466 0.3972 3.6514 0.1611
PAAA5_AD_L 0.6446 Sb 0.9967 0.0258 2.8617 0.0854 0.9582 0.0657 0.9677
PAAA7_AD_L 0.8041 Sb 0.9902 0.0599 3.0421 0.0631 0.9689 0.4690 0.7910
T ab. 15. Data transformation of spread seriesfor each asset class by means of the Johnson Fit procedure.
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Collateralised Debt Obligations (CDO), synthetic
CSAAA3 CSAAA3_L CSAAA3_AD_L CSA5 CSA5_L CSA5_AD_L CSBBB7 CSBBB7_L CSBBB7_AD_L
Mean 43.1624 3.7314 3.7314 125.7536 4.8060 4.8060 252.0388 5.5049 5.5049
Median 46.0000 3.8286 3.8192 137.0000 4.9200 4.8697 256.0000 5.5452 5.5449
Maximum 65.0000 4.1744 4.3118 175.0000 5.1648 5.3492 375.0000 5.9269 6.0047
Minimum 30.0000 3.4012 3.2583 72.0000 4.2767 4.1993 174.0000 5.1591 5.0301
Std. Dev. 11.1472 0.2617 0.2617 28.8914 0.2447 0.2447 56.4064 0.2236 0.2236
Rel. Variation 25.83% 7.01% 7.01% 22.97% 5.09% 5.09% 22.38% 4.06% 4.06%
Skewness 0.2464 -0.0271 -0.0914 -0.2057 -0.4738 0.0461 0.3951 0.0181 0.0972
Kurtosis 1.9558 1.5821 3.2128 1.8318 1.9614 3.5767 2.4892 2.0100 3.3628
Jarque-Bera 5.1664 7.8022 0.3051 6.0075 7.7426 1.3359 3.4679 3.8437 0.6636
Prob.JB 0.0755 0.0202 0.8585 0.0496 0.0208 0.5128 0.1766 0.1463 0.7176
Ep 9.3451 16.5417 1.1243 11.3919 20.9996 3.1429 5.5840 5.0403 1.8504
Prob. E 0.0093 0.0003 0.5700 0.0034 0.0000 0.2077 0.0613 0.0804 0.3965
LB-Q (lags)* 815.09 (26) 882.6 (26) 437.37 (14) 902.86 (27) 909.24 (27) 587.16 (26) 822.25 (28) 911.34(28) 609.65 (25)
AC value 0.1870 0.1850 0.1990 0.1860 0.1730 0.1980 0.1870 0.1710 0.1980
Observations 93 93 93 93 93 93 93 93 93
Collateralised Debt Obligations (CDO), traditional
CTAAA3 CTAAA3_L CTAAA3_AD_L CTA5 CTA5_L CTA5 AD L CTBBB7 CTBBB7_L CTBBB7_AD_L
Mean 29.7670 3.3846 3.3846 94.8936 4.5263 4.5263 199.2566 5.2839 5.2839
Median 28.0000 3.3322 3.3769 90.0000 4.4998 4.5700 185.2200 5.2215 5.2672
Maximum 39.0000 3.6636 3.6240 150.0000 5.0106 5.0782 300.0000 5.7038 5.6205
Minimum 25.6000 3.2426 3.0413 72.0000 4.2767 4.2178 170.0000 5.1358 4.9377
Std. Dev. 4.0718 0.1313 0.1313 22.4846 0.2284 0.2284 31.0592 0.1428 0.1428
Rel. Variation 13.68% 3.88% 3.88% 23.69% 5.05% 5.05% 15.59% 2.70% 2.70%
Skewness 0.7577 0.6853 -0.2280 0.6303 0.3858 0.2781 1.5057 1.2042 0.0360
Kurtosis 1.9730 1.8238 2.7507 2.2566 1.7907 2.2272 4.8686 3.7495 3.0430
Jarque-Bera 13.1245 12.7770 1.0582 8.3887 8.0601 3.5511 49.1922 24.9182 0.0276
Prob.JB 0.0014 0.0017 0.5891 0.0151 0.0178 0.1694 0.0000 0.0000 0.9863
Ep 61.6615 59.8116 1.0287 24.0032 21.3419 5.4736 69.3523 49.9135 0.4472
Prob. E 0.0000 0.0000 0.5979 0.0000 0.0000 0.0648 0.0000 0.0000 0.7996
LB-Q (lags)* 581.14(15) 583.9 (15) 420.4 (13) 1002.3 (27) 1072.8 (27) 655.46 (16) 674.81 (25) 768.14 (26) 739.28 (28)
AC value 0.1740 0.1740 0.1790 0.1600 0.1800 0.1840 0.1820 0.1710 0.1690
Observations 93 93 93 93 93 93 93 93 93
Time series are stated in basis point spreads o f ABS tranche indices, where M= "Residential Mortgage-Backed Securities (RMBS)", 
P= "Pfandbrief1, CS= "Synthetic Collateralised Debt Obligation (CDO), and CT= "Traditional/True Sale Collateralised Debt Obligation". 
Letter "AAA" to "BBB" reflect the Standard&Poor's investment grade rating system. The number associated with each time series reflects the 
maturity in years. * Llung-Box Q-statistic significant at 5% level for the given number of lags and suitable AC value. AC value denotes when 
the H0 of no autocorrelation can no longer be rejected at 5% level at a certain number of lags, i.e. the test statistic falls within the two standard
error bounds of + /-2T°'5.
T  ab. 16. Descriptive statistics of all CDO spread series (level data).
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Mortgage-Backed Securities (MBS)
M A A A 3 M A A A 3_L M A A A 3^ A D _L M A A A 5 M A A A 5_L M A A A 5_A D _L M A7 M A7_L MA7_^AD_L MBBB7 MBBB7 _L M BBB7_J3D_L
M ean 20.7234 3.0217 3.0217 22.9782 3.1244 3.1244 65.1915 4.1751 4.1751 140.3138 4.9367 4.9367
Median 22.0000 3.0910 2.9947 24.0000 3.1781 3.0854 66.0000 4.1897 4.1829 142.0000 4.9558 4.9514
M axim um 25.0000 3.2189 3.2047 28.0000 3.3322 3.3879 75.0000 4.3175 4.3678 175.0000 5.1648 5.2871
M inim um 17.0000 2.8332 2.7988 17.5000 2.8622 2.8285 60.0000 4.0943 4.0988 120.0000 4.7875 4.4829
Std. Dev. 2.8099 0.1404 0.1404 3.2387 0.1446 0.1446 4.3854 0.0673 0.0673 16.9122 0.1207 0.1207
Rel. Variation 13.56% 4.65% 4.65% 14.09% 4.63% 4.63% 6.73% 1.61% 1.61% 12.05% 2.44% 2.44%
Skewness -0.3854 -0.4277 -0.1348 -0.2056 -0.2931 0.0701 0.0774 0.0080 0.3847 0.1416 0.0127 0.1279
K urtosis 1.3751 1.3694 2.0911 1.4860 1.4694 3.3462 1.7472 1.6577 2.5218 1.8052 1.6713 7.3745
Jarque-Bera 12.6680 13.2799 3.5201 9.6394 10.5222 0.5463 6.2409 7.0582 3.2142 5.9050 6.9174 75.2062
P rob.JB 0.0018 0.0013 0.1720 0.0081 0.0052 0.7610 0.0441 0.0293 0.2005 0.0522 0.0315 0.0000
E> 53.6208 62.5617 4.6662 26.1014 32.9179 1.7428 11.2472 13.7045 4.9582 10.5874 13.2351 49.1697
Prob. E 0 0 0.097 0 0 0.4184 0.0036 0.0011 0.0838 0.005 0.0013 0
LB-Q (lags)* 886.74 (22) 905.08 (22) 164.22 (7) 934.77 (23) 967.94 (23) 35.073 (3) 752.65 (20) 785.63 (21) 645.58 (19) 699.72(17) 733.1 (17) 22.393 (2)
AC value 0.1710 0.1820 0.1270 0.1760 0.1810 0.1410 0.1890 0.1720 0.1760 0.1570 0.1890 0.1300
Observations 93 93 93 93 93 93 93 93 93 93 93 93
Pfandbriefe
P A A A 3 P A A A 3_L P A A A 3 _J3D_L P A A A 5 PA A A 5_L P A A A 5_A D _L P A A A 7 P A A A 7 L P A A A 7_A D _L
Mean 18.7766 2.9268 2.9268 24.9894 3.2045 3.2045 31.8192 3.4437 3.4437
Median 19.0000 2.9444 2.9571 25.0000 3.2189 3.2111 31.5000 3.4499 3.4540
M axim um 29.0000 3.3673 3.2652 36.0000 3.5835 3.6690 47.0000 3.8501 3.9766
M inim um 15.0000 2.7081 2.5928 17.0000 2.8332 2.8406 22.0000 3.0910 2.9558
Std. Dev. 2.1056 0.1065 0.1065 4.1543 0.1691 0.1691 5.8217 0.1819 0.1819
Rel. Variation 11.21% 3.64% 3.64% 16.62% 5.28% 5.28% 18.30% 5.28% 5.28%
Skewness 1.4225 0.8305 -0.1098 0.1397 -0.2348 0.0258 0.3768 0.0708 0.0599
K urtosis 7.6301 4.9100 3.6506 2.6313 2.4766 2.8617 2.3737 2.0795 3.0421
Jarque-Bera 115.6686 25.0950 1.8466 0.8381 1.9371 0.0854 3.7609 3.3975 0.0631
Prob. JB 0.0000 0.0000 0.3972 0.6577 0.3796 0.9582 0.1525 0.1829 0.9689
Ep 22.4233 10.8896 3.6514 0.5585 2.1983 0.0657 6.3592 4.2158 0.469
Prob. E 0 0.0043 0.1611 0.7564 0.332 0.9677 0.0416 0.1215 0.791
LB-Q Gags)* 151.67 (10) 189.51 (12) 226.06 (12) 415.8 (15) 459.52 (15) 410.94 (14) 584.97 (20) 617.95 (19) 543.62 (17)
A C  value 0.1940 0.0710 0.1090 0.1760 0.1820 0.1950 0.1810 0.1910 0.2130
Observations 93 93 93 93 93 93 93 93 93
T im e series are stated in basis p oint spreads o f  ABS tranche indices, w here M =  "Residential M ortgage-Backed Securities (RMBS)", P =  "Pfandbrief1, C S=  "Synthetic Collateralised D eb t O bligation  (C D O ), and 
C T =  "Traditional/True Sale Collateralised D eb t Obligation". Letter "AAA" to  "BBB" reflect the Standard& Poor's investm ent grade rating system . T h e num ber associated w ith  each tim e series reflects the m aturity in years. 
* Llung-Box Q -statistic significant at 5% level for the given num ber o f  lags and suitable A C  value. AC  value denotes w h en the Ho o f  no  autocorrelation can no longer be rejected at 5% level at a certain num ber o f  lags, i.e. the  
test statistic falls w ith in  the tw o  standard error bounds o f  +  /-2T"° 5.
T ab. 17. Descriptive statistics of all MBS and Pfandbrief spread series (level data).
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Collateralised D eb t O bligations (C D O ), synthetic
CSAAA3 CSAAA3_L CSAAA3_AD_L CSA5 CSA5_L CSA5_AD_L CSBBB7 CSBBB7_L CSBBB7_AD_L
Mean 0.3717 0.0081 0.0083 1.0860 0.0093 0.0114 2.1541 0.0082 0.0101
Median 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Maximum 15.0000 0.4055 0.5521 35.0000 0.2877 0.3907 75.0000 0.2231 0.3586
Minimum -2.0000 -0.0426 -0.3072 -5.0000 -0.0351 -0.0935 -20.0000 -0.0690 -0.0884
Std. Dev. 2.1615 0.0509 0.0770 4.8647 0.0391 0.0568 10.0505 0.0341 0.0432
Rel. Variation 447.94% 422.77% 500.04% 447.94% 422.77% 500.04% 447.94% 422.77% 500.04%
Skewness 5.2634 5.2634 4.0859 5.1544 5.1544 5.0211 5.2045 5.2045 5.8904
Kurtosis 33.0000 33.0000 34.8839 32.8519 32.8519 30.5179 35.3596 35.3596 47.4653
Jarque-Bera 3874.7840 7307.8110 4152.8740 3864.9620 3755.5780 3325.0580 4477.5320 2774.3060 8199.2860
Prob.JB 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
LB-Q Gags)* 0.0382 (1) 0.0285 (1) 0.009 (1) 0.0159 (1) 0.0586 (1) 0.0856 (1) 0.0124 (1) 0.0151 (1) 0.0084 (1)
AC value -0.0200 -0.0170 -0.0100 -0.0130 -0.0250 -0.0300 0.0110 0.0130 -0.0090
Observations 92 92 92 92 92 92 92 92 92
Collateralised Debt Obligations (CDO), traditional
CTAAA3 CTAAA3JL CT AAA3_AD_L CTA5 CTA5_L CTA5_AD_L CTBBB7 CTBBB7_L CTB B B 7_AD_L
Mean 0.0237 0.0009 0.0021 0.5484 0.0056 0.0038 0.8530 0.0041 0.0050
Median 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Maximum 8.0000 0.2595 0.2038 23.0000 0.2772 0.3718 35.0000 0.1508 0.1485
Minimum -4.0000 -0.1082 -0.1918 -25.0000 -0.1823 -0.1247 -50.0000 -0.1823 -0.1482
Std. Dev. 1.1024 0.0350 0.0446 4.6333 0.0427 0.0522 7.7770 0.0312 0.0364
Rel. Variation 447.94% 422.77% 500.04% 447.94% 422.77% 500.04% 447.94% 422.77% 500.04%
Skewness 3.3225 3.3225 0.8222 0.6595 0.6595 3.9327 -1.3280 -1.3280 0.0885
Kurtosis 33.3007 33.3007 14.8060 20.8972 20.8972 29.8630 26.5657 26.5657 12.2877
Jarque-Bera 3728.8620 4247.6470 550.5783 1247.9450 1920.5030 3035.9980 2179.2930 1386.9480 334.3823
Prob.JB 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
LB-Q Gags)* 0.3985 (1) 0.4403 (1) 0.3923 (1) 0.1126 (1) 0.098 (1) 1.1888 (1) 1.1131 (1) 0.6712 (1) 0.5088 (1)
AC value 0.0640 0.0680 0.0640 0.0340 0.0320 0.1110 0.1080 0.0840 0.0730
Observations 92 92 92 92 92 92 92 92 92
Time series are stated in basis point spreads o f ABS tranche indices, where CS="Synthetic Collateralised Debt Obligation (CDO) and 
CT="Traditional/True Sale Collateralised Debt Obligation". Letter "AAA" to "BBB" reflect the Standard&Poor's investment grade rating system. 
The number associated with each time series reflects the maturity in years. * Llung-Box Q-statistic significant at 5% level for the given number of 
lags and suitable AC value. AC value denotes when the H0 of no autocorrelation can no longer be rejected at 5% level at a certain number of lags, i.e. 
the test statistic falls within the two standard error bounds of +/-2T°'S.
Tab. 18. Descriptive statistics of all CDO spread series (first differences).
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MAAA3 MAAA3 L MAAA3 AD L MAAA5 MAAA5L MAAA5 AD L MA7 MA7 L MA7 AD L MBBB7 MBBB7 L MBBB7 AD L
Mean -0.0430 -0.0022 0.0021 -0.0860 -0.0036 0.0000 -0.1075 -0.0017 -0.0016 -0.3333 -0.0025 0.0014
Median 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Maximum 3.0000 0.1278 0.4060 3.0000 0.1133 0.5595 8.0000 0.1128 0.1702 23.0000 0.1409 0.8041
Minimum -2.0000 -0.1112 -0.4060 -1.5000 -0.0564 -0.5595 -3.0000 -0.0408 -0.0829 -13.0000 -0.0847 -0.5943
Std. Dev. 0.5450 0.0253 0.0906 0.5984 0.0251 0.1598 1.0781 0.0155 0.0220 3.5496 0.0230 0.1252
Rel. Variation 447.94% 422.77% 500.04% 447.94% 422.77% 500.04% 447.94% 422.77% 500.04% 447.94% 422.77% 500.04%
Skewness 0.7786 0.7786 -0.7285 1.1376 1.1376 -0.6800 4.0873 4.0873 4.4868 2.7928 2.7928 1.3561
Kurtosis 15.4485 15.4485 14.7080 10.0180 10.0180 10.7610 36.4269 36.4269 43.2074 23.5092 23.5092 26.1380
Jarque-Bera 609.8813 464.3998 539.4039 210.9124 95.0048 240.5687 4588.7070 4028.5860 6576.4790 1750.8160 1180.8090 2103.0570
Prob. JB 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
LB-Q (lags)* 0.379 (1) 0.0018 (1) 0.8166 (1) 0.2488 (1) 0.6727 (1) 38.913 (3) 1.6009 (1) 1.7533 (1) 1.1814(1) 2.3927 (1) 3.1105 (1) 3.9858 (1)
AC value -0.0630 0.0040 -0.0920 0.0510 0.0840 -0.2330 0.1290 0.1350 0.1110 0.1580 0.1800 -0.2040
Observations 92 92 92 92 92 92 92 92 92 92 92 92
Pfandbriefe
PAAA3 PAAA3JL PAAA3_AD_L PAAA5 PAAA5_L PAAA5_AD_L PAAA7 PAAA7 L PAAA7_AD_L
Mean -0.0215 -0.0010 -0.0007 -0.0645 -0.0020 -0.0027 -0.1613 -0.0041 -0.0055
Median 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Maximum 12.0000 0.5341 0.4285 11.0000 0.3646 0.4579 7.0000 0.1924 0.1764
Minimum -8.0000 -0.3228 -0.2241 -5.0000 -0.1671 -0.2312 -6.0000 -0.2151 -0.2141
Std. Dev. 2.0954 0.1002 0.0937 2.2351 0.0847 0.0913 2.2423 0.0701 0.0754
Rel. Variation 447.94% 422.77% 500.04% 447.94% 422.77% 500.04% 447.94% 422.77% 500.04%
Skewness 1.4112 1.4112 0.8764 1.1500 1.1500 1.2008 0.3424 0.3424 0.0547
Kurtosis 15.1285 15.1285 6.5829 8.1286 8.1286 8.6559 3.5867 3.5867 3.3994
Jarque-Bera 600.8837 284.2860 61.6469 122.4217 35.8703 146.3052 3.1510 1.9576 0.6646
Prob. JB 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.2069 0.3758 0.7173
LB-Q (lags)* 23.88 (2) 23.899 (2) 22.358 (2) 8.4783 (2) 9.0816 (2) 8.3868 (2) 3.3562 (1) 5.1163 (1) 1.4672 (1)
AC value 0.0570 0.0680 0.0560 -0.0170 -0.0020 -0.0190 -0.1870 -0.0230 -0.1240
Observations 92 92 92 92 92 92 92 92 92
Time series are stated in basis point spreads of ABS tranche indices, where M="Residential Mortgage-Backed Securities (RMBS)", P="Pfandbrief", CS="Synthetic Collateralised Debt 
Obligation (CDO), and CT="Traditional/True Sale Collateralised Debt Obligation". Letter "AAA" to "BBB" reflect the Standard&Poor's investment grade rating system. The number 
associated with each time series reflects the maturity in years. * Llung-Box Q-statistic significant at 5% level for the given number of lags and suitable AC value. AC value denotes when 
the H0 of no autocorrelation can no longer be rejected at 5% level at a certain number of lags, i.e. the test statistic falls within the two standard error bounds of +/-2T"05.
Tab. 19. Descriptive statistics of all MBS and Pfandbriefspread series (first differences).
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L IB O R
level 1st difference
LIBOR LIBOR_L LIBOR LIBOR_L
Mean 4.6042 1.5174 -0.0196 -0.0040
Median 4.1875 1.4321 -0.0125 -0.0024
Maximum 5.8838 1.7722 0.0831 0.0209
Minimum 3.9113 1.3639 -0.2800 -0.0691
Std. Dev. 0.6555 0.1380 0.0591 0.0131
Rel. Variation 14.24% 9.09% 447.94% 422.77%
Skewness 0.5968 0.5214 -1.9469 -1.9469
Kurtosis 1.7500 1.6214 9.0406 9.0406
Jarque-Bera 11.6996 11.7038 200.1450 305.8752
Prob. JB 0.0029 0.0029 0.0000 0.0000
LB-Q (lags)* 995.75 (25) 1006 (25) 995.75 (2) 1006 (25)
AC value 0.1980 0.1970 0.1980 0.1970
Observations 93 93 92 92
* Llung-Box Q-statisdc significant at 5% level for the given number 
of lags and suitable AC value. AC value denotes when the H 0 of no 
autocorrelation can no longer be rejected at 5% level at a certain 
number o f lags, Le. the test statistic falls within the two standard error 
bounds o f + /-2T '0'5.
Tab. 20. Descriptive statistics of LIBOR rate series (level data and first 
differences).
C ollateralised D eb t O bligations (C D O ), synthetic
CSAAA3 CSAAA3 L CSAAA3 AD L CSA5 CSA5 L
— - i-------„ ----- ------
CSA5 AD L CSBBB7 CSBBB7 L CSBBB7 A D  L
pO;-l 0.9530 0.9580 0.9270 0.9520 0.9520 0.9220 0.9480 0.9560 0.9330
Q lb 87.2740 88.1170 82.5760 88.0140 88.0270 82.5140 87.1850 88.7000 84.4700
PQ 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
p0;-2 -0.0260 -0.0220 -0.0350 -0.0510 -0.0600 -0.1030 -0.0410 -0.0350 -0.0100
Q lb 167.0500 169.5400 153.5400 167.8800 167.7600 150.8900 165.6400 170.1300 158.5900
PQ 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
p0;-3 -0.0220 -0.0210 -0.0570 -0.0350 -0.0390 -0.0560 -0.0350 -0.0320 -0.0370
Q lb 239.6300 244.4900 213.2700 239.7800 239.3200 206.0700 235.6100 244.3900 222.8700
PQ 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
P0;-4 -0.0420 -0.0340 -0.0470 -0.0270 -0.0250 -0.0210 -0.0470 -0.0510 -0.1000
Q lb 305.0400 313.0200 262.5300 304.0400 303.1200 249.9200 297.2200 311.3900 276.6900
PQ 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
P0;-S -0.0230 -0.0210 -0.0450 0.0530 0.1090 0.1210 -0.0290 -0.0250 -0.0460
Q lb 363.6300 375.3800 302.2300 362.1900 361.4500 286.7000 350.9400 371.4300 320.8800
PQ 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Collateralised Debt Obligations fCDOl, traditional
CTAAA3 CTAAA3 L CTAAA3 AD LCTA5 CTA5_L CTA5 AD  L CTBBB7 CTBBB7 L CTBBB7.AD L
po-,-1 0.9580 0.9580 0.9300 0.9640 0.9680 0.9640 0.9500 0.9560 0.9380
Q lb 88.9800 89.1300 83.9630 90.2500 90.9060 90.1840 87.5170 88.6140 85.4380
PQ 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
pO-,-2 -0.0720 -0.0720 -0.0470 -0.0600 -0.0640 -0.0250 -0.0970 -0.0710 0.0050
Q lb 170.3900 170.8400 156.3400 174.3400 176.2600 174.5900 165.6300 169.3200 161.5800
PQ 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
p0;-3 -0.0840 -0.0760 -0.0110 -0.0230 -0.0120 -0.0880 -0.1380 -0.1280 -0.0450
Q lb 243.6200 244.6000 218.4500 252.3600 256.2200 252.4900 232.9900 240.8900 228.5800
PQ 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
P0;-4 -0.0040 -0.0290 -0.0910 -0.0080 -0.0230 -0.0290 0.0170 -0.0090 -0.0910
Q lb 309.2600 310.6700 269.9700 324.6500 330.8700 323.9900 290.8800 303.9600 285.8700
PQ 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
po-.-s -0.1230 -0.1160 -0.1180 -0.0110 -0.0020 -0.1120 0.1140 0.0830 0.0080
Q lb 366.4600 368.2600 310.4600 391.4900 400.5200 388.2400 341.9000 360.3400 334.9600
PQ 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Time series are stated in basis point spreads o f CDO tranche indices, where CS= "Synthetic Collateralised Debt Obligation
(CDO), and CT= "Traditional/True Sale Collateralised Debt Obligation". Letters "AAA" to "BBB" reflect the
Standard&Poor' s investment grade rating system. The number associated with each time series reflects the maturity in
years. * Significance o f Llung-Box Q-statistic indicates the existence o f autocorrelation.
Tab. 21. Partial autocorrelation coefficient of CDO spread series (level data).
M ortgage-B ack ed  S ecu r ities  (M B S)
M AAA3 M AAA3_L M AAA3_AD_L MAAA5 MAAA5_L M AAA5_AD L MA7 MA7_L MA7 A D  L MBBB7 MBBB7_L MBBB7_AD_L
PM 0.9750 0.9780 0.7800 0.9650 0.9690 0.3950 0.9560 0.9590 0.9340 0.9680 0.9710 0.4620
Q lb 92.2630 92.7800 59.0820 90.4130 91.1770 15.1250 88.6460 89.3220 84.6480 90.9430 91.5290 20.7330
PQ 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
pO-,-2 -0.0060 -0.0590 0.1000 -0.0530 -0.0680 0.3220 -0.1510 -0.1490 -0.1550 -0.1390 -0.1430 -0.1060
Q lb 180.8900 181.9700 100.2900 174.9100 177.0300 33.0990 168.1900 170.3200 155.9400 175.5100 177.3100 22.3930
PQ 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
po.j -0.1850 -0.2130 0.0350 -0.0600 -0.0680 -0.1330 0.1060 0.0860 0.2150 -0.0770 -0.0870 -0.1930
Q lb 264.3600 265.9800 129.9700 253.1300 257.1100 35.0730 240.7400 244.6000 219.6800 253.1100 256.6400 24.1400
PQ 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
PM -0.1030 -0.0940 -0.1050 0.0880 0.0750 -0.0120 0.0480 0.0430 0.0390 0.0720 0.0570 -0.2320
Q lb 342.0900 344.2300 147.4900 326.4900 332.4900 36.9230 307.9900 313.5800 278.6700 324.8000 330.2900 35.0160
PQ 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
P»,-5 0.0000 0.0170 -0.0530 -0.0740 -0.0760 0.1780 -0.0360 -0.0370 0.0050 -0.0650 -0.0780 0.2830
Q lb 414.1700 416.8000 157.0600 394.5400 402.7300 39.6900 370.0100 377.3300 332.9700 390.5000 397.9800 35.4200
PQ 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
P fa n d b riefe
PAAA3 PAAA3_L PAAA3_AD_L PAAA5 PAAA5_L PA A A 5.A D  L PAAA7 PAAA7JL PAAA7_AD_L
P»,-l 0.4820 0.5340 0.5950 0.8200 0.8480 0.8190 0.8900 0.8990 0.8680
Q lb 22.5850 27.7090 34.3760 65.3190 69.7340 65.1260 76.8030 78.4860 73.1580
PQ 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
pfr.-2 0.3040 0.3270 0.3380 0.2330 0.2460 0.2370 0.1630 0.1810 0.1620
Q lb 43.8990 54.1280 66.4950 120.4000 130.6200 120.1500 143.6400 148.2700 134.9800
PQ 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
pOj-3 0.1440 0.1390 0.1410 0.0540 0.0450 0.0620 0.0740 0.0870 0.1370
Q lb 60.0660 74.2330 91.9920 166.1900 182.6100 166.1900 203.1500 211.7500 190.9400
PQ 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
PM 0.0060 -0.0030 -0.0050 0.0800 0.0450 0.0720 0.0600 0.0270 0.0240
Q lb 69.7600 87.0500 109.5400 206.8900 228.4200 206.9100 257.2500 269.4300 240.6600
PQ 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
P0;-S 0.1570 0.1630 0.1580 0.0440 0.0340 0.0390 -0.0250 -0.0330 -0.0070
Q lb 83.6090 104.1500 130.6500 243.0500 269.1400 242.9300 305.0600 320.6900 284.1200
PQ 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Time series are stated in basis point spreads o f  MBS and Pfandbrief tranche indices, where M = "Residential Mortgage-Backed Securities (RMBS)" and
P="Pfendbrief". Letters "AAA" to "BBB" reflect the Standard&Poor's investment grade rating system. The number associated with each time series reflects the
maturity in years. * Significance o f  Llung-Box Q-statistic indicates the existence o f  autocorrelation.
Tab. 22. Partial autocorrelation coefficient of MBS and Ifandbrief spread series (level data).
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Collateralised Debt Obligations (CDO), synthetic
CSAAA3 CSAAA3 L CSAAA3_AD_L CSA5 CSA5_L CSA5_AD_L CSBBB7 CSBBB7_L CSBBB7_AD_L
0.5630 0.0481 0.0811 3.1125* 0.12638* 0.13182 0.0808 0.0359 0.0808
(t-stat.) (0.5786) (0.5405) (0.4613) (1.4733) (1.4469) (0.7595) (0.8063) (0.5319) (0.8063)
Y -0.0045 -0.0107 -0.0195 -0.0162 -0.02439* -0.0251 -0.0129 -0.0050 -0.0129
(t-stat.) -(0.2199) (0.4671) -(0.4264) -(1.0478) -(1.3733) (0.7021) -(0.6973) -(0.4015) -(0.6973)
Adj. R2 -0.0106 -0.0081 -0.0068 -0.0018 0.0122 0.0003 -0.0067 -0.0099 -0.0067
F-stat. 0.0460 0.2687 0.3813 0.8304 2.1397 1.02956 0.3861 0.0969 0.3861
(p-value) (0.8306) (0.6055) (0.5385) (0.3646) (0.1470) (0.3130) (0.5359) (0.7563) (0.5359)
0 126.3710 4.4836 4.1497 192.3321 5.1816 5.2527 6.2838 7.1301 6.2838
T| 155.5886 64.6231 35.4696 42.8318 28.4205 27.6198 53.9246 137.5019 53.9246
e /p 224.4669 93.2314 51.1718 61.7932 41.0021 39.8470 77.7968 198.3733 77.7968
Collateralised D ebt O bligations (C D O ), traditional
CTAAA3 CTAAA3_L CTAAA3_AD_L CTA5 CTA5 L CTA5_AD_L CTBBB7 CTBBB7 L CTBBB7 AD L
b 1.2292* 0.13618* 0.2382* 2.0870 -0.0934 -0.0705 5.1733 0.0809 0.2279
(t-stat.) (1.3024) (1.4485) (1.4590) (0.6603) -(1.0666) (0.5424) (0.4285) (0.3245) (0.9830)
Y -0.0405 -0.03997* -0.0698* -0.0163 0.0219 0.0164 -0.0217 -0.0145 -0.0422
(t-stat.) -(1.2759) -(1.4449) (1.4712) (0.4531) (1.0931) (0.5551) -(0.3396) -(0.3051) -(0.9646)
Adj. R2 0.0118 0.0120 0.0320 -0.0047 0.0028 -0.0058 -0.0035 -0.0066 0.0165
F-stat. 2.0989 2.1163 4.0454 0.5658 1.2627 0.4679 0.6784 0.3970 2.5474
(p-value) (0.1508) (0.1492) (0.0473) (0.4539) (0.2641) (0.4957) (0.4123) (0.5302) (0.1139)
0 30.3704 3.4072 3.4144 128.2759 4.2710 4.2987 237.9495 5.5637 5.3997
*1 17.1253 17.3426 9.9367 42.6028 -31.6954 -42.2445 31.8820 47.6816 16.4202
0 /|I 24.7066 25.0200 14.3357 61.4628 -45.7268 -60.9459 45.9960 68.7900 23.6894
We define the level o f mean reversion as 0 —y/p and the speed of mean reversion as r|=ln(0.5)/y.
T ab. 23. Test of mean reversion — OLS regression of secondary market spreads of CDO spread series (actual\ tran formed and Johnson Fit 
adjusted spreads).
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Mortgage-Backed Securities (MBS)
MAAA3 MAAA3 L MAAA3 AD L MAAA5 MAAA5 L MAAA5 AD L MA7 MA7 L MA7 AD L MBBB7 MBBB7_L MBBB7_AD_L
p 0.2636 -0.0611 -0.5959** -0.2842 0.0654 -1.8904*** 1.8013* 0.1033* 0.2182* 1.9679 0.0581 2.6557**
(t-stat.) (0 .8084) -(0 .9828) -(2 .2887) -(0 .5940) (1.2756) -(3 .5561) (1.4059) (1.3462) (1.4033) (0.9085) (0.7702) (2.0783)
y -0.0148 0.0195 0.1977** 0.0086 -0.0221* 0.6049*** -0.0293* -0.02515* -0.0526* -0.0164 -0.0123 -0.5377**
(t-stat.) -(0 .8807) (0.9405) (2.3133) (0.3927) -(1 .3390) (3.5717) -(1.4082) -(1 .3482) -(1 .4011) -(0 .9430) -(0 .7847) -(2.0810)
Adj. R2 -0.0051 0.0010 0.0824 -0.0088 0.0053 0.2948 0.0033 0.0011 0.0151 -0.0049 -0.0068 0.2635
F-stat. 0.5315 1.0906 9.2631 0.1964 1.4938 39.4681 1.3013 1.0977 2.4147 0.5545 0.3766 33.9136
(p-value) (0.4679) (0.2991) (0.0031) (0.6587) (0.2248) (0.0000) (0.2570) (0.2975) (0.1237) (0.4584) (0.5409) (0.0000)
0 17.8416 3.1315 3.0135 32.8770 2.9619 3.1248 61.5714 4.1101 4.1458 120.1776 4.7367 4.9392
t| 46.9103 -35.5333 -3.5053 -80.1975 31.3982 -1.1458 23.6933 27.5660 13.1704 42.3296 56.5142 1.2892
e /n 67.6773 -51.2636 -5.0571 -115.7006 45.2981 -1.6530 34.1822 39.7693 19.0009 61.0687 81.5328 1.8599
Pfandbriefe
PAAA3 PAAA3_L PAAA3 AD L PAAA5 PAAA5_L PAAA5_AD_L PAAA7 PAAA7 L PAAA7 AD L
F 9.5776*** 1.3409*** 1.16206*** 4.2115*** 0.4587*** 0.5525*** 3.3490*** 0.3420*** 0.4476***
(t-stat.) (4 .8210) (4.9629) (4.8191) (3.8409) (3.3895) (3.5922) (3.2638) (3.1760) (2.6783)
Y -0.5119*** -0.4587*** -0.3975*** -0.1714*** -0.1439*** -0.1734*** -0.1103*** -0.1005*** -0.1316***
(t-stat.) -(4 .9210) -(4.9995) -(4.8838) -(3.8803) -(3 .4199) -(3.6002) -(3.3983) -(3.2397) -(2 .7277)
Adj. R2 0.2561 0.2284 0.1949 0.0917 0.0725 0.0933 0.0729 0.0585 0.0920
F-stat. 32.6744 28.2328 23.2714 10.2867 8.1909 10.4697 8.2300 6.7212 10.3186
(p-value) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0019) (0.0052) (0.0017) (0.0051) (0.0111) (0.0018)
0 0.9797 0.9927 2.9238 24.5698 3.1887 3.1870 30.3553 3.4023 3.4018
B 0.1409 0.1386 1.7440 4.0438 4.8180 3.9982 6.2826 6.8958 5.2678
0/p 0.2032 0.2000 2.5160 5.8340 6.9509 5.7682 9.0639 9.9485 7.5998
We define the level of mean reversion as 0=-y/p and the speed of mean reversion as Tj=ln(0.5)/y.
T ab. 24. Test of mean reversion — OLS regression of secondary market spreads of MBS and Pfandbrief spread series (actual, transformed and Johnson Fit adjusted spreads).
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A u gm en ted  D ickey-F u ller  (A D F) P hillips-P erron (P P)
level on first difference level on first difference
Asset Class Spread 
Series
#
test stat F-stat. test stat F-stat. test stat. F-stat test stat F-stat
CSAAA3 -2.3140** 1.5576 -5.5484*** 22.2851 -2.4223** 3.1151 -9.6455*** 46.4573
CSAAA3JL -0.4839 0.9531 -5.5683*** 29.5000 -0.4904 0.6055 -9.6009*** 92.1149
CSA A A 3_A D JL -2.1156** 1.3658 -5.4391*** 21.9381 -2.1046** 2.4597 -9.5749*** 45.8374
CSA5 -2.5714** 1.6863 -5.7524*** 22.1030 -2.5505** 3.0210 -9.5820*** 45.8853
CSA5_L -2.6638*** 2.0236 -5.9545*** 23.2591 -2.3890** 3.0565 -9.8002*** 47.9418
CSA5_AD_L -3.3677*** 2.8945 -6.2532*** 23.6575 -2.7279*** 3.5594 -9.9196*** 49.1234
CSBBB7 -2.5313** 1.7858 -5.4888*** 21.1444 -2.5878** 3.2069 -9.3913*** 44.1208
CSBBB7_L -2.6056** 1.7604 -5.4044*** 20.9290 -2.6831** 3.2168 -9.3288*** 43.5410
CSBBB7_AD_L -2.1521** 1.2455 -5.8862*** 23.3047 -2.3390** 2.5349 -9.5909*** 45.9627
CTAAA3 -1.4439 0.8831 -5.3088*** 19.3894 -1.3659 1.2306 -8.9347*** 39.8270
CTAAA3_L -1.4229 0.8646 -5.2056*** 19.1877 -1.3609 1.2461 -8.9104*** 39.5956
C F AA A3_AD _L -1.8073* 1.0596 -7.0360*** 26.7650 -1.8599* 2.0212 -8.9250*** 39.9795
CTA5 -3.0885*** 2.4290 -5.4990*** 19.9566 -3.0655*** 4.2334 -9.1314*** 41.7461
CTA5_L -3.0500*** 2.3745 -5.4322*** 20.0319 -3.1217*** 4.3954 -9.1637*** 42.0493
CTA5_AD_L -1.4271 1.0235 -4.9343*** 17.2697 -1.3810 /. 1353 -8.6148*** 36.8747
CTBBB7 -3.2841*** 3.6199 -5.1932*** 18.7573 -2.7308** 2.9486 -8.5495*** 36.0481
CTBBB7_L -3.1429*** 3.3880 -5.0281*** 19.5884 -2.6448** 2.8272 -8.7677*** 37.8804
CTBBB7_ADJL -3.8687*** 3.8989 -7.1995*** 28.3019 -3.5079*** 5.2950 -8.9273*** 39.9059
MAAA3 -1.7679* 1.2054 -4.6158*** 25.5425 -2.1149** 2.1762 -10.2174*** 52.6226
MAAA3_L -1.7920* 1.2790 -4.3566*** 22.5060 -2.0457** 1.9105 -9.5844*** 45.8448
M AAA3_jAD_L -2.6696*** 2.3823 -5.6247*** 27.9576 -4.0668*** 7.6201 -11.7885*** 68.7735
MAAA5 -1.7236* 0.9351 -5.4159*** 20.3606 -1.7681 1.5475 -8.9980*** 40.5530
MAAA5JL -1.6178 0.9349 -5.2955*** 18.7964 -1.6538 1.2912 -8.6936*** 37.9098
M A AA 5_SlD _L -3.9070 13.6306 -7.0601*** 70.6754 -6.4086*** 19.6483 -18.2340*** 144.1522
MA7 -2.0783** 2.4331 -6.1644*** 18.0974 -2.2989** 2.4371 -8.2614*** 34.7440
MA7_L -2.0272** 2.2151 -6.0274*** 17.5368 -2.2188** 2.2264 -8.2097*** 34.3158
M A 7_A D _L -2.2938** 4.1190 -6.6164*** 21.2514 -2.7183*** 3.6791 -8.4312*** 35.9602
MBBB7 -1.8053* 1.5161 -5.6216*** 16.6324 -1.6638 1.2180 -8.0614*** 32.5201
MBBB7_L -1.7667* 1.7375 -5.4615*** 16.0057 -1.6060 1.1357 -7.8950*** 31.0959
MBBB7_ADJL -6.0350*** 10.9508 -7.2394*** 35.9587 -5.7618*** 16.8164 -12.1448*** 68.2325
PAAA3 -3.1250*** 13.0609 -7.5542*** 72.1750 -6.5740*** 20.8522 -18.8840*** 133.2142
PAAA3_L -2.8552*** 12.1875 -7.3476*** 70.8088 -6.1020*** 18.0583 -18.5838*** 132.9419
PA A A 3_A D _L -2.5263** 10.6802 -7.2234*** 66.8306 -5.4183*** 14.5363 -18.0251*** 127.5861
PAAA5 -1.5787 3.8632 -7.1813*** 43.9521 -2.7667*** 5.3391 -13.9087*** 85.7595
PAAA5_L -1.3258 3.7093 -6.8171*** 43.6746 -2.3216*** 4.1785 -13.8450*** 87.2536
PA AA 5_AD _L -1.5908 3.8489 -7.1147*** 43.7777 -2.8242*** 5.4351 -13.8917*** 85.7927
PAAA7 -1.6260 2.1706 -6.5231*** 34.9019 -2.5999*** 4.4974 -11.9813*** 68.9135
PAAA7_L -1.3387 2.4807 -6.4202*** 37.0432 -2.2305** 3.6349 -12.4745*** 74.0244
PA AA 7_AD _L -1.5950 2.0476 -6.4679*** 32.5846 -2.9957*** 5.5289 -11.6370*** 63.6673
Sample (adjusted): 21/01/2001-18/10/2002; 92 weekly observations; constant and linear time trend (shift) included in the text as exogenous 
variables.# MacKinnon (1996) critical values for rejection o f hypothesis o f a unit root based on one-sided p-values. Significance: * significant 
at 10% level, ** significant at 5% level, *** significant at 1% level. PP test completed with three-lag truncation for Bardett (1981) kernel given 
Newey-West (1987) test.
Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test is based on: Ayt=p+Y]t+Y2yt_i+8iAyt_i+52Ayt_2+£twith H q:Y 2 = 0  v s . H ,:y 2 < 0
Phillips-Perron (PP) test is based on: Ayt= p + p i(t-T/2)+p2yt.1+£twith Ho:P2= l vs.
Tab. 25. Test of unit root — all spread series of CDO, MBS and Tfandbrief transactions (actual, tranformed and Johnson 
Fit adjusted spreads).
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Collateralised Debt Obligations (CDO), synthetic
CSA A A 3______________ C S A A A 3_L __________C SA A A 3 _ A D _ L ______________ CSA5____________________ C SA 5_L ______________ C S A 5 _ A D _ L ______________ CSBBB7_______________C S B B B 7_L _________ C S B B B 7_A D _L
B H H H M B H H H M B H H H M B H H H M B H H H M B H H H M B H H H M B H H H M B H H H M
d o 5.6629 11.6277** 0 .3736 0.8084*** 0.1681 0.5673** 82.1876*** 36.7125*** 1.3413* 1.0422*** 0.8561 0.8234** 60.6480*** 50.1377** 0.1505 0.7801** 1.0612 0 .6703
(0.7887) (2.0442) (0.4278) (4.3991) (0.3228) (2.3169) (5.3921) (3.8377) (1.8484) (3.2132) (0.6994) (2.3969) (29289) (21338) (0.5926) (23033) (0.9432) (1.1831)
“ 1.1 -0 .0292 -0.0843* -0 .0492 -0.1245*** 0.0100 -0.0861** -0.2565*** -0.11026*** -0.1707* -0.1452*** -0.1161 -0.0996*** -0.0950*** -0 .0609* -0.0167 -0.0891** -0 .1325 -0.0737
-(0.3667) (1.8029) -(0.3434) (4.8184) (0.1381) (2.1S00) -(5.6064) (3.8146) -(1.8960) .(3.3035) (0.8382) -(25819) (26592) -(19317) -(0.5853) (20950) -(1.0774) -(1.1921)
a ti2 -0 .0944 -0.1304** -0 .0 6 2 4 -0.1358*** -0.0205 -0 .1069** -0.2862*** -0.1443*** -0.1782** -0.1519*** -0 .1266 -0.1041*** -0.1369*** -0 .0963** -0 .0236 -0 .0941** -0 .1404 -0.0811
-(11794) -(22624) -(0.4571) -(5.1952) -(0.2787) (24369) -(5.9723) (45266) (19683) (33717) (0.9098) -(26786) (3 3330) -(24910) -(0.8070) (21667) (1.1281) -0  2729)
“ 2.1 -0 .9928 -1.7704*** -0 .1368 -0.2251*** -0 .1482 -0.1686** -10.9896*** -5.0398*** -0.3374* -0.2212*** -0 .1990 -0.2166** -7.6613*** -7 .0530** -0.0357 -0 .1835** -0.2061 -0 .1635
(1.0796) (26898) -(0.6058) (3.5891) -(0.9615) (22852) (5.2046) -(3.8125) (1.8255) -(27464) -(0.5777) -(21525) (26252) -(21273) -(0.5799) (22239) -(0.7286) -(1.1351)
0-23 -0 .7045 -1.6302** -0 .1208 -0.2178*** -0 .1224 -0.1554** -10.3384*** -4.6166*** -0.3258* -0.2135*** -0 .1812 -0.2129** -6.9744*** -6.4840** -0.0343 -0.1784** -0.1955 -0.1543
-(0.8030) -(2 2152) -(0.5368) -(3.7199) -(0.8175) (23193) -(5.1427) -(3.7183) (17578) -(27797) (0 5291) -(2 1487) (25168) (21519) -(0.5490) (22342) -(06962) (10871)
“ 3 0 .0725 0.2051 10.8264 3.1593 0.8867 2.4101 0.0069 0.0290 -3.8201 -4.2320*** -0.5681 -3 .1765 0 .0115 -0 .0025 11.9613 -2.2831 -9 .0706 -8.2993
(0.4139) (1 3289) (0.2799) (1.0714) (01735) (1 3336) (0 2280) (1 1875) (D.2980) (05920) (0 0374) (0 4909) (0.3437) (0 1052) (1.2357) (0.4054) -(1.1269) (0.7596)
Po 4.6916 2 .0758 -0 .0025 0.0016 0.0825 0.0036 -117 .5480 13.2978 0.0454*** 0.0015 0.0402** 0 .0048 -202 .1772 57 .3044 0.0326 0.0019 0.0212 0 .0025
(1.1534) (0.2388) -(0.1594) (0.3757) (1.4821) (0.0560) (10040) (0.0607) (3 5771) (00337) (20382) (08641) (0 5807) (0.11S6) (10211) (0.1910) (0.6551) (0.1658)
P . 0.0007 -0.0321 -0 .0029 -0.0313 0.0183 -0 .0224 -0.0401** -0.0313 0.0373 -0.0181 -0 .0026 -0.0291 -0.0151 -0 .0265 0.0299 0 .0989 0.0744 -0 .0187
(0.0397) -(0.6457) (0.6009) (0.8673) (0.4590) -(D.6368) -(20888) .(0.8348) (1.1921) (0.6800) (0,1131) -(13545) -(0.3371) -(0.5455) (0.9771) (1.1819) (1.1934) -(0.8653)
P2 1.3508 0.7059 1.8411 0.7861 -0.2161 0.1569 1.1389 0.2230 1.7378 0.1816 0.5707 0.4609 0.3949 0.0671 0.8798 0.0753 0.0623 0 .1350
(1.2619) (0.5441) (0.2309) (1.0094) (1.5171) (0.6341) (0.6263) (0.0534) (10053) (00561) (0 3310) (1.0849) (0 2824) (0 0712) (0.5946) (0.0875) (0.1393) (0.4765)
P 3 0.0043 -0 .0130 0 .0008 -0.0001 -0 .0114 -0.0005 0.6032** -0.0072 -0.0058*** -0 .0004 -0.0047** -0 .0004 0 .5670 -0 .0054 -0 .0034 0.0001 -0.0026 0.0001
(0.0887) -(0.1814) (0.3109) -(0.1777) (1.3641) -(0.0424) (2.0434) (0.0118) (3.5538) (0.0681) (1.9611) (0.5894) (0.7037) -(0.0058) -(0.8763) (O.OB85) -(0-7561) (0.0571)
P t -0 .8316 -0 .1798 0.0002 -0 .0007 -0 .0228 0.0001 12.7831 -0.1413 -0.0111*** 0.0006 -0.0110** -0 .0018 18.4805 -0 .4459 -0 .0084 -0 .0015 -0.0041 -0.0016
(1.6276) -(0.1538) (00555) -(0.6244) (1.5008) (0.0114) (0.7843) (0.0048) (3.5940) (0.0675) (20897) -(1.1541) (0.5247) -(3.0150) -(1.2269) (1.2034) -(0.4896) -(0.3404)
Ps 0.2786 0.5402*** -0 .0080 0.7080*** 0.1876 0 .5772 0.2185 0 .5794 0.2630** 0.5358 0.5468** 0.8814*** 0.5842 0.5801 -0.3852** 0.5760*** 0.5387*** 0 .6524
(1.3202) (3.3529) -(0.0244) (13.0004) (0.3804) (08391) (0.9346) (1.5814) (1.9765) (0.7306) (20165) (12 4155) (1.1636) (0.3931) -(23793) (6.6436) (2.6656) (0.8460)
Z-statistics in parentheses; ***=1%  sign ificance, **=5%  sign ificance, *= 10%  significance. * n o  Bollerslev-W oolridge robust standard errors and variance.
T  ab. 26. Estimation Results of G ARCH (1,1) modelfor synthetic CDO spreads (actual, transformed and Johnson Fit adjusted spreads) — LIBOR at level data.
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Collateralised Debt Obligations (CDO), synthetic
CTAA A3 CTAAA3._L CTA A A 3. A D L CTA5 CTA5 _L CTA5
-)a< CTBBB7 CT BB B7 L CTBBB'
B H H H M B H H H M B H H H M 5 B H H H M B H H H M B H H H M B H H H M B H H H M B H H H
do 0.5409 0.5852 -0.0837 0.0601 -0.7135 0.2943 11.1646 16.0871 0.3411 0.4467 0.1866 0.0937 3.7886 6.9902 -0.1282 0.1158 0.4390
(0.S399) p.7471) (0.2749) (1.0171) -p.5266) (1.0250) (1.0199) p.9238) p.8970) (10432) p.7681) p . 1888) p.3888) p.4518) -p.5296) (2010Z) p.6291)
“ u -0.0101 -0.0126 0.0133 -0.0120 0.1775 -0.0511 -0.0402 -0.0522 -0.0513 -0.0688 -0.0280 -0.0318 -0.0585*** -0.0117 0.0328 -0.0160*** -0.0769
p.5628) -(0.7535) p . 1853) -P-7090) P.5247) -p.7022) -p.6870) -p.6057) -06734) -p.9355) .p . 7225) -P-5013) -(10.3849) -p.2991) P.7713) (27979) -p.6902)
“ W -0.0948*** -0.0928*** -0.0146 -0.0379** 0.1528 -0.0758 -0.1066* -0.1105 -0.0642 -0.0797 -0.0391 -0.0390 -0.1035*** -0.0415 0.0287 -0.0261*** -0.0892
-(5.3820) -(5.2279) -(0.2054) -(22’OS) p.4525) (10653) (1.6536) (1 2438) -p-932) (1 0712) •P-9835) -06297) -(7.1422) -p.9013) p. 6629) (6.1301) -p.7861)
“ 2.1 -0 .1292 -0.0823 0.0251 -0.0119 0.0564 -0.0813** -1.0001 -1.6299 -0.0745 -0.0654 -0.0369 0.0378 -0.4421 -0.8705 -0.0245 -0.0220 -0.0196
(1.2914) (D.9193) p .5425) -p.5299) P-5495) -(23773) -p.8092) -P.8066) (12070) -P-9093) ■p.7351) 0.2229) -p.2285) -P.5S2P -PJ793) -p.7608) -P-2799)
“ 2.2 -0 .0050 -0.0257 0.0286 -0.0108 0.0635 -0.0762** -1.0054 -1.6279 -0.0708 -0.0670 -0.0362 0.0431 -0.6195 -0.6917 -0.0201 -0.0120 -0.0178
-(0.0515) (0.3345) p.0702) -p.5185) p.6198) -0.3188) -p.8809) -P-8451) (1.1766) -p. 9721) -p. 7214) p . 2597) -02971) -p.4787) -p.5203) -p.4291) -P.2563)
“ 3 0.2307 0.1851** 8.0880 2.9834 21.5533 11.7871 -0.0942 -0.1492 7.4916 -12.5652 2.5065 -4.5571 2.1909**** 0.0073 2.0140 20.0742***’ 7.9509
(1.2081) (1.9830) p.3698) p .0428) p .4549) (10322) p.7191) (1 1969) p .7506) p .9305) (1.0794) 0.3882) (3.8512) p.1435) p .4297) (4.9169) p .9429)
Po 0.5376 0.5145 0.0044 -0.0007 0.0202 0.0012 -6.0672 9.4582 0.0263 0.0015 0.0243** -0.0016 -18.2465 25.6589 0.0058 0.0004 0.0129
(0.4812) (04514) (1.3944) -p.2501) (10060) p  1793) -p.2531) P.2326) P-7287) P . 1377) (24426) (1.2960) ■ P  9476) p.2289) P-5457) P2362) p . 7765)
p. -0 .0214 -0.0209* -0.0089 -0.0147 -0.0114 -0.0246 -0.0313 -0.0370* 0.1382 -0.0291 0.1741 0.0397 -0.2356 0.1776 0.2464 0.1680 0.3558*
(1 3491) ■(1.7145) -p.5908) ■ P5516) -P-3718) (12860) (13884) (1 8033) (13139) (1.4490) p . 9792) (12659) (1 1028) p.7828) p .9969) (1.4149) (1.6544)
P2 0.4425 0.0735 0.9194 0.0867 0.1371 0.2851 -0.0750 -0.0291 -0.1256 0.0659 -0.6778** -0.1088 0.4408 -0.2316 0.2613 0.0683 -0.1365
(0.1257) (0.0173) p.2117) p .0304) P-3769) (1.3934) (0.5181) -P-2633) ■P-5272) p.4846) -(25173) -0.9324) (1.7377) -p.7993) p.3959) p .6003) -p.4364)
P3 -0.0025 -0.0005 -0.0013 -0.0005 -0.0050 -0.0008 0.0694 0.0298 -0.0032 -0.0002 -0.0036** -0.0003*** 0.1725 0.0187 -0.0009 0.0000 -0 .0020
(0.1340) (0.0148) -(1.1331) .p.4761) (1.0883) -p.5056) P-4119) p . 1285) -p.5237) -p. 1160) (24146) (10.3164) (11.1763) P.0557) -P5038) p.0309) -p.7841)
P4 -0 .0030 -0.0007 0.0002 0.0018 -0.0014 0.0013 1.1979 -0.9925 -0.0071 0.0001 -0.0046** 0.0021** -0.2055 -4.4633 -0.0007 -0.0002 -0.0014
-(0.0350) -(0.0001) p . 1693) (1.5088) -P.7239) p .9064) P-4797) -p.2285) -(1.2444) p.0791) (23085) (21239) -0.0516) -p.4683) - p . 8061) -p.5885) -P-7085)
P5 0.5787** 0.5921** 0.3471 0.5303 0.2834 0.5115* 0.7020** 0.5842* 0.3533 0.6283 0.5237** 0.7522*** 0.6533*** 0.6592 0.7080 0.6035*** 0.4624
(20079) (1.9120) P  4950) P  5383) p.3945) (18500) (20848) (18914) (1.4323) (25105) (22190) (7.8176) (5.6901) (1 1907) p .3915) (28133) (1.2741)
Z-statistics in parentheses; ***—1% significance, **=5%  significance, *=10%  significance. * no  Bollerslev-W oolridge robust standard errors and variance; * SQ R -G A R C H  result.
Tab. 27. Estimation Results of G ARCH(1,1) modelfor traditional CDO spreads (actual, transformed and Johnson Fit adjusted spreads) — LIBOR at level data.
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Mortgage-Backed Securities (MBS)
M AAA3 M AAA3 L M AAA3 A D  L M AAA5 M AAA5 L M AAA5 A D  L
B H H H M B H H H M5 B H H H M B H H H M 5 B H H H M* B H H H M
do 0.0698 -0.0726 -0.0533 0.0039 0.9237 0.3424 0.1344 -0.1093 0.0792** 0.0492 1.13716*** 1.2931***
(01334) -(0,2750) *p.4787) p.0310) (1.0163) (1.1870) p.5856) (1.3769) (1.9771) p.aoo6) (4.2574) (4.6541)
<*1.1 0.0317 0.0058 0.0224 -0.0078 -0.2341 -0.18967** -0.0435*** -0.0149*** -0.0405*** -0.0257 -0.4084*** -0.4882***
(0.4216) (0.4881) PJ548) -p.1530) (1.0446) (2.0648) -(5.4542) (22072) -(28977) -p.8428) (4.1699) (4.4655)
<*1,2 0.0083 -0.0428*** 0.0087 -0.0255 -0.2939 -0.1916** -0.0872*** -0.0588*** -0.0551*** -0.0403 -0.4302*** -0.4889***
(0.1 ISO) (4.1383) p . 1402) -p.5042) -(1.4322) -(2.0874) -p.1186) -p .7137) (3 8996) (13417) .(44030) (4.4651)
<*2.1 -0.0774 -0.0009 -0.0038 0.0147 -0.0545 0.1656 0.2235*** 0.1191*** 0.0382*** 0.0237 0.0951 0.1543*
(0.2420) (00104) -P0675) p.4824) -p.1876) (1.4387) (3.6672) (27425) (24978) PJ622) (1.4032) (1.6910)
<*22 -0.0728 0.0196 -0.0036 0.0180 -0.0682 0.1630 0.2165*** 0.1318*** 0.0392*** 0.0238 0.1006 0.1485*
(0.2944) (0.2663) -p.0657) p.5922) -p .2422) (1.4285) (3.8529) (29256) (26728) (0.3684) (1.4829) (1.6540)
<*3 -1.0954 -0.1041 -13.1130 -0.0002 -16.8725 -8.5146 0.1158 0.0477 -4.8700 10.7097 -0.1351 -0.4513
(1.0666) -(03472) -p.7192) p.oooc) -p.8079) (1.3835) p.3980) p.1772) -p.4817) PJ017) -p.9746) -p.7901)
Po -0.0625 0.0906 -0.0005 -0.0004 0.0024 -0.0104* -0.1749 0.0210 0.0002 0.0000 -0.1489** -0.0264
(0.2566) (0.4324) ■p.7642) -P3182) p.4813) (1.6784) .p .7654) PJ797) p.1980) p.0732) (23609) -p.7384)
Pi 0.0093 0.0030 0.0612 0.1223 -0.0190 -0.0013 0.3279 0.8260*** 0.1862 0.1629 0.3987* 1.0853
(0.0614 (1.0948) (1.0336) p .4899) -p .4008) -p.0077) (0.2853) p.9285) p.5922) (1.0381) (1.8461) (1.1291)
Pt 0.4527 -0.1782** 0.4175 0.0544 0.0950 0.0494 -1.3062 0.8982 -0.7514** 0.0518 1.4608* 0.4080
(0.7403) -(1.9816) p.5363) p.1452) (L1319) (0.2688) -p.9057) p.7670) -(20128) p.0973) (1.8608) p.4617)
P3 0.0325 0.0001 0.0001 0.0002 0.0000 0.0005 -0.0044 -0.0026*** -0.0002 -0.0002** 0.0457** 0.0056
p,7572) (0.0171) p.9736) p.3874) p.2178) (L3S07) p.5244) (3.5536) p.8432) (24012) (2134? p.5025)
P« -0.0928 0.0003 -0.0003 0.0000 -0.0005 0.0006** 0.0962 0.0108 0.0005 0.0004** 0.0061 0.0067***
* (3.6474) (0.0105) -p.6355) p.0826) -p.6713) (1.8720) (1.5304) P-5943) (1.1136) (22461) p.8620) (2.9066)
Ps 0.0136 0.5482 0.0107 0.5774 0.8653 0.3978*** 0.0518 0.1638 0.4637 0.5950*** -0.0122 0.0079
(00693) (1.1846) p .1088) (1.3767) (4.4138) (29750) p.4083) (1.5546) (1.4356) (6 3968) ■p.7778) P-6601)
MA7 MA7 L M A 7_A D _L M BBB7 M BBB7 L M BBB7 A D  L
B H H H M B H H H M5 B H H H B H H H M B H H H M* B H H H M
a<> 0.9846 -0.1528 -0.0505 -0.0119 -0.0364 -0.0068 9.6640 -3.5135 -0.2022** -0.0420 1.5360** 2.9156***
(04706) -(0.1344) -p.1042) -p.0992) - p j 059) -p.0403) P6319) -p9835) (24117) -p.4306) (22703 (4.8699)
aU -0.0449 0.0032 0.0107 -0.0007 0.0165 -0.0047 -0.0751 -0.0011 0.0334*** -0.0019 -0.3043** -0.5922***
(D.6737) (0.1556) p.0768) p.0206) PJ643) -P-1170) -p.7548) ■p.0711) (4.S207) ■ p . 1234) (23303) -(4.8137)
a1.2 -0.0722 -0.0227 0.0089 -0.0070 0.0135 -0.0104 -0.1093 -0.0271* 0.0280*** -0.0065 -0.3270** -0.6115***
(1.2046) (1.1280) p.0643) (0-2074) PJ041) -p.2618) (1.1208) (1.6582) (3.8276) -p.4559) (24617) (4.9738)
<<2,1 0.3379 0.0096 0.0013 0.0104 -0.0162 0.0185 0.0558 0.8405** 0.0318 0.0368 -0.0193 0.0115
(07162) (00668) p.0146) p.2S13) -p .4998) p.3221) p.0549) (20711) p.5625) p.6936) -p.2680) p.1889)
0.3919 -0.0012 0.0014 0.0117 -0.0136 0.0210 0.0703 0.8250** 0.0328 0.0366 -0.0219 0.0081
(08644) (0.0044) p.0212) p.3152) -p .7425) (0.3663) p.0691) (21183) P-5766) P6841) -PJ031) p . 130?
»3 0.4709** 0.0297 23.7852* 24.6253 -5.1952 -0.0001 0.2348 0.0581 -24.9125 4.3805 1.7645 3.9074
(1.8230) (00916) (1.8000) P-6458) ■p.5337) poooo) p.5600) p .7364) (12921) p.1401) PI142) p.8978)
Po -5.3516 0.4602 0.0004 -0.0002 0.0016 -0.0006** -46.0613 4.8028 -0.0001 -0.0006*** -0.0776** -0.0100
(0.7215) (0.0469) p.5248) -(1.7584) P-2996) (1.9248) (1.3728) p . 1296) -p.1843) -(4.1222) (22549) -p.1379)
Pi -0.0089 -0.0170 0.1453** 0.1343 0.1241 0.1401 -0.0182 -0.0206 0.0434 0.1454 0.2669 0.5514
(0.1728) (0.6640) (2.1786) P-5083) (1.1818) p.6356) -p.4764) -p.6482) (1.4703) p.9352) (12400) p.4615)
p 2 2.2857 -0.0922 0.0592 0.0453 0.0210 0.0509 0.1554 -0.0647 0.5090 0.0527 0.4774 -0.1345
(04686) (0.1161) p.2265) p.1417) p.0431) p .0550) p.4910) -p.7827) (1.3938) p.2001) p . 5279) p . 1432)
P 3 0.1600 -0.0002 -0.0001*** -0.0000*** -0.0004 -0.0001*** 0.3101 -0.0006 -0.0002*** -0.0000*** 0.0145** 0.0002
(0.8477) (00027) (10.2457) -(6.4880) -p.3236) -(7.3532) (1.2139) -p.0039) -(7.3622) -p.2730) (22189) P-0148)
P4 -0.9421 -0.0010 0.0000 0.0003*** 0.0002 0.0008*** 2.3255* 0.0245 0.0008 0.0006*** 0.0041*** 0.0065**
(1.0215) (0.0093) p . 1944) (2.6140) p.9834) (28981) (1.6750) p.0112) (1.5648) (4.4062) (27368) P4768)
P5 -0.0677 0.5849 0.6162 0.5953*** 0.6633 0.5962*** -0.0406 0.5261 0.4580*** 0.5960*** 0.3891** 0.0892
(0.1284) (0.3992) (1.1891) (43514) (3.4786) (46666) -p.1124) p.4391) (3.1366) p.0502) (1.8906) PJ27S)
Z-statistics in parentheses; ***=1%  significance, **=5%  significance, *=10%  significance. * no Bollerslev-W oolridge robust standard errors and variance; * 
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Tab. 28. Estimation Results of GARCH(1,1) model MBS spreads (actual, transformed and Johnson Fit adjusted 
spreads) — LIBOR at level data.
Pfandbriefe
PAAA3 PAAA3 L PAAA3 AD L PAAA5 PAAA5 L PAAA5_AD_L PAAA7 PAAA7L PAAA7 AD L
BHHH M BHHH M BHHH M5 BHHH M BHHH M BHHH M BHHH M BHHH M BHHH M
“ o 3.9549*** 4.1712*** 0.6664** 0.8484*** 0.3371* 0.6694*** -0.3175 -1.8157** -0.0265 -0.0061 0.0096 0.1029 10.2552 1.5828 0.2707 0.2698 0.1282 0.8264***
(4.5495) (4.5403) (23496) (4.8825) (1.9480) (3.1636) -(0.1399) -(1.9784) (0.2131) -(0.0656) (O.OST) (07087) (0.0083 (0.8220) (0.6421) (12464) (1.2063) (3.5174)
“ 1.1 -0.2361 -0.2763*** -0.2508* -0.2993*** -0.1328** -0.2377*** 0.0416 -0.0076 -0.0007 -0.0329 0.0034 -0.0562 0.0044 -0.0288 -0.0894 -0.0810 -0.0433 -0.3019***
-(1.5904) -(3.1123) -(1.6861) -(25761) -(2.1319) <27505) (08726) <0.2733) -(0.0161) <10944) (0.07153 < 1.5043 (0.0015) -(0.7453 -(1.5900) <0.9743 -(1.0492) (3.5624)
“ u -0.3200*** -0.3398*** -0.2800** -0.3273*** -0.1576** -0.2647*** -0.0726 -0.1171*** -0.0322 -0.0692** -0.0338 -0.0936** -0.0454 -0.1239*** -0.1182 -0.1089 -0.0751* -0.3270***
-(2.6170) -(42243) -(1.9870) -(2.9545) -(25466) -(3.1353) -(1.4602) <4.7159) -(0.7343) -(23776) -(06981) <2 5064) -(00157) - p .3593 <0.7796) <1.3064) <183923 -(3 8437)
“ 2.1 0.2305 0.2922 0.0732 0.0466 0.0439 0.0455 0.2300 0.6491*** 0.0480 0.1021** 0.0315 0.0787 0.0282 -0.1206 0.0781 0.0559 0.0381 0.2143
(0.5676) (1.3321) (0.7773) (0.3340) (14013) (0.5294) (03928) (28443) (0 4410) (22135) (0 2627) (0 9720) (00001) <0.2113 (0 6001) (0.6694) (0.7803 (15737)
a 2 2 0.2986 0.3440 0.0773 0.0497 0.0483* 0.0479 0.2046 0.7283*** 0.0491 0.1101** 0.0284 0.0849 0.1044 0.0077 0.0878 0.0651 0.0503 0.2277*
(0.6549) (1.4898) (0.7657) (0.3502) (1.6853) (0.5454) (03595) (3 1888) (0 4507) (23583 (0.2413 (1.0783 100003 (0.0134) (0 6833 (07943 (1.0513 (1.6733
“ 3 -0.0983 -0.0887 -3.3732 -6.6377 0.1799 -6.5453 -0.0653 -0.1278*** 0.8377 -2.5695 -0.4139 -0.0091 -7.3575’ 0.4745* -23.0264 -■21.5251 -0.0609 -43.8189**
-(0.6256) -(1.1115) -(0.991*) -(0.4747) (>.0838) -(0.5626) -(0.1483) -(264-3) (0.0703 <0.8583 <0.0393 -(D.0013 -(0.07243 (1.6573 < 0.5043 <1 1081) < 0.0143 <1.8943
P o -1.6088 1.9050** -0.0087 0.0159*** 0.0128* 0.0218*** -0.9827 -0.7278 -0.0023 -0.0018 -0.0013 -0.0001 0.8594 -0.1347 0.0096 0.0087* 0.0022 0.0045***
-(0 5469) (2.1147) -(0.4421) (3.3432) (7.2262) (3.6464) -(0.4079) -(0 7681) -(0.5749) -(0 5860) -(02556) <0.0273 (0.0043) -(0 1301) (11431) (1.7911) (0.2713) (3 6997)
P , 0.0313 0.3166* 0.1884 0.0886 0.1103 0.1248 -0.0096 0.0781* -0.0188 0.0137 -0.0080 -0.0367 0.1515 -0.1592 0.0801 0.1711 0.4441* 0.0446
(0.4247) (16423) (14286) (0.7803) (0 8971) (0.9484) -(0.1736) (17815) <0.3293 (0 4646) -(00933 (0.2233 (0.0359) -(1.0426) (0 3453) (12058) (19043) (1.0182)
P 2 1.3898 3.2809 1.1873 1.3155 2.2513*** 0.5987 0.0207 3.8487* 0.1994 1.6646** 0.0068 -0.0728 -0.2496 0.1515 -0.0452 -0.0480 -0.3781 0.14646*
(0.6110) (0.9*27) (0.7876) (0.4713) (2.7118) (0.4979) (00795) (18231) (0 9099) (22041) (00326) -(0 5863 - p .0293 (1.1131) < 0.3073 <04493) <1.4163 (1.6693
P 3 0.1248 0.0128 0.0041 -0.0030 -0.0020* -0.0062* 0.0117 0.0060 -0.0003 0.0002 -0.0001 0.0000 0.0290 0.0313** -0.0033 -0.0029 -0.0017 -0.0020***
(0.5577) (0.0706) (0.5417) -(09299) -(1.9074) <1.8653 (0.5713 (03136) <02365) (0.2524) -(0.1146) (0.0523 (00510) (24827) -(1.0660) <14439) <0.5843) <102133
P 4 -0.1577 -0.3340 -0.0021 -0.0036 -0.0038*** -0.0015 0.2066 0.1869 0.0027 0.0011 0.0012 0.0001 -0.2154 -0.1366 0.0024 0.0018 0.0039 0.0018**
-(0.5073) -(0.5567) •(01651) -(0 6569) -(3 2261) -(03510) (0.3503) (0.8513 (0.8189) (0 7553 (03013 (0.0273 -(00069) -(0 3914) (0.7751) (0.7492) (1.2765) (23573
Ps 0.6747** -0.0181 0.6548*** 0.0557 0.0428 0.0825 0.8754* 0.3792* 0.6935* 0.4336 0.9378 1.0295*** 0.6210 0.9664*** -0.0477 0.1142 -0.1975 0.6096***
(25617) -(0.2694) (4.234) (0.4662) (0.4804) (06023 (1.7454) (1.9577) (17257) (14113 (22243) (3.0843 (0.0394) (4.6493 <0.0613 (>.4623 <1.4082) (6.5966)
Z-statistics in parentheses; ***=1% significance, **=5% significance, *=10% significance. * no Bollerslev-Woolridge robust standard errors and variance; * SQR-GARCH result
Tab. 29. Estimation Results of GARCH(1,1) modelfor Pfandbriefspreads (actual, transformed and Johnson Fit adjusted spreads) — LIBOR at level data.
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Collateralised Debt Obligations (CDO), synthetic
CSAAA3 CSAAA3 L CSAAA3 AD L CSA5 CSA5 L CSA5_AD_L CSBBB7 CSBBB7_L CSBBB7
BHHH M BHHH M BHHH M BHHH M BHHH M BHHH M BHHH M BHHH M BHHH
a o 7.9788 12.7725*** 0.4420 0.8244 0.4512* 0.4900 4.0043 41.6226** 0.8631*** 0.9854*** 0.9461* 0.9770** 93.0984*** 87.8123*** 1.2159** 1.2243* 1.1291**
(0.7090) (21526) (1.0239) (0.9245) (1.7998) (1.2518) (0.9378) (25123) (27281) (26027) (1.7644) (20314) (4,0323) (2.8247) (24032) (17528) (20673)
“ 1.1 -0.1576 -0.1360** -0.3165 -0.1527 -0.5265*** -0.0742 0.0448 -0.1112 -0.5389*** -0.1538 -0.2365 -0.1521*** -0.1971*** -0.1604 -0.5286** -0.2045 -0.3345***
-(1.2616) -(21247) -(1.5516) -(0.7655) -(3.3951) -(06637) (0.7680) -(12405) -(369-1) -(0790} -(1 5629) -(26568) -<3.7334) -(1 1820) -(22025) -(08349) -(3.2611)
“ w -0.1892 -0.1702*** -0.3252 -0.1623 -0.5232*** -0.0892 0.0230 -0.1245 -0.5407*** -0.1565 -0.2390 -0.1541*** -0.2121*** -0.1835 -0.5289** -0.2074 -0.3362***
-(15566) -(27327) -(1.5746) -(0.6140) -(3.4540) -(08003) (04376) -(14116) -(3.9069) -(0.8044) -(1.5863) -(27158) -(4.0134) -(1.3159) -(21923) -(0.8502) -(3.2779)
a 2 ,l 0.1146 0.0512 0.2573 0.0336 0.4876*** 0.0019 -0.0854 -0.0127 0.4234*** 0.0200 0.1174 0.0398** 0.1063** 0.0686 0.3789* 0.0705 0.2047***
(1.4179) (1.3623) (0.9719) (0.3351) (28917) (0.0373) -(1.3-83) -(01919) (31670) (0.1169) (07602) (25641) (1 9588) (05542) (1.7900) (0.2713) (3.7188)
Ct->7 0.0869 0.0185 0.2531 0.0305 0.4675*** -0.0032 -0.0936* -0.0402 0.4163*** 0.0156 0.1087 0.0364** 0.0742 0.0441 0.3717* 0.0675 0.1979***
(1.1439) (0.5267) (0.9569) (0.3069) (28506) -(00655) -(1.7148) -(0.6068) (3.1236) (3.0912) (0.7092) (24113) (1.4016) (0.3397) (1.7693) (0.2599) (3.5631)
“ 3.1 -1.3348 -1.9666*** -0.1536 -0.2456 -0.2089*** -0.1501 -0.4498 -5.9072** -0.1952*** -0.2185** -0.2400 -0.2695** -13.6506*** -12.1689*** -0.2487** -0.3075 -0.2557**
-(0.1913) -(3,0973) -(1.3604) -(0.6046) -(2.6787) -(1.5846) -(0.6158) -(2-318) -(1.6057) -(23200) -(1 5306) -(20732) -(4 1595) -(3.4613) -(24015) -(16330) -(2217}
“ v -1.1029 -1.7746*** -0.1405 -0.2355 -0.1718*** -0.1363 0.0414 -5.3946* -0.1936*** -0.2094** -0.2182 -0.2629** -13.3445*** -12.4147*** -0.2436** -0.2994 -0.2506**
-(0.7626) -(29635) -(1.2549) -(0.7600) -(22716) -(1 5869) (0.0624) -(25534) -(3.6172) -(23347) -(1.4292) -(20562) -(4.1993) -(3.5787) -(23949) -(1.5803) -(22008)
a 4 0.0659 0.1653 12.6202 -4.6430 0.2385 1.7231 0.1641** 0.0717 4.4645*** -5.1008 -3.3676 -10.6189 -0.0531 -0.0496 0.1807 -14.5659 -8.8101
(0.3729) (0.1499) (0.3752) -(0.0559) (0.1367) (03261) (24348) (0 6923) (0.94 SO) -(0 0895) -(0 3630) -(1.5540) (06366) -(0.2666) (00175) -(0.3535) -(15093)
Po -14.5372 2.1177 -0.0076 0.0028 0.0918** 0.0035 127.8183*** 13.1115 0.0141 0.0011 0.0308 0.0032 -129.7419 54.5565 0.0109 0.0037 0.0067
-(0.6572) (0.2507) -(23390) (0.3127) (21162) (00403) (27676) (0.0786) (1.2250) (0 0304) (1 1176) (0.5237) -(1 4244) (04001) (1 4559) (1.3142) (07215)
P , 0.0372 -0.0318 0.0096 -0.0106 0.4130 -0.0215 -0.0115 -0.0301 0.1056* -0.0161 0.0619 -0.0319 -0.0260 -0.0127 0.0940 -0.0240 0.0611
(0.7905) -(0.9545) (0.2512) -(0.2304) (1.2536) -(05969) -(0.9392) (0.6129) (1.8152) -(0 6207) (1 1260) -(1.4870) -(1.1804) -(0.8405) (1.0954) -(1.2809) (0.6275)
P 2 2.0004 0.5680 1.9087 0.7363 -0.4774 0.1675 1.5589* 0.1989 1.9600 0.2526 0.0272 0.3497 1.2635 2.1876 0.0609 0.1964 0.1205
(0.1019) (0.4273) (02001) (0.2620) -(14226) (0.6034) (18311) (0.0647) (0 4711) (00550) (0.0301) (0 7898) (13324) (07900) (00898) (0 5913) (0.383}
P3 0.1192 -0.0117 0.0014*** -0.0003 -0.0133 -0.0004 -0.2954** -0.0068 -0.0018 -0.0002 -0.0039 -0.0003 0.3021* 0.0149 -0.0014 -0.0001 -0.0007
(0,6753) -(0.23419 (3.1306) -(01651) -(20757) -(0.0284) -(21389) -(00146) -(1.1367) -(0.0502) -(1.1666) -(08885) (1.7168) (0.0659) -(1.3941) -(0.3470) -(06463)
P4 6.7962 -0.4344 0.0018 -0.0011 -0.0254** 0.0002 -18.0546*** -0.1214 -0.0035 0.0004 -0.0075 -0.0010 13.3568 -4.3228 -0.0022 -0.0018 -0.0017
(0.6633) -(0.1029) (1.5991) -(04500) -(21467) (00143) -(26365) (00054) (1J33J) (0 0502) (10411) -(0 4001) (12583) -(02626) -(‘ 532} -(1.5358) -(0 8310)
Ps 0.2884 0.4936 0.0648 0.5770 -0.0053 0.5230 -0.1828 0.5083 -0.0732 0.4463 0.3139 0.76623*** 0.9441*** 0.32858*** 1.16305*** 0.5297 0.6896
(0.4642) (1.0473) (0.1915) (1.5705) -(0 0209) (08905) -(0.9887) (10890) -(D461I) (0 6734) (0 9934) (3.7768) (56159) (2 ’ 351) (2.6311) (0.5571) (0.4944)
Po -0.0170 -0.0183 0.1859 -0.0314 0.1209 0.0248 0.5671*** 0.0171 0.0087 -0.0651 0.2954 0.2048** -0.2172** -0.1381 -0.3871 0.0259 0.1188
-(0.0945) -(0.131S) (0.2645) -(0.1757) (3.90029 (0 0300) (25995) (00313) (0.2239) -(0.1051) (0.8117) (20187) -(20889) -(1.0310) -(0.8424) (0.0399) (00953)
Z-statistics in parentheses; ***=1% significance, **=5% significance, *=10% significance. * no Bollerslev-Woolridge robust standard errors and variance.
Tab. 30. Estimation Results of GARCH(2,1) modelfor synthetic CDO spreads (actual, transformed and Johnson Fit adjusted spreads) — LIBOR at level data.
247
Collateralised Debt Obligations (CDO), traditional
CTAAA3 CTAAA3. L CTAAA3. A D  L CTA5 CTA5 L CTA5 AD L CTBBB7 CTBBB7 L CTBBB7 A D  L
B H H H M B H H H M5 BH H H M5 BH H H M B H H H M BH H H MS B H H H M5 B H H H M B H H H M
«0 -1.6504 0.4481 0.0639 0.0473 -1.3025*** 0.2386 14.5228 16.0989 0.0236 0.4432 0.4565*** 0.1675 11.7002 6.3271 -0.0617 0.2296 0.9452* 0.3330
(09151) (0.3168) (0.9077) (0.6798) -(25877) (1.0214) (14443) (12618) (0.0321) (0.7378) (3.2101) (0.2551) (0 5427) (0.1269) (0.0804) (0.2613) (1.7063) (0.8089)
“ 1.1 0.1646 0.0257 0.0212 -0.0030 0.2034* 0.0347 0.0408 -0.0013 0.0016 -0.0029 -0.1127 0.0445 0.0828 -0.0021 0.0058 0.0123 0.1230 -0.0173
(0.7158) (0.3474) (0.2776) (0.0426) (1.7791) (01912) (0.4395) (0.0088) (0.0165) (0 0082) (1.0673) (02009) (0.6241) (0.0035 (0.0296) (00655 (0.4810) (00704)
a u 0.0987 -0.0582 -0.0018 -0.0272 0.1891* 0.0105 -0.1421 -0.0334 -0.0074 -0.0143 -0.1256 0.0375 0.0540 -0.0297 0.0024 0.0085 0.1139 -0.0262
(0.4481) -(D.8456) (0 0235) (0.3978) (1.6724) (0.0583) -(0.5187) -(0.1269) (0.0780) (0.0411) (12021) (0.1700) (0.4216) (0.0455 (0.0121) (00451) (04455 (0.1094)
a 2.1 -0.1375 -0.0429 -0.0379 -0.0104 0.1029 -0.0675 -0.1078 -0.0570 -0.0069 -0.0617 0.0494 -0.0946 -0.1194 -0.0078 -0.0016 -0.0660 -0.2595 -0.0452
(0.5815 (0.5524) (0.6433) (0.2661) (1.1419) (0.4766) -(L218B) (0.4220) -(0.0925 (0.1865) (0.5199) ■(0.6474) (08267) (p.0115 (0.0110) (0.4973) -(1.1244) (0.1853)
a 2,2 -0.1407 -0.0416 -0.0382 -0.0113 0.0957 -0.0669 -0.0303 -0.0943 -0.0114 -0.0634 0.0435 -0.0941 -0.1158 -0.0102 -0.0032 -0.0670 -0.2601 -0.0465
(0.6441) (0.5941) (0.6595) (0.2975) (1 0706) (0.4862) (01118) (0.3524) (0 1520) (0.1941) (04661) -(D.6525 (0.8325 -(0.0155 (0.0215) -(0.5076) (1.1316) -(0.1956)
a v 0.0463 -0.0849 -0.0067 0.0007 0.1374* -0.0931 -1.3347 -1.7306 -0.0144 -0.0832 -0.0991*** 0.0447 -1.0347 -0.7434 0.0255 0.0293 -0.1412** 0.0086
(0 3460) (0.8519) (0.2077) (00116) (1.8453) (0.4711) (1.1845) (12832) (01210) (0.5470) (3 1577) (02249) .(0.6889) (0 1395 (0.4845 (06051) (22325 (0.0788)
a Sj 0.1122 -0.0295 -0.0066 -0.0004 0.1479** -0.0896 -1.1742 -1.7052 -0.0143 -0.0851 -0.0957*** 0.0462 -0.5135 -0.6348 0.0270 0.0302 -0.1340** 0.0093
(0.8303) (0.3405) (0.2133) (D.0080) (19641) (0.4519) (10442) -(1.3815) -(0119*5 -(05675 - (3.19950 (0.2338) (0J414) (0.1284) (0.5126) (0.6145 (22001) (0.0861)
<*♦ 0.6263 0.4875 11.6594 3.4497 32.3039*** 17.0636 -0.0366 -0.0771 18.1668 -7.5247 -1.6554 -8.1021 0.0159 0.0093 9.0876** 20.6387 -10.3923 -10.9276
(10109) (0.8213) (0J674) (D1633) (27027) (02182) (0.4287) (03951) (0.2382) (0.0759) (0.4600) (07213) (0 5381) (00856) (23355 (09236) (1 1939) -(0.4733)
Po 1.8618 0.5107 0.0005 0.0004 0.0222*** 0.0004 4.1226 10.1080 0.0077 0.0012 0.0237*** -0.0001 -16.0578 24.9945 0.0048 0.0017 0.0171 -0.0040
(0JS60) (0.3989) (0.1179) (D.0980) (140.1111) (01159) (0.1570) (0.2243) (0.2763) (0.1118) (2S758) (D.0626) (0.0564) (0.3383) (0.2045 (0.1071) (1-288(9 (0.7115)
p . 0.0146 -0.0191 -0.0108 -0.0123 -0.0285 -0.0212* 0.0533 0.0744 0.0053 -0.0245 0.1772 0.0543 0.0713 0.2398 0.1983 0.0591 0.2941* 0.0762
(0.5403) -(1.2948) (0.3650) -(0.3908) (1.4088) .(1.6859) (0.9788) (0.9522) (0.1310) -(1.3934) (1.3784) (1.1411) (0 7073) (0.5401) (1.1328) (D.742S) (1.6461) (0.9299)
p 2 0.3916 0.1744 0.0598 0.0715 0.2067*** 0.2023 0.2397 -0.2049 0.0000 0.0564 0.9762 0.0026 0.0347 -0.2818 0.1063 -0.0108 -0.2284 0.0003
(0.4797) (0.0395) (0.0320) (0.0381) (2.5649) (03284) (0.6577) (0.8307) (0.0001) (0.1523) (12649) (00137) (0.0921) ■ (0.4978) (0.4645 (0.0183) -(0.7793) (0.0020)
Ps -0.0203 -0.0011 -0.0003 -0.0005 -0.0051*** -0.0007 0.0378 -0.0050 -0.0010 -0.0001 -0.0037** -0.0005*** 0.3054 0.0023 -0.0005 0.0001 -0.0026 0.0004
(0.2062) -(0.0612) -(0.2181) (0.3320) (1468.4230) -(0.6889) (0.2649) (00199) (0.2870) (0.0506) (25371) (3.9475) (0.2691) (0.0098) (0.1178) (0.0395 -(1.2705) (0.5728)
P 4 -0.0933 0.0001 0.0006 0.0012 -0.0028*** 0.0017 -0.5270 -0.1556 -0.0014 -0.0001 -0.0047** 0.0016 -5.2871 -2.6552 -0.0014 -0.0013 -0.0020 0.0014
(0.3240) (0.0008) (0.3463) (0.6410) (28.4047) (1.0501) -(0.1736) (0.0471) (0.2431) (00203) -(2.S385 (0.9803) -(03250) (0.3464) (0.6945 (0.8303) -(1.3045 (0.9509)
Ps 0.3386 0.5233 0.5197 0.5130 0.5079** 0.4568 1.2875*** 0.5117 1.0084 0.5039 0.1138*** 0.6167 0.9058*** 0.5256 0.5236 0.5052 0.5414 0.6151
(0.3871) (1.2273) (0.4470) (0.4560) (2.0074) (0.6355) (5.5904) (1.0732) (0.4823) p.2697) (3.7855 (0.7225) (3.6261) (0.3656) (0.8021) (0.4595) (0.8415 (0.5775
Po -0.0615 0.0341 0.0333 0.0137 0.0224 -0.0962 -0.6716*** 0.0231 -0.7084 0.0169 0.6477*** 0.1813 -0.4763*** 0.0339 0.0296 -0.0024 -0.0211 -0.0035
(0.0878) (0.0684) (0 0222) (0.0197) (0.1435) (0 1559) .(2 5748) (0.0558) (02760) (0 0087) (6.2909) (0.2576) (26100) (0 0329) (0 0496) -(3.0031) (0.0465 (00041)
Z-statistics in parentheses; ***=1% significance, **=5% significance, *=10% significance. * no Bolletslev-Woolridge robust standard errors and variance.
T ab. 31. Estimation Results of GARCH(2,1) modelfor traditional CDO spreads (actual, tranformed and Johnson Fit adjusted spreads) — U B O R  at level data.
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Mortgage-Backed Securities (MBS)
M A A A 3 M A A A 3_L M A A A 3. A D  L M A A A 5 M A A A 5, L M AA A5. A D  L
B H H H M B H H H M B H H H M B H H H M  B H H H 5 M 5 B H H H M
“ o -0 .0260 0.0094 0.0004 -0.0157 0.3194*** 0.3525** -0.1397 -0.0286 -0.0367 0.0229 1.2504*** 0.9530***
-{0.0778) (0.0423) (0.0082) -(0.3858) (2.4108) (1.9392) -(0.4275) -(0.0922) .(0.8457) (0.4172) (28365) (2.9930)
“ u -0 .0896 0.0031 -0.1129 0.0122 -0.1772*** -0.1247 -0 .0484 0.0025 0.0119 -0.0477 -0.6625*** -0.6684***
(0.5284) (0.0254) -(0.7687) (0.0796) -(28007) -(1.3521) -(0.3227) (0.0449) (0.1471) -(03111) -(61594) -(5.5622)
“ u -0.1201 -0.0406 -0.1194 -0.0026 -0.2051*** -0.1665* -0.0864 -0.0329 -0.0012 -0.0606 -0.6949*** -0.6937***
-(0.7142) (0.3446) -(0.8115) -(0.0172) (3.3320) -(1.8223) (0.5754) (D.609Z) -(0.0154) (0.3997) -(66998) (5.7991)
“ 2,1 0.1607* 0.0043 0.1244 -0.0050 0.0630 0.0170 0.0393 -0 .0036 -0.0288 0.0170 0.2645** 0.3568***
(1.74110 (0.0361) (0.8172) -(00323) (0.9134) (0.1851) (0.2444) (0.051S) -(0-3724) (0.1144) (2.2946) (3.4265)
0t2_2 0.1505* -0.0003 0.1224 -0.0082 0.0400 0.0051 0.0316 -0 .0042 -0.0300 0.0151 0.2355** 0.3321***
(1.7088) -(0.0029) (0.8089) (0.0534) (0.4480) (0.0595) (0.2035) -(0.0656) (03922) (0.1033) (2.0586) (3.2385)
“ 3.1 -0 .2732 -0 .0202 -0.0207 -0.0036 0.0223 -0.0103 0.1222 0 .0266 0.0665 0.0551 0.0292 0.0197
-(0.5340) -(0.3452) -(0.9320) -(1.2488) (0.6670) -(0.1916) (0.9923) (0.2741) (0.6983) (0.3678) (03767) (0.2281)
“ 3.2 -0 .2497 0.0047 -0.0162 0.0018 0.0390 0.0034 0.1174 0.0230 0.0697 0.0584 0.0370 0.0400
-(0.4441) (0.0878) (0.7845) (0.1521) (1.2150) (0.0617) (0.9925) (0.2830) (0.7353) (0.3896) (0.4998) (0.4797)
a 4 -1.0271 -0.2745 -3.9059 -0.0002 -0 .7260 -5.6636 -0 .4344 0.1806 -63 .4937 -35.7051 -1.2715 -0 .7484
-(0.7212) (0.2283) (03059) (0.0000) (0.3230) (0.5495) -(0.2567) (0.2838) (0.7947) -(0.3242) -(0.5421) (0.4148)
Po -0 .0424 0.0698 -0.0008 0.0000 -0.0181 0.0023 -0.0622 0.0877 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0458 0.0042
(0 5901) (0.2588) (0.4354) -(0.0388) (0.6834) (0.1304) (0.2459) (0.1497) (0.6072) -(0.1762) (1.3639 (0.1582)
P. 0.0123 0.0199 0.0086 0.1187 0.1647** 0.1324 0.2671 -0 .0249 -0 .0070 0.0210 0.0841 0.1591*
(0.3209) (0.3465) (0.0514) (1.1962) (2.4651) (D.61S4) (0.3314) -(0.6698) -(0.4583) (0.3596) (1.1114) (1.9194)
P2 -0 .0850  ■-0.1538* 0.2664 0.0641 -0 .0970 -0.1869 -0.2616 -0 .5114 -0 .0562 0.0571 0.4669* 0.4121
(0.8488) (1.7104) (0.5121) (0.1257) (1.0344) (0.8561) (0.2438) (0.7295) -(0.1330) (0.069^ (1.8585) (12123)
P 3 0.0342 0.0016 0.0007 0.0001 0.0033 -0.0005 0.0119 0 .0004 -0.0002*** -0.0003*** 0.0135 0.0011
(0.9029) (0.1303) (0.7164) (0.1244) (0.4810) (0.0840) (0.9230) (0.0309) (3.1056) -(53743) (1.1257) (0.1098)
P« -0 .1266 0.0045 -0.0007 0.0000 0.0100 0.0011 -0.0123 0.0021 0.0004** 0.0006 0.0040 -0.0039
-(0.9047) (0.1348) (0.9155) (0.0853) (1.0344) (0.2044) (0.1721) (0.0514) (2.2154) (1.4234) (0.8448) -(0.8201)
Ps 0.6909*** 0.3878 0.5098* 0.5105 -0.9052*** 0.2583 -0.1882 0 .5012 0.2661 0.5052 0.8476*** 0.8306***
(2.9001) (0.4076) (1.7944) (0.7042) -(4.8651) (0.5547) -(0.5138) (0.4808) (0.4739) (D.7221) (5.0418) (8.0419)
Po -0 .1459 -0.0938 -0.2301 0.0139 0.0736 -0.2539 -0 .0854 0 .0094 0.3901 0.0185 -0.3504*** -0.3146***
(1.1510) (0.1768) -(0.8740) (0.0244) (03942) -(0.4311) -(0.3877) (0.0102) (0.8314) (0.0404) -(2.7044) -(3.7821)
M A7 M A7. L M A 7_A D _L M BBB7 M B B B 7. L M B B B 7. A D _ L
B H H H M B H H H M 5 B H H H M B H H H M B H H H M B H H H M
“ o -1 .7969 -0.1637 0.0196 -0.0046 -0.0208 -0.0001 -0.9935 -1.4183 0.0385 -0.0501 0.6839*** 0.7650**
(0.4029) (0.2633) (0.1598) (0.0315) (0.1024) (0.0000) (0.0324) (0.1700) (0.3129) -(0.3385) (3.4583) P0976)
“ 1.1 0.0396 0.0008 -0.0074 -0.0010 -0 .0425 -0.0052 -0.0195 -0.0911*** -0 .0680 -0.0862 -0.2034 -0.2182*
(0.2444) (0.0113) (0.0280) (0.0086) (0.2263) (0.0389) -(0.0504) (2.6878) (03544) (0.9872) -(1.2460) -(1.7698)
“ l2 0 .0264 -0.0232 -0.0080 -0 .0064 -0.0433 -0.0018 -0.0429 -0.1153*** -0.0723 -0.0905 -0.2185 -0.2313*
(0.1802) -(0.3358) -(0.0304) -(0.0532) (02306) (0.0108) (0.1112) (3.3220) -(03781) -(1.0389) -(1.3388) (1.9069)
“ 2.1 -0 .0165 -0.0001 0.0026 -0.0023 0.0536 -0.0067 0.0499 0.0932* 0 .0710 0.0750 0.0359 0.0429
(0.1750) (0.0013) (0.0098) (0.0185) (0.2551) (0.0413) (0.3325) (1.7193) (0.3806) (0.8891) (0.2010) (0.6068)
“ 2 2 -0 .0167 -0.0017 0.0026 -0.0028 0.0515 -0.0039 0 .0410 0.0849* 0.0686 0.0745 0.0319 0.0376
(0.1814) -(0.0229) (0.0098) -(0.0228) (0.2472) -(0.0253) (0.2853) (1.6992) (0.3698) (0.8923) (0.1799) (0.5317)
“ 3.1 0.1441 0.0158 0.0003 0.0133 -0.0117 -0.0052 0.0879 0.7289 -0.0188 0.0754 0.1017*** 0.0710
(0.3248) (0.1181) (0.0221) (0.1618) (0.6220) (D.0338) (0.0797) (13250) (0.4201) (0.9097) (4.7600) (1.2623)
“ 3 2 0 .1364 0.0275 0.0006 0.0137 -0.0096 0.0211 0.0960 0.6863 -0.0177 0.0767 0.1014*** 0.0728
(0.3187) (0.2654) (0.0428) (0.1444) -(0.4451) (0.4219) (0.0877) (1.1681) (0.3975) (0.9335) (47216) (13155)
“ 4 -0.2871 0.1691 -2.3559 0.0000 -7 .3350 0.0000 -0 .2539 -0.1261 -34 .5735 -23.4130 1.0722 3.5558**
-(1.1755) (0.2958) (0.1512) (0.0000) (0.6724) (0.0000) (0.1688) (0.6148) (0.4318) -(0.4800) (0.5258) P3450)
Po -2 .3698 0.4439 0.0004 -0.0003 0.0013 -0.0004 -25.4507 4.8318 0.0007 -0.0010 0.0085*** 0.0026
-(0.5851) (0.0553) (0.0456) -(0.8541) (0.2029) (0.7429) (0.3893) (0.1158) (0.8911) -(1.4393) (49.2055) (02307)
Pi 0.0325 -0.0151 0.1200 0.1303 0.0966 0.1268 -0.0018 -0.0202 0.0911 0.0741 0.3862*** 0.2877***
(1.3150) -(0.5010) (1.1870) (0.5706) (0.4433) (0.4495) -(0.0514) -(0.6574) (0.8354) (D.5047) (6.2671) 0.8947)
P2 -0 .2679 -0.0997 0.0792 0.0459 0.0962 0.0472 0 .0102 -0.0767 -0.0723 0.0649 0.1948 0.0589
(0.8353) -(0.0513) (0.1516) (0.0574) (0.2275) (0.0452) (0.0449) -(0.6835) -(0.4334) (0.3094) (0.7854) (0.5145)
p 3 0.0575 -0.0002 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0004 -0.0001** 0.2675 0.0021 -0.0001 0.0000 -0.0015*** -0.0006
(0.4072) -(0.0025) -(0.0587) (0.4035) (0.2241) (2.3959) (0.4196) (0.0134) -(0.9406) -(0.8701) -(217.87) -(0.2911)
p 4 -0 .2378 -0.0007 0.0001 0.0004 0.0002 0.0006 -0 .4622 0.0752 0 .0000 0.0008 -0.0006*** 0.0006
-(0.4141) -(0.0044) (01512) (0.8438) (0.6192) (1.1075) (0.1749) (0.0313) (0.0755) (1.3570) -(4.4976) (0.4473)
Ps 1.2458*** 0.5115 0.4291 0.5335 0.5880 0.5337 -0 .3250 0.4681 0.2766 0.5122 0.3243 0.4136***
(4.2168) (0.3524) (0.8079) (0.3928) (0.4339) (0.5510) -(0.2134) (0.7493) (03931) (0.6915) (1.3768) (3.5039)
P6 -0.5432*** 0.0295 0.1453 0.0442 0.0412 0.0423 0.2416 -0.0309 0.3403 0.0181 0.1073 -0.1178***
(25544) (0.0103) (0.2091) (0.0490) (0.0379) (0.0691) (0.3407) (0.0291) (0.6119) (0.0411) (0.7290) -(3.6302)
Z-statistics in parentheses; ***=1%  significance, **=5%  significance, *=10%  significance. * n o  B ollerslev-W oolridge robust standard errors and 
variance.
Tab. 32. Estimation Results of GARCH(2,1) model for MBS spreads (actual, tranformed and Johnson Fit adjusted
spreads) — LIBOR at level data.
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Pfandbriefe
PA A A 3 PA A A 3 L PA A A 3 A D  L PA A A 5 PA AA 5 L PA A A 5 A D  L PA A A 7 P A A A 7 L PA A A 7. A D  L
B H H H M B H H H M B H H H M B H H H M B H H H M B H H H M B H H H M B H H H M B H H H M
“ o -2.3941 -0 .2784 -0 .1304 -0.0094 -0.1462 0.0411 -5.1302 -0.2240 0.5168 -0.0250 -0.8795 -0.0888 2.0082 0.4605 0.0658 0.0848 0.0688 0.0831
.(1.5990) (0 1282) (0 -2 5 ) (0.0338) (0.4601) (0.158$ (10624) (0.1519) (0.6451) (0.2159) .(0.3157) (0.8203) (07805) (0.4084) (0.7976) (1.0266) (0 7261) (0 8460)
**1.1 -0.4068*** 0.0499 -0.3360*** -0.0013 -0.4316*** -0.4995 -0.3059*** 0.0439 0.0593 -0.1912*** -0.4301 -0.1856*** -0.4062*** -0.2983*** -0.2664*** -0.4321*** -0.2950*** -0.3040***
(4 1671) (0 1627) -(4 4035) -(0.0044) (5.4273) (5 6524) -(3 4736) (0 2951) (01864) (27051) (0 3165) -(27298) (4.1546) -(3.6863) -(3.0252) (6.1489) (4.0992) -(3.0449)
“ 1.2 -0.4900*** -0.0497 -0.3639*** -0.0327 -0.4636*** -0.5246 -0.3833*** -0.0678 0.0351 -0.2204*** -0.4546 -0.2155*** -0.4624*** -0.3666*** -0.2821*** -0.4496*** -0.3139*** -0.3204***
-(5.4476) (0.1761) -(4.8857) -(0.1117) (6.0432) (6.1235) (4.6246) (0.4724) (0 IMS) (3 2051) (0 3384) -(3.2446) -(4.9955) (4 6966) (3 2629) -(6.4867) .(4 4373) (3.2653)
02.1 0.5691*** 0.0238 0.4201*** 0.0099 0.4935*** 0.4928 0.3990*** 0.0394 -0.1092 0.1814** 0.2790 0.2231*** 0.4078*** 0.3123*** 0.2511*** 0.4170*** 0.2860*** 0.2821***
(4.1941) (0.1U1) (6.0639) (0.0571) (5.6383) (8.1106) (4.5803) (0.2552) (0.3729) (23258) (0.5371) (28094) (4.6626) (3.9314) (3.0988) (5.7003) (3.8173) (1.1812)
t t y 0.4933*** 0.0032 0.4063*** 0.0061 0.4677*** 0.4639 0.3268*** -0.0014 -0.1160 0.1637** 0.2540 0.2084*** 0.3316*** 0.2500*** 0.2372*** 0.3953*** 0.2669*** 0.2617***
(4.1633 (0.0275) (6 4286) (0.0363) (5.43SS) (7.9264) (4 1366) (00103) (0.4061) (21707) (0 5002) (2.7004) (4.1878) (3.4845) (3.0112) (5.5471) (3.6558) (3.0405)
a 3.I 0.0236 -0.0168 -0.0409 0.0166 0.0206 0.0228 1.8008 0.1611 -0.0997 0.0786 0.7674 0.0112 0.6039 0.3345 0 .0224 0.0241 -0.0023 0.0236
(70738) (0.0432) (D.3640) (0.1786) (0 5280) (0.5070) (0.7062) (0 3976) -(0.2350) 0  2522) (0 2832) (01851) (0.9894) (0.7495) (0 3813) (0.5276) (0.044?) (0.5446)
a 3>2 0.0321 0.0686 -0.0372 0.0243 0.0219 0.0298 1.8911 0.1734 -0.1120 0.0810 0.7694 0.0266 0.6732 0.4295 0.0268 0.0301 0.0090 0.0330
(71088) (0.1517) (03133) (0.2409) (0.5753) (0.6524) (0.7431) (0.4291) (0.2660) 0 3531) (0 2909) (0.4511) (1.1092) (0.9810) (74768) (0.6743) (0.1774) (0.7809)
a 4 0.5476*’ -0.0925 -2.1979 -0.0323 -2.3015 -1.2285 -3.2573’ -0.3491 -2.3905***’ -0.0059 3.4222 -0.1315 -2.9661 -0.7117* -5.9001 -12.5255 7.1095 3.0617
(1.6152) (0.7407) (0.6480) (0.0256) (0.2789) (0.1282) ■(0.4928) (1.3048) -(3.7470) (0 0005) (0.5860) (1.0680) (0.8965) -(1.7393) (0.6166) -(1.4828) (79129) (0.3779)
Po 1.2857** 0.4113 -0.0132 0.0009 0.0062 0.0012 -3.0263 0.9931 0.0192** 0.0008 0.0166 -0.0097 -0.0079 -0.1827 0.0003 0.0008 0.0070* 0.0012
(2.3264) (0 2432) (06235) (0.0406) (1.1436) (0.1290) -(0.8276) (0.7776) (28732) (0.1556) (5.4446) (0.7166) (0.0315) -(0.3475) (03162) (0.7119) (1.8599) (03990)
P. 0.0158 0.4810** 0.0001 0.2823 -0.0030 -0.0289 -0.0101 0.0645** 0.1839 -0.0182 -0.4906 0.0785 0.0753 0.0117 0.0420 0.1064 0.0441 -0.0991
(0.2044) (21355) (0 0042) (0.7782) -(0 0499) .(1.1847) (0.4442) (2.1689) (13150) (0 0750) (0.3434) (1.2205) (0.9257) (0.2531) (1.1117) (1.3394) (1.0463) -(1 5350)
P2 0.5682 0.9440 1.6474 0.5491 0.4379 0.2439 0.0489 -0.3367** -0.3161 -0.1631 0.6608 0.2777* -0.1687 -0.0392 0.0749 0.1640 0.0408 0.3725*
(1.54(3) (0 5197) (1.5652) (0.3142) (1 5409) (0.7780) (0.6002) (23860) (12887) (1.2989) (0.3407) (1.8896) (10324) (0.2797) (0.5234) (08946) (0.9146) (1.9103)
Ps -0 .0777* -0.0242 0 .0054 -0.0004 -0.0030 -0.0003 -0.0002 0.0061 -0.00211** -0.0004 0.0046 -0.0006 -0.0085 -0.0032 0.0001 -0.0006 -0.0032*** -0.0005
(1.7336) (0.1563) (0.6020) (0.0363) (1.4466) (0.0897) (0.0097) (0.1587) (20261) (0.4678) (4.5493) (0.5880) (0.7260) (0.3247) (71619) (12094) -(3.505Z) -(74422)
P4 0.0676 0.1015 -0.0012 0.0010 0.0018** 0.0004 0.8574 0.0098 -0.0067 0.0005 -0.0181 0.0092 0.1090 0.0553 -0.0001 0.0009 0.0037*** 0.0008
(0 5978) (03428) (0.4373) (0.is3g (1.8611) (D.2067) (0.8787) (0.0252) (1.1441) (0.2132) (15.7505) (1.1068) (1.0118) (7368?) -(72084) (1.4480) (3.0172) (0.6071)
Ps 0.9142*** 0.4895*** 0.0119 0.5151** 0.2033 0.5628 -0.1501 0.4660 0.0293 0.7204 0.8679 0.6453*** 0.7682 0.6639 1.3542*** 0.6280 0.8942*** 0.5448
(3.5209) (4.6545) (0.1187) (22618) (0.8088) (1.0273) -(03066) 01312) (00837) (0.6576) (1.1119) (27110) (1.3589) (0.2052) (4 9589) (79648) (11.1602) (1.3991)
P 6 -0 .2710 -0.1295* 0.2613 -0.1408 0.5787** 0.0215 0.5745 0.0452 0.6567** 0.3195 -0.1246 -0.4895*** 0.0286 0.3472 -0.6758*** 0 .1134 -0.7964*** -0.0451
-(1.4105) (16898) (0.6503) (1.1566) (25586) (0.0693) (1 1935) (0 1272) (23056) (0 4463) (01929) (2 6539) (70623 (71066) -(27202) (7201?) (102685) (0.1055)
Z -statistics in parentheses; ***=1%  significance, **=5%  significance, *=10%  significance. * n o  B olletslev-W oolridge robust standard errors and variance; * SQ R -G A R C H  resu lt
Tab. 33. Estimation Results of G ARCH (2,1) modelfor PJandbriefspreads (actual, transformed and Johnson Fit adjusted spreads) — LIBOR at level data.
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Collateralised Debt Obligations (CDO), synthetic
CSAAA3 CSAAA3_L CSAAA3_AD_L
BHHH M BHHH M BHHH M
Wald-test H0: a 1]= a ] 2 (t-stat.)
(p-value)
36.0405***
0.0000
7.5079***
0.0076
31.9245***
0.0000
30.8982***
0.0000
6.7844**
0.0110
4.44058**
0.0382
Wald-test H0: otjj-KXi^O (t-stat.)
(p-value)
0.6018
0.4402
4.2942**
0.0415
0.1685
0.6825
25.1154***
0.0000
0.0052
0.9425
5.3525**
0.0233
LB-Q Statistic (lags)
(p-value)
1.0334 (1)
0.3090
NA (-)
NA
1.0628 (1)
0.3030
0.6721 (1)
0.4120
0.5394 (1)
0.4630
0.0055 (1)
0.9410
LB2-Q Statistic (lags)
(p-value)
0.0289 (1)
0.8650
NA(-)
NA
0.0439 (1)
0.8340
0.9712 (1)
0.3240
0.0067 (1)
0.9350
0.0411 (1)
0.8390
Jarque-Bera
(p-value)
1578.18***
0.0000
NA
NA
7013.79***
0.0000
1075.78***
0.0000
3164.16 (1)
0.0000
2759.87***
0.0000
Collateralised D eb t O bligations (C D O ), synthetic
CSA5 CSA5_L CSA5_AD_L
BHHH M BHHH M BHHH M
Wald-test H0: a ljl= a 1>2 (t-stat.)
(p-value)
18.0798***
0.0001
23.6982***
0.0000
11.4597***
0.0011
18.1055***
0.0001
12.7732***
0.0006
16.6566***
0.0001
Wald-test H0: otI1+ a 1>2=0 (t-stat.)
(p-value)
33.7353***
0.0000
17.7308***
0.0001
11.4597***
0.0011
11.1440***
0.0013
0.7641
0.3846
6.9203**
0.0102
LB-Q Statistic (lags)
(p-value)
2.9472 (1)
0.0860
0.0026 (1)
0.9590
0.6383 (1)
0.4240
0.0343 (1)
0.8530
0.0226 (1)
0.8800
0.0000 (1) 
0.9990
LB2-Q Statistic (lags)
(p-value)
0.0000 (1) 
0.9960
0.0287 (1) 
0.8660
0.0931 (1)
0.7600
0.0477 (1)
0.8270
0.0202 (1)
0.8870
0.2457 (1)
0.6200
Jarque-Bera
(p-value)
1347.63***
0.0000
2994.27***
0.0000
2591.68***
0.0000
3371.84***
0.0000
2346.54***
0.0000
1695.81***
0.0000
Collateralised D eb t O bligations (C D O ) , synthetic
CSBBB7 CSBBB7_L CSBBB7._AD_L
BHHH M BHHH M BHHH M
Wald-test H0: a 11= a ](2 (t-stat.)
(p-value)
14.4963***
0.0003
10.8793***
0.0014
10.1577***
0.0020
8.8309***
0.0039
13.3682***
0.0005
5.3048**
0.0238
Wald-test H0: ot j j -Kx j ^ =0 (t-stat.)
(p-value)
9.2623***
0.0032
5.0824**
0.0269
0.4869
0.4873
4.5433**
0.0361
1.2165
0.2733
1.5213
0.2210
LB-Q Statistic (lags)
(p-value)
0.0210 (1)
0.8850
0.0731 (1)
0.7870
NA (-)
NA
0.0050 (1)
0.9440
NA (-)
NA
0.0389 (1)
0.8440
LB2-Q Statistic (lags)
(p-value)
0.0323 (1)
0.8570
0.0366 (1)
0.8480
NA (-)
NA
0.0774 (1)
0.7810
NA (-)
NA
0.0746 (1)
0.7850
Jarque-Bera
(p-value)
4415.49***
0.0000
4753.40***
0.0000
NA
NA
2834.24***
0.0000
NA
NA
6542.72***
0.0000
* no Bollerslev-Woolridge robust standard errors and variance; ***=1%  significance, **=5% significance, *=10% 
significance. N A  indicates that no results could be generated by the statistics software due to data overflow.
Tab. 34. Coefficient and residual tests of GARCH(1,1) modelfor synthetic CDO spreads (actual\ tran formed and Johnson
Fit adjusted spreads) — LIBOR at level data.
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Collateralised D eb t O bligations (C D O ), traditional
CTAAA3 CTAAA3_L CTAAA3_AD_L
BHHH M BHHH M BHHH MS
Wald-test H 0: ocljl= a 1>2 (t-stat.)
(p-value)
108.9847***
0.0000
108.9847***
0.0000
253.5534***
0.0000
152.6011***
0.0000
79.9122***
0.0000
83.3839***
0.0000
Wald-test H 0: a 11+ a 12=0 (t-stat.)
(p-value)
9.1467***
0.0033
9.1467***
0.0033
0.0001
0.9928
2.2105
0.1410
0.2387
0.6264
0.7777
0.3805
LB-Q Statistic (lags)
(p-value)
0.0214 (1)
0.8840
0.0214 (1)
0.8840
NA (-)
NA
0.0162 (1)
0.8990
NA (-)
NA
2.009 (1)
0.1560
LB2-Q Statistic (lags)
(p-value)
0.0067 (1)
0.9350
0.0067 (1)
0.9350
NA (-)
NA
0.0244 (1)
0.8760
NA (-)
NA
0.2317 (1)
0.6300
Jarque-Bera
(p-value)
7737.57***
0.0000
12315.67***
0.0000
NA
NA
13144.28***
0.0000
NA
NA
660.55***
0.0000
Collateralised D eb t O bligations (C D O ), traditional
CTA5 CTA5_L CTA5_AD_L
BHHH M BHHH M BHHH M
Wald-test H0: cti ^ a j  2 (t-stat.)
(p-value)
11.8138***
0.0009
7.6877***
0.0069
5.0434**
0.0274
3.7712*
0.0556
15.2958***
0.0002
4.9260**
0.0293
Wald-test H 0: cq j+oti ^ O  (t-stat.)
(p-value)
1.4571
0.2309
0.8765
0.3519
0.5407
0.4643
1.0089
0.3182
0.7311
0.3950
0.3190
0.5738
LB-Q Statistic (lags)
(p-value)
0.7101 (1)
0.3990
0.6813 (1)
0.4090
2.0100 (1)
0.1560
0.7248 (1)
0.3950
0.0994 (1)
0.7530
0.2557 (1)
0.6130
LB2-Q Statistic (lags)
(p-value)
0.1828 (1)
0.6690
0.0967 (1)
0.7560
3.6191 (1)
0.0570
0.0282 (1)
0.8670
0.0209 (1)
0.8850
0.0981 (1)
0.7540
Jarque-Bera
(p-value)
2172.71***
0.0000
881.33***
0.0000
1359.71***
0.0000
1992.07***
0.0000
5902.84***
0.0000
2297.89***
0.0000
Collateralised D eb t O bligations (C D O ), traditional
CTBBB7 CTBBB7JL CTBBB7._AD_L
BHHH M BHHH M BHHH M
Wald-test H0: (t-stat.)
(p-value)
10.2911***
0.0019
10.6905***
0.0016
8.3745***
0.0049
9.5689***
0.0027
15.7247***
0.0002
16.6589***
0.0001
Wald-test H 0: a i fi+ a ]>2=0 (t-stat.)
(p-value)
0.1091
0.7420
0.3920
0.5330
0.5136
0.4757
14.0592***
0.0003
0.5455
0.4623
1.2380
0.2691
LB-Q Statistic (lags)
(p-value)
0.2969 (1)
0.5860
0.3335 (1)
0.5640
18.9560 (11)
0.0620
2.3554 (1)
0.1250
NA (-)
NA
1.0750 (1)
0.3000
LB2-Q Statistic (lags)
(p-value)
0.1829 (1)
0.6690
0.0516 (1)
0.8200
2.6250 (1)
0.1050
0.0621 (1)
0.8030
NA (-)
NA
0.0409 (1)
0.8400
Jarque-Bera
(p-value)
903.10***
0.0000
1578.17***
0.0000
780.72***
0.0000
27672.90***
0.0000
NA
NA
199.43***
0.0000
® no Bollerslev-Woolridge robust standard errors and variance; ***=1%  significance, **=5%  significance, *=10% 
significance. N A  indicates that no results could be generated by the statistics software due to data overflow.
Tab. 35. Coefficient and residual tests of GARCH(1,1) modelfor traditional CDO spreads (actual, transformed
and Johnson Fit adjusted spreads) — U B O R  at level data.
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Mortgage-Backed Securities (MBS)
MAAA3 MAAA3_L MAAA3_AD_L MAAA5 MAAA5_L MAAA5_AD_L
BHHH M BHHH M5 BHHH M BHHH M5 BHHH5 M5 BHHH M
Wald-test Hgt a* j =0C] ^  (t-stat.)
(p-vJut)
9.7558***
00015
54.1433***
0.0000
63.2212***
0.0000
26.3544***
0.0000
17.6523***
0.0001
1.4256
0.2360
150.8776*** 1792.4630***
0.0000 0.0000
248.6674***
0.0000
118.4728***
0.0000
11.6254***
0.0010
5.9025**
0.0173
Wald-test H0: a^+cq^O  (t-stat)
(p-value)
0.0740
0.7863
3.0367*
0.0852
0.0616
0.8045
0.1076
0.7438
1.5961
0.2101
4.3106**
0.0410
57.4436***
0.0000
29.9905***
0.0000
11.5838***
0.0010
1.1889
0.2788
18.3921***
0.0000
19.9390***
0.0000
LB-Q Statistic (lags)
(p-value)
8.2894 (4)
0.0820
2.7906 (1)
0.0950
1.9684 (1)
0.1610
0.5128 (1)
0.4740
0.1071 (1)
077430
0.0378 (1)
0.8460
0.0033 (1)
0.9540
0.978 (1)
0.3230
2.9706 (1)
0.0850
0.9241 (1)
0.3360
0.1214 (1)
0.7270
1.0248 (1)
03110
LB2-Q Statistic (lags)
(p-value)
0.4031 (1)
0.5250
0.3592 (1)
0.5490
0.7890 (1)
0.3740
0.0295 (1)
0.8640
0.0466 (1)
0.8290
0.4199 (1)
0.5170
0.0112(1)
0.9160
0.1106 (1)
0.7390
0.0203 (1)
0.8870
0.6161 (1)
0.4330
0.0753 (1)
0.7840
1.5304 (1)
0.2160
Jarque-Bera
(p-value)
17107.26***
0.0000
3416.07***
0.0000
1923.7310***
0.0000
2243.06***
o.oooo
268.68***
0.0000
329.03***
0.0000
30808.85***
0.0000
227.85***
0.0000
279.46***
0.0000
416.55***
0.0000
93.2860***
0.0000
150.3086***
0.0000
Mortgage-Backed Securities (MBS)
MA7 MA7 L MA7 AD L MBBB7 MBBB7 L MBBB7 AD L
BHHH M BHHH M5 BHHH M5 BHHH M BHHH M5 BHHH M
Wald-test H0: oq^cq^ (t-stat)
(p-value)
11.7194***
0.0010
47.5542***
0.0000
0.4832
0.4890
66.0740***
0.0000
2.3304
0.1308
22.3917***
0.0000
71.4082***
0.0000
66.0505***
0.0000
73.1955***
0.0000
23.1904***
0.0000
8.4351***
0.004T
10.0377***
0.0022
Wald-test H0: a, ,1+a^^O (t-stat)
(p-value)
0.8600
0.3565
0.2331
0.6305
0.0050
0.9439
0.0128
0.9100
0.1119
O '388
0.0356
08508
0.8763
0.3520
0.7945
0.3754
17.4695***
0.0001
0.0817
0.7757
5.7481**
0.0188
23.9630***
0.0000
LB-Q Statistic (lags)
(p-value)
0.0020 (1)
0.9650
0.0815 (1)
0.7750
NA(-)
NA
0.9440 (1)
0.3310
0.4851 (1)
0.4860
0.0036 (1)
0.9520
27.5200 (3)
0.0000
18.9110(11)
0.0630
0.0199 (1) 
0.8880
0.0659 (1)
0.7970
1.4258 (1)
0.2320
0.1592 (1)
0.6900
LB2-Q Statistic (lags)
(p-ralue)
0.0142 (1)
0.9050
0.0134 (1)
0.9080
NA (-)
NA
0.0000 (1) 
0.9960
0.0014 (1)
0.9710
0.0163 (1)
0.8980
0.0006 (1)
0.9810
21.7170 (13) 
0.0600
0.0081 (1) 
0.9280
0.0376 (1)
0.8460
7.2609 (1)
0.0640
0.0114 (1)
0.9150
Jarque-Bera
(p-velue)
15072.62***
0.0000
16250.28***
0.0000
NA
NA
16106.35***
0.0000
14268.90***
0.0000
18763.83***
0.0000
1971.09***
0.0000
2203.59***
0.0000
4748.05***
0.0000
3909.90***
0.0000
78.90***
0.0000
2919.99***
0.0000
5 no Bollerslev-Woolridge robust standard errors and variance; ***=1% significance, **=5% significance, *=10% significance. NA  indicates that no results could be generated by the statistics software due to data 
overflow.
Tab. 36. Coefficient and residual tests of GARCH(1,1) modelfor MBS spreads (actual, transformed and Johnson Fit adjusted spreads) — LIBOR at level data.
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Pfandbriefe
PAAA3 PAAA3_L PAAA3_AD_L
BHHH M BHHH M BHHH M§
W a l d - t e s t  H 0: oc1:]= a lt2 ( t - s ta t . )
(p-value)
6.8409**
0.0106
31.9393***
0.0000
11.2868***
0.0012
16.0852***
0.0001
109.4263***
0.0000
48.5179***
0.0000
W a l d - t e s t  H 0: a 11 + a 1 2 = 0  ( t - s ta t . )
(p-value)
4.2396*
0.0427
13.2826***
0.0005
3.3585*
0.0705
0.4808
0.4900
5.4711**
0.0218
8.6506***
0.0043
LB-Q S t a t i s t i c  ( la g s )
(p-value)
2.5576 (1)
0.1100
1.4352 (1)
0.2310
0.0865 (1)
0.7690
0.0264 (1)
0.8710
9.4366 (4)
0.0510
0.0024 (1)
0.9610
LB2-Q S t a t i s t i c  ( la g s )
(p-value)
0.0263 (1)
0.8710
0.0265 (1)
0.8710
0.0396 (1)
0.8420
0.1840 (1)
0.6680
0.7654 (4)
0.3820
0.1560 (1)
0.6930
J a r q u e - B e r a
(p-value)
433.45***
0.0000
634.1820***
0.0000
1751.75***
0.0000
2071.82***
0.0000
145.98***
0.0000
502.40***
0.0000
Pfandbriefe
PAAA5 PAAA5 L PAAA5_ AD_L
B H H H M B H H H M B H H H M
W a l d - t e s t  H 0: ( t - s ta t . )
(p-value)
96.4146***
0.0000
175.1976***
0.0000
65.6694***
0.0000
118.4801***
0.0000
97.1823***
0.0000
164.5061***
0.0000
W a l d - t e s t  H 0: o c j j - K X i ^ O  ( t - s ta t . )
(p-value)
0.1031
0.7489
5.7279**
0.0190
0.1424
0.7069
2.9867*
0.087B
0.1003
0.7523
4.0279**
0.0481
LB-Q S t a t i s t i c  ( la g s )
(p-value)
3.6470 (1)
0.0560
0.9733 (1)
0.3240
0.2344 (1)
0.6280
0.5830 (1)
0.4450
3.2244 (1)
0.0730
0.3085 (1)
0.5790
LB2-Q S t a t i s t i c  ( la g s )
(p-value)
0.2203 (1)
0.6390
2.0041 (1)
0.1570
0.4414 (1)
0.5060
0.2155 (1)
0.6430
9.2248 (1)
0.0020
0.0016 (1)
0.9680
J a r q u e - B e r a
(p-value)
15413.08***
0.0000
26.64***
0.0000
262.94***
0.0000
1156.14***
0.0000
70.42***
0.0000
3635.51***
0.0000
Pfandbriefe
PAAA7 PAAA7 L PAAA7_ AD_L
B H H H M B H H H M B H H H M
W a l d - t e s t  H 0: 0 1 ^ = 0 1 ^  ( t - s ta t . )
(p-value)
0.0747
0.7853
132.6121***
0.0000
129.1162***
0.0000
123.3417***
0.0000
144.5944***
0.0000
101.6267***
0.0000
W a l d - t e s t  H 0: a i ^ + o t i ^ O  ( t - s ta t . )
(p-value)
0.0000
0.9944
4.1373**
0.0452
0.4691
0.4954
1.3015
0.2573
2.0817
0.1529
13.7176***
0.0004
LB-Q S t a t i s t i c  ( la g s )
(p-value)
227.9500 (7)
0.0000
0.1680 (1)
0.6820
N A (-)
NA
N A  (-)
NA
0.0120 (1)
0.9130
NA  (-)
NA
LB2-Q S t a t i s t i c  ( la g s )
(p-value)
269.87 (8)
0.0000
0.0284 (1)
0.8660
NA (-)
NA
N A  (-)
NA
0.0035 (1)
0.9530
NA  (-)
NA
J a r q u e - B e r a
(p-value)
426.80***
0.0000
7680.63***
0.0000
NA
NA
NA
NA
0.6626
0.7180
NA
NA
 ^no Bollerslev-Woolridge robust standard errors and variance; ***=1% significance, **=5% significance, *=10% significance. N A  
indicates that no results could be generated by the statistics software due to data overflow.
Tab. 37. Coefficient and residual tests of GARCH(1,1) model for Ifandbrief spreads (actual, tran formed and Johnson Fit 
adjusted spreads) — LIBOR at level data.
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C o lla tera lised  D e b t  O b lig a tio n s  (C D O ), sy n th e tic
CSAAA3 CSAAA3 L CSAAA3
Q<
BH H H  M BHHH M BHHH M
Wald-test H 0: a i ji= a ij2 (t-stat.)
(p-value)
6.7751**
0.0111
9.3459***
0.0031
3.7257*
0,0573
26.5706***
0.0000
0.1271
0.7224
2.2928
0.1341
Wald-test H0: a ]1+ a i 2=0 (t-stat.)
(p-value)
1.9872
0.1627
5.9244**
0.0173
2.4436
0.1222
0.6237
0.4321
11.7339***
0.0010
0.5367
0.4660
Wald-test Hq: a 2ji= a 2>2  (t-stat)
(p-value)
6.7284**
0.0114
8.4518***
0.0048
2.0350
0.1578
4.3959**
0.0394
4.2960**
0.0416
1.2270
0.2715
Wald-test Hq: a 2ii+ a 2 2=0 (t-stat.)
(p-value)
1.6578
0.2016
0.9402
0.3353
0.9367
0.3362
0.1031
0.7490
8.2510***
0.0053
0.0002
0.9901
LB-Q Statistic (lags)
(p-value)
0.0077 (1)
0.9300
0.4873 (1)
0.4850
1.9216 (1)
0.1660
0.1346 (1)
0.7140
0.5394 (1)
0.4630
0.0665 (1)
0.7960
LB2-Q  Statistic (lags)
(p-value)
0.0333 (1)
0.8550
0.0907 (1)
0.7630
0.1954 (1)
0.6580
0.0455 (1)
0.8310
0.0067 (1)
0.9350
0.0480 (1)
0.8270
Jarque-Bera
(p-value)
3267.45***
0.0000
802.12***
0.0000
5786.53***
0.0000
5838.44***
0.0000
1712.16***
0.0000
3077.07***
0.0000
Collateralised D eb t O bligations (C D O ), synthetic
CSA5 CSA5 L CSA5_AD_L
BHHH M BHHH M BHHH M
Wald-test H 0: cxi,i=a12 (t-stat.)
(p-value)
3.5244*
0.0643
2.3731
0.1275
0.4414
0.5084
5.0931**
0.0269
1.7234
0.1932
6.8480**
0.0107
Wald-test H0: otj i+ a i^ O  (t-stat.)
(p-value)
0.3878
0.5353
1.7606
0.1885
15.2267***
0.0002
0.6361
0.4276
2.4795
0.1194
7.2158***
0.0088
Wald-test Hq: a 21= a 2^ (t-stat)
(p-value)
0.3621
0.5491
9.1094***
0.0034
22.1788***
0.0000
6.6009**
0.0121
14.0394***
0.0003
3.6399*
0.0601
Wald-test H0: a 2jI+ a 2>2= 0 (t-stat)
(p-value)
2.3818
0.1269
0.1604
0.6899
9.8934***
0.0024
0.0108
0.9174
0.5399
0.4647
6.2133**
0.0148
LB-Q Statistic (lags)
(p-value)
N A
N A
0 . 0 0 0 1  (1)
0.9900
N A  (-)
N A
0.2230 (1)
0.6370
1.0199 (1)
0.3130
1.4055 (1)
0.2360
LB2-Q Statistic (lags)
(p-value)
N A
N A
0.0126 (1) 
0.9110
N A  (-)
N A
0.0363 (1)
0.8490
0.5661 (1)
0.4520
1.3667 (1)
0.2420
Jarque-Bera
(p-value)
N A
N A
2375.76***
0.0000
N A
N A
3528.01***
0.0000
957.54***
0.0000
1339.42***
0.0000
Collateralised D eb t O bligations fC D O l. svnthetic
CSBBB7 CSBBB7 L CSBBB7 A D  L
BHHH M BH H H M BHHH M
Wald-test Ho: oti i= a 12 (t-stat.)
(p-value)
5.3318**
0.0236
13.6743***
0.0004
0.0155
0.9013
1.0279
0.3138
0.0491
0.8252
0.0574
0.8113
Wald-test H0: a i ii+ a 12=0 (t-stat.)
(p-value)
15.0605***
0.0002
1.5626
0.2151
4.8285**
0.0310
0.7098
0.4021
2.6887
0.1051
0.4347
0.5117
Wald-test H0: a 2 ]= a 2>2 (t-stat)
(p-value)
16.1542***
0.0001
8.1008***
0.0057
7.9645***
0.0061
2.2627
0.1366
0.9576
0.3309
0.5550
0.4585
Wald-test H0: a 2>i-Nx2>2=0 (t-stat.)
(p-value)
2.8502*
0.0954
0.1976
0.6579
3.1673*
0.0791
0.0705
0.7913
0.6819
0.4115
0.0515
0.8210
LB-Q Statistic (lags)
(p-value)
0.0075 (1)
0.9310
0.0055 (1)
0.9410
13.1000 (7)
0.0700
0.4112 (1)
0.5210
N A (-)
N A
0.1473 (1)
0.7010
LB2-Q Statistic (lags)
(p-value)
0.0502 (1)
0.8230
0.0701 (1)
0.7910
1.9839 (1)
0.1590
0.0069 (1)
0.9340
N A  (-)
N A
0.0478 (1)
0.8270
Jarque-Bera
(p-value)
3616.38***
0.0000
2535.47***
0.0000
1353.82***
0.0000
1936.01***
0.0000
N A
N A
5533.32***
0.0000
* no Bollerslev-Woolridge robust standard errors and variance; ***=1% significance, **=5% significance, *=10%  
significance. AL4 indicates that no results could be generated by the statistics software due to data overflow.
Tab. 38. Coefficient and residual tests of G ARCH (2,1) modelfor synthetic CDO spreads (actual, tran formed and
Johnson Fit adjusted spreads) — LIBOR at level data.
C olla tera lised  D e b t  O b lig a tio n s  (C D O ), trad ition al
CTAAA3 CTAAA3_L CTAAA3. A D  L
BHHH M BHHH Ms BHHH M5
Wald-test H 0: 0 i i ,i= a i ,2 (t-stat.) 12.2311*** 45.4637*** 83.9468*** 97.8820*** 5.4014** 3.4914*
(p-value) 0.000B 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0228 0.0655
Wald-test H 0: Oii,i+Oti,2=0 (t-stat.) 0.3424 0.0523 0.0164 0.0479 2.9815* 0.0156
(p-value) 0.5602 0.8198 0.8983 0.8273 0.0882 0.900S
Wald-test H0: 0t2,i=cX2,2 (t-stat.) 0.0260 0.0185 0.0300 0.7142 2.2902 0.0018
(p-value) 0.8723 0.8922 0.8630 0.4007 0.1343 0.9664
Wald-test H0: ot2,i+<X2,2=0 (t-stat.) 0.3740 0.3278 0.4242 0.0793 1.2250 0.2322
(p-value) 0.5426 0.5686 0.5168 0.7790 0.2718 0.6313
LB-Q Statistic (lags) N A  (-) 0.0245 (1) 0.0993 (1) 0.0508 (1) N A  (-) 0.1827 (1)
(p-value) N A 0.8760 0.7530 0.8220 N A 0.6690
LB2-Q Statistic (lags) N A  (-) 0.0135 (1) 0.0138 (1) 0.0209 (1) N A  (-) 0.1776 (1)
(p-value) N A 0.9070 0.9060 0.8850 N A 0.6730
Jarque-Bera N A 11389.16*** 13242.40*** 12863.58*** N A 999.72***
(p-value) N A 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 N A o.oooo
Collateralised D eb t O bligations (C D O ), traditional
CTA5 CTA5 L CTA5_AD_L
BHHH M BHHH M BHHH Ms
Wald-test H 0: cti,i=a i ,2 (t-stat.)
(p-value)
0.4277
0.5151
0.0202
0.8873
2.3699
0.1278
0.2219
0.6389
39.6823***
0.0000
0.8163
0.3691
Wald-test H 0: a i,i+ai,2=0 (t-stat.)
(p-value)
0.1151
0.7353
0.0091
0.9243
0.0009
0.9756
0.0006
0.9804
1.2868
0.2602
0.0344
0.8533
Wald-test H0: 012 ,1= 012,2 (t-stat.)
(p-value)
0.0754
0.7843
0.0288
0.8657
5.5128**
0.0214
0.0065
0.9361
7.8005***
0.0066
0.0041
0.9493
Wald-test H 0: (t-stat.)
(p-value)
0.2297
0.6331
0.1744
0.6774
0.0149
0.9032
0.0363
0.8495
0.2433
0.6232
0.4225
0.5176
LB-Q Statistic (lags)
(p-value)
2.7012 (1)
0.1000
2.0031 (1)
0.1570
0.9812 (1)
0.3220
0.0926 (1)
0.7610
104.0900 (7) 
0.0000
0.7942 (1)
0.3730
LB2-Q Statistic (lags)
(p-value)
0.0817 (1)
0.7750
0.1220 (1)
0.7270
4.1944 (1)
0.1230
0.0979 (1)
0.7540
36.9010 (7)
0.0000
0.0128 (1)
0.9100
Jarque-Bera
(p-value)
557.85***
0.0000
1025.17***
0.0000
1446.97***
0.0000
2095.24***
0.0000
808.52***
0.0000
6190.15***
0.0000
C ollateralised D eb t O bligations (C D O ), traditional
CTBBB7 CTBBB7_L CTBBB7_ A D  L
BHHH Ms BHHH M BHHH M
Wald-test H 0: CCi,i=0 Ci,2 (t-stat.)
(p-value)
3.3580*
0.0707
0.0004
0.9839
7.9272***
0.0062
11.5509***
o.oou
7.1080***
0.0093
3.0521*
0.0846
Wald-test H 0: Oti,i+cxi,2=0 (t-stat.)
(p-value)
0.2762
0.6007
0.0000
0.9996
0.0004
0.9834
0.0030
0.9561
0.2144
0.6446
0.0213
0.8842
Wald-test H 0: 012,1= 012,2 (t-stat.)
(p-value)
0.0838
0.7730
0.0000
0.9945
4.2373**
0.0429
1.5779
0.2129
0.0748
0.7852
0.0768
0.7825
Wald-test H 0: 0 2 ,1+ 062,2 = 0  (t-stat.)
(p-value)
0.6891
0.4090
0.0000
0.9996
0.0003
0.9871
0.2524
0.6168
1.2723
0.2628
0.0313
0.8601
LB-Q Statistic (lags)
(p-value)
0.0536 (1)
0.8170
0.1160 (1)
0.7330
N A  (-)
N A
3.0265 (1) 
0.0820
N A  (-)
N A
1.2850 (1)
0.2570
LB2-Q Statistic (lags)
(p-value)
0.0195 (1)
0.8890
0.0001 (1) 
0.9910
N A  (-)
N A
0.0147 (1)
0.9030
N A  (-)
N A
0.0132 (1)
0.9090
Jarque-Bera
(p-valuc)
10451.73***
0.0000
30228.41***
0.0000
N A
N A
577.64***
0.0000
N A
N A
242.31***
0.0000
s no Bollerslev-Woolridge robust standard errors and variance; ***=1% significance, **=5% significance, *=10% significance. 
N j4  indicates that no results could be generated by the statistics software due to data overflow.
Tab. 39. Coefficient and residual tests of GARCH(2,1) model for traditional CDO spreads (actual, tranformed
and Johnson Fit adjusted spreads) — LIBOR at level data.
Mortgage-Backed Securities (MBS)
M A A A 5 M A A A 5 L M A A A 5 _ A D _ L M A A A 3 M A A A 3 L M A A A 3 A D L
B H H H  M B H H H 5 M 5 B H H H  M B H H H  M B H H H  M B H H H M
W ald-test Ho", dj ) =ct) >2 (t-stat.)
(p-value)
32.5711***
0.0000
88.3360***
0.0000
32.8384***
0.0000
5.2058**
0.0253
5.1387**
0.0262
60.2948***
0.0000
26.8723***
0.0000
29.5187***
0.0000
11.7610***
0.0010
21.3593***
0.0000
4.7236**
0.0328
5.8495**
0.0179
W ald-test H 0: oti ) -Kt) 2= 0  (t-stat.)
(p-value)
0.2018
0.6545
0.0776
0.7813
0.0044
0.9474
0.1265
0.7231
41.4529***
0.0000
8.9119***
00038
0.3829
0.5379
0.0241
0 8770
0.6243
0.4319
0.0010 
0 9749
9.4775***
0.0029
2.5382
0.1152
W ald-test H 0: a 2,i = 0 (2,2 (t-stat.)
(p-valtie)
1.4840
0.2269
0.0078
0.9298
0.2107
0.6475
0.1068
0.7447
22.7569***
0.0000
18.6160***
0.0000
4.0453**
0.0478
0.5541
0.4589
1.0973
0.2981
1.3953
0.2411
6.1316**
0.0155
1.9223
0.1696
W ald-test H 0: a 2 , i+ a 2 i2 = 0  (t-stat.)
(p-value)
0.0504
0.8230
0.0034
0.9537
0.1461
0.7033
0.0119
0.9135
4.7428**
0.0325
7.5959***
0.0073
2.9903*
0.0878
0.0003
0 9865
0.6611
0.4187
0.0018 
0 9660
0.6222
0.4326
0.0155
0.9013
L B -Q  Statistic (lags)
(p. value)
0.1855 (1)
0.6670
0.1697 (1) 
0.6800
0.3824 (1)
0.5360
0.7196 (1)
0.3960
2.0220 (1) 
0.1550
0.8496 (1)
0.3570
1.7085 (1)
0.1910
1.7543 (1)
0.1850
0.1339 (1)
0.7140
1.8920 (1)
0.1690
0.0643 (1) 
0.8000
1.1198 (1)
0.2900
LB 2-Q  Statistic (lags) 0.0096 (1) 0.0006 (1) 0.0328 (1) 0.0002 (1) 0.1321 (1) 1.1775 (1) 0.0243 (1) 0.0609 (1) 2.7637 (1) 0.0176 (1) 0.6286 (1) 0.2226 (1)
(p-ralue) 0.9220 0.9800 0.8560 0.9900 0,7160 0.2780 0.8760 08050 0.0960 0.8950 0.4280 0.6370
Jarque-Bera 26790.68*** 1901.43*** 82.29*** 2333.07*** 20.32*** 60.62*** 459.91*** 5307.79*** 1368.40*** 1901.99*** 76.75*** 110.87***
(p-mbe) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Mortgage-Backed Securities (MBS)
M A7 M A7 L M A 7 _ A D _ L M BB B7 M B B B 7 L M BB B7 A D  L
B H H H M B H H H  M 5 B H H H  M B H H H  M B H H H  M B H H H M
W ald-test H 0: 0 4  ] =01) -2 (t-stat.)
(p-vahie)
9-4249***
0.0030
49.9306***
00000
0 .1 5 2 4
0.6973
14.2554***
0.0003
0 .2979
0 5868
14.7772***
00002
64.6798***
00000
71.5939***
0.0000
24.7189***
0.0000
1.2911
0.2594
33.6852***
0.0000
11.7910***
0.0010
W ald-test Hq! a i j + d )  2 = 0  (t-stat.)
(p-vahic)
0.0 5 0 0
0.8236
0.0255
0.8735
0.0009
0.9763
0.0013
0.9715
0 .0522
0 8199
0.0007
0.9793
0.0065
0.9357
9.0669***
0.0035
0.1342
0.7151
1.0267
0.3141
1 .6704
0.2001
3.3781*
0.0699
W ald-test H 0: d 2 .l= a 2,2 (t-stat.) 0 .0 0 8 2
0.9283
0 .2 4 5 8
0.6215
0 . 0 0 0 0
0.9974
0 .0396
0.8428
0 .9567
0.3311
0 .4792
0.4909
1 .2104
0.2747
2 .7693
0.1002
3 .3093*
0.0728
0 .0 1 3 0
0.9096
2 .1379
0.1478
4 .8648**
0.0304
W ald-test H 0: a 2,i-HX2j = 0  (t-stat.) 0 .0317 0 . 0 0 0 1 0 . 0 0 0 1 0 .0005 0.0631 0 .0009 0 .0957 2 .9248 0 .1408 0 .7937 0 .0363 0.3241
(p vdu .) 0.8591 0.9905 0.9922 0.9822 08023 0.9765 0 7578 00913 0.7086 0.3757 0.8494 0.5708
L B -Q  Statistic (lags)
(p-nhie)
3 .1 8 1 4 (1 )
0.0740
0 .0 0 5 0  (1)
0.9440
1 .1880 ( 1) 
0.2760
0.0131 (1)
0.9090
0 .6432  (1)
0.4230
0 .0 0 0 4  (1)
0.9850
0 .2046  (1)
0.6510
0.6785  (1)
0.4100
N A  (-)
NA
6 .8 8 0 8  (3)
0.0760
9 .5759  (5) 
0.0880
0 .4099  (1)
0.5220
L B 2-Q  Statistic (lags) 10 .7210  (1) 0 .0 1 8 4  (1) 0.0231 (1) 0 .0156  (1) 0 .0105 (1) 0 .0139  (1) 0 .0385  (1) 0 .0353  (1) N A ( - ) 0 .0 0 4 8  (1) 7 .0 5 1 0  (3) 1 1 .2 8 3 0 (6 )
(p-vahie) 0.0010 0.8920 0.8790 0.9010 0.9180 0.9060 0.8440 0.8510 NA 0.9450 0.0700 0.0800
Jarque-Bera 6115.21*** 17410.78*** 6817.44*** 19525.19*** 12551.25*** 21186.81*** 4154.05*** 4998.98*** N A 2086.77*** 235.03*** 92.3033***
(p-value) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 NA 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
* n o  B ollerslev-W oolridge robu st standard errors and variance; ***= 1%  sign ificance, **=5%  sign ificance, *= 10%  sign ificance. N A  indicates that n o  results cou ld  b e  generated  by the statistics softw are du e to data 
overflow .
Tab. 40. Coefficient and residual tests of GARCH (2,1) modelfor MBS spreads (actual, tranformed and Johnson Fit adjusted spreads) — LIBOR at level data.
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P fa n d b r ie fe
PAAA3 PAAA3 L PAAA3 A D L
B H H H  M BH H H  M BH H H M
Wald-test H 0: Oti]={Xii2 (t-stat)
(p-value)
19.9055***
0.0000
14.0971***
0.0003
93.9649***
0.0000
17.8898***
0.0001
72.0880***
0.0000
46.5572***
0.0000
Wald-test H 0: ot1>1+ a ] i2=0 (t-stat.)
(p-vahie)
23.0527***
0.0000
0.0000
0.9997
21.5501***
0.0000
0.0033
0.9543
32.8384***
0.0000
34.6323***
0.0000
Wald-test H0: oc21= a 2,2 (t-stat.)
(p 'V thie)
14.8641***
0.0002
2.2041
0.1417
1.8807
0.1742
0.4962
0.4633
65.6099***
0.0000
82.2001***
0.0000
Wald-test H 0: Ol21-NX22=0 (t-stat.)
(p-vahie)
23.8952***
0.0000
0.012316
0.9119
39.0546***
0.0000
0.002194
0.9628
30.6751***
0.0000
64.3480***
0.0000
LB-Q Statistic (lags)
(p-value)
0.0065
0 .9360
2.2069 (1)
0.1370
1.9969 (1)
0.1580
5.6423 (2)
0 .0600
0.4320 (1)
0.5110
0.2826 (1)
0.5950
LB2-Q  Statistic (lags)
(p-vahie)
1.6212
0 .2030
0.0541 (1) 
0.8160
0.1360 (1)
0.7120
0.0495 (1)
0 .8240
0.0292 (1)
0.8640
0.2164 (1)
0.6420
Jarque-Bera
(p-value)
1950.50***
0.0000
1479.74***
0.0000
3159.79***
0.0000
703.26***
0 .0000
603.62***
0.0000
467.81***
0.0000
Pfandbriefe
PAAA5 PAAA5 L PAAA5 _A D _L
BH H H M BH H H M BH H H M
Wald-test H 0: Oti,i=Oli,2 (t-stat)
(p-value)
70.2573***
0.0000
111.8280***
0.0000
9.4890***
0.0029
96.8696***
0 .0000
0.7314
0.3951
60.2948***
0.0000
Wald-test H 0: Olij-KX 1,2=0 (t-stat.)
(p-value)
16.2869***
0.0001
0.0067
0.9351
0.0223
0.8818
8.7148***
0 .0042
0.1072
0.7443
8.9119***
0.0038
Wald-test H 0: Ot2ji=Ot2 ,2  (t-stat.)
(p-vahie)
31.9256***
0.0000
2.8370*
0.0962
0.5845
0.4469
24.6538***
0 .0000
0.3015
0.5846
18.6160***
0.0000
Wald-test H0: Ot2]-KX22= 0 (t-stat.)
(p-vahie)
19.15840***
0.0000
0.017646
0.8947
0.151561
0.6981
5.06178**
0.0273
0.269685
0.6050
7.5959***
0.0073
LB-Q Stadstic (lags)
(p-vahie)
0.4544 (1)
0.5000
0.4712 (1)
0.4920
221.4200 (10) 
0.0000
0.0074 (1)
0.9310
50.9990 (4) 
0.0000
0.8496 (1)
0.3570
LB2-Q  Statistic (lags)
(p-value)
0.0698 (1)
0.7920
0.0004 (1)
0.9850
236.9200 (10)
0.0000
0.0099 (1)
0.9210
59.1510 (4)
0.0000
1.1775 (1)
0.2780
Jarque-Bera
(p-vahie)
723.33***
0.0000
925.93***
0.0000
731.85***
0.0000
338.33***
0.0000
6864.36***
0.0000
1557.34***
0.0000
Pfandbriefe
PAAA7 PAAA7 L PAAA7 A D L
BH H H  M BH H H  M BH H H M
Wald-test H 0: 0t11=CXli2 (t-stat.) 32.2521*** 90.3554*** 45.7684*** 75.4514*** 82.7466*** 39.3219***
(p-vahie) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Wald-test H 0: CXj i+OCj^O (t-stat.) 20.8666*** 17.5222*** 9.8789*** 39.9064*** 18.2086*** 9.9496***
(p-valuc) 0.0000 0.0001 0.0024 0.0000 0.0001 0.0023
Wald-test H 0: 012,1= a 2 ,2  (t-stat.) 44.5057*** 46.6682*** 20.4185*** 89.8797*** 52.9039*** 36.9836***
(p-value) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Wald-test H 0: cx?i+(X??=0 (t-stat.) 19.7309*** 13.84745*** 9.3386*** 31.6402*** 13.9719*** 9.6854***
(p-value) 0.0000 0.0004 0.0031 0 .0000 0.0004 0.0026
LB-Q Statistic (lags) 0.6069 (1) 0.0771 (1) 0.0180 (1) 1.2534 (1) 0.3850 (1) 0.3263 (1)
(p-value) 0.4360 0.7810 0.8930 0 .2630 0.5350 0.5680
LB2-Q  Statistic (lags) 0.0414 (1) 0.0088 (1) 0.6194 (1) 1.3203 (1) 1.2235 (1) 0.1346 (1)
(p-value) 0.8390 0.9250 0.4310 0 .2510 0.2690 0.7140
Jarque-Bera 4576.94*** 19536.74*** 14.2607*** 1.86 4.25 0.75
(p-value) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0008 0.3938 0.1193 0.6860
® no Bollerslev-Woolridge robust standard errors and variance; ***= 1% significance, **=5%  significance, *=10% significance.
AL4 indicates that n o results could be generated by the statistics software due to data overflow.
Tab. 41. Coefficient and residual tests of GARCH(2,1) modelfor Pfandbrief spreads (actual, tranformed and Johnson
Fit adjusted spreads) — LIBOR at level data.
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Collateralised Debt Obligations (CDO), synthetic
CSAAA3_____________ CSAAA3_L_________ CSAAA3_AD_L____________ CSA5_______________ CSA5_L___________CSA5_AD_L___________ CSBBB7_____________ CSBBB7_L_________ CSBBB7_j\DJL
BHHH4 M BHHH M BHHH M BHHH M BHHH M BHHH M BHHH M BHHH M BHHH M
« 0 -0.8551 -1.2154 -0.0610 -0.0190 -0.3359*** -0.0410 0.9887 -0.2715 0.0772 0.0678 0.1323*** 0.0913 2.1930 2.1807 0.0496*** -0.0523 -0.0297*** 0.0284
-(1.2474) (1.3049) -(l 4471) (0.1149) -(3.3259) -(0 7740) (0.5276) (0.2101) (0.6683) (04151) (2054196) (D.6366) (0.5213) (0.5911) (5.6289) (0.2437) (2.9629) (0.2427)
“ u 0.0062 0.0150 0.0118 0.0034 0.0891*** 0.0064 0.0128 -0.0009 -0.0106 -0.0137 -0.0249*** -0.0181 -0.0319 -0.0043 -0.0107*** 0.0098 0.0071*** -0.0044
(0-4746) (1.0037) (0.9444) (0.0798) (29162) (0.4687) (0.6929) -(0.1097) (0.5459) (0.3918) (14207.88) (0.7259) -(1.3675) (0.4321) •(7.7536) p).2392) (3.8994) (0.2047)
a l,2 -0.0446*** -0.0804*** -0.0006 -0.0059 0.0598* -0.0166 -0.0219 -0.0313*** -0.0167 -0.0206 -0.0360*** -0.0271 -0.0762*** -0.0226* -0.0143*** 0.0068 -0.0031*** -0.0060
"(2-0761) (2.9259) -(0.0499) -(0.1247) (1.9246) (1.1533) -(1.0991) -(26461) (0.8167) (0.5433) (15.-886) -(1.0937) (3.0201) -(1.7341) -(18.8033) (0.1679) (29980) (0.2853)
“ 2.1 2.1073 1.6028 0.1847 0.4288 -1.6439 0.6318 -51.8906*** -1.3986 -1.9048*** -0.0360 -1.1522 -1.0708 95.5457** -0.0138 -0.5551 0.0244 -0.2637 -0.0498
(0.2666) (0.2022) (0.2396) (0.2102) -(1.3817) (0.8343) .(4.0234) .(0.1424) (25399) -(0.0079) (1.6226) (1.1388) (21589) (0.0006) -(0.7127) (0.0820) -(0.7213) (0.0593)
c t?  ? -1.3642 -18.3401* -0.6329 -1.5902* -1.6393 -2.6656** 1.2630 -33.0674* 0.4336 -0.9184 -0.0550 -0.7110 -74.3427*** -0.0841 -0.2729 -0.1064 -0.5683*** -0.6308
-(0.1514) -(1.9006) -(0.5631) (1.7556) -(0.9609) (20165) (0.1026) (1.9225) (0.4467) -(0.8527) -(0.146S) -(D.9964) (26201) -(0.0033) (0.5332) -(0.5095) -(4.1118) (1.0676)
“ 3 0.3069*** 0.1149** 13.7955** 3.2842 2.0765 2.1496 -0.0323 0.0438** -3.6839 4.0844 14.9445*** 2.0489 0.0650** 0.0157 21.2035* 9.3126 4.2287 5.2430
(2.4949) (1.9733) (24474) (0.2451) (0.4274) (10491) (0 7248) (23145) (0 3764) (0.1944) (54122) (0.3819) (23533) (09509) (1.7476) (0.3916) (0.6065) (0.7013)
Po -1.1175*** 3.2366 -0.0032** 0.0008 -0.0120 0.0040 -3.7391* 12.3671 -0.0026* 0.0006 -0.0056*** 0.0026 -121.45*** 56.5935 -0.0022*** -0.0037*** -0.0021*** 0.0016
-(3.6197) (0.5155) -(23255) (0 4656) (1.3781) (3.4336) (1,9243) (0.3264) (1 6543) (0 3703) (217.00) (15286) (2S961) (0 2241) (48.6419) (59,9617) -(21.7155) (0.1263)
Pi -0.0602*** -0.0484 -0.0212 0.1371 0.0003 -0.0450 0.0112 -0.0422 0.0304 0.1338 -0.0308 -0.0364 -0.0457 -0.0249 -0.0232 -0.0243*** -0.0059 0.0031
-(2.7453) (1.0961) (0 9566) (D 6716) (00161) (0.9273) (0.6565) -(0.4478) (1 I7S8) (06770) (0.5067) -P16998) (1 6215) (0 6326) -(1.4512) -(28280) (0.6064) (0.0553)
P 2 0.0610 0.0609 0.0663 0.0510 0.2444 -0.0812 2.6823 0.1243 1.7925* 0.0493 0.6496*** 0.0492 0.2086 -0.4027 -0.1469 0.0492 0.4211** 0.0380
(0 4172) (0.2760) (0.5439) (0 1197) (1.2922) (0.9271) (13949) (0.2780) (1.7741) (0.0782) (29599) (0.0197) (0.7776) (1.0217) ■(0.8498) (0.1487) (2 2967) (0.1503)
Ps 0.0605*** -0.0100 0.0010** -0.0001 0.0047* -0.0002 0.0619** -0.0099 0.0006* -0.0001 0.0012*** -0.0001 0.7272*** -0.0017 0.0004*** 0.0007*** 0.0004*** 0.0000
(5.2764) (0.1243) (23903) -(0.2960) (1.8499) (0.0892) (22659) (0.0496) (1717-) (0 1810) (14512) (1 1325) (29500) (0.0025) 5.36G4101 (29 3998) 3.53E+I01 (0 0039)
P 4 -40.4670*** -6.5551 -0.0637** -0.0298*** -0.2075** -0.0463 -79.4555 -0.1514 -0.0227 -0.0321* -0.0043 0.0092 -185.14* -0.0066 -0.0059* -0.0287** 0.0004*** 0.0374
(6.9422) -(0.1736) -(2.5126) -(3.9705) (23513) (0 2913) (0 9551) -(0 0011) (0.7251) (1 8692) (P 1624) (0 1444) (1.9248) (0 0000) (19510) .(22316) (2.6800) (1.6291)
Ps 0.5662*** 0.5455 0.5513*** 0.5869** -0.1685 0.5379* 0.2359*** 0.5699 0.3130* 0.5902** 0.4014*** 0.5482 0.4401 0.5850 0.8551*** 0.6160*** 0.8667*** 0.5850
(3.9647) (0.9619) (3.6009) (2.3640) (0.7951) (1.7867) (2.6031) (0.8541) (1 «792) (22750) (28251) (11179) (1.4188) (0.6391) (14.3558) (3,9683) (9.9654) (1.0821)
Z-statistics in parentheses; * * * = l°o  significance, **=5%  significance, *= 10° o significance. 4  singular covariance coeffic ien ts are n o t unique.
Tab. 42. Estimation Results of GARCH (1,1) modelfor synthetic CDO spreads (actual, tranformed and Johnson Fit adjusted spreads) — U B O R  atfirst differences.
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Collateralised Debt Obligations (CDO), traditional
C TAA A3 C T A A A 3 L CTAAA3._A D _L CTA5 CTA5._L CTA5 A D  L CTBBB7 CTBBB7 L CT BB B7 A D  L
B H H H M B H H H M B H H H M B H H H M B H H H M B H H H M B H H H M B H H H 4 M B H H H 4 M
<*0 0.6439* 0.3405 0 . 1 1 1 2 ** 0.0797 -0.1968 0.1684* 5.1104*** 0.4793 0.1968*** 0.1231 0.0602 0 . 1 1 1 2 -6 .8337 -15.183*** 0.0466 0 .0084 0.0966 0.0468
(1.4773) (0.4399) (23644) (1.2882) (0.6718) (1.6841) (3 0 7 57) (0.1535) (28226) (0.617? (0.297? (0.6731) -(12584) (4618? (0.502? (0.193? (0.607? (0.35S?
“ 1.1 -0 .0155 -0.0097 -0.0347*** -0.0242 0.0534 -0.0513* -0.0519*** -0.0007 -0.0413*** -0.0181 -0.0079 -0.0227 0.0400 0.0881*** -0.0080 0.0047 -0.0175 -0.0087
-(1 1210) (0 4387) -(26546) (1.3929) (0.6599) (1.7668) .(3.1279) -J).0273) -(2779? (0.4221) (0 180? (0.6256) (1349? (4.736? -(0.452? ( p i n ? (0.6644) -(0 351?
“ 1.2 -0.0740*** -0.0853*** -0.0543*** -0.0448*** 0.0288 -0.0817*** -0.1420*** -0.0653 -0.0587*** -0.0318 -0.0225 -0.0335 -0 .0074 0.0718*** -0.0141 0.0290 -0.0339 -0.0219
(4 4509) -(3.8488) -(4.0510) -(25886) (03705) -(28829) ' (4.4476) -(1.0632) (3.6716) (0.7193) (0.5283) .(0.947? -(02194) (3.862? -(0.759? p.071? (1-304? -(0.8794)
“ 2,1 -3 .7499* 0.7793 -0.9576 0.3960 1.0116 0.4629 0.5567 -0.0878 0.0708 -0.6704 0.2295 -0.2453 -19.2870 -53.805*** -0.2521 -0.1546 0.1529 0.0762
-(1.7488) (0.2379) (0928? (0.7865) (1.5034) (1.1539) (0.0514) -(0.007? (0 3459) -(1.4487) (0.2843) -(0.1584) -(1.1994) -(2524? (0.8844) -(0.769? (0.394? <0227?
“ 2^ 0.7453 -7.1908 -0.0819 -0.9900** -0.3110 -0.8679 4.0575 -0.0517 0.2132 0.0616 -0.1719 -0.0663 -18.0423 -8 6 .1 2 2 *** -0.2140 0 . 0 0 0 0 -0 .1412 -0.2355
(o.ioos) (0 8859) (0.0965) (24953) (0.6428) (1.4785) (0.3405) (00133) (0.4035) (01476) (0.323? (0.0546) (1 3956) (3.736? (0.6164) (0.000? (0 3633) <07941)
“ 3 -0 .2005 -0.0742 24.0456 -3.9680 17.8444* 10.4784*** 0.0460* 0.0403 1.1624 -11.1224 -4.9717 -6.6773 0.0319 -0.0003 10.4854* -0.0490 9.5078* 14.2827**
(1 3920) (0 3263) (0.9971) (0.2504) (1.6697) (2343? (1 7870) (0.9802) (0479? (10695) (1.1266) (0.6684) (13985) (0.3021) (1.6325) (0.206? (19613) (2332?
Po -0.4030* 0.5727 -0.0023 0.0003 -0 .0 2 0 1 0.0008*** -1.3138 9.4850 0.0018 0 . 0 0 1 2 0.0038 0 .0 0 2 1 * -40.2400* 1.6435 -0.0067*** 0.0912 -0 .0 0 0 0 * 0.0005***
(1.7366) (0.2595) (0.9308) (0.8843) (0.3914) (13.0040) (0.4541) (0.2947) (0.6150) (0.256? (0.482? (1.821? •(1.7964) (0.493? (260.916? (0.898? -(1.740? (32623?
P . 0.2810** -0.0296 0.0052 0.1186** 0.3203** 0.0856 0.1183 0.1155 0.2092** -0.0421* 0.0978 0.0167 0.1338 0.7755* 0.0035 0.0433 0 .1564 0 . 2 0 2 0
(22457) -(0.2744) (0.1936) (23615) (20288) (1.453? (13381) (0 892? (20725) (1.6687) (10565) (0 8621) <1.427? (1 942? (0.0326) (0.0971) (1.4661) (1580?
P 2 -0.0517 0.0147 0.1429 0.0432 0.3782*** 0.1703 -0.1163 -0.1885 -0.2815 0.0570 -0.4667 0 . 0 1 1 2 0.0366 1.9784 -0.0602 0.5887*** 0.1654 0.0908
(01951) (0 0280) P.3S91) (0.1191) (3.5246) (0.3619) -(0.4841) (1.1400) -(14343) (0 5604) -(0 916? (0.034? (03043) (1.535? -(0.461? (2682? (0.229? (0.3364)
P 3 0.0185** -0.0029 0.0007 -0 .0 0 0 1 0 .0 0 0 0 -0 .0 0 0 1 ** 0.0691* -0.0168 -0.0003 -0 .0 0 0 1 -0 .0007 -0.0004* 0.2361** -0.0059 0.0013*** 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 .0 0 0 0 *** -0 .0 0 0 1 ***
(21868) -(0-0792) (1.0154) -(0.7072) (0.0000) -(24866) (1.7080) -(0.0653) -(0.48S? (0.0731) ■ (1.394? -(1.7410) (1.9731) -(0.318? (305.9971) (00000) (26604) (5.6946)
P4 -4.5136 -0.4556 -0.0227*** -0.0138*** -0.0018 -0.0257 -187.53*** -0.1148 -0.0649*** -0.0253 -0.0503 -0.0226 -210.06*** -98.0413** -0.0192*** 0 .0 0 0 2 * -0.0170 -0.0130
-(1.0223) (0.0254) -(3.9802) -(6.0019) (1.3512) -(1.4135) -(3.768? -(0.0013) -(3.099? (1.046? (1.358? (13443) (4.4704) (2222? -(4.1694) (1.722? (1.212? (0.938?
P 5 0.4351*** 0.5534 0.2744** 0.5904*** -0.0338*** 0.4730*** 0.5815*** 0.5503 0.6033*** 0.6250** 0.6705*** 0.8015*** 0.6478*** 0.0027 0.7099*** -0.0262* 0.5084*** 0.4764***
(3.6475) (0.5363) (24093) (44381) -(3.0594) (27125) (66731) (0.8649) (6.0545) (2320? (4 639? (5.9026) (79633) (0.128? (7.108? (1.750? (3.030? (3 622?
Z -stadsdcs in parentheses; ** * = 1% significance, **=5%  significance, *=10%  significance. 4  singular covariance coeffic ients are n ot unique.
Tab. 43. Estimation Results of GARCH (1,1) modelfor traditional CDO spreads (actual, transformed and Johnson Fit adjusted spreads) — LIBOR atfirst differences.
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Mortgage-Backed Securities (MBS)
MAAA3 MAAA3_L MAAA3. AD_L MAAA5 MAAA5_L MAAA5_AD_L
BHHH M BHHH M BHHH* M BHHH M BHHH* M* BHHH M
«0 0.6957* -0.2128 0.0648 -0.0107 0.5348*** 0.2316* 0.1188 0.2213 0.0256* 0.0283 2.1303*** 1.5572***
(1.4789) -(0.8552) (1.1690) -(9-1381) (15633) (1.6494) (0.2290) (0.4193) (1.6860) (1.0144) (63509) PJ027)
“ 1.1 -0.0299* 0.0138 -0.0200 0.0038 -0.1828** -0.0748 0.2504 0.0805 -0.0057 -0.0094 -0.6812*** -0.5001***
-(19276) (1.0007) -(1.1498) (0.1725) -(2.4703) -(1.5934) (1.2238) (3.3420) -(1.2629) -(0.9509) -(6.2183) -(52584)
“ u -0.0604*** -0.0368*** -0.0274 -0.0125 -0.2256*** -0.1189*** -0.0052 -0.0021 -0.0204*** -0.0236** -0.7325*** -0.5222***
-(4.0029) -(2.8427) -(1.6163) -(0.5712) -p.6568) -(26805) -(0.6008) -(02496) -(4.9925) -p.4034) -(6.8095) -(5.4144)
“2,1 7.3730*** 0.3402 1.0977*** 0.0413 1.4318 0.0244 -0.0464*** -0.0417*** 0.1197 -0.0415 2.0532 0.2156
p.6070) (0.2681) p.7006) (D.0404) (0.8512) (0.0332) -(5.0098) -(4.5036) (0.7985) -(02552) (12231) (0.2065)
a 2,2 -2.7031 -0.9292 -0.4855 -0.1552 -0.6449 -0.4362 -2.0158* 0.0567 -0.3930* -0.4621 -3.4029*** -3.4593***
-p.8587) -(0.333*) -(0.5967) -(0.1834) -(0.6854) -(0.5801) -(1.7796) (0.0531) -(1.7680) -(1.2727) -p . 5324) -(4.3524)
“ 3 -1.5082 -0.5373 -18.3664 0.0015 5.9111 0.3255 0.0000 0.0000 2.7644 12.8894 -0.8505 0.1480
-(1.4477) -(03407) -(12266) (0.0000) (0.9384) (0.1759) (0.0000) (0.0000) (02942) (0.7370) -(0.4761) (1.1015)
Po 0.0794* 0.0523 0.0016* 0.0006*** 0.0043 0.0062 0.0000 0.0000 0.0004*** 0.0002*** -0.0432 0.0015
(1.8114) 00-5130) (1.8934) (62344) (02351) (0.1694) (D.0000) p.0000) (532556) p .9080) -(1.0739) p.0404)
Pi 0.0091 0.0114 0.0532 -0.0090 0.2535 0.7420 0.0472 0.0741 -0.1274 -0.0097 0.3087** 1.1233***
(0.1088) (0.3710) (0.5191) -01.4440) (0.8003) (0.4465) (0.4403) (3.7038) -(0.9836) -(0.1956) P0863) p . 1385)
P2 0.5378 -0.0629** 0.4983 -0.0209 -0.3176 -0.7731 -0.0304 -0.0279 -0.4370 0.0032 0.4484 -0.0755
(1.1829) -(20783) (0.9361) -(03928) -(0.9157) -P-4581) -(0.8052) -(0.4207) -(1.4432) (O.OUO) (1.1253) -p.1319)
P 3 -0.0031* -0.0007 -0.0005* -0.0002*** -0.0006 -0.0011 -0.6187 -0.3699 -0 .0001*** 0.0000 0.0145 0.0001
-(1.4449) -(0.1*49) -(1.7743) -(69541) -(0.0929) -(0.0895) -(0.4865) -(02027) -(123141) -(0.65195 (1.1208) (0.0116)
P4 -0.4114 -0.6510 -0.0040 -0.0074*** -0.0003 -0.0677* 0.4912** 0.5339 -0.0065* -0.0090* -0.0720 -0.1149***
-(0.4405) -(0.7741) -(0.2277) -(26771) -(0.0051) -(1.6378) (20016) (12200) -(1.6449) -(1.8953) -(0.8909) -(28773)
Ps 0.5592*** 0.5156 0.3149* 0.4751** 0.4093 -0.0283 -0.6850*** -0.5010* 0.9944*** 0.5492 0.2605* -0.0195
(32889) (0.9115) (1.8783) (23788) (13163) -(03605) -(26283) -(29144) (4.6450) (L37D7) (17464) -(12926)
MA7 MA7 L MA7_AD_L MBBB7 MBBB7 L MBBB7 AD L
BHHH M BHHH BHHH M* BHHH M BHHH M* BHHH M
Oo -1.1642 -0.5196 0.0144 0.0009 0.0515 0.0245 2.8840 -0.2653 -0.0384 -0.0455 2.3855*** -0.5993***
•(1.4944) -(1.1044) (0.7254) (0.0193) (0.1996) P-1144) (0.5617) -(0.1044) -(0.1847) -(0.2241) (4.0927) -(14.8031)
“ 1.1 0.0170 0.0075 0.0116 -0.0043 -0.0122 -0.0059 -0.0157 0.0138 0.0110 0.0098 -0.4828*** -0.6014***
(13486) (1.1033) (0.5827) -(0.0952) -(0.1973) -(0.1144) -(p.3543) (0.8344) (02469) (0.2283) -(4.0894) -(14.8182)
“ u -0.0040 -0.0123* 0.1227 0.0000 -0.0178 -0.0115 -0.0491 -0.0149 0.0059 0.0050 -0.5015*** -0.2156
-(0.3354) -(1.9457) (1.1794) (0.0000) -(02875) -(0.2229) -(1.1019) -(1.0194) (D.1338) (0.1171) -(42517) -(12432)
“ 2.1 6.8531** 3.0618 -0.0403 -0.0001 0.7260 0.4869 4.4225 -0.0301 0.3038 -0.1120 -1.1507 -0.1725*
(25022) (1.4271) -(0.428Q -poooi) (0.9759) (1.2174) (0.3253) -(D.0033) (03402) -(0.1307) -(0.5924) -(1.8021)
a 2_2 -6.9857 -5.2354 0.0000 0.0000 -0.6688** -0.6939*** -0.3839 -0.2074 -0.0617 -0.0524 -0.7079* . 0.0000
-(1.5038) -(13074) (0.0000) (D.0000) -(24369) -(3.0943) -(0.0300) -(D.0161) -(1.0806) -p. 1383) -(1.6821) (0.0000)
“ 3 -0.3496 -0.2204 -0.0568 -0.0027 -26.8013 -30.2562 0.0927 -0.0626 -20.8092 4.6995 0.6263 2.9657***
-(1.441^ -(0.4844) -(0.6800) -(D.0142) -(0.9588) -(0.6955) (0.7440) -(0.7903) -(0.4024) (0.1439) (0.9345) (14.7673)
Po 0.8997*** 0.1552 0.0560 0.1500 0.0009*** 0.0007 -15.3932 5.1587 -0.0005* -0.0013*** -0.1892 0.7880***
(15.0398) (0.7541) (1.3212) (0.8243) (264730) (1.0044) -(1.5272) (0.3515) -(1.8374) -(9.9610) -(1.4452) p.6708)
Pi 0.1038 0.3452 0.1834 0.0500 0.1363 0.0762 0.0329 0.0010 0.0225 0.1152 -0.0070 -0.5056***
(1.1804) (0.6705) (1.5569) (0.1091) (0.8727) (0.5797) (0.3800) (0.0109) (02811) (1.4374) -P.10S2) -p.4664)
P2 0.3949* 2.0668** 0.6331*** 0.5999*** -0.2383 0.0507 -0.0275 -0.1203*** -0.0082 0.0316 1.3879** 0.1516***
(1.7001) (20921) (6.2818) p.7642) -(0.7476) P-1372) -(0.2015) -(27599) -(0.0450) (0.1075) (20043) P2581)
P3 -0.0125*** -0.0009 0.0000 0.0000 -0.0002*** -0.0002 0.1361 0.0000 0.0001** 0.0003*** 0.0395 0.0000
-(1770.81) -(DJ045) (0.0000) (D.0000) -(23.4734) -(0.9566) (1.5791) (0.0004) (23875) (10.5667) (1.5088) p.0000)
P4 -2.7159 -1.2876 -0.0001*** 0.0000 -0.0033*** -0.0032*** -46.0344** -0.3574 -0.0083 -0.0038*** 0.0976*** -0.0009***
-(1.4138) -(12432) -(48.0315) -(0.3251) -(4.0140) -(4.1013) -(23497) -(0.0035) -(1.274S) -(2.9474) p .9777) -(26.6370)
Ps 0.4571*** -0.0547 -0.0013*** -0.0024** 0.7180*** 0.5792** 0.5122*** 0.5494 0.6573*** 0.5963*** -0.0162 0.0005
(29391) -(1.3602) -(5.9347) -(2.1764) (68271) p.2639) (4.0929) p . 74723 (2.6673) (7.6506) -(0.1770) p.7430)
Z-stadstics in parentheses; ***=1% significance, **=5% significance, *=10% significance.& singular covariance coefficients are not unique.
Tab. 44. Estimation Results of GARCH (1,1) model MBS spreads (actual, tranformed and Johnson Fit adjusted spreads)
— LIBOR atfirst differences.
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Pfandbriefe
PAAA3 PA AA 3_L PAAA3..A D J . PAAA5 PAAA5_L PAAA5 A D  L PAAA7 PA AA 7_L PAAA7 A D _L
B H H H * M BH H H M BH H H M B H H H M BH H H M B H H H * M B H H H M BH H H M B H H H M
a o 4.5513*** 5.6343** 0.5429 0.6141*** 0.6466** 0.9528*** -0.8757 -0.0421 -0.0376 -0.0378 0.2456 -0.0298 0.2407 0.8810 0.3565 0.1193* 0.1436* 0.1854*
(3.MHO) (2.5071) (1.5640) (4.6451) (20666) (3.0310) (0 9609) (0.06S3) (0.4130) (0.474S) (1 5503) (0.2116) (0.3494) (1.3721) (1.5510) (1.9337) (1.7794) (1.7381)
“ l . l -0.2044*** -0.2226* -0.1694 -0 .2 0 0 0 *** -0.1954* -0.3058*** 0.0795** 0.0189 0.0230 0 .0 2 0 2 -0.0512 0.0262 0.0438* 0.0209 -0.0783 -0.0193 -0.0317 -0.0339
■(3.0234) -(1.6070) (1.4601) (4.6567) (16961) (2.9253) (20655) (0.5391) (0.7973) (0.7725) (10606) (0.5746) (1.7265) (0.9192) (1.2991) (1.1243) (1.3121) (1.2202)
£*1,2 -0.3256*** -0.3238*** -0.2133* -0.2268*** -0.2328** -0.3331*** -0.0438 -0.1040*** -0.0141 -0.0152 -0.0891* -0.0118 -0.0473* -0.0698*** -0.1069* -0.0447*** -0.0632*** -0.0637**
-(4.6571) (2 9230) -(1.4363) (5.3691) -(22627) (3.2500) -(1 2452) -0.2536) (0 4969) (06021) (1 9260) (0.2766) (1 9665) (3.5111) -(1.7644) ■(2 7144) (26532) -(23190)
£*2,1 6.4384 9.4402 1.9844 0.7331 -2.8504* 0.3296 3.2729 -1.3795 0.0006 -0.5939 -0.9247 -0.4692 -5.1516 -5.8705 -0.7777 -1.2712 -2.7918*** -2.3784*
(0.6704) (1.4444) (0.9166) (0.5743) (1.6531) (0.3034) (0.4073) (0.3241) (0.0005) (0.7015) (0.5411) (0.3023) (0.6764) (1.0136) -(0.5775) (12549) (26031) -(1.8177)
£*2,2 -10.6560* -4.9765 -2.2307 -2.2567*** 0.2487 -0.2304 1.0301 3.9858* 0.4105 0.7705* -1.6499 -0.0087 -0.6495 -6.3677 -1.4791* -1.0521 -0.6465*** -0.1273
(1.9043) -(0.4741) (1.1635) (4.9699) (01666) -(0.2640) (0.1960) (1.7260) (0.5665) (1.9067) (09669) (0.0075) -(0.2646) .(14651) .(16625) (14043) ■(3.2229) (0.1862)
<*3 -0.1792* -0.2756*** -5.4912* -5.8886 -7.9308* -8.8594** 0.1442 0.5381*** 6.2790 10.1118** -9.4603* 0.0943 -0 .1 1 2 1 -0.1375 -22.9699 -7.3764 6.8546* -8.9689
-(1.9417) (4.0149) -(1.7575) (0.7796) (1.6327) -(1.9770) (1.0643) (29712) (1.3663) (21555) (1,9167) (0.0165) (0.6157) (0.6695) (1.5915) (1.0597) (1.9447) (0.4953)
Po 3.7387*** 2.1333 0.0204 0.0190*** 0.0295*** 0.0205 1.1119*** 0.2832 0.0033** 0.0014 0.0145*** 0.0034*** -0.0294 0.2193 0.0090*** 0.0040*** 0.0052 0.0032
(3.2557) (0.5262) (1.4537) (3.3434) (4 4363) (15404) (1.6610) (0 6654) (19999) (0 4616) (61 6143) (3 0639) (0.1135) (1.1010) (3.1027) (20.0363) (1 1709) (0.4735)
P , 0.1603** 0.0496*** 0.1331** 0.2025 0.1006* 0 .0 0 2 1 -0.0556 -0.0725* -0.0864* -0.0821** 0.0518** -0.0362 -0.0663 -0.0266 0.1432 0.1665 0.4051*** 0.2566
(2.0744) (3.4596) (20639) (0.9694) (1.7346) (0.0153) (1.3369) (1.6391) (1.6775) (1.9661) (2I6’0) (0.9539) (0.9620) (0.3430) (0.6560) (1.1739) (3.2657) (0.7780)
Pz -0.8337*** -1.0851*** -0.4667** 0.9820 -0.1881 0.5556* -0.0314 0.0863 0.1273 0.3038** -0.2147 -0 .1 0 2 0 0.1083 0.0551 -0.0600 0.0612 -0.3755*** -0.1729
.(26019) -(3.7494) (2 1599) (0.9413) (0.5436) (1.6716) -(0.3754) (1.2097) (13129) (20910) (1 3652) (0 7059) (06266) (0 1607) .(06102) (0 3655) (3.1600) (0.4375)
P 3 -0.1730*** -0.0033 -0.0067 -0.0061*** -0.0098*** -0.0068 -0.0376*** -0 .0 0 0 1 -0.0009* - 0 .0 0 0 1 -0.0042*** -0 .0 0 1 1 *** 0.0023 -0.0072 -0.0024*** -0 .0 0 1 1 *** -0.0006 -0.0004
■(3.3667) -(0.0152) (1.4561) -(3.3725) (5.0569) -(1.5721) -(1.4066) (0.0054) -(1 6242) (0.1417) (123.903) (24746) (0.2301) (1.0470) .(3.0972) (116.656) (0.5019) (0.2118)
P 4 -18.6581** 1.5632 -0.1379 -0.0533 -0.0974** -0.0541** -14.5482*** -10.3230*** -0.0827** -0.0941** -0 .1 0 1 0 -0.0848*** -5.5926* -8.2869*** -0.0400** -0.0635*** 0.0297*** 0.0286
(21055) (0.0721) (1 1530) (1.1452) (21245) (22270) (2 4745) (26079) (21092) (2 1559) (1 2116) (2 6255) (1.6512) (3 2629) (20693) (3 7936) (3.3916) (1.6265)
Ps 0.6907*** 0.5878*** 0.6838** 0.0840 0.6548*** 0.6085*** 0.8650*** 0.7896*** 0.7998*** 0.4894*** 0.6171*** 1.0095*** 0.9232*** 0.9176*** 0.3777* 0.5733*** -0.4841*** -0.0229
(10.5717) (3.1351) (4.6616) (0.6759) (63602) (29404) (10.9277) (5.3276) (7.4704) (3.2640) (5.7479) (119213) (9.0556) (20.9413) (1.6607) (4.1402) (3.1267) .(0.0311)
Z-stadstics in parentheses; ***—1% significance, **—5% significance, *—10°/o significance. & singular covariance coefficients arc not unique.
Tab. 45. Estimation Results of GARCH (1,1) modelfor Pfandbrief spreads (actual, transformed and Johnson Fit adjusted spreads) — LIBOR atfirst differences.
262
Collateralised Debt Obligations (CDO), synthetic
CSAAA3 CSAAA3._L CSAAA3. A D  L CSA5 CSA5. L CSA5_ A D  L CSBBB7 CSBBB7 L CSBBB7. A D  L
B H H H M B H H H * M * B H H H M * B H H H M B H H H M B H H H M B H H H M B H H H M B H H H M
<*0 -0.9165 0.2938 -0.1324*** -0.0309 -0.1941** -0.0442 2.2535** -1.7213 0.0312 0.0932 0.1842 0.1719 -2.5155 -10.0061** 0.1166 -0.0603 -0.0167 0.0034
(1.15*1) (0.6161) (2.5725) -(0.5400) (2.2929) (0.5708) (2.2964) -(0-3864) (0.3236) (1.0101) (0.7698) (0.7167) (0.4893) (2.2299) (0.4786) (0.6537) (0.1937) (0.0210)
“ 1.1 0.0932 -0.0036 0.0942 0.0090 -0.2280* 0.0214 0.0089 0.0465 -0.1363 -0.0174 -0.2984** -0.0638 0.0996 0.0577 0.0605 0.0250 -0.0463 -0.0244
(13416) (0.1569) (1.2065) (0.2281) (1 7833) (0 6529) (03267) (06184) (1 4109) (0 1577) (20652) (0 5323) (0.7414) (0 4924) (0.2000) (0.3713) (09307) (0.1925)
“ i ; 0.0426 -0.0356 0.0859 0.0043 -0.2445* -0.0049 -0.0085 0.0571 -0.1417 -0.0206 -0.3017** -0.0657 0.1006 0.0381 0.0591 0.0238 -0.0478 -0.0274
(0.6193) (1.7404) (1.0998) (0.1102) (1.9301) (0.1417) (0.2896) (0.7670) -(1.4666) (0.1877) (2.0735) (0.5589) (0.7720) (0.3711) (0.1955) (0.3526) (0.9654) -(0.2178)
“ 2,1 -0.0771 -0 . 0 0 1 0 -0 .0616 -0.0027 0.2855** -0.0116 -0.0158 -0.0501 0.1349 -0 . 0 0 2 2 0.2665* 0.0345 -0.1042 -0.0062 -0.0858 -0.0159 0.0533 0.0253
■ (1.0911) -(0.0475) (0.8089) (0.0824) (2 1343) (0 2903) -(0.5349) (0.8052) (1.5537) (0.0213) (1.7713) (0.3893) (0.7455) (0.042S) (0.2631) -(0.2549) (0.9765) (0.2368)
a 2|2 -0.0799 -0 .0 1 2 1 -0.0663 -0.0046 0.2116** -0.0152 -0.0389 -0.0782 0.1320 -0.0055 0.2588* 0.0300 -0.1411 -0.0267 -0.0877 -0.0213 0.0464 0 . 0 2 1 0
(1.1319) ■ (0.6143) (0.8798) (0.1436) (2 0965) (0.3821) -(1.3789) (1.3135) (1.5347) (0 0540) (17211) (03448) (1.0020) (0.2061) (0.2702) (0.3409) (0.8531) (0.1968)
« V -8.6818 -0.0361 0.7767 0.3594 -2.3231** 0.7941 -36.963** 0.8871 -1.3951** 0.1148 -1.1604 -0.4630 -9.6551 -3.7598 -0.8035 0.0798 -0.5769 -0.2904
(1.1016) (0.0042) (1.0292) (0.4149) -(2.2330) (0.5694) (19946) (0.0599) (1.9881) (0.1362) (1.0842) (0.3714) (0.2014) (0.0548) .(0.3670) (0.1360) (1.0068) (0.3569)
a 3,2 -1 .5302 -0.4673 -1.1494 -2.1324* -0.8871 -2.3778 -3.8433 -38.8050* 0.1550 -1.2040 0.2274 -0.7047 -49.882* -57.964*** -0.2410 -1.0439* -0.0673 -0.5853
(0 1570) (0.1324) (1 1088) (19028) (0.6393) (16223) (04329) (1 7889) (02950) (16/64) (02838) (07/30) (19097) (4.2393) -(0.2295) -(1.7309) (0.1306) (1.1260)
<*4 0.3009 0.0699 7.9678** 4.7340 0.7800 2.1554 0.0551** 0.0737 -1.7372 5.7496 0.2279 -3.7926 0.0652* 0.0131 31.8975 11.9746 0.4265 3.2328
(1.4414) (0.9777) (2.0938) (0.6688) (0.2096) (0.7992) (20155) (1.0558) (02508) (0.3945) (0.0419) (0.4530) (1.8584) (0.5207) (1.3500) (0.7368) (0.0569) (0.3829)
P o -0.7249 2.3338 -0.0030*** 0.0015*** -0.0076 0.0039*** -5.4397 17.2733 0.0024 0 .0 0 1 0 * -0.0141* 0.0026*** -63.123*** 54.2793 -0.0025*** 0.0008 -0.0066* 0.0015*
(0.9379) (0.1199) (15.3516) (4.7983) (1.1494) (4 2016) .(0.8084) (05118) (13603) (2 0924) •(1.7285) (38374) -(3.5708) (06481) -(4.1777) (1.3472) (1.9590) (1.7703)
P . -0.0459 -0.0247 -0.0362 -0.0351 0.0298* -0.0451** -0.0269 -0.0610 0.1350 -0.0407 0.0228 -0.0312 -0.0104 0.0142 -0.0337** -0.0352 0 . 0 0 1 2 -0.0275
(11557) (0.2435) (0.8413) (1.0654) (1.6543) .(2 1677) (0.7562) (16127) (1.3389) (1 5852) (0 8507) -(0.6901) (0.1846) (1.3114) (2.1938) (0.5579) (0.0622) (0.2434)
P 2 0.3352 0.0718 0.0241 0.2346 0.2483 -0.0640 1.5260** 0.2235 1.9004* 0..0790 1.3710 -0.0117 0.1807 1.8008 -0.0738 0.0279 2.2296* 0.0825
(15264) (0.0060) (0.2251) (0.8227) (15919) (1 1462) (22651) (0.6975) (1.7805) (0.3097) (0 8863) (0.0031) (0.2688) (1.3264) (0.3139) (0.0882) (19109) (0.0985)
P 3 0.0440* -0.0041 0 .0 0 1 0 *** -0 .0 0 0 2 *** 0.0031** -0 .0 0 0 2 0.0665* 0.0025 -0.0004 OjOOOO 0.0032* -0 .0 0 0 1 0.3442*** 0.0127 0.0005*** 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 .0 0 1 2 ** 0 .0 0 0 0
(1.S460) (0.0241) (35.2391) (5.1066) (2.1357) (0.2586) (1.6480) (0.0137) (0.9729) (0.7362) (18286) (0.0778) (3.3357) (0.0331) (4.5434) (0.4545) (2.0343) (0.1515)
P 4 -25.6427*** -0.6181 -0.0808 -0.0336 -0.1694* -0.0722 -102.26*** -6.2214 -0.0185 -0.0126 -0.0541** -0.0104 -319.12** -0.2916 -0.0037 -0.0115 -0.0103** 0.0272**
(2.7195) -(O.OOS8) (1.5893) -(0.4713) -(1.7845) -(0.3417) .(3.1820) -(0.0528) (0.5432) (0 1794) ■(2.3442) (0.1621) (1.9810) (0.0026) (0.5354) .(0.6625) -(2.1798) (2.2919)
PS 0.6252*** 0.5246 0.7877*** 0.4460 -0.1030 0.4582 0.1958 0.4839 0.0789 0.4430 0.7313** 0.4833 0.1388 -0.1558 0.9408** 0.5031 0.0973* 0.5069
(3.6110) (0.6490) (2-9751) (1-3773) (14103) (1.5705) (0.4217) (10430) (0.5713) (1 1050) (13745) (08760) (06636) (1 3625) (2 2960) (1.1034) (1 7637) (0.9299)
P6 -0.1654 0.0350 -0.1527 -0.0753 -0.1824 -0.0333 0.2734 0.0027 0.0642 -0.0593 -0.4457* -0.0087 0.5519 -0.0967 -0.1518 0.0274 0.2711*** 0.0171
(1.2913) (0.0203) -(0.6984) -(0.5117) (1.1124) (0.0884) (1.3089) (0.0069) (0.2196) (0 1360) (16526) (0.0091) (1.6252) -(0.8681) -(0.3456) (0.0656) (3.3183) (0.0371)
Z-statistics in parentheses; ***=1%  significance, **=5%  significance, *=10%  significance. & singular covariance coefficients are not unique.
T  ab. 46. 'Estimation Results of GAR.CH(2,1) modelfor synthetic CDO spreads (actual, tranformed and Johnson Fit adjusted spreads) — U B O R  atfirst differences.
263
Collateralised Debt Obligations (CDO), traditional
C TAA A3 C T A A A 3_L C T A A A 3_A D _L CTA5 CTA5 L C T A 5_A D _L CTBBB7 CTBBB7 L C T BB B7._A D _L
B H H H M B H H H M B H H H M B H H H M B H H H M B H H H M B H H H M B H H H * M * B H H H M
<*0 0.5430 -0.4539 0.0538 0.0580 -0.0711 -0.1511 4.5026*** 0.5589 0.1967** 0.1119 0.0039 0.0135 2.3518 -14.1340** 0.2097 0.0869 0.0153 0.1471
(14404) (12954) (0 7175) (1.3240) (0.3454) (1.3905) (29974) (0.2013) (2.2214) (1.0451) (00234) (0.0414) (0.2379) (23445) (1.3144) (0.3495) (0.1014) (0.9631)
“ 1.1 0.0700 0.0581 0.0466*** 0.0610 0.2259 0.1746*** 0.2073 0 . 0 0 0 0 0.1469 0 .0 2 1 1 -0 .0746 0.0432 0.0558 0.0498 0 . 0 1 0 0 0.0092 -0.0900 -0.0147
(0 4974) (1 1400) (25574) (0.4474) (1 1915) (125770) (1.4424) (0 0004) (11641) (0 2203) (0.4774) (0.0657) (0.3646) (D.2116) (0.0771) (0.0460) (0.6335) (0.0946)
“ 1.2 0.0066 -0.0305 0.0292 0.0397 0 .2 0 2 1 0.1540*** -0.1642 -0.0396 0.1337 0.0089 -0.0880 0.0240 0.0229 0.0219 0.0057 0.0014 -0.0994 -0.0234
(D.0441) (0.4323) (1.5923) (0.2921) (1.0934) (7.4951) (0.4144) (0.2744) (1.0474) (0.0940) (0.5442) (0.04-6) (0.1543) (0.0944) (0.0439) (0.0069) (0.7013) (D.1579)
“ 2,1 -0 .0847 -0.0448 -0.0622*** -0.0806 -0.2067 -0.1339*** -0.2560* -0.0057 -0.1901 -0.0387 0.0735 -0.0459 -0.0660 0.0312 -0.0506 -0.0263 0.0897 -0.0090
(11411) (0.9529) (5.9444) (0.4144) -(1.1435) (3.2232) .(1.7226) -(0.0074) (1.5091) (0.4342) (0.4649) (0.0492) (0.5316) (0.1323) (0.4741) (0.1444) (0.7016) -(0.0545)
“ 2,2 -0 .0800 -0.0387 -0.0623*** -0.0781 -0.2052 -0.1308*** 0.0225 -0.0396 -0.1936 -0.0408 0.0728 -0.0409 -0.0766 0 . 0 2 2 2 -0 .0523 -0.0299 0.0874 -0.0132
(1.1432) (0.4919) -(♦.7400) (0.4110) -(1.1424) (3.0491) (0.0434) -(0 2259) (1 5429) (0 4444) (04702) (0 0405) (0 6343) (0.0969) (0.4976) -(0.1641) (0.6410) (0 0422)
“ 3.1 -0 .9176 1.8798 -0.5188 0.5116 -0.3280 -0.0972 -33.649** -0.1030 -0.6267 -0 .7414 -1.2032 -0.4383 4.9368 -11.1842 -0.3600 0.0860 -0.1281 0.0217
(0.3975) (0.9044) (0.7411) (1.1444) -(0.4096) (0.0444) (23165) (0.0047) (0.9621) (1 5933) <1.4916) (D.09~l) (0.3770) -(0.4177) (12232) (0.1951) -(0.2707) (0.0161)
“ 3,2 -1 .6029 -5.9203 0.1107 -1.0346* -0.2005 -0.7562*** 14.1711 -0.0873 -0.0835 0 .1896 0.1939 -0.0588 -14.575 -34.088*** -0.2130 -0.2398 -0.7577* -0.4926**
(0.3793) (1.0470) (0.1749) (1.7441) (0.3205) (29754) (1.3256) (0.0161) (D 1511) (0 5003) (0 6755) (0.0197) (1.1142) (3.9612) (0.6076) (0.7736) (16755) (20410)
0.1487 0.0900 19.1670 16.6260 12.8721* 21.5064 0.0953*** 0.0626 8.4844* -7.2260 5.1810 1.3884 0.0481* 0.0063 19.587** 21.7091 -9.0672 -18.5734
(0.5404) (0.1790) (0.7734) (1.3497) (1.9155) (1.2530) (29034) (0.9471) (1.4492) -(0 7766) (1.4333) (0.0674) (1 4422) (0.7410) (22591) (1.4091) -(1.4917) -(0.73123
Po -0.7087** -0.0129 -0.0014* 0.0004*** 0.0046 0.0080*** -5.7895*** 9.8934 0 .0 0 1 1 0 .0014 0.0073** 0 .0 0 1 1 -46.2602 9.6684 -0.0063*** 0.0004*** 0 . 0 0 1 0 0.0007
(23097) (0.0520) -(1.4447) (11.4742) (0.9494) (74.5940) (29919) (0.2422) (0.3124) (1 5677) (21316) (0 454^ -(1.4040) (0.3226) -(974.4171) (17.2724) (0.6655) (0.6005)
p . -0.0090 -0.0088 -0.0154 0.0943 -0.0379 -0.0085 0.0088 0.0765 0.0290 -0 .0442 0.0697 0.1183 0.0477 0.4386** -0.0443 0.1492 0.1278* -0.0031
-(0.5409) -(0.7741) (1.2447) (0.9127) -(0.7499) (0.3343) (0.1643) (0.6601) (0.5434) (0.5642) (0.6176) (0.4493) (0.3633) (21146) (0.4447) (1.9129) (1.7007) (0.0779)
P 2 -0 .0624 0.2628 0.0561 0.0138 0.3330* 0.0409 0.1979 -0.1610 -0.0747 -0.0894 -0.4589 0.0411 -0.0223 0.5234 -0.0204 -0.0468 -0.0173 0 .1 1 0 1
■(1.1222) (1.0433) (0.3477) (0.0451) (1.7947) (0.4737) (0,7773) .(0.6604) (0.2559) (W 7293) -(1.2324) (P-0329) -(0.1531) (0.4515) -(0.1716) (0.3371) (0.1446) (0.56543
p , 0.0291** 0.0067 0.0005** -0 .0 0 0 1 ** -0 . 0 0 1 2 -0 .0 0 2 2 *** 0.0902*** -0.0103 -0 .0 0 0 1  -0 .0 0 0 0 *** -0.0015** -0 .0 0 0 1 0.2832 -0.0366 0 .0 0 1 2 *** -0 .0 0 0 0 *** -0 . 0 0 0 2 -0 .0 0 0 1
(23004) (0.7310) (20442) (20003) (0.9524) (-3-5E+100) (27234) (0.0377) (0.2050) (5.2597) (21090) -4.59E-01 (1.5441) (0.2165) (229.6929) (24294) (0.6121) (0.3440)
P 4 -3 .3265* -4.7877** -0.0150*** -0.0189 -0.0207 -0.0040 -94.1082 -0.1115 -0.0414* -0.0307 -0.0195 -0.0655* -177.78*** -17.0316 -0.0146*** -0.0181 -0 .0 0 1 1 0.0072
(1.9242) (22142) (13.2959) (1.0544) (1.1274) (1.5119) -(1.5295) (0.0012) (1.4374) (0 6744) (1 5034) (1.6491) .(3.3441) -(0.5769) -(4.2345) (0.9606) (0.4139) (1.0416)
Ps 0.7944*** 0.2463* 0.7934** 0.4061* 0.7336 0.6902*** 0.7230* 0.4937 0.7548 0 .4840 0.2800 0.5425 0.7744*** 0.4296*** 0.7962** 0.5136 1.3411*** 0.5740
(11.4447) (1.7195) (24452) (1.4714) (1.5417) (35443) (1.4462) (0.6703) (1.5717) (1.2444) (0.9502) (0.9115) (3.4011) (3.0916) (21440) (1.4533) (10.4099) (0.4566)
Po -0.3648*** -0.0273 -0.2865 -0.0634 -0.2123 -0.4029* -0.0189 0.0058 -0.0583 -0.0055 0.4933* 0.0661 -0.1591 -0.1613*** -0.0420 0.0241 -0.5758*** 0.0856
(7.4447) -(0.3320) (1.0575) -(0.4970) (0.7264) -(20172) .(0.0535) (0.0069) -(0.15921 (0.0149) (1.4743) (0.1341) -(1.1039) -(27255) -(D.1266) (0.0463) (7.2270) (0.0695)
Z-statistics in parentheses; ***= 1 % significance, **=5%  significance, * = 1 0 % significance.* singular covariance coefficients are n ot unique.
Tab. 47. Estimation 'Results of GAR.CH(2,1) modelfor traditional CDO spreads (actual, tranformed and Johnson Fit adjusted spreads) — LIBOR atfirst differences.
264
Mortgage-Backed Securities (MBS)
MAAA3 M AAA3_L MAAA3. AD  L MAAA5 M AAA5_L MAAA5 _AD_L
BH HH M BHHH M BHHH M BHHH M BH HH 41 M BHHH M
“ o 0.4868 -0.0750 0.0487 0.0236 0.7483*** 0.2823 0.0326 0.4856*** 0.0116 0.0300 -1.6262 -0.1207
(1.4747) -P J399 p.9501) p.3234) (26615) (1.5964) P1545) (26935) p3066) p .7335) -P-7829) -p. 1135)
“ l.l -0.2381*** 0.0136 -0.1495 0.0080 -0.2049 -0.0953 -0.0303 -0.1264* -0.0149 -0.1024 1.6073*** 1.0435**
-(3.0717) p.1124) -(1.1178) p.0458) -(1.4412) -(1.2999) -p.3493) (1.8244) -p.1763) -(1.0181) (4.3718) (23521)
“ u -0.2548*** -0.0278 -0.1534 -0.0088 -0.2450* -0.1353* -0.0728 -0.1646** -0.0263 -0.1139 -0.7933*** -0.6072***
-(35754) -P24I1) -(1.1587) -P-0512) -(1.6944) -(1.9106) -p.8364) -(24143) P5136) -(1.1365) -(7.7255) -(43501)
•*2,1 0.2152*** -0.0083 0.1356 -0.0155 0.0962 0.0139 0.0327 0.1158 0.0146 0.0957 -0.8251*** -0.6140***
(2.9187) -p.0697) 0-0644) -p.087g p.9082) P.1459) PJ678) (1.6256) p.1681) p. 8742) -P-4767) (4.3868)
a  u 0.2073*** -0.0136 0.1320 -0.0158 0.0835 -0.0026 0.0290 0.1092 0.0104 0.0918 0.2909*** 0.2728*
(2.9598) ■p. 1214) 0.0413) .p.0894) p.1642) -p.0296) p.3409) 0-6237) p.1213) P  6516) (26656) (1.7937)
“ 3.1 2.0166 2.2738 0.7417 0 .0 0 2 2 0.3298 0.1252 0.2501 -3.5663** -0.0489 -0.1724 0.2565** 0.2544*
(1.4228) 039  87) (1.5300) p.0024) P2270) P.1385) p .1561) -(1.9597) -P16B9) ■ p.4186) (23743) (1.7039)
“ 3.2 -1.6992 -2.8867 -0.2391 -0.0327 0.3130 -1.0085 -0.2271 -4.4025** -0.2763 -0.5382 1.9604 1.4554
(0.5220) -p.7884) (1.1792) -p.0634) P-2928) -(1.2501) -P-1873) -(21325) -p.9146) -(1.0361) (1.1445) p.8466)
“ 4 -0.6969 -0.4942 -19.7467 0 .0 0 0 2 -91.6566** -8.6834 0.4942 -1.4640 -3.6681 -15.7246 0.0000 0.0000
•(0.9234) -PJ528) -P.9195) p.0000) (24194) -(1.0666) p.6547) -P.9583) -p.2571) -P29S9) p.0000) p.0000)
Po 0.0291 0.0879 0.0008*** 0.0005*** -0.0006 0.0027 0.0815 0.0750*** 0.0009 0 .0 0 0 2 0.0000 0.0000
(0.3447) p.5662) (25783) (11.3813 -(1.4493) P1442) p.6551) (3.28619 (13664) P-3004) P-000C) P-0000)
Pi 0.0083 0.0477 0 .0 1 0 2 0.0583 -0.0253 0.1481 0.0176 -0.0513 0.0769 -0.0483 -0.0339 0.0027
p.1271) p.8018) P6555) p .4406) -(1.5675) (1.0144) P3894) -0-5606) (13180) -(1.1521) -(1.5271) p.1715)
0 2 0.5859 -0.1469* 0.3948** 0.0162 0.0306* -0.1951 -0.6433 -0.2954 0.6448 0.0485 0.1296*** 0.6075*
(0.9548) -0 6433) (22961) p.0909) (1.7999) (1.2501) -O-iooi) -0.6101) (13051) P-1226) (26631) 0.6990)
03 -0.0003 -0.0007 -0.0003** -0 .0 0 0 1 *** 0.0005*** 0.0008 0 .0 0 1 2 -0.0015*** -0.0003 0.0000 -0.0025 -0.0790
■p.0728) -p.1539 -(21579) -(10.9828) (137.7558) P1289) p.2001) -P921363) -(13095) ■P-1064) -P0637) -0-4169)
P* -0.2974 -0.3033 -0.0030** -0.0103*** 0.0027 -0.0689*** -0.6431 -0.9197* -0.0103** -0.0061 -0.4234*** -0.1507***
-P-2314) -p.1344) -(22788) -(29805) P-6919) -(3.2289) -p.6700) -0-7239) .(20965) -(1.1734) ■(3.7514) -(29736)
Ps 0.2639 0.4439 0.3088 0.4876** -0.0485 -0.2361 0.6863** 0.5408* 0.1079 0.4639 0.4127* 0.3203
0.1249) p.4659 01145) (23001) -P.5703) (14119) (20242) 08115) p.5449) p. 7449) (16400) P-5344)
P. 0.0329 -0.0515 0.0255 -0.0152 0.8832*** -0.3478* -0.4743 0.1056 0.2556 -0.0208 0.9811*** 0.5588***
(0.2233) -p.1475) p.1001) P.0917) (10.2092) •(18147) -P-9223) 0-1288) (12991) -P-0660) P4004) (52719)
MA7 MA7. L M A7_AD_L MBBB7 MBBB7_L MBBB7 A D  L
BH HH M BHHH M BHHH M BHHH41 M BH HH 41 M B H H H 4* M
“ o -0.9301 -0.2115 -0.0178 -0.0058 0.0043 -0.0040 -2.2637 0.5382 -0.0513 -0.0527 1.7863 0.0268
-(0.8507) -P.4410) .(1.1152) -p.0866) (D. 1731) -p.0468) -0.0429) PJ135) -p.1848) •P.4567) p.9309) P0430)
“ l,l 0.0345 0.0140 0.02915*** 0.0004 -0.0119*** 0.0006 -0.2040 -0.1435 -0.0432 -0.1132 -0.0591 -0.0017
(0.2179) P1197) 026285) p.0038) (121498) p.0080) -0.5270) -0-0108) -P3209) -P.6897) -p.1525) .p.0085)
“ u 0.0186 -0.0068 0.0267*** -0.0067 -0.0148*** -0.0055 -0.2286* -0.1603 -0.0485 -0.1185 -0.0713 -0.0059
(0.1198) -p.0594) (15.0188) -p.0434) -(7.6477) -p.0714) -0-7242) -0-1478) -P-3616) -P.7234) -P1847) -P-0293)
“ 2,1 -0.0174 -0.0143 -0.0242*** -0.0003 0.0119*** 0.0005 0.2249* 0.1503 0.0550 0.1290 -0.3025 -0.0034
-<0.1179 -p.1249) (28.7970) •p.0025) (19.3590) P.007S) (1.8199) 0.1184) p.3198) P-7471) -(1.1710) - P 0125
0-22 -0.0224 -0.0145 -0.0239*** 0 .0 0 2 2 0.0118*** 0.0005 0.2090* 0.1344 0.0537 0.1257 -0.3058 -0.0061
-p. 1544) -p.1285) -(18.9327) p.0216) (54S2S) P.0076) (1.7490) 0.0234) P-3140) p .7337) (1.1971) -p.0217)
6.9869** 3.1172 0.0808 -0.0180 0.3231 -0.0074 -7.9981 4.4998 0 .1 0 1 2 -0.0782 3.6380** -0.0835
(23613) p.9171) p.1412) -P.0838) (1.2862) -P.0390) -p.3395) p.3548) P.1729 -P-1499) (1.9859) -p.0392)
“ 3.2 -4.8158 -4.3490 -0.0146 -0.1029 -0.1718 -0.1433 0.3639 -16.2003* -0.1714 -0.0780 -0.1605 -0.0736
-p .9748) -P-9309 -p.0786) -P2481) P4157) -p.2331) P.0205) -0-7174) -P4113) -P1075) -(1.4074) -P.0241)
“ « -0.4758 0.5215 -9.1387 -0 .0 0 0 2 -21.7732 -0.0004 0.0533 -0.0867 3.9314 -24.6576** -0.3115 0.0337
-0-0419) p.5208) -P.4066) p.ooc») -p.4504) p.0000) (1.1261) -p.5840) P-0948) -(1.9580) -p. 1282) P-0128)
Po 0.5091 0.3177** 0.0003* 0 .0 0 0 1 *** 0.0008*** 0 .0 0 0 2 *** -8.3230*** 4.4075 -0.0087*** 0 .0 0 0 2 *** 0.0532*** 0.0040***
p.6283) (24539) (1.9260) (4.8379) (3.2880) (10.0610) ■04.2803) 0.2129) (-210.751) (5.8307) (156.066) (35354)
P. 0.0236 0.0558 0.0742 0.0248 0.0451 0.0533 0.1302 -0.0226 -0.0316 0.0956** 0.4824 0.3536***
p.7820) p.6513) P.6613) P-5742) p.8101) P.6000) P-8044) -P4012) -P.8059) (20534) p.8159) (27346)
P2 0.2685 -0.1158 0.1088 0.0370 0.1704 0.0318 -0.3392** -0.0954* 0.0918 0.0496 -0.0527 0.1931
P. 8045) -P.9411) p. 5027) P 1141) p.6340) PI245) (23207) -0.8458) P-7531) p.3588) -p.0398) p.8957)
P> -0.0067 -0.0026*** -0 .0 0 0 1 *** 0.0000 -0 .0 0 0 2 *** 0.0000 0.0730*** -0.0023 0.0019*** 0.0000 -0.0106*** -0.0006***
-p.5484) -(4165.675) (-2E+100) -(1.7157) (-4.8E+100) -(1.1969) (4313.608) -p.0665) (813.599) -P.B24^ -(2599.17) -p.2588)
P4 -2.7396 -2.4292 -0.0009** -0.0039 -0.0033** -0.0069 -41.9922 -77.9337*** -0.0107*** -0.0124 0 .0 1 0 0 -0.0690
-0.1673) (1.1972) ■(22344) -p.4196) -(23655) .p.3841) -0-0441) -(27831) (28585) -P6994) P-6090) -(1.3080)
p5 0.5926** 0.3404 0.4849 0.4734 0.5189 0.4690 0.8758*** 0.4494 -0.3147* 0.5066 0.0962 0.3881
(20470) 0.6048) P-6384) P-8454) P-9904) p.7719) (4.2615) (1.5093) -(1.9235) (1.1924) pjaoT) (1.1547)
P4 -0.0375 -0.0750 0.1050 -0.0348 0.0754 -0.0417 -0.1714 -0.0018 0.0207 0.0196 0.0758 0.0251
-p.1409) -P-4041) p . 1942) -p.0797) p.2325) •p.0906) -0-0514) -p.0071) p.0734) p.0685) (1.2080) p .1223
Z-statistics in parentheses; ***=1% significance, **=5% significance, *-10%  significance. *  singular covariance coefficients are not unique.
Tab. 48. Estimation Results of GARCH(2,1) modelfor MBS spreads (actual transformed and Johnson Fit
adjusted spreads) — LIBOR atfirst differences.
Pfandbriefe
PA AA 3 PA A A 3.JL PA AA 3._AD _L PA A A 5 PA AA 5 L PA A A 5. A D  L PA A A 7 PA A A 7_L PA A A 7. A D  L
B H H H M B H H H M B H H H 41 M B H H H M B H H H M B H H H 41 M B H H H 41 M B H H H M B H H H M
<*0 -0 .2647 -0.1451 -0.0521 -0.0134 -0.2188 0 .0 1 1 1 -0.3758 0.0890 -0.0255 -0.0706 -0.0398 -0.0206 0.8504 0.7241* 0.0871 0.0314 0.0285 0.1354
(0.2174) (0.0*01) -(0.3110) (0.0626) -(0.7491) (D.0528) -(0.5093 (0.1116) (0.25S3) (0.8890) (0.3241) (0.2341) (1449Z) (1.7590) (1.2126) (0.6284) (0.2953) (1.5318)
“ 1.1 -0.4041*** -0 . 0 2 0 0 -0.3629*** 0.0171 -0.4586*** -0.4860*** -0.0843 0.0665 -0.1878** -0.2283*** -0.2253*** 0.0139 -0.4118*** -0.2762*** -0.4454*** -0.4144*** -0.3051*** -0.3609***
-(3.4401) -(0.0*74) (1.1673) (0.1115) (4.0932) (4.3664) (0.7856) (0.4314) (23724) (3.6545) (24311) (0.1200) (5.0326) •(4.4457) (6.1585) (5.9506) -(13119) -(4.6788)
-0.4676*** -0 .1 1 2 1 -0.3882*** -0.0168 -0.4894*** -0.5101*** -0.1744* -0.0446 -0.2157*** -0.2558*** -0.2547*** -0.0139 -0.4663*** -0.3355*** -0.4614*** -0.4318*** -0.3224*** -0.3756***
(4.3169) (0.5103) -(3.5065) (0.1101) (4.5011) -(4.7338) (16906) -(0.3004) . -(27172) -(4 1992) -(3.0509) (0.1214) -(5.9511) (5.6461) -(6.4872) .(63006) -(3.5524) (4.9805)
<*2,1 0.4477*** 0.0879 0.3913*** 0.0078 0.5510*** 0.5004*** 0.1786 0.0284 0.2177*** 0.2706*** 0.2611*** 0.0119 0.4634*** 0.2933*** 0.4416*** 0.4259*** 0.3102*** 0.3366***
(4.6573) (0.729*) (4.3343) (0.0603) (6.1349) (6.3623) (1.6183) (0.1757) (26406) (5.9818) (3.1786) (0.1045) (5.6037) (4.7038) (6.4452) (5.9969) (3.5725) (5.1403)
<*2,2 0.3947*** 0.0438 0.3752*** -0.0074 0.5246*** 0.4689*** 0 .1 2 2 1 -0.0087 0.2047*** 0.2507*** 0.24649*** -0.0040 0.3909*** 0.2371*** 0.4183*** 0.4057*** 0.2904*** 0.3184***
(4 3111) <0.4326) (42064) (0.0599) (5.9729) (6.1266) (12185) (0 0639) (25709) (5 8036) (3.1068) (0 0361) (5.2543) (4 1295) (6.2584) (5.8479) (34543) (5.0485)
“ 3.1 10.3354 3.0072 2.3453 0.7539 -0.2003 0.3079 -0.3055 0.2739 0.0833 -0.0182 -0.2845 0.3500 -11.6693** -6.5375 -1.7284** -1.7950*** -1.8068* -2.5797**
(1.5*55) (0.9293) (1.S090) (0.5364) -(0.1315) (0,1591) -(0.0885) (0.0273) (0.0636) (0.0207) (0.2127) (0.7107) -(22211) -(13905) (20663) (25874) -(1.8651) (24691)
<*32 -5.6915* -3.1671 -1.1432** -0.0077 0.5323 -0.0839 -4.0858 0.2218 -0.4698 -0.0344 -1.1240 -0.0154 -1.4411 0.1250 -0.1108 -0.1863 -0.2118 -0.1203
(1.6577) -(0.7661) (2030*) -(0.0050) (0.5655) -(0.1245) ■(0.6747) (0.0223) (0 6641) (0 0709) <1.0113 (0.0435) (0.2899) (0.0714) -(0 2285) -(0.2628) -(0.91 SI) -(0.1970)
<*4 0.0050 -0.1540 0.2491 -0.7786 3.0892 0.9344 -0.2438 -0.2997 -6.5642 0 .0 1 2 1 -4.2735 -1.2837 -0.5257 0.3724** -8.7588 -8.3737 7.5425 -2.9003
(0.0401) -(0.3*3 Z) (0.0931) -(0.1243) (0.4628) (0.1599) (0.8731) (1.3737) (1.1551) (0.0014) (0.9724) (0.5465) -(1.3467) (2.0032) (1.0964) .(0.8609) (0.8112) -(0.5882)
Po 3.0869 0.7277 0.0171 0.0027*** 0.0209* 0.0015 1.3128 0.9882 0.0070** 0.0029 0.0075 0.0025 0.4995 0.0089 0.0033*** 0.0025** 0.0024 0.0005
(1.0649) (0.3410) (1.3231) (1.0660) (1.6838) (0.0765) (0.7960) (0.8083 (2.2043 (0.8463 (1.5993) (0.3623 (1.4063 (0 4569) (27083 (24549) (1.2444) (1.1164)
Pi 0 .0226 0.0604 0.0247 0.0454 -0.0322 -0.0573 0.3667 0.0626** -0.0045 -0.0665 0.0550 0.4921 0.0489 -0.1162** 0.2369* 0.2832* -0.1270 -0.1868**
(0.3781) (0 9067) (0.5131) (0.2668) (0 5628) -(0.5971) (09260) (19620) -(0.0869) -(0 7354) (0 8001) (10731) (0.3883 (21403 (17863 (1.7703 <11403 <22866)
P 2 0.7875* -0.3590 0.8903*** -0.0551 -0.0145 0.0530 -0.1054 -0.2871*** 0.4026 -0.0837 0.3333 0.0509 -0.1771 0.0837 0.0295 0.0912 0.2854** 0.3425
(1.7649) (1.0415) (25254) (0.1660) (0.1021) (0.1586) (0.2634) (26410) (1.4263 (0 3693) (1.5243 (0.1193 -(1.0583 (1.6276) (>.1613 (0.4485) (21324) (1.S193
P j -0.1521 -0.0169 -0.0057 -0 .0 0 0 2 *** -0.0065 -0 .0 0 0 1 0.0103 0 .0 0 1 1 -0.0018* -0 . 0 0 1 0 -0.0017 -0 .0 0 0 1 -0 .0072 0.0019** -0.0009*** -0.0006* -0.0006 -0 .0 0 0 1
(1 0161) (0.1537) -(1.3141) (137999) (1.5383 (0.0190) (0.1858) (D034S) (1 8896) (0 7933) -<1.1373 (0 0493) (0.5033 (23653 (28210) (1.9143 -(1.1923 -(0.9043
P4 -8.5958 -11.5618 -0.0774 -0.1672 -0.1137 -0.0462 -14.9679 -1.8951 -0.0500 -0.0578 -0.1478** -0.1289* -6.9851** -2.3354*** -0.0198* -0.0441*** -0.0090 -0.0172
(0.9231) (1.1107) (1.1688) -(0.6663 -(1.2618) (0.3343) (1.5093 (0.0977) -(1.5620) (1.2503) -(23356) (1.9683) ■(24833 (3 09 13 <1.7283 -(3.7841) <13373 ■ (1.3658)
Ps 0.3031 0.5662*** 0.1451 0.4813 0.6591** 0.5085* -0.1980 0.5130 0.6829*** 0.5658 0.3350 -0.0237 -0.0118 1.6075*** 0.4965 0.0816 0.8466** 0.9862**
(0.4112) (6.0261) (0.3199) (1.2279) (21626) (1.8351) (1.3601) (1.0814) (29924) (13850) (10985) (0.1976) -(0.0293) (220634) (1.2373 (0.9043 (24563 (24273
Po 0.0570 0.1016 0.1557 -0.0551 -0.2124 0.0057 -0.0455 0.0376 -0.4480* 0.4708 -0.2247** -0.0637* 0.6824*** -0.6173*** 0 . 0 0 0 2 0.0621 -0.1936 0.0033
(0.1090) (1.0347) (0.4741) -(0.1795) -(0.6723 (D.0086) (0.7414) (0.0894) -(1.8475) (1.3553 (22530) (1.7333 (3.9131) -(7.3964) (0.0003 (p.3073 -(0.5803 (0.0083
Z-statistics in parentheses; ***=1%  significance, **=5%  significance, *= 10° o significance. *  singular covariance coefficients are n ot unique.
Tab. 49. Estimation Results of GARCH(2,1) modelfor Pfandbrief spreads (actual, transformed and Johnson Fit adjusted spreads) — LIBOR atfirst differences.
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Collateralised Debt Obligations (CDO), synthetic
CSAAA3 CSAAA3JL CSAAA3_AD_L
BHHH* M BHHH M BHHH M
Wald-test H0: 0tij=0Cii2 (t-stat.)
(p-value)
46.2651***
0.0000
18.0171***
0.0001
23.7990***
0.0000
0.3587
0.5509
7.5655***
0.0074
5.4546**
0.0220
Wald-test H0: ct] j+oq 2=0 (t-stat.)
(p. value)
1.9190
0.1698
3.0870*
0.0827
0.1977
0.6578
0.0008
0.9779
6.0161**
0.0164
0.7126
0.4011
LB-Q Statistic (lags)
(p-value)
0.2871 (1)
0.5920
0.0078 (1)
0.9290
0.3356 (1)
0.5620
0.4916 (1)
0.4830
0.0494 (1)
0.8240
0.0684 (1)
0.7940
LB2-Q Statistic (lags)
(p-value)
0.0413 (1)
0.8390
0.0744 (1)
0.7850
0.0617 (1)
0.8040
0.0189 (1)
0.8910
0.0909 (1)
0.7630
0.0802 (1)
0.7770
Jarque-Bera
(p-value)
9674.84***
0.0000
843.07***
0.0000
7103.24***
0.0000
4277.12***
0.0000
2206.44***
0.0000
3691.25***
0.0000
Collateralised Debt Obligations (CDO), synthetic
CSA5 CSA5i_L CSA5_AD_L
BHHH M BHHH M BHHH M
Wald-test H0: (t-stat.)
(p-value)
24.3937***
0.0000
26.7143***
0.0000
12.4572***
0.0007
1.0132
0.3171
23.8282***
0.0000
0.2490
0.6192
Wald-test H0: a 1i+ a12=0 (t-stat.)
(p-value)
0.0577
0.8107
3.0030*
0.0869
0.4695
0.4952
0.2230
0.6380
712.6768***
0.0000
0.0574
0.8113
LB-Q Statistic (lags)
(p-value)
1.3587 (1)
0.2440
0.0194 (1)
0.8890
1.5633 (1)
0.2110
0.6237 (1)
0.4300
0.3783 (1)
0.5380
0.1861 (1)
0.6660
LB2-Q Statistic (lags)
(p-value)
0.0665 (1)
0.7960
0.0694 (1)
0.7920
0.0042 (1)
0.9480
0.0429 (1)
0.8360
0.0692 (1)
0.7930
0.0602 (1)
0.8060
Jarque-Bera
(p-value)
1368.03***
0.0000
1551.56***
0.0000
4496.75***
0.0000
1826.39***
0.0000
3449.73***
0.0000
3778.63***
0.0000
Collateralised D ebt Obligations (CDO), synthetic
CSBBB7 CSBBB7_L CSBBB7._AD_L
BHHH M BHHH M BHHH M
Wald-test H0: Cl] i=<Xi 2 (t-stat.)
(p-value)
20.3832***
0.0000
17.3294***
0.0001
1.1270
0.2916
1.0254
0.3142
49.3522***
0.0000
1.4367
0.2342
Wald-test H0: oq J-KX] 2=0 (t-stat.)
(p-value)
5.1587**
0.0258
1.4015
0.2399
0.4525
0.5031
0.0416
0.8389
2.3971
0.1255
0.0172
0.8959
LB-Q Statistic (lags)
(p-value)
0.9405 (1)
0.3320
0.1060 (1)
0.7450
0.2041 (1)
0.6510
0.0580 (1)
0.8100
0.1617 (1)
06880
0.0911 (1)
0.7630
LB2-Q Statistic (lags)
(p-value)
0.0177 (1)
0.8940
0.0361 (1)
0.8490
0.0660 (1)
0.7970
0.0837 (1)
0.7720
0.0352 (1)
0.8510
0.0300 (1)
0.8620
Jarque-Bera
(p-value)
3991.63***
0.0000
5024.83***
0.0000
2772.27***
0.0000
2887.26***
0.0000
6709.17***
0.0000
10758.22***
0.0000
***=1% significance, **=5% significance, *=10% significance. N A  indicates that no results could be generated by the 
statistics software due to data overflow. & singular covariance coefficients are not unique.
Tab. 50. Coefficient and residual tests of GARCH(1,1) modelfor synthetic CDO spreads (actual, tran formed and
Johnson Fit adjusted spreads) — LIBOR atfirst differences.
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Collateralised Debt Obligations (CDO), traditional
C T A A A 3 C T A A A 3 J L C T A A A 3 _ A D _ L
B H H H  M B H H H  M B H H H M
Wald-test H0: Oti ^ a ^  (t-stat.)
(p-value)
5 1 . 6 9 3 5 * * *
0.0000
2 3 .4 5 9 1 * * *
0.0000
5 1 .4 7 5 9 * * *
0.0000
1 3 1 . 4 5 * * *
0.0000
3 8 . 1 1 8 4 * * *
0.0000
1 4 0 . 2 8 7 2 * * *
0.0000
Wald-test H0: a 11-KX] 2=0 (t-stat.)
(p-value)
9 . 2 2 9 7 * * *
0.0032
0 . 9 3 8 0
0.3357
1 1 . 4 2 1 6 * * *
0.0011
3 . 9 7 0 3 *
0.0497
1 9 .2 3 5 2 * * *
0.0000
1 0 . 2 3 0 1 * * *
0.0020
L B - Q  Statistic (lags)
(p-value)
1 . 4 9 6 3  (1 )
0.2210
0 . 2 6 5 3  (1 )
0.6070
0 . 0 0 0 8  ( 1 )  
0.9780
0 . 1 3 9 3  (1 )
0.7090
0 . 1 0 6 9  (1 )
0.7440
0 . 0 4 7 7  (1 )
0.8270
L B 2- Q  Statistic (lags)
(p-value)
0 . 0 0 3 5  (1 )
0.9530
0 . 0 0 6 6  ( 1 )
0.9350
0 . 0 2 4 2  (1 )
0.8760
0 . 0 0 9 6  (1 )
0.9220
0 . 0 1 2 8  ( 1 )
0.9100
0 . 1 4 1 0  ( 1 )
0.7070
Jarque-Bera
(p-value)
9 2 9 6 . 4 2 * * *
0.0000
4 6 5 9 . 0 5 * * *
0.0000
1 1 6 1 4 . 0 9 * * *
0.0000
6 3 8 3 . 0 1 * * *
0.0000
2 3 4 . 9 3 * * *
0.0000
4 9 1 . 2 4 * * *
0.0000
Collateralised Debt Obligations (CDO), traditional
C T A 5 C T A 5 L C T A 5 _ A D _ L
BHHH M BHHH M BHHH M
Wald-test H0: Ctj>i=a ]i2 (t-stat.)
(p-value)
1 3 . 5 3 0 5 * * *
0.0004
2 . 9 6 5 8 *
0.0889
1 5 .4 5 5 5 * * *
0.000177
1 . 2 9 9 5
0.2577
2 4 . 9 7 0 6 * * *
0.0000
8 .7 7 7 7 * * *
0.0040
Wald-test H0: Oti ]+a1>2=0 (t-stat.)
(p-value)
1 8 . 8 9 5 9 * * *
0.0000
0 . 5 8 2 9
0.4474
1 0 .7 1 3 7 * * *
0.0016
1 . 1 4 4 4
0.2879
0 . 1 2 4 4
0.7252
0 . 6 1 7 0
0.4345
L B - Q  Statistic (lags)
(p-value)
1 . 1 0 4 4  (1 )
0.2930
0 . 2 0 8 8  ( 1 )
0.6480
1 . 1 0 4 4 ( 1 )
0.2930
0 . 3 1 3 6  (1 )
0.5750
7 . 1 3 9 5  (3 )
0.0680
1 . 7 5 1 9  ( 1 )
0.1860
L B 2- Q  Statistic (lags)
(p-value)
0 . 0 8 5 7  (1 )
0.7700
0 . 1 5 5 8  (1 )
0.6930
0 . 0 7 4 1  ( 1 )
0.7850
0 . 0 9 5 3  (1 )
0.7580
0 . 1 3 5 9  (1 )
0.7120
0 . 1 0 6 2  ( 1 )  
0.7440
Jarque-Bera
(p-value)
1 1 6 0 . 8 5 * * *
0.0000
1 3 3 5 . 4 7 * * *
0.0000
1 9 9 4 . 7 0 * * *
0.0000
1 8 4 5 . 7 0 3 0 * * *
0.0000
5 7 7 1 . 9 4 5 * * *
0.0000
4 1 6 6 . 9 1 * * *
0.0000
Collateralised Debt Obligations (CDO), traditional
C T B B B 7 C T B B B 7 _ L C T B B B 7 . _ A D _ L
BHHH M BHHH“ M BHHH“ M
Wald-test H0: 0Cii=ali2 (t-stat.)
(p-value)
1 2 . 5 3 8 3 * * *
0.0007
0 . 6 5 7 0
0.4200
1 1 .1 9 9 6 * * *
0.0012
1 8 .1 2 9 3 * * *
0.0001
2 8 . 3 5 8 9 * * *
0.0000
2 . 9 8 3 6 * * *
0.0000
Wald-test H0: a 1i+a1^ =0 (t-stat.)
(p-value)
0 . 2 7 4 8
0.6016
0 . 1 1 3 9
0.7366
1 3 .9 5 0 2 * * *
0.0003
0 . 2 4 2 7
0.6236
0 . 9 6 7 6
0.3282
0 . 3 8 1 7
0.5384
L B - Q  Statistic (lags) '
(p-value)
1 . 8 4 8 4  (1 )
0.1740
0 . 0 4 6 8  (1 )
0.8290
0 . 6 0 1 9  (1 )
0.4380
0 . 0 0 0 6  ( 1 )  
0.9810
0 . 2 8 4 0  (1 )
0.5940
0 . 3 1 2 9  (1 )
0.5760
L B 2- Q  Statistic (lags)
(p-value)
0 . 0 0 9 1  (1 )
0.9240
0 . 0 5 1 2  (1 )
0.8210
0 . 0 1 2 0  ( 1 )
0.9130
0 . 0 1 1 8  ( 1 )
0.9140
0 . 0 4 5 7  (1 )
0.8310
0 . 0 0 1 4  (1 )
0.9700
Jarque-Bera
(p-value)
1 3 8 1 . 5 2 * * *
0.0000
1 7 0 5 . 5 0 * * *
0.0000
1 3 4 9 . 0 1 * * *
0.0000
1 1 5 6 . 7 1 * * *
0.0000
3 1 9 7 . 5 4 * * *
0.0000
1 4 9 . 0 9 * * *
0.0000
***=1% significance, **=5% significance, *=10% significance. N A  indicates that no results could be generated by the statistics 
software due to data overflow. & singular covariance coefficients are not unique.
T ab. 51. Coefficient and residual tests of GARCH(1,1) model for traditional CDO spreads (actual, tranformed and
Johnson Fit adjusted spreads) — LIBOR atfirst differences.
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M ortgage-Backed Securities (MBS)
MAAA3 MAAA3 L MAAA3 AD L MAAA5 MAAA5 L MAAA5 AD L
BHHH M BHHH M BHHH M BHHH M BHHH5 M5 BHHH M
Wald-test H0: 2 (t-stat.)
(p-value)
51.6257***
00000
66.6042***
0.0000
14.7224***
0.0002
80.0245***
0.0000
3.1593*
0.0792
114.4901***
0.0000
150.5251***
0.0000
291.1307***
0.0000
15.9830***
0.0001
66.1914***
0.0000
16.0829***
0.0001
18.1481***
0.0001
Wald-test H0: a ltl+ a1>2=0 (t-stat.)
(p-value)
8.8757***
0.0038
0.7818
0.3792
1.9116
0.1706
0.0395
0.8430
2.3547
0.1288
4.5068**
0.0368
8.5931***
0.0044
6.2005**
0.0148
0.0038
0.9511
0.7207
0.3984
42.5402***
0.0000
28.5036***
0.0000
LB-Q Statistic (lags)
(p-value)
2.7276 (1)
0.0900
1.3907 (1)
0.2380
0.0026 (1)
0.9590
1.6504(1)
0.1990
0.0403 (1)
0.8410
0.0029 (1)
0.9570
0.5881 (1)
0.4430
0.4457 (1)
0.5040
0.5825 (1)
0.4450
0.3414 (1)
0.5590
0.0015 (1)
0.9690
0.3397 (1)
0.5600
LB2-Q Statistic (lags)
(p-value)
0.2811 (1)
0.5960
0.0286 (1)
0.8660
0.5351 (1)
0.4640
0.1462 (1)
0.7020
0.3496 (1)
0.5540
0.0105 (1)
0.9180
0 . 0 1 0 0  (1)
0.9200
0.0007 (1)
0.9800
0.0093 (1)
0.9230
0.0172 (1)
0.8960
145.5700 (1)
0.0000
0.0697 (1)
0.7920
Jarque-Bera 1638.7350*** 3236.1840*** 1023.56*** 1689.1530*** 371.94*** 365.36*** 2315.29*** 1346.21*** 1035.26*** 3470.21*** 10.9757*** 133.1563***
(p-value) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0041 0.0000
Mortgiige-Backed Securities (MBS)
MA7 MA7._L MA7_AD_L MBBB7 MBBB7JL MBBB7 AD L
BHHH M BHHH M* BHHH M* BHHH M BHHH M* BHHH M
Wald-test H0: (t-stat.)
(p-vahie)
48.7051***
0.0000
49.6932***
0.0000
32.5483***
0.0000
21.5544***
0.0000
19.4155***
0.0000
35.4487***
0.0000
70.1703***
0.0000
46.9081***
0.0000
12.9539***
0.0005
11.8526***
0.0009
20.1336***
0.0000
20.5709***
0.0000
Wald-test H0: a^-KXi j^O (t-stat.)
(p-vatue)
0.4663***
0.4967
0.0876
0.7680
0.4277
0.5150
0.0014
0.9698
0.0587
0.8091
0.0284
0.8665
0.5324
04677
0.0015
0.9697
0.0364
0.8492
0.0300
0.8630
17.3983***
0.0001
219.3632***
0.0000
LB-Q Statistic (lags)
(p-vahie)
0.3859 (1)
0.5340
0.0081 (1) 
0.9280
1.0488 (1)
0.3060
0.0086 (1) 
0.9260
0.9923 (1)
0.3190
0.2815 (1)
0.5960
0.6734 (1)
0.4120
0.0392 (1)
0.8430
0.0031 (1)
0.9560
0.1009 (1)
0.7510
0.1718(1)
0.6790
31.0600 (20)
0.0540
LB2-Q Statistic (lags)
(p-vihie)
0.0142 (1)
0.9050
0.0183 (1)
0.8920
0.0007 (1)
0.9790
0.0165 (1)
0.8980
0.0311 (1) 
0.8600
0.0125 (1)
0.9110
0.0389 (1)
0.8440
0.0148 (1)
0.9030
0.0523 (1)
0.8190
0.0339 (1)
08540
7.1737 (3)
0.0670
24.2910 (15)
0.0600
Jarque-Bera
(p-vahie)
10549.54***
0.0000
17874.59***
0.0000
11612.55***
0.0000
20155.39***
0.0000
5119.85***
0.0000
5102.31***
0.0000
3973.24***
0.0000
4171.32***
0.0000
3318.68***
0.0000
3470.21***
0.0000
714.69***
0.0000
121.25***
0.0000
***=!% significance, **=5% significance, *=10% significance. N A  indicates that no results could be generated by the statistics software due to data overflow. * singular covariance coefficients are not unique.
Tab. 52. Coefficient and residual tests of GARCH (1,1) modelfor MBS spreads (actual, transformed and Johnson Fit adjusted spreads) — LIBOR atfirst differences.
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P fa n d b r ie fe
PAAA3 PAAA3_L PAAA3._AD_L
BHHH*1 M BHHH M BHHH M
Wald-test Hq: Otii=a12 (t-stat)
(p-value)
1 2 9 . 1 3 0 6 * * *
0.0000
3 9 . 2 6 0 9 * * *
0.0000
1 3 7 . 0 9 1 4 * * *
0.0000
3 1 . 2 0 0 7 * * *
0.0000
7 9 . 7 2 0 4 * * *
0.0000
5 5 . 8 4 8 2 * * *
0.0000
Wald-test H0: C C ii-K X i)2= 0  (t-stat.)
(p-value)
1 4 . 9 3 7 6 * * *
0.0002
5 . 4 6 4 7 * *
0.0219
2 . 7 1 7 6
0.1031
2 5 . 1 7 9 0 * * *
0.0000
4 . 3 6 7 6 * *
0.0398
9 . 5 2 5 5 * * *
0.0028
LB-Q Statistic (lags)
(p-value)
0 . 2 4 1 2  ( 1 )
0.6230
0 . 2 9  ( 1 )
0.5900
NA (-)
NA
1 . 1 6 5 9  ( 1 )
0.2800
0 . 0 1 0 0  ( 1 )
0.9200
4 . 9 2 9 8  ( 2 )
0.0850
LB2-Q Statistic (lags)
(p-value)
0 . 3 7 5 1  ( 1 )
0.5400
0 . 0 0 1 5  (1 )
0.9690
NA(-)
NA
0 . 5 5 8 7  ( 1 )
0.4550
0 . 0 3 4 1  ( 1 )
0.8540
0 . 0 3 6 2  ( 1 )
0.8490
Jarque-Bera
(p-value)
1 9 8 9 . 2 0 6 0 * * *
0.0000
2 8 5 8 . 4 3 * * *
0.0000
NA
NA
1 5 2 4 . 7 1 * * *
0.0000
1 3 9 . 5 2 * * *
0.0000
5 9 . 8 1 2 4 * * *
0.0000
Pfandbriefe
PAAA5 PAAA5 L PAAA5._AD_L
BHHH M BHHH M BHHH* M
Wald-test H q :  a 1 i = a 1 2  (t-stat)
(p-value)
1 2 1 . 6 4 5 6 * * *
0.0000
1 6 0 . 1 5 4 6 * * *
0.0000
1 5 3 . 8 8 0 5 * * *
0.0000
1 5 4 . 8 1 2 6 * * *
0.0000
1 8 0 . 2 6 8 4 * * *
0.0000
4 4 . 5 3 1 1 * * *
0.0000
Wald-test Hq: <Xii-KXit2=0 (t-stat.)
(p-value)
0 . 1 6 0 3
0.6900
1 . 6 3 9 6
0.2040
0 . 0 2 4 4
0.8763
0 . 0 0 9 4
0.9230
1 . 0 6 0 5
0.3062
0 . 0 2 6 8
0.8705
LB-Q Statistic (lags)
(p-value)
1 . 5 4 7 4  ( 1 )
0.2140
0 . 4 6 3 1  ( 1 )
0.4960
0 . 0 2 2 0  ( 1 )
0.8820
0 . 0 6 7 2  ( 1 )
0.7960
0 . 6 9 4 5  ( 1 )
0.4050
1 . 7 0 1 5  ( 1 )
0.1920
LB2-Q Statistic (lags)
(p-value)
0 . 1 9 2 2  ( 1 )
0.6610
0 . 0 0 7 4  ( 1 )
0.9310
0 . 0 0 8 4  ( 1 )
0.9270
0 . 1 1 9 0  ( 1 )
0.7300
0.0007 ( 1 )
0.9790
1 . 9 6 9 1  ( 1 )
0.1610
Jarque-Bera
(p-value)
1 1 4 8 . 9 9 * * *
0.0000
1 3 1 6 . 8 6 * * *
0.0000
2 8 3 . 7 5 * * *
0.0000
6 3 4 . 5 7 * * *
0.0000
1 2 6 3 . 3 7 * * *
0.0000
4 7 7  4 j * * *
0.0000
Pfandbriefe
PAAA7 PAAA7_L PAAA7. AD_L
BHHH M BHHH M BHHH M
Wald-test H q :  <Xi i = a i  2 (t-stat)
(p-value)
1 3 0 . 3 7 1 6 * * *
0.0000
1 1 6 . 3 7 0 0 * * *
0.0000
1 1 9 . 8 8 2 0 * * *
0.0000
1 3 1 . 1 7 7 0 * * *
0.0000
1 5 0 . 4 7 * * *
0.0000
7 2 . 2 6 5 0 * * *
0.0000
Wald-test H0: Oti_i+Ot12=0 (t-stat.)
(p-value)
0 . 0 0 5 0
0.9439
1 . 3 7 0 9
0.2451
2 . 3 4 9 1
0.1293
3 . 6 3 1 8 *
0.0602
3 . 9 2 1 2 *
0.0511
3 . 1 3 3 0 *
0.0805
LB-Q Statistic (lags)
(p-value)
0 . 1 7 0 2  (1 )  
0.6800
1 . 1 6 5 6  (1 )
0.2800
NA (-)
NA
0 . 9 3 2 8  ( 1 )
0.3340
0 . 5 0 6 6  (1 )
0.4770
0 . 2 2 8 6  ( 1 )
0.6330
LB2-Q Statistic (lags)
(p-value)
0 . 3 4 5 7  (1 )
0.5570
1 . 2 6 9 0  ( 1 )
0.2600
NA (-)
NA
0 . 5 5 1 3  ( 1 )
0.4580
8 . 4 9 2 9  ( 4 )
0.0750
0 . 2 2 0 3  ( 1 )
0.6390
Jarque-Bera
(p-value)
1 0 2 . 2 6 * * *
0.0000
1 1 . 7 6 * * *
0.0028
NA
NA
1 0 . 1 5 * * *
0.0063
1 . 4 1 2 5
0.4935
1 . 8 7 4 6
0.3917
***=1% significance, **=5% significance, *=10% significance. N A  indicates that no results could be generated by the 
statistics software due to data overflow. & singular covariance coefficients are not unique.
Tab. 53. Coefficient and residual tests of GA.RCH(1,1) modelfor Ifandbrief spreads (actual, tran formed and
Johnson Fit adjusted spreads) -  LIBOR atfirst differences.
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Collateralised D ebt O bligations (C D O ), synthetic
CSAAA3 CSAAA3_L CSAAA3_AD_L
BHHH M BHHH4 M4 BHHH M4
Wald-test Ho: <Xi,i=Oi,2 (t-stat)
(p-value)
9.1476***
0.0034
49.0537***
0.0000
2.2721
0.1359
4.2153**
0.0435
2.7887*
0.0990
0.1793
0.6731
Wald-test Hq: Oi,i+ali2=0 (t-stat.)
(p-value)
0.9792
0.3255
0.8159
0.3692
1.3313
0.2522
0.0287
0.8658
3.4511*
0.0671
0.0002
0.9895
Wald-test Hq: 02 ,1=02,2 (t-stat.)
(p-value)
0.0361
0.8491
2.1791
0.1440
0.9019
0.3453
1.8848
0.1738
10.0836***
0.0022
0.0026
0.9594
Wald-test Hq: a 2 i+a22= 0  (t-stat)
(p-value)
1.2564
0.2659
0.1052
0.7465
0.7133
0.4010
0.0127
0.9105
4.4756*
0.0377
0.0003
0.9873
LB-Q Statistic (lags)
(p-value)
1.1351 (1)
0.2870
0.3066 (1)
0.5800
0.7078 (1)
0.4000
0.0251 (1)
0.8740
0.8522 (1)
0.3560
0.0000 (1) 
0.9950
LB2-Q Statistic (lags)
(p-value)
0.0697 (1)
0.7920
0.0665 (1)
0.7960
0.0578 (1) 
0.8100
0.0004 (1)
0.9840
0.0411 (1)
0.8390
0.0907 (1)
0.7630
Jarque-Bera
(p-value)
3764.22***0.0000 4169.84***0.0000 4614.09***0.0000 2062.80***0.0000 444.50***0.0000 1479.40***0.0000
Collateralised Debt Obligations (CDO), synthetic
CSA5 CSA5 L CSA5_AD_L
BHHH M BHHH M BHHH M
Wald-test Hq: (t-stat)
(p-value)
2.8538*
0.0952
5.9786**
0.0168
9.1380***
0.0034
8.2931***
0.0052
6.7854**
0.0110
0.0081
0.9286
Wald-test H^ : Oti,i-Kxlr2=0 (t-stat)
(p-value)
0.0001
0.9944
0.1706
0.6807
2.0701
0.1543
0.0082
0.9280
1.8470
0.1781
0.0708
0.7908
Wald-test Hq: d i 1=a2a (t-stat)
(p-value)
13.5211***
0.0004
2.3582
0.1217
3.9763**
0.0497
0.4491
0.5048
0.7065
0.4032
0.0031
0.9557
Wald-test Hq: 02 ,1+0 2 ,2=0 (t-stat.)
(p-value)
0.9063
0.3441
0.5624
0,4556
2.3848
0.1266
0.0043
0.9478
2.1695
0.1448
0.0125
0.9112
LB-Q Statistic (lags)
(p-value)
0.3237 (1)
0.5690
0.0551 (1)
0.8140
0.0599 (1)
0.8070
0.1783 (1)
0.6730
2.8715 (1)
0.0900
0.0011 (1) 
0.9730
LB2-Q Statistic (lags)
(p-value)
0.2919 (1)
0.5890
0.0648 (1)
0.7990
0.0404 (1)
0.8410
0.043 (1)
0.8360
0.2253 (1)
0.6350
0.0365 (1)
0.8480
Jarque-Bera
(p-value)
742.78***0.0000 1494.31***0.0000 3920.82***0.0000 1184.47***0.0000 2343.01***0.0000 4101.14***0.0000
Collateralised Debt Obligations fCDOl. synthetic
CSBBB7 CSBBB7_L CSBBB7 AD L
BHHH M BHHH M BHHH M
Wald-test Hq: Oi,i=Oi,2 (t-stat.)
(p-value)
0.0056
0.9405
1.3355
0.2514
0.0854
0.7709
0.0719
0.7893
0.0338
0.8546
0.0237
0.8780
Wald-test Hq: Ct]_ 1-t-OtI>2=0 (t-stat.)
(p-value)
0.5736
0.4511
0.1902
0.6640
0.0391
0.8437
0.0081
0.9286
17.2446***
0.0001
0.0019
0.9652
Wald-test Hq: a 2ii=a2,2 (t-stat.)
(p-value)
11.0249***
0.0014
1.4186
0.2373
0.1937
0.6611
0.1022
0.7501
0.8336
0.3641
0.0620
0.8040
Wald-test Hq: 02 ,1+0 2 ^= 0  (t-stat.)
(p-value)
0.7654
0.3844
0.0143
0.9050
0.0711
0.7904
0.0039
0.9506
0.0620
0.8040
0.0019
0.9658
LB-Q Statistic (lags)
(p-value)
0.5277 (1)
0.4680
0.0085 (1)
0.9270
0.3907 (1)
0.5320
0.9231 (1)
0.3370
5.6452 (2)
0.0590
0.0019 (1)
0.9650
LB2-Q Statistic (lags)
(p-value)
0.0617 (1)
0.8040
0.0153 (1)
0.9020
0.1802 (1) 
0.6710
0.0528 (1) 
0.8180
0.4504 (1)
0.5020
0.0266 (1) 
0.8700
Jarque-Bera
(p-value)
2046.31***0.0000 1717.90***0.0000 2722.73***0.0000 7203.98***0.0000 7155.60***0.0000 9634.85***0.0000
***=1% significance, **=5% significance, *=10% significance. N A  indicates that no results could be generated by the 
statistics software due to data overflow. 4  singular covariance coefficients are not unique.
Tab. 54. Coefficient and residual tests of GAKCH(2,1) model for synthetic CDO spreads (actual,
tranformed and Johnson Fit adjusted spreads) — LIBOR atfirst differences.
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Collateralised D eb t O bligations (C D O ), traditional
CTAAA3 CTAAA3_L CTAAA3._AD_L
BHHH M BHHH M BHHH M
W a l d - t e s t  H q: a 11= a li2 ( t - s t a t . )
(p-Tahie)
117.7515***
0.0000
85.9906***
0.0000
6.0677**
0.0160
5.3532**
0.0234
3.7628*
0.0561
11.9642***
0.0009
W a l d - t e s t  H q: o q i + O l i ^ O  ( t - s t a t )
(p-Tahie)
0.2472
0.6205
0.0794
0.7789
4.4698**
0.0377
0.0016
0.9660
104.4335***
0.0000
0.0500
0.8236
W a l d - t e s t  H q: <X2 ,i= < X 2 ,2  ( t - s t a t )
(p-Tihie)
0.4967
0.4631
1.5472
0.2173
0.0000
0.9977
0.0399
0.6421
0.1002
0.7524
0.2597
0.6118
W a l d - t e s t  H e , :  < X 2 , i+ C t2 ,2 = 0  ( t - s t a t )
(p-Tahie)
1.3275
0.2526
0.8542
0.3582
29.6054***
0.0000
0.0149
0.9031
9.9549***
0.0023
0.2925
0.5902
L B - Q  S t a t i s t i c  ( l a g s )
(p-vftlue)
0.5066 (1)
0.4770
0.0613 (1)
0.8040
0.4119 (1)
0.5210
0.2989 (1)
0.5850
10.7930 (5)
0.0560
0.2555 (1)
0.6130
L B 2- Q  S t a t i s t i c  ( l a g s )
(p-vihte)
0.0037 (1)
0.9520
0.0180 (1) 
0.8930
0.0159 (1)
0.9000
0.0054 (1)
0.9410
14.7820 (8)
0.0640
0.0021  (1) 
0.9640
J a r q u e - B e r a
(p-raKic)
11195.83***
0.0000
19175.19***
0.0000
13273.06***
0.0000
9904.79***
0.0000
213.67***
0.0000
696.64***
0.0000
Collateralised Debt Obligations (CDO), traditional
CTA5 CTA5 L CTA5 AD L
B H H H M B H H H M B H H H M
W a l d - t e s t  H o :  < X i , i = ( X i ,2  ( t - s t a t . )
(p-Tahie)
1.4672
0.2295
0.0527
0.8191
5.2952**
0.0241
0.4114
0.5232
24.9096***
0.0000
4.6735**
0.0337
W a l d - t e s t  H q: t t i . i + o q ^ O  ( t - s t a t )
(p-rahie)
0.0211
0.1646
0.0617
0.6045
1.2230
0.2722
0.0034
0.9539
0.2732
0.6027
0.0045
0.9469
W a l d - t e s t  H q: a-2 .i= a 2 i  ( t - s t a t )
(p-rahie)
0.8064
0.3720
0.0278
0.8679
1.1227
0.2927
0.0108
0.9174
0.0658
0.7963
0.1476
0.7019
W a l d - t e s t  H q : <x 2 , i + ( X 2 i2 = 0  ( t - s t a t )
(p-Tahie)
0.5828
0.4476
0.0715
0.7096
2.3289
0.1311
0.0305
0.8619
0.2196
0.6407
0.0072
0.9326
L B - Q  S t a t i s t i c  ( l a g s )
(p-value)
0.0207 (1) 
0.6660
0.0742 (1)
0.7850
0.2789 (1)
0.5970
0.7867 (1)
0.3750
0.0728 (1)
0.7870
0.0106 (1) 
0.9180
L B 2- Q  S t a t i s t i c  ( l a g s )
(p-Tihie)
0.0118(1)
0.9140
0.1756 (1)
0.6750
0.0229 (1) 
0.8800
0.0412 (1)
0.8390
0.0870 (1)
0.7680
0.0187 (1)
0.8910
J a r q u e - B e r a
(p-value)
479.78***
0.0000
1146.55***
0.0000
1552.34***
0.0000
2408.92***
0.0000
8004.54***
0.0000
10425.07***
0.0000
Collateralised Debt Obligations (CDO), traditional
C T B B B 7 C T B B B 7 _ L C T B B B 7 . AD L
B H H H M B H H H “ NT B H H H M
W a l d - t e s t  Hq: c q  1= 01.1 .2  ( t - s t a t . )
(p-rmhie)
5.6831*
0.0196
4.6951**
0.0333
1.0248
0.3146
11.6448***
0.0010
16.2930***
0.0001
1.1134
0.2947
W a l d - t e s t  H q: a j  i + a i ^ O  ( t - s t a t . )
(p-value)
0.0739
0.7664
0.0075
0.9311
0.0798
0.7783
0.0007
0.9790
0.4454
0.5065
0.0161
0.8993
W a l d - t e s t  H q :  0 2 1 = 0 2 2  ( t - s t a t )
(p-value)
2.6372
0.1085
0.0009
0.9759
0.1467
0.7026
3.7456*
0.0566
1.7833
0.1857
0.2469
0.6207
W a l d - t e s t  H q : CX2,i + O 2 2 = 0  ( t - s t a t . )
(p-value)
0.3412
0.5608
0.0216
0.8834
0.0817
0.7757
0.0247
0.8755
0.4849
0.4683
0.0046
0.9458
L B - Q  S t a t i s t i c  ( l a g s )
(p-value)
0.4125 (1)
0.5210
0.0045 (1)
0.9460
0.0470 (1) 
0.8260
0.0099 (1)
0.9210
24.6870 (15)
0.0540
0.3046 (1)
0.5810
L B 2 - Q  S t a t i s t i c  ( l a g s )
(p-value)
2.0083 (1)
0.1560
0.0762 (1)
0.7830
0.0715 (1)
0.7S90
0.0098 (1)
0.9210
5.1869 (2)
0.0750
0.0124 (1)
0.9110
J a r q u e - B e r a
(p-value)
1365.94***
0.0000
1580.87***
0.0000
3747.04***
0.0000
753.83***
0.0000
156.61***
0.0000
181.45***
0.0000
***=1% significance, **=5% significance, *=10% significance. N A  indicates that no results could be generated by the 
statistics software due to data overflow. 4  singular covariance coefficients are not unique.
Tab. 55. Coefficient and residual tests of GARCH(2,1) model for traditional CDO spreads (actual,
tranformed and Johnson Fit adjusted spreads) — LIBOR atfirst differences.
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M ortgage-Backed Securities (MBS)
M A A A 3 M A A A 3 L M A A A 3 A D  L M A A A 5 M A A A 5 L M A A A 5 _A D _L
B H H H  M B H H H  M B H H H  M B H H H  M B H H H *  M B H H H M
W ald-test Ho: Cti,i=Cti,2 (t-stat.) 14.0474*** 28.4184*** 1.9952 18.5008*** 13.0022*** 3.2037* 158.05***:243.7303*** 66.1130*** 140.7861*** 6.2115** 0 .7 4 0 2
(p-value) 0.000] 0.0000 0.1618 0.0000 0.0006 0.0774 0.0000 o.oooo 0.0000 0.0000 0.0148 0.3923
W ald-test H 0: a lfI + a 12= 0  (t-stat.) 10.3853*** 0 .0412 1.2955 0 . 0 0 0 0 2 .4650 0.0024 0 .3520 4.4828** 0 .0598 1.1603 65.6843*** 19.0990***
(p-value) 0.0019 0.8397 0.2586 0.9980 0.1205 0.9607 0.5547 0.0375 0.8074 0.2848 0.0000 0.0000
W ald-test H 0: a 2>i= 0 C2,2 (t-stat.) 2 .4 4 7 9 0 .1167 1.5577 0.0040 1.0149 0 .0895 0 .5867 2 .3217 5.2070** 4.5688** 18.9879*** 12.5057***
(p-vahie) 0.1218 0,7336 0.2158 0.9499 03169 0 7656 0.4460 0.1317 00253 0.0357 0.0000 0.0007
W ald -test H 0: Ct^i-HX2i2= 0  (t-stat.) 8.6410*** 0 . 0 0 0 0 1.1089 0 .0 0 7 8 0.7886 0.0024 0 .1258 2.6399 0 . 0 2 1 0 0.7448 6.3620** 3.0602*
(p-value) 00043 0.9967 0.2956 0.9299 0.3773 0.9607 0.7238 0.1083 0.8851 0.3908 0.0137 0.0842
L B -Q  Statistic (lags) 0 .0 5 4 5  (1) 1.3708 (1) 0 .2573  (1) 0 .7213  (1) 0 .6578  (1) 0 .7573  (1) 0 .6 8 2 7  (1) 6 .9812  (1) 0 .2 3 6 6  (1) 0 .9 2 3 8  (1) 0 .2 7 0 8  (1) 1 .2203 (1)
(p-value) 0.8150 0.2420 0.6120 03960 0.4170 0.3840 0.4090 0.0720 0.6270 0.3360 0.6030 0.2690
L B 2-Q  Statistic (lags) 0 .0545  (1) 0 .0133  (1) 0 .0 0 0 8  ( 1) 0 .0013  (1) 0 .1050  (1) 0 .0 2 4 4  (1) 0 .1165  (1) 0 .2955  (1) 0 .0 3 7 0  (1) 0 . 0 0 0 1  (1) 9 8 .7 0 8 0  (8 ) 0 .0091 (1)
(p-value) 0.8150 0.9080 0.9770 0.9710 0.7460 0.8760 0.7330 0.5870 0.8470 0.9930 0.0000 0.9240
Jarque-Bera 4961.71*** 4749.15*** 1345.78*** 2825.98*** 112.1410*** 102.29*** 1332.68*** 97.4937*** 421.1872*** 241.08*** 18.8417*** 218.43***
(p-Tidu.) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0001 0.0000
Mortgage-Backed Securities (MBS)
M A 7 M A7 L M A7 A D  L M BB B7 M B B B 7 L M B B B 7 A D  L
B H H H M B H H H M B H H H M B H H H M B H H H M B H H H * M
W ald-test H 0: a i , i = 0t i i2 (t-stat.) 16.0644*** 54.1040*** 0 .9503 0 .1 6 0 4 2 .6785 0.1464 38.3527*** 35.2435*** 1 .9714 0.9780 3.3301* 0.0681
(p-mlu.) 0.0001 0.0000 0.3327 0.6899 0.1058 0.7031 0.0000 0.0000 0.1643 0.3258 0.0719 0.7949
W ald-test H 0: oq j-MX] 2= 0  (t-stat.) 0 .1276 0 .0009 289.1358*** 0 . 0 0 0 0 115.8702*** 0 . 0 0 0 0 0.6695 0.1242 0.9869 0 .8 7 9 2 0.0757 0 .0 0 0 4
(p-value) 0.7219 0.9755 0.0000 0.9959 0.0000 0.9997 0.4158 0.7255 0.3236 0.3514 0.7840 0.9850
W ald-test Hq. Ct2 \ = a 2 2  (t-stat.) 0 .0425 0.0027 0 .0675 0.0023 0 .0047 0 . 0 0 2 2 6.3986** 3.5912* 0 .7 40516 1.0438 0 .1885 0 .02 9 1 1 9
(p-value) 0.8373 0.9588 0.7957 0.9615 0.945] 0.9623 0.0135 0.0618 0.3922 0.3101 0.6654 0.8650
W ald-test H q: cx2.i + a 22= 0  (t-stat.) 0 .0595 0.0161 841.4658*** 0 . 0 0 0 0 124.1782*** 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 .7052 0.108211 0.8612 1.0907 0.1426 0 .0003
(p-value) 0.8080 0.8995 0.0000 0.9975 0.0000 0.9984 0.4036 0.7431 0.3563 0.2996 0.7067 0.9865
L B -Q  Statistic (lags) 0 .7893  (1) 0 .1 5 8 4  (1) 1.1107 (1) 0 .0323  (1) 1.6291 (1) 0.0025  (1) 0 .4 2 8 8  (1) 0 .4 6 0 2  (1) N A  (-) 8 .2213 (4) 7 .1643  (3) 4 .3 8 4 8  (2)
(p-value) 0.3740 0.6910 0.2920 0.8570 0.2020 0.9600 0.5130 0.4980 NA 0.0840 0.0670 0.1120
LB2-Q  Statistic (lags) 0 .0207  (1) 0 .003  (1) 0 .0139  (1) 0 .0165 (1) 0 .2007 (1) 0 .0146  (1) 0 .0229  (1) 0.0411 (1) N A  (-) 0 .0 0 0 8  (1) 1 .1795 (1) 0 .7 8 0 6  (1)
(p-value) 0.8800 0.9560 0.9060 0.8980 0.6540 0.9040 0.8800 0.8390 NA 0.9770 0.2770 0.3770
Jarque-Bera 13574.11*** 14751.88*** 10808.59*** 20019.31*** 14168.17*** 23505.94*** 12912.18*** 2411.09*** N A 2411.09*** 382.03*** 1045.63***
(p-value) o.oooo 0.0000 o.oooo o.oooo 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 NA 0.0000 o.oooo 0.0000
* * * = 1 % sign ificance, **= 5%  sign ificance, * = 1 0 % sign ificance. N A  indicates that n o  results cou ld  b e  generated by the statistics softw are du e to data overflow . *  singular covariance coe ffic ien ts  are n o t unique.
Tab. 56. Coefficient and residual tests of GARCH(2,1) model for MBS spreads (actual, tranformed andJohnson Fit adjusted spreads) — LIBOR, atfirst differences.
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Pfandbriefe
PAAA3 PAAA3_L PAAA3 AD L
BHHH M BHHH M BHHH* M
Wald-test H0: 0Ci,i=<Xi,2 (t-stat.) 25.9411*** 66.1769*** 30.0515*** 22.9634*** 40.9130*** 26.2764***
(p-value) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Wald-test H0: ai i+ a12=0 (t-stat.) 14.9274*** 0.0870 11.1170*** 0.0024 10.9676*** 20.6809***
(p-vnh»e) 0.0002 0.7689 0.0013 0.9613 0.0014 0.0000
Wald-test H0: 02 ,1=02,2 (t-stat) 15.6226*** 4.2855** 14.1315*** 0.0314 44.1682*** 81.4127***
(p-vahie) 0.0002 0.0410 0.0003 0.0599 0.0000 0.0000
Wald-test H0: 021+02 ,2=0 (t-stat.) 20.2373*** 0.353607 18.2490*** 0.000611 34.0455*** 39.0259***
(p-vahie) 0.0000 0.5530 0.0001 0.9003 0.0000 0.0000
LB-Q Statistic (lags) 3.3700 (1) 6.4031 (3) 2.8382 (1) 2.2874 (1) 11.4420 (1) 0.3812 (1)
(p-value) 0.0660 0.0940 0.0920 0.1300 0.0010 0.5370
LB2-Q Statistic (lags) 0.3998 (1) 0.1084 (1) 0.6363 (1) 0.0030 (1) 25.6920 (1) 0.1814 (1)
(p-value) 0.5270 0.7420 0.4250 0.9560 0.0000 0.6700
Jarque-Bera 4483.14*** 4776.23*** 2649.86*** 1871.34*** 667.74*** 638.28***
(p-value) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Pfandbriefe
PAAA5 PAAA5 L PAAA5 AD L
BHHH M BHHH M BHHH* M
Wald-test H0: 0 ^ = 0 ] ,2  (t-stat) 83.3926*** 112.9865*** 92.8332*** 98.6260*** 95.7934*** 19.9111***
(p-vahie) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Wald-test Hq: au+a^^O  (t-stat.) 0.5652 0.0052 2.6263 0 . 0 0 0 0 0.5399 0.7550
(p-wlue) 0.4545 0 9425 0.1092 0.9998 0.4647 0.3876
Wald-test H0: 012,1=012,2 (t-stat.) 9.5896*** 1.842273 6.4145** 0.00314 14.0902*** 6.3326**
(p-value) 0.0027 0.1767 0.0134 0.9555 0.0003 0.0139
Wald-test H0: 02 ,1+012,2=0 (t-stat.) 0.8319 0.004338 1.547299 0.0000261 0.652934 1.69031
(p-vahie) 0.3646 0.9477 0.2173 0.9959 0.4216 0.1974
LB-Q Statistic (lags) 0.3635 (1) 0.8217 (1) 1.1426 (1) 0.1458 (1) 0.2058 (1) 8.0446 (4)
(p-vahie) 0.5470 0.3650 0.2850 0.7030 0.6500 0.0900
LB2-Q Statistic (lags) 0.0365 (1) 0.0021 (1) 0.0894 (1) 0.0038 (1) 0.0301 (1) 1.5583 (1)
(p-valuc) 0.6480 0.9630 0.7650 0.9510 0.6620 0.2120
Jarque-Bera 2237.18*** 1105.09*** 546.21*** 251.70*** 1799.2100*** 1233.82***
(p-vahie) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Pfandbriefe
PAAA7 PAAA7 L PAAA7 AD L
BHHH* M BHHH M BHHH M
Wald-test H0: O j^ a ^  (t-stat)
(p-value)
52.4371***
0.0000
113.2866***
0,0000
55.0310***
0.0000
92.1496***
0.0000
52.2577***
0.0000
13.6369***
0.0004
Wald-test H0: otj,i+ali2=0 (t-stat.)
(p-vahie)
28.9154***
0.0000
25.3665***
0.0000
39.9667***
0,0000
37.5099***
0.0000
11.7751***
0.0010
23.3220***
0.0000
Wald-test H0: 02,1= 02,2 (t-stat.)
(p-vahie)
66.1212***
0.0000
67.1582***
0.0000
93.3045***
0.0000
88.4765***
0.0000
35.8244***
0.0000
17.6272***
0.0001
Wald-test H0: 02,1+05 2=0 (t-stat.)
(p-vahie)
25.7835***
0.0000
19.6427***
0.0000
40.3666***
0.0000
35.0885***
0.0000
12.3520***
0.0007
25.9819***
0.0000
LB-Q Statistic (lags)
(p-vahie)
1.2895 (1)
0.2560
1.3956 (1)
0.2370
2.1350 (1)
0.1440
0.2643 (1)
0.6070
0.1635 (1) 
0.6060
0.0508 (1) 
0.6220
LB2-Q Statistic (lags)
(p-vahie)
0.0142 (1)
0.9050
0.2844 (1)
0.5940
2.3081 (1)
0.1290
0.2311 (1)
0.6310
0.1961 (1)
0.6500
0.0555 (1)
0.8140
Jarque-Bera 5935.17** 137.0564*** 0.36 2.91 0.91 30.06***
(p-vahie) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0347 0.2328 0.6344 0.0000
***=1% significance, **=5% significance, *=10% significance. N A  indicates that no results could be generated by the 
statistics software due to data overflow. & singular covariance coefficients are not unique.
Tab. 57. Coefficient and residual tests of GARCH(2,1) model for Pfandbrief spreads (actual,
tranformed and Johnson Fit adjusted spreads) — LIBOR atfirst differences.
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CHAPTER V: “SECURITY ISSUANCE AND INVESTOR
INFORMATION”
published as:
Jobst, A. (2005), “Security Issuance and Investor Information,” Center for Financial Research (CFR) 
Working Paper Series, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), March. Submitted to 
Journal of Financial Research and accepted at the Global Finance Conference 2005.
1 ABSTRACT
Although the commoditisation o f  illiquid asset exposures through securitisation facilitates the 
disciplining effect o f  capital markets on risk management, private information about securitised debt 
and complex transaction structures could impair fair market valuation. In a simple issue design model 
without intermediaries we maximise issuer proceeds over a positive measure o f  issue quality, where a 
direct revelation mechanism (DRM) by profitable informed investors engages endogenous price discovery 
through auction-style allocation preference as a continuous function o f  perceived issue quality. We 
derive an optimal allocation schedule for maximum issuer payoffs under different pricing regimes if  
asymmetric information requires underpricing. In particular, we study how the incidence o f  
uninformed investors at varying levels o f  valuation uncertainty and their function o f  clearing the 
market effect profitable informed investment. We find that the issuer optimises own payoffs at each 
valuation irrespective o f the applicable pricing mechanism by awarding informed investors the lowest 
possible allocation (and attendant underpricing) that still guarantees profitable informed investment. 
Under uniform pricing, the composition o f the investor pool ensures that informed investors 
appropriate higher profit than uninformed types. Any reservation utility by issuers lowers both the 
probability o f  information disclosure by informed investors and the scope o f  issuers to curtail profit 
taking by informed investment.
Keywords: asset securitisation, security design, security issue, direct revelation mechanism, aymmetric information, 
auction model, asset securitisation, reservation utility
JE L  Classification: D82, G12, G14, G23
2 INTRODUCTION
Asset securitisation refers to the growing tendency o f substituting capital markets for intermediaries 
in channelling external funds to efficient uses o f economic activity. Recently it has been touted as a 
viable and expedient risk management and refinancing method. It allows issuers to convert existing
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or future cash flows from pooled asset exposures (“reference portfolio”) into marketable debt 
securities as commoditised structured claims, which blend default risk and asset pricing features o f  
securitised assets (mosdy mortgages, consumer debt, trade receivables and corporate loans) and the 
merchantability o f fixed income securities. Secured debt, such as asset-backed securities (ABS), 
registers as a safer claim than unsecured debt under the pecking order theory (Myers, 1977; Leland, 
1998), mainly because it derives its value from repayment on a scrutinisable asset portfolio insulated 
from overall issuer performance. At the same time, the inherent asset transformation o f  securitisation 
challenges the traditional value proposition o f  financial intermediation by separating asset origination 
and risk management as two distinctive components in external finance. Despite its efficiency- 
enhancing effect as a diversified source o f liquid funds, securitisation falls short o f mitigating 
incomplete capital allocation in financial markets. The complex nature o f  securitisation engenders 
valuation uncertainty and possible non-verifiability o f trading motives due to imperfect information 
dissemination. Asymmetric information between issuers and investors suggests that issuers have 
superior information about the true asset value, so that investors in securitised assets would 
reasonably command external price discounting to compensate for ex ante moral hazard as regards 
the deliberate misrepresentation o f securitised asset quality and adverse selection by rational investor 
expectations a la Akerlof (1970).1 Issuers usually retain the most junior claim in a transaction (credit 
enhancement) as ex ante reservation utility to mitigate these agency costs o f asymmetric information 
(DeMarzo and Duffie, 1997).
In this chapter, we present a general issue design, which demonstrates how valuation uncertainty and 
credit enhancement might affect both the incentive structure o f  investors and issuer payoff o f  
security issuance. A low incidence o f  informed investors suggests an auction-style allocation 
mechanism with price discounting (“underpricing”) as a feasible model design for the optimal choice 
o f pricing and allocation under valuation uncertainty. Our proposed model introduces a new 
argument for optimal security issuance under asymmetric information without intermediaries in 
keeping with the “winner’s curse” problem. Although our framework o f  optimal security issuance 
relies on the conventional allocation-based argument o f IPO underpricing due to asymmetric 
information between issuers and investors in keeping with the “winner’s curse” problem (Rock, 
1986), our simple one-period approach goes beyond the rationing o f  uninformed investors as the
1 Rational investors would expect to be offered only poor deals in securitisation markets under asymmetric 
information. I f  the investment choice is conditional on the level o f investor information, uninformed investors 
assume to partake in a disproportionately large number of poor transactions once better informed investors 
have picked off most if not all profitable deals. Asymmetric information might also arise from (i) incentives o f 
biased loan selection at the time the asset composition o f the portfolio is determined (ex ante moral hazard) and 
(ii) reduced monitoring of asset exposure after securitisation (ex post moral hazard). See Jobst (2003) for a 
detailed review o f the information economics o f asset securitisation.
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main determinant o f  underpricing. In a general auction-style design, we maximise issuer payoffs 
conditional on price discounting needed to guarantee profitable informed investment over a positive 
measure o f  issue quality for a given degree o f  valuation uncertainty about securitised assets. As 
opposed to Rock (1986), where underpricing compensates uninformed investors for being rationed 
by informed demand across all states o f profitable investment, we explain underpricing to be joindy 
determined by both an auction-style share allocation to informed investors and the degree o f  
uninformed investment associated with valuation uncertainty. It is not the rationing o f  uninformed 
investors, but the allocation preference by informed investors, which guides our thinking about 
underpricing and how it relates to the optimisation problem o f  issuer proceeds. We treat the level o f  
allocation as a strategic choice variable, which allows issuers to extract information about the actual 
quality o f  the security issue through revealed allocation preference by informed investors in a direct 
revelation mechanism (DRM).2 DRM endogenises price discovery in an auction-style allocation 
preference as a continuous function o f perceived issue quality. Informed investors accept some 
allocation as a continuous function o f  their beliefs about the actual issue valuation and reveal their 
valuation to uninformed investors only if a known price-quantity schedule implies profitable 
investment.3 The acceptance set o f  profitable informed investment qualifies an optimal allocation 
schedule for maximum issuer payoffs at varying degrees o f valuation uncertainty and different pricing 
regimes. Issuers maximise issue payoffs at a positive measure o f  issue quality for an allocation that 
ensures participation by informed investors. The price discovery o f  actual issue quality conditional on 
some acceptance set o f informed investors allows issuers to price the residual allocation to 
uninformed investors to clear the market. In particular, we study how the incidence o f  uninformed 
investors at varying levels o f  valuation uncertainty affects the utility from informed investment if  the 
offering price is set to be either the same for both types o f investors (uniform pricing) or higher for
2 Due to private information informed investors have superior knowledge about the actual quality of the 
security issue, whose valuation uncertainty is indicated by the precision measure o f the private signal received 
by informed investors.
3 The option value o f informed investment increases (decreases) the higher (lower) the valuation uncertainty 
and the lower (higher) the precision of investor beliefs, which implies that more investors become informed as 
information gathering about the true value o f the transaction becomes more profitable. An increase in the 
number o f informed investors raises the rational expectation of uniformed investors to be allocated shares in a 
disproportionately large number o f unprofitable (bad) deals (“winner’s curse dilemma”). Uninformed investors 
will require sufficient underpricing to compensate for ex ante valuation uncertainty (“*x ante uncertainty 
hypothesis”) as agency cost o f adverse selection. Also informed investors would only commit to profitable, 
underpriced investments. If  the size o f the overall investor pool is kept unchanged, the altered composition o f 
the investor pool due to a larger share o f informed investors at higher valuation uncertainty changes the prices 
both types o f investors would be prepared to pay. The degree o f underpricing associated with valuation 
uncertainty depends on the applicable pricing scheme (uniform pricing vs. discriminatory pricing). Uniform 
pricing induces informed investors to require higher underpricing as more informed investors in the investor 
pool reduce the individual net payoff o f each informed investor relative to the payoff o f uninformed investors. 
Discriminatory pricing schemes would be sustainable at lower levels o f underpricing as valuation uncertainty 
increases.
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uninformed investors (discriminatory pricing). The residual allocation to uninformed investors and 
the incentive o f informed investors to subscribe to DRM at any issue quality — as long as some 
allocation yields positive payoff -  curtail the ability o f informed investors to optimise own payoffs 
from disclosing their beliefs under the profitability condition o f  DRM. Under uniform pricing, the 
incidence o f  investor types associated with the degree o f  valuation uncertainty further conditions the 
propensity o f  informed investors to participate. As an extension to the existing underpricing 
paradigm, we add credit enhancement to the model as some reservation utility in the form o f  
fractional investor repayment, which sanctions the scope o f profitable informed investment.4
We find that issuers maximise own payoffs and derive an optimal solution to the design problem if 
their allocation to informed investors remains large enough to elicit “truth telling” in return for 
profitable investment, irrespective o f the pricing regime (uniform or discriminatory). A higher 
allocation to informed investors means that a larger portion o f  the transaction is subject to 
underpricing, which in turn reduces overall issue payoffs. The presence o f  an unknown number o f  
uninformed investors only matters as a participation constraint o f  optimal allocation under uniform 
pricing, which requires an adjustment o f the allocation choice to still guarantee profitable informed 
investment. Increased uninformed investment demand at lower valuation uncertainty limits the utility 
o f informed investment. Thus, the composition o f the investor pool ensures that informed investors5 
appropriate higher relative profit than uninformed types. We find that issuers maximise payoffs 
under uniform pricing by keeping the actual quality o f the transaction, valuation uncertainty and any 
reservation utility as low as possible. This rule o f action establishes an “efficient frontier” o f  
allocation choices, which implies higher individual net payoff from informed investment relative to 
uninformed investment.
The rest o f the chapter is structured as follows. The chapter begins with a review o f  the literature, 
linking stylised facts about asset securitisation with information processing under asymmetric 
information in matters pertinent to efficient security issuance in securitisation markets. In the next 
sections we present a simple issue design model without intermediaries, where a direct revelation 
mechanism (DRM) determines the optimal allocation choice for maximum issuer payoffs at varying 
degrees o f valuation uncertainty and different pricing regimes — assuming asymmetric information 
requires “winner’s curse”-type underpricing and uninformed investment demand clears the market. 
With information processing by informed investors taking a critical role in security issuance, we first
4 If  issuers retain some reservation utility the resultant fractional repayment increases demands on the 
minimum issue quality.
5 Informed investors can infer valuation uncertainty and the incidence o f uninformed investment from the 
precision of their private signal, which qualifies the allocation schedule o f profitable investment.
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derive an acceptance set o f profitable informed investment, which prescribes an optimal allocation 
schedule for a perceived issue quality. We then determine expected issuer proceeds if  informed 
investors maximise their payoffs within this acceptance set according to a fixed price-quantity 
schedule. In particular, we study how the incidence o f uninformed investors at varying levels o f  
valuation uncertainty impacts the utility from informed investment under uniform pricing conditions. 
Subsequendy, we introduce endogenous price discovery through auction-style allocation preference 
as a continuous function o f  perceived issue quality (in keeping with a fixed price-quantity schedule) 
within the acceptance set o f  profitable informed investment to derive maximum issuer net payoffs. 
Finally, we provide a numerical illustration o f the relationship between perceived issue quality and net 
issuer proceeds contingent on the degree o f valuation uncertainty (see section 6). The chapter 
concludes with a summary o f  significant findings and recommendations.
3 LITERATURE REVIEW AND EMPIRICAL REASONING
The design problem o f  security issuance under asymmetric information and valuation uncertainty has 
been extensively studied in past research on the underwriting process and investor behaviour in stock 
markets.6 However, so far the well-understood economic rationale behind the alignment o f  asset 
pricing and share allocation choices to investor incentives has not been transposed into related areas 
o f  external finance, such as asset securitisation. Asset securitisation represents a cost-efficient and 
flexible structured finance instrument to convert illiquid present or future asset claims o f varying 
maturity and quality into tradable debt securities by re-packaging and diversifying receivables into 
securitisable asset portfolios (liquidity transformation and asset diversification).1 Transactions typically 
involve reference portfolios o f one or more (fairly illiquid) asset exposures, from which stratified 
positions (or tranches) with different seniority are created, reflecting different degrees o f investment 
risk.8 The existing literature in securitisation primarily focuses on the implications o f potential agency 
costs arising from adverse selection and moral hazard sanctioned by capital market investors.
6 See Welch and Ritter (2002) for a recent overview o f the literature in this regard.
7 Asset securitisation initially started as a way o f depository institutions, non-bank finance companies and other 
corporations to explore new sources o f asset funding either through moving assets o ff their balance sheet or 
raising cash by borrowing against balance sheet assets (“liquifying”). In the meantime, securitisation goes a long 
way in advancing two main objectives: (i) to curtail balance sheet growth and realise certain accounting 
objectives and balance sheet patterns, and /or (ii) to reduce economic cost o f capital as a proportion o f asset 
exposure and ease regulatory capital requirements (by lower bad debt provisions) to manage risk more 
efficiently. Most commonly, a balanced mix o f both objectives and further operational and strategic 
considerations determine the type o f securitisation — traditional or synthetic — in the way issuers envisage 
securitisation as a method to shed excessive asset exposures.
8 These positions may take the form o f fully/partially funded asset-backed securities or unfunded derivatives.
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In securitisation, issuers and/or investors tend to retain some o f  the securitised asset exposure 
and/or provide other means o f structural support to build investor confidence in the quality o f  their 
security issue. Frequently, such risk sharing agreement between issuers and investors comes in the 
form o f an equity-like claim9 on the expected losses o f the securitised assets in the effort to limit 
agency costs o f  asymmetric information due to inherent valuation uncertainty.10 These information 
problems associated with the lack o f  external verifiability o f securitised assets and the risk-sharing 
arrangements between issuers and investors are common considerations in existing security design 
models. We reconcile existing approaches to model the information structure o f investors and partial 
asset retention by issuers as crucial elements to security issuance under asymmetric information. In 
order to specify (i) information processing o f  informed investors as “truth tellers” in an auction-style 
allocation choice under asymmetric information and (ii) how valuation uncertainty affects the degree 
o f  underpricing, we amalgamate previous findings from (i) economic models with multiple 
equilibrium outcomes from information processing and coordination games, (ii) security design 
model o f  debt contracts with partial repayment and (iii) auction-style solutions to IPO mechanisms. 
In order to determine how informed investors process private information we resort to the concept 
o f  adjusted investor beliefs in a coordination game setting proposed by Morris and Shin (2000) in the 
context o f  bank runs, where the discrepancy between the indeterminacy o f  beliefs and the objective 
assessment could lead to suboptimal economic outcomes.11 In particular, we adopt the definition o f  a 
precision measure o f  private signals to specify informed investment decisions as a basis o f a direct 
revelation mechanism (DRM). Second, we borrow the optimal design o f lending contracts with partial 
repayment from Inderst and Muller (2002) in order to derive the first-best condition o f  optimal 
informed investment if  a reservation utility associated with credit enhancement reduces expected payoffs 
from investment. This approach is in stark contrast to many erroneous accounts in the literature,
9 The structural risk sharing arrangement between issuers and investors through subordination, which 
concentrates most default loss in the most junior tranche, also entails leveraged investment due to the 
difference of tranche sizes across different levels of seniority. Tranches with litde or no subordination are more 
affected by the mean and volatility of default losses (expected and unexpected losses) (Gibson, 2004), i.e. their 
ratio of relative tranche losses to relative portfolio losses is higher than for more senior tranches. So we would 
expect an ever greater effect of adverse selection from valuation uncertainty on leveraged exposures in 
securitised asset portfolios. Issuers and investors might also be faced with the prospect of high trading cost 
(Duffie and Garleanu, 2001) associated with a small market volume of outstanding issues, liquidity premium to 
the agency cost from adverse selection.
10 Early models suggest signalling (DeMarzo and Duffie, 1997; Leland and Pyle, 1977) as a means to curb 
investor uncertainty, where sellers of a security issues convey the value of the security by their willingness to 
partake in the risk as they retain a portion of the issue. Riddiough (1997) takes a slighdy different twist on risk 
sharing. He proposes a theoretical model of asset-retention as an effort choice by issuers to mitigate external 
price discounting as agency cost of rational investor beliefs about superior information10 about the securitised 
asset risk held by non-recourse single-purpose entities in conventional securitisation structures.
11 In their view multiple equilibria assume that economic outcomes result from actions motivated by the beliefs 
of individuals. However, any indeterminacy of beliefs, although these beliefs themselves are rationale and 
consistent with fundamental economic features, yields quite different states of affairs, which might not be 
perfecdy in a nod to what would be deemed appropriate judging by the underlying information to start with.
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which regard credit enhancement as a signalling device12 Finally, we resort to the rich literature about 
IPO underpricing (Malakhov, 2003; Welch and Ritter, 2002; Myerson, 1981) o f  corporate share 
issues as the theoretical basis for the specification o f an optimal security auction under asymmetric 
information with maximum issuer payoffs. We rule out all but asymmetric information from the list 
o f  researched explanations for IPO underpricing,13 as most o f  the legal and strategic considerations 
o f  alternative explanatory approaches do not apply to securitisation.14 Asymmetric information 
models suggest a positive correlation between ex ante valuation uncertainty and underpricing. The 
“winner’s curse” problem is one o f the asymmetric information models,15 whose economic reasoning 
for IPO underpricing seems to be most in tune with empirical observations about the workings o f  
securitisation markets. The “winner’s curse” problem postulated by Rock (1986) implies that 
asymmetric information about the actual issue quality entails adverse selection o f investor as regards 
share allocation, where informed investors benefit from better information.16 Since the information
12 Since credit enhancement compensates for the rating shortfall between the rating quality and the desired 
rating quality of the transaction (as a completely discretionary choice), the level of credit enhancement cannot 
increase information transparency as a signalling device.
13 In classical IPO models issuers offer new shares at a selling price below fair market value (“underpricing”) 
due to one or more of the following factors; (i) asymmetric information, (ii) institutional and systemic 
constraints, (iii) strategic considerations, and (iv) ownership and control. However, individual characteristics of 
national stock markets and disparate statutory regulations limit how these factors might actually explain the 
reasons for discounted IPOs. Besides asymmetric information other main reasons for underpricing are defined 
as; (i) legal risk of violations against securities laws (“lawsuit hypothesis”), price support and book building as a 
mechanism of information revelation could explain high levels of underpricing as investors require significant 
compensation for systemic uncertainty and institutional constraints by means of underpricing; (ii) pricing 
and/or explicit rationing bias give rise to restrictions on ownership and control; (iii) strategic considerations 
(“manager’s strategic underpricing explanation”), where underpricing occurs as an agency cost that results from 
strategic considerations by managers to benefit from higher expected shareholding value at lock-up expiration 
if underpricing creates an information momentum, which shifts the demand curve for the issued shares 
outwards (Aggarwal et al., 2002). Hence, managers trade-off substantial underpricing against a maximisation of 
personal wealth when they have their first opportunity to sell shares.
14 Although a good part of securitisation deals are sold via private placements especially uniform pricing of 
securitised claims leaves asymmetric information as a probable explanation for the workings of securitisation 
issuance.
15 Other asymmetric information models of IPO underpricing include signalling models (Welch, 1989 and 
1996) and principal agent models about the significance of underwriting services (Jenkinson and Ljunqvist, 
2001). In signalling models good issuers use discounting to signal actual valuation as a means to achieve 
separation from bad issuers under information asymmetry between issuers and investors. A noisier 
environment with high uncertainty increases the extent of underpricing needed for separation. Allen and 
Faulhaber (1989), Michaely and Shaw (1994) as well as Welch (1989 and 1996) find that the signalling 
hypothesis explains the empirical pattern of underpricing behaviour. Second, in principal-agent models greater 
valuation uncertainty puts a premium on the underwriting services (Jenkinson and Ljunqvist, 2001), where 
higher underwriting (agency) cost conditional on uncertainty entails higher levels of underpricing. Nonetheless, 
this situation can only occur if competition in the underwriting line and/or difficulties in placing shares with 
investors accords underwriters sufficient market power to seek information rents from issuers. Third, the ex 
ante hypothesis problem developed by Ritter (1984) as well as Beatty and Ritter (1986) explains a discounted 
offering price as compensation for the investment risk of uninformed investors, whose rational expectation 
would suggest disproportionately high shares in poor transactions when informed investors shy away placing 
their bids.
16 Since informed investors condition their decision to request some allocation on positive payoff, this 
allocative benefit results in underpricing and increases in valuation uncertainty. Hence, the benefit from
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advantage o f  informed investors carries higher gross payoffs as the degree o f  valuation uncertainty 
rises, higher informed investment demand in the composition o f the investor pool entails a higher 
degree o f underpricing (to maintain the participation incentive o f  investors). Hence, higher gross 
payoffs from informed investment exacerbate the “winner’s curse” problem. Uninformed investors 
would rationally believe that they receive a disproportionately high allocation o f transactions o f  poor 
quality.17
It is commonplace to argue that securitisation markets are notorious for weak information disclosure 
about underlying reference portfolios, intricate auditing standards and legal uncertainty surrounding 
the estimation o f expected investor return and the complex enforcement o f  restrictive covenants and 
redemption criteria. These contingencies and information constraints impede efficient asset pricing 
and hinder full understanding o f the fundamental risk involved in securitisation transactions.18 Low  
market liquidity o f  securitisation instruments suggests substantial valuation uncertainty.19 In the 
presence o f  disintegrated capital markets, the low degree o f  informed investment could provide 
grounds for discounted offerings to compensate for investment risk. So, the adaptation o f  
asymmetric information models o f  IPO pricing has intuitive appeal. Moreover, participants in 
securitisation markets20 learn about allocation rates, which award all agents regardless o f  their size the 
same chance o f  placing a successful bid. Consequently, the “winner’s curse” problem seems a 
plausible cause to underpricing o f securitisation transactions.
generating private information production is similar to investment in a call option on the IPO with the offering 
price as strike price and the valuation of the issue as the underlying asset price. The call option reflects the 
degree of underpricing. As the option value increases with uncertainty about the underlying valuation, more 
investors become informed.
17 Some empirical studies confirming the winner’s curse problem on the basis of allocation rates of IPO issues 
include Koh and Walter (1989), Levis (1990), Keloharju (1993) as well as Amihud et al. (2003).
18 See also Rudedge (2004) on the frequendy decried absence of widespread standardisation in securitisation 
markets.
19 Substantial liquidity risk and rent seeking from information advantage has confined most investment in 
securitisation markets to “buy-and-hold” strategies by large and well-informed institutional investors, insurance 
companies, banks and other financial institutions; yet evidence about the degree of uninformed investment 
remains inconclusive for loss of empirical observations.
20 The securitisation market consists of two types of investors: individual investors and institutional investors. 
While the majority of investors, which mosdy invest in high-volume issue tranches with high seniority (such as 
big insurance companies), could be regarded as uninformed, the small portion of institutional and private 
investors function is informed and invests in junior and riskier. As senior tranches outweigh lower rated 
tranches by far in notional volume, uninformed investor claim a sizeable part of investment demand in 
securitisation markets.
4 MODEL
We tender a security (issue) design model, where a single monopolistic issuer o f  securitised claims 
maximises his proceeds through an optimal allocation that is incentive compatible with informed 
investment demand. The model describes a simplified issuing process in a simplified securitisation 
market consisting o f  one issuer without endowment21 and two discrete types o f investors, with 
competition limited to investors only. The issuer offers securitised claims to outside investors at 
some selling price after having sounded out the perceived issue quality by taking initial quantity 
orders from sophisticated investors on the basis o f a commonly understood pricing scheme. The 
total number o f  claims is set to unity. We distinguish between two discrete types o f buyers: informed 
investors I  (e.g. large institutional investors, banks, hedge fund managers) and uninformed investors
6  e  = £l, 6  J (e.g. retail investors), whose types are defined by nature ex ante as measures o f
informed and uninformed demand. Informed investors act as quasi-market makers and price setters 
during initial placement, before uninformed investors clear the market after price discovery by 
informed types. The probability o f being an informed or uninformed investor is proportional to the 
incidence o f  types, where l j ( l  + 6 ) is the probability o f being informed. The distribution o f
uninformed investment 6  and the total number o f informed investors I  is common knowledge. 
Informed investors have sufficient funds to buy the entire transaction (or as much as available). The 
same applies to the total number o f  uninformed investors. In keeping with Rock (1986) we assume 
uniform informed investment, where each informed investor can be allocated more than one share 
(i.e. varying quantity orders). Uninformed investors can only buy at m ost one share each and have 
sufficient funds to buy the entire issue at any valuation irrespective o f the offering price. If informed 
investors decide to buy (at some pricing schedule based on allocation), we anticipate rationing o f  
uninformed investors in the sense o f  the “winner’s curse” adverse selection problem in Rock 
(1986).22 All agents in the model are assumed to be risk-neutral. The issue valuation r is  a random
variable r  ~  with precision a  . The issuer does not know the realisation o f  uninformed
investment 6  and offers the transaction with promised repayment c { r ) € . C =  [0.1] to informed
investors / €  I  at a fixed price-quantity schedule. Informed investors learn about the actual valuation 
by gathering precise but not perfect information about the quality o f  the issue before they tender a
21 i.e. funds generated from the issue accrue irrespective of other assets the issuer might hold on his books.
22 See also section 3 for a brief review o f the rationale of underpricing in the context o f initial public offerings 
o f stocks (IPO).
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bid.23 They observe the realisation o f valuation r  as a i.i.d. private (and cosdess)24 noisy signal 
g  = r +  e ,  where and / ( ^ )  = exp - ( f  — r)2j^2/3~2^j^yl27rfi~'1 j . Due to perfect
information sharing all informed investors form uniform beliefs about the actual issue valuation on  
aggregate; however, we rule out information extraction by means o f  simple cross-reporting (Cremer 
and McLean, 1988).25 Informed investors adjust their beliefs g  about realisation r with non­
decreasing contractual repayment c{r) to the weighted measure26 s = ( a r  + 0 g ) / ( a  + 0 )  with 
,€ * ■ [ 0 ,1 ]  27 They have an incentive to participate only if the noisy signal g o f private information 
is sufficiently accurate, so that precision measure y  = (a 2 ( a  + 0 ^ j 0  ( a  + 2 0 )  o f  the private signal 
received by informed investors satisfies y  < 2 n  (see section 5.2). The precision also indicates the 
degree o f valuation uncertainty.
Our design problem maximises issuer payoffs contingent on an efficient rule o f  action, which 
prescribes a particular allocation preference o f  informed investors with belief s to obtain positive 
payoffs for a given price-quantity schedule. Informed investors request some allocation 0 < q{s) < 1
if  and only if  the fixed price-quantity schedule o f general property p ( s )  — q ( s ) a ( 0 < a < l )  implied
23 This superior capability of interpreting the investment risk of securitised exposures in a more informative 
way could be interpreted in several ways. Informed investment by large brokerage firms or other financial 
institutions with expert knowledge, either within or outside the issuer’s industry, could stem from their own 
expertise in originating and monitoring credit risk and structured risk (i.e. market and asset liquidity, interest 
and currency volatility as well as organisational risk of asymmetric information in lending relationships), such as 
credit risk analysis (Boot and Thakor, 2000). Similarly, Inderst and Muller (2002) suggest that also gathering 
new information about macroeconomic facts, such as market growth and product demand, effecting the 
outcome of issue performance might help improve the accuracy of risk assessment. Both arguments indicate 
that informed investors are able to extract private information about the actual issue quality and update their 
beliefs accordingly.
24 Inderst and Muller (2002) point out two prime inefficiencies associated with the information production 
through noisy signals: (i) misclassification of the actual valuation r, so that the action of informed investment 
after observing signal s would constitute either overpriced investment or forgone profitable investment; and (ii) 
mismatch of actual efforts taken by informed investors and required effort level for appropriate risk analysis 
(Manove et al., 2001). In order to remedy these inefficiencies, for simplicity we consider (i) the information 
content of the signal fixed and (ii) the effort of risk analysis essentially cosdess (instead of the proposition of a 
marginal cost associated with the signal).
25 In contrast, uninformed investors behave quasi-atomistically, so their allocation implies forgone informed 
investment, given sufficient availability of investment funds by both categories of investors.
26 Assuming that uncertainty about the valuation r would otherwise eliminate private signals g unless they were 
sufficientiy precise, informed investors adjust their subjective beliefs g about the expected returns by the 
degree of perceived accuracy of private information.
27 The acceptance set of adjusted beliefs for profitable informed investment is adapted from the work by 
Morris and Shin (2000) on the indeterminacy of beliefs as a source of co-ordination failure. Their model of 
bank runs is based on a Bayes Nash equilibrium of an imperfect information game. In our case, we treat each 
realisation of perceived valuation as a continuum of varying investment decisions by informed investors in a 
one-shot game.
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by an auction-style allocation preference as a continuous function o f perceived issue quality yields
profitable investment £}(f(r)|.r) > p ( s ) ,  where 0 < £ <  p{s)  and 9_>T. The acceptance set of
allocation choices associated with profitable informed investment formalises a direct revelation 
mechanism (DRM). The issuer allocates the residual portion of the transaction to uninformed investors 
at the same (i.e. uniform) or a higher (i.e. discriminate) offering price. Uninformed investors are 
unaware o f the realisation of both r and 9  . If the uniformed price is still lower than fair market price, 
passive uninformed investment demand clears the market.28 We attribute no additional function to 
uninformed investors. If  informed investors do not appropriate any profit for a given issue quality, 
they refrain from disclosing information about actual issue quality through an acceptable allocation 
level. Without allocation to informed investors, everybody receives zero payoffs.29 Hence, our issue 
design model relies on efficient allocation as the only strategic choice variable to (i) maximise issuer 
payoffs under optimal information extraction from informed investors and (ii) ensure their as price 
setters o f uninformed investment demand.30
5 OPTIMAL ISSUING PROCESS AND ALLOCATION
Our basic model framework o f optimal security issuance relies on the conventional allocation-based 
argument o f IPO underpricing due to asymmetric information between issuers and investors in 
keeping with the “winner’s curse” problem (Rock, 1986). However, our approach goes beyond the 
rationing o f uninformed investors as the main determinant of underpricing. In a general auction-style 
design, we maximise issuer proceeds conditional on price discounting needed to guarantee profitable 
informed investment over a positive measure of issue quality for a given degree of valuation 
uncertainty about securitised assets reflected in the composition o f the investor pool. In extension to
28 This issue process requires waiting to be the dominant strategy of uninformed investors if the appellation of 
being informed is limited only to those investors who can adjust their beliefs about actual issue quality based on 
the realisation of signal q . So no uninformed can pretend to be informed by definition.
29 Since any allocation of claims will only take place if informed investors decide to participate, all poor 
transactions are singled out through this direct revelation mechanism, and, hence, have no effect on the 
optimal allocation and pricing schedule of the issuing process. This implies that issuers would not be able to 
solicit any investment demand unless a true market valuation (as some “seal of approval”) has been sought 
from informed investors. Ruling out investment in poor securitisation transactions with a negative signal denies 
any partial or full issuance prior to risk assessment (with the resultant formation of investor beliefs) and indirect 
information disclosure through informed investment demand. In this case the offering price would need to be 
regarded as a sunk cost, so that the investment choice of informed investors could be solved trivially for the 
first best outcome without repayment playing a role. Hence, we confine the feasible states of issuing a 
securitisation transaction to a continuous range of positive measures of issue quality with positive signals only. 
Hence, we confine the feasible states of issuing a securitisation transaction to a continuous range of positive 
measures of issue quality with positive signals only.
30 Only the proportion of informed investment is common knowledge, and both types of investors have 
sufficient funds on aggregate to theoretically buy the entire transaction.
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the “winner’s curse” problem, we derive a sustainable equilibrium solution for an optimal issuing 
process with endogenous price discovery, in which the allocation choice satisfies informed 
investment demand as a continuous function of perceived issue quality. At the same time, issuers are 
able to extract maximum surplus from informed investors in a direct revelation mechanism (DRM).
Before we present an auction-style allocation choice to derive maximum issuer payoffs under 
uniform and discriminatory pricing, we solve the optimisation problem o f informed investors within 
an efficient acceptance set of adjusted beliefs about actual issue quality (see section 5.2), which 
prescribes a profile o f profitable allocation choices at a fixed price-quantity schedule. We firs derive 
expected issuer returns under uniform and discriminatory pricing if informed investors were granted 
optimal allocation (see section 5.3). Then we introduce an auction-style allocation preference as a 
continuous function o f perceived issue quality within the acceptance set o f profitable informed 
investment, which allows issuers to maximise own payoffs by extracting information surplus from 
price discovery through DRM by informed investors (Malakhov, 2003; Myerson, 1981) (see section
5.4). Let us now revisit the fundamental rationale of the Rock IPO model, before we derive the 
acceptance set o f optimal informed investment and an allocation schedule under DRM, which 
maximises profitable informed investment at a fixed price-quantity schedule.
5.1 The Rock (1986) model revisited
The aforementioned ex ante rationing problem of uninformed investors for an issuing process of 
“good deals” at a fixed price offering equates to the widely known “winner’s curse” problem of IPOs 
in equity markets. According to Rock (1986), less privileged investors are crowded out by investors 
with superior information about the true value o f the issue, who would only invest if shares priced at 
their expected value or lower, else they withdraw from the market in response to an observed bad 
quality o f the IPO shares. This argument explains why issuers would need to discount uniform 
offering price below fair market value in order to compensate uniformed investors for a “lemons 
problem” (Akerlof, 1970) o f share allocation. Most shares allocated to uninformed issuers are 
“overpriced” compared to shares desired by informed investors. So underpricing accommodates the 
rational expectation that a disproportionately large share of “bad deals” are allocated to uninformed 
investment demand. Uninformed investors receive a full allocation of all shares only for overpriced 
issues (with informed investment being limited to “good deals”). A simplified version of the Rock 
model in Biais et al. (2002) conveys the essence of the “winner’s curse” dilemma of issuers.31-32
31 In line with Rock (1986) an issuer offers a total number of shares at uniform price p, where all informed 
investors (with individually varying quantity orders) demand at most I  shares, whilst each of 6 uninformed
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5.2 Optimisation problem of informed investors
Since price discovery in our DRM is contingent on profitable informed investment, we first derive 
the acceptance set o f allocation choices that generate positive net payoffs at a fixed price-quantity 
schedule for eligible (i.e. sufficiendy precise) beliefs about actual issue quality. At this stage we 
represent uniform informed investment demand by one informed investor. Informed investor belief s 
about the true issue quality is associated with an absolutely continuous distribution function Gs (r)
of valuation r € R with positive conditional density gs (r) > 0 continuous in the interior of S, where
is ' (r ) / is  (r ) strictly increases for all r € R , given any pair of signals with s’ > s
[Monotone Likelihood Ratio Property (MLRP)]. The conditional and unconditional expected return o f the 
issue at valuation r is  defined as fis — JRrgs(r)dr and f { f ) i s(f)ds respectively. Given a repayment
contract33 c(r) with f {c)>  0 , we re-specify expected investor return as
us(r)=  j[ 4 r) i s ( r) dr - 0)
buyers are allocated at most one share. This assumption reflects allocative benefits associated with better 
information about the actual issue quality, where only individual allocation of shares to uninformed investors 
matters to model an optimal allocation schedule in the presence of investor rationing. Informed investors 
request I  shares on aggregate if the IPO is a “good deal”, i.e. the market valuation v  of the issue is larger than 
the offering price p. If v < p informed investors abstain from investing and leave all shares to uninformed 
investors. Consequently, higher overall informed demand and associated rationing of investors for “good 
deals” results in a “winner’s curse problem” — uninformed investors receive a disproportionately large amount 
of shares in “bad deals” if their bids are successful. Hence, uninformed investors would expect a “price 
discount” proportional to the rationing rate, so that = £[r(v — y>)] > 0 , where the rationing rate 
T — 1/(/ + #) if v > p  , else r  = 1JO. Since the covariance of r  and v  is positive, it follows that E(v) > p  .
32 Note that the participation incentive of informed investors to engage in information production represents a 
call option on the actual value of the IPO, which they will only exercise (by requesting shares in the IPO) if the 
underlying expected value exceeds the offering price (as strike price). The value of the option held by informed 
investors increases with valuation uncertainty. More investors become informed as higher information 
asymmetry between issuers and investors increases the option value, which exacerbates the “winner’s curse 
problem”. Higher uncertainty also implies that a declining fraction of uninformed investors suffers from higher 
chances of being allocated a disproportionately large amount of shares in “bad deals”. Empirical evidence of 
IPOs suggests that the degree of asymmetry seems to be correlated with the size of the issue. The larger the 
issue the higher the chances of professional management and transparency, so more information about the true 
valuation reduces the degree of asymmetric information.
33 Fractional repayment arises if issuers retain some expected return (“first loss provision”/ “credit 
enhancement”) as a positive effort choice to guarantee residual claims over and above full payment on issued 
securities. We follow the credit decision approach by Maskin and Tirole (1990 and 1992) in modelling the 
specification of the overall repayment level to investors.
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If the noisy signal g is deemed to be sufficiently precise, informed investors would only request an 
allocation 0 < q(s) < 1 as a continuous function o f updated investor beliefs s, where the associated 
offering price implies positive payoff for p(s )  < us (r)  , which is binding at the optimum .34 In order 
to devise a rule o f action for optimal informed investment, we need to specify a lower bound of 
informed investor belief s with associated conditional investor payoff us ( r )  to yield profitable 
investment.
0:5--
s* t
Fig 1. Cumulative distribution function of updated investor beliefs.
Informed investors adjust their beliefs about the realisation r with contractual repayment c{r) to the 
weighted measure s = {ar  + f3g^j{a + with ;  £ l  = [0, l] upon observing noisy signal g . The 
distribution functions F  ( j)  and F  ($") with f ( s ) > 0  and /  ( f )  > 0 are absolutely continuous and 
common knowledge. Informed investors consider g sufficiently accurate only if precision measure 
Y = { a 2 (cc + /? ) ) /P{pt + 2/?) of (weighted) signal s is small enough to satisfy y  < 2n  and meet the
critical value s* = Q^yfy  (j- * — r ) j , where 0 ( . )  denotes a standard normal distribution.35 Higher 
precision (at a low y )  reflects lower valuation uncertainty o f informed investor belief s about the 
realisation o f r. The critical level s * (see Fig. 1) is obtained at the intersection of 0 ( . )  with the 45
34 This specification restricts the specification of repayment in Inderst and Muller (2002), where informed 
investment maximise gross payoff for a menu m e M  of possible repayment contracts cm (r) e C , to a single 
repayment contract. In keeping with Innes (1990) as well as Marzo and Duffie (1999) we assume that 
repayment is non-decreasing in investment returns. In lending relationships borrowers could realise ex post 
arbitrage gains by borrowing cash to boost expected future cash flows and qualify for some lending criteria if 
contractual repayment generated from an investment project was to decrease over some subset of realised 
project payoffs (Innes, 1990).
35 In this set-up we ignore the co-ordination problem of several agents in Morris and Shin (2000).
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degree line, which divides the indeterminate region [0, l] around its mid point. The critical level s * 
diverges to the left o f expected r the less precise the signal. Conversely, if the signal becomes less 
noisy, s * approximates r at <i>(.)=0.5 . As noise becomes negligible in the limit, the curve o f O (.) 
flattens out, and y  and s * tend to zero and 0.5 respectively. Once signal s > s * passes muster as 
sufficiendy precise private information, informed investors consider a profitable allocation level that 
satisfies us (r) > p(s)  . At s * the utility of private information from noisy signal g is zero and non- 
random. The expectation o f r is only conditional on j- * , which is s * itself. Since noise p  o f signal 
g is independent o f r, informed investor are uniformly indifferent at s * in expectation o f valuation 
r.
Since all eligible signals s > s* G S  of sufficient precision belong to the absolutely continuous 
distribution function Gs (r)  and each allocation level is subject to a fixed price-quantity schedule
with the general property />(r) = q(s)“ (0 < ^ £ l) , by monotonicity we obtain an optimisation 
problem with a simple crossing property and an unconstrained maximum. Provided that informed 
investors only disclose their private information if their allocation generates positive net payoff, we 
define two cases of the relationship between (implied) offering price and expected investment return: 
us (r )  < ^ ( r )  and us (r )  > /> (/), which rules out the trivial case o f either positive or negative signals
for all levels o f adjusted investor beliefs s about valuation r e R .  Since we assume the margin of 
indifference to divulge private information to be a zero-probability event, we include the case 
us (r) = p (s )  o f zero payoffs from informed investment in the acceptance set as boundary
condition. Note that the repayment level restricts the acceptance set o f profitable informed 
investment.36
Lem m a. The acceptance set of informed investors for repayment c(r) is defined by 
.f * a  s> s  s.t. us (r) > p ( s ) } c z S  with cut-off signal s e  [0. 1] with pero profit from
informed investment at us {r) = p (f ) -  Unless us (r )  < ^ ( r )  with s = 1, s > s *  is unique and informed 
investment occurs for all /  > £ > /* >  0 .
36 With full repayment (i.e. no restriction on conditional return from valuation r by some repayment contract),
we would need to distinguish the less restrictive conditions fls < p(s)  and fis >  y>(.r) . This consideration
reflects the repayment choice in securitisation — the lower the quality of securitised assets, the higher the level 
of required credit support as reservation utility and the lower repayment from the realised portfolio value as 
higher expected default reduces expected returns from the securitised asset pool.
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Based on Lemma, we can derive the net payoff from optimal informed investment for allocation 
choice q(s)  and conditional return us ( r )  with gs (r)  > 0 for each belief s within the acceptance set
Q(j-) . Informed investors derive the first best solution of their optimisation problem by requesting 
allocation 0 <qx ( j )  < 1 for payment of offering price pj  ( / ) ,  which maximises the concave objective 
function
u(s)i=i^ f Jwmo-aMJ/co** (2)
where the optimal allocation choice q] (.r) = %Jt^ s ( r ) / (a + 1) implies p* (r) = q] (s)a = us ( r ) / (a + 1) 
under the general property o f a fixed price-quantity schedule. Note that non-decreasing repayment
r ( r )  yields surplus L  ? i as reservation utility from
fis — p) (j)^ f {s )d s  before repayment at valuation r. Since informed investors optimise
net payoff U  (j-) > 0 over acceptance set Q (j-) the probability o f profitable informed investment for 
all eligible private signals is illustrated as the area indicated by Pr^U  (r) > o j for s > s * in Fig. 2 as 
the subset of distribution function F ( f ( r ) )  and F ( / )  of expected conditional return and adjusted
belief. Hence, this probability measure reflects the chances o f private information about the actual 
issue to be sufficiently accurate for consideration o f profitable investment within acceptance set 
in Lemma. We will revisit this interim observation at a later stage o f our analysis (see section
5.4) when we were to represent issuer payoff over the entire range of r  e  [0.1]-
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Fig 2. Probability of profitable informed investment given updated investor
5.3 Issuer payoffs under optimal informed investment
For illustrative purposes, we first determine issuer payoffs for our issue design problem with price 
discovery of first-best informed investment at optimal allocation q] (x) within the acceptance set
under uniform and discriminatory pricing,37 with informed investors acting as price setters for 
uninformed investment demand. Under uniform pricing, both informed and uninformed investors pay 
the same offering price, which creates straightforward incentive compatibility. All investors obtain 
positive payoff with certainty, with uninformed investors being rationed at a rate o f r  = 1/(g*j (x) + #).
With total issue volume set to unity, complete allocation at uniform price p] (x) generates issuer 
payoff
E (U )u = JL{s)P i ( s) f ( s) ds= l Kl)(us(r) / ( a + 1) ) f ( s) ^ = 0[ l^ ^ f ^ ds’ (3)
where informed investors obtain U (x); in (2). Since the remainder, 1 — qj (x ) , is tendered to
uninformed investors at the same offering price to clear the market, they each receive expected net 
payoff
U ( s)u = "^ JL(/)(1 - ^  (J))(* ' ( r ) “  AGr) ) / ( J)^ r • (4)
Issuers can increase their expected issue payoff £(11)^ through a minimum allocation o f claims at a
slightly discounted offering price within acceptance set Q (x ) . A low value o f us (r)  further limits
the absolute measure o f underpricing. However, uniform pricing could weaken incentives of 
informed investors to engage in price discovery for an efficient allocation choice, as net payoff 
U (x)/ o f informed investors might even be smaller than individual payoff U  (x)^ of uninformed
investors at high valuation uncertainty. If  0  -  4i (■*■))/0 > q i ( s ) < > 9 < { \ - q \  ( x)) jq \  (x) informed
37 Note that by restricting ourselves to solving the design problem for maximum informed investor payoff, we 
deliberately disregard valuation uncertainty and the associated composition o f the investment demand as a 
determinant o f the optimal allocation choice by the issuer to achieve a sustainable equilibrium outcome.
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investors38 may choose to misrepresent their type for a given expected conditional return us ( r ) . 
Only a high incidence of uninformed investors associated with low valuation uncertainty preserves 
informed investment demand for efficient allocation choices in O (x) under uniform pricing.
Note that higher valuation uncertainty is reflected in lower precision (i.e. a high y  measure, see 
section 5.2) of informed investor belief s about the realisation o f r, which decreases acceptance set 
of Lemma. If  U (j‘)/ were to be kept constant, a higher allocation q\ ( /)  associated with a
smaller range o f profitable allocation choices leaves a smaller residual allocation 1 — q\ (r) to 
uninformed investors 0 .  Since uninformed investors are limited to one share each, higher rationing 
at lower r  = l/ig] (.r) + #) leaves a smaller number of uninformed investors 6  in the investor pool, 
who might possibly claim U (j-)^ > U ( j ) / .39
Proposition 1 [Valuation uncertainty and acceptance set]. Lower valuation uncertainty increases the 
acceptance set Q ( /)  and decreases both the optimal allocation to informed investors and underpricing. Lower (higher) 
valuation uncertainty also implies a higher (lower) incidence of uninformed investors.
Proposition 2 [Uniform pricing]. Under uniform pricing the issuer extracts most informed investor surplus by 
keeping the perceived valuation and valuation uncertainty as low as possible within acceptance set Q (j’) according to 
Proposition 1, while preventing misrepresentation by informed investors.
Alternatively, issuers might have discretion in tendering the residual allocation to uninformed 
investors at an offering price higher than the offering price pj (j-) implied by a first-best allocation
to informed investors. Since both types o f investors act independently, discriminatory pricing allows 
the issuer to extract more surplus from investors, while eliminating the danger o f misrepresentation 
by informed investors. Discriminatory pricing can satisfy the incentive compatibility constraint 
U (j-)/ > U (s)[/ invariant to the incidence o f uninformed investors. The issuer allocates the
38 For the determination of this threshold of uninformed investment demand, we maintain the assumption o f 
uniform informed investment behaviour, such that our comparative statics are only influenced by the number 
o f informed investors in relation to positive net payoffs from investment.
39 At the same time, we could also argue this aspect from the perspective o f underpricing in line with the IPO 
underpricing model by Rock (1986). Valuation uncertainty represents an (implicit) “outside option”, where 
uninformed issuers would expect higher underpricing associated with a higher rationing rate for higher levels o f 
valuation uncertainty, which increases the option value. Lower valuation uncertainty implies higher levels of
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proportion 0 < q*j (x) < 1 o f the issue to informed investors at price p \ (x ) . The remainder 
qv (x) < \ — q] (x) is offered to uninformed investors to clear the market. The maximum offering 
price p v (x) the issuer can charge to uninformed investors is
pv (x) = m ax j^ ; (x), us (r)  ( r ) “  A  (■r) ) ^ J  ’ (5)
which solves inequality
rjU(s)i >U(s )v <^l][^s)q] ( s ) {uXr ) - pI ( s ) ) f ( s ) d s > ^ \ n^ q u (s)(us ( r ) - p lj { s ) ) f ( s ) ds ,  (6)
where fraction 0 < Tf < 1 denotes the multiple o f the payoff received by all informed investors at 
allocation q] (x) to the maximum net payoff of each uninformed investor at allocation 
qv (x) < \ — q\ (x ) . The measure TJ becomes binding if informed investors expect rj -times higher 
informed payoff than individual uninformed investment payoff, which requires 8 6 / dr] = —1. Thus, 
expected issuer payoff under discriminatory pricing would be
E ( U )d = JL(,)A ( s ) f ( s ) d s + JL^ u ('HA; ( s ) ~  P i ( s ) ) f ( s ) ds a=0 J W/ W^  C1)
9u0)=1-9i(')
Proof of equation (7). See Appendix.
Since py (x) > p] (x ), the issuer could extract more surplus from uninformed investors, so that 
expected issuer gross payoffs under discriminatory pricing satisfies
(8)E (n )D > E (n )„ « ( 1+a) - J E E ( 2 + a ( i - * r ) )
within the range for all 0 < a < 0 . Only in the limit of a —> 0 , when the selling price equals unity, 
would issuers be indifferent between both pricing regimes.
market information about the true issue quality and lower discounting o f the uniform offering price as
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Proposition 3 [Discriminatory pricing]. Discriminatory pricing allows issuers to charge uninformed investors 
a higher offering price than informed investors to achieve separation. Higher relative payoff of informed investors 
(regardless of the degree of uninformed investment demand ly Proposition 1) completely eliminates the incentive of 
misrepresentation. The issuer extracts most informed investor surplus ly keeping the valuation as low as possible within 
acceptance set .
5.4 Optimal allocation for maximum issuer payoffs
The ability o f issuers to achieve complete allocation within acceptance set of profitable
informed investment under different pricing regimes indicates the importance o f the incidence of 
investor types in our issue design problem. However, the residual allocation to uninformed investors 
and the incentive o f informed investors to participate in DRM at any issue quality — as long as some 
allocation yields positive payoff -  curtail the ability of informed investors to optimise own payoffs by 
disclosing their beliefs. So far, we have not recognised the allocation level as a strategic choice 
variable of issuers. In the following section we derive the conditions for maximum expected issuer 
payoffs in an auction-style issuing process under uniform and discriminatory pricing, where the 
issuer’s allocation choice satisfies the acceptance set Q ( / ) . In line with the general notion of a fixed
price-quantity schedule in the previous section, we now derive the offering price from an auction- 
style allocation choice of informed investors as a continuous function o f adjusted beliefs about the 
actual issue quality. We also assume multiple informed investors to compare individual investor 
payoffs similar to our approach in section 5.3.
Under discriminatory pricing issuers discount their allocation to informed investors and solve the 
allocation choice for optimal (gross) payoffs by offering the residual allocation to uninformed 
investors at a fair (market) price. This implies 2ero net payoffs from uninformed investment while 
completely denying informed investors incentives of misrepresenting themselves as uninformed 
types. Since the issue mechanism depends on the participation of informed investors for an 
allocation choice within the acceptance set Q (s) , the issuer chooses to discount the issue for
p ( s } < u s{r) at unit offering price p{s) lq{s)  and acceptable allocation 0 < ^ ( r ) < 1 according to
uninformed investors would assume lower chances of being outsmarted by informed investors.
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the fixed price-quantity schedule.40 In extension to the previous section, we model the allocation 
choice as a continuos function o f investor beliefs about the true issue quality to represent the fixed 
price-quantity schedule. The remainder 1 — q{s) is tendered to all uninformed investors at the
offering price = us ( r ) , so that
(9)
Under uniform pricing the issuer offers the same selling price to both types o f investors at individual 
allocation rates o f q{ s ) / l  and (l —^ ( j) ) /#  respectively to maximise expected payoff
P ( s) - f . \  . P ( s)
E ( n ) " M S )  M  T w , W  + ( l ' , W)  \ f ( l ) d l ‘ .SS& i > T o  •f { l ) J s "  (10)
We solve the above optimisation problem in (9) and (10) for both pricing regimes by means o f a 
DRM auction model adapted from Myerson (1981), where the issuer maximises own payoffs over a 
positive measure of issue quality through an allocation choice within an acceptance set of profitable 
informed investment. Each allocation level of the acceptance set relies on a fixed price-quantity 
schedule implied by an auction-style allocation preference as a continuous function o f perceived issue 
quality. This implies an offering price that satisfies the following participation and incentive 
constraints:
U(s)  > 0 & q ( s )  us ( r ) ~ ^ p r  = q(s)u3( r ) ~  p ( s )>  0
I  W ) J
(PC)
? (XK  (r ) -  p ( s) *  ( r ) -  p(s )  V s’}’r (ICi)
40 The variables p(s) and q{s) are used as shorthand to denote the offering price and the allocation to 
informed investors. For simplicity we drop the index for the investor type from the notation in the remainder 
of the chapter, as the allocation to uninformed investors is not a strategic parameter choice and follows from 
the price-quantity schedule of informed investors.
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q(s)  , w  G q(s)
W  (IC2)
. .  7 ( l - ^ ( j ) )  . .  I
<?>q(s)>-±---- - ^ - d l  > q ( s ) > --------,
* W  G * W  I +  G
where ^  (r)  > 0  is strictly continuous. IC2 applies only to uniform pricing, ensuring that the 
proposed allocation-based direct information revelation awards informed investors higher individual 
net payoff.42 We consider the allocation choice q{s) a continuous function o f investor belief
From rewriting IQ  and PC above (see Proof Theorem 1) we obtain an alternative 
definition o f non-decreasing and absolutely continuous U(s) > 0 with = q(s)
(ii)
Combining PC and (11) with U ( r ) ; = 0 (see Lemma) yields the “allocation-based” offering price
p(s )  = q(s)us (r) -  ^ { s ) d s  , (12)
Theorem 1 and 2 follow from substituting (12) in equations (9) and (10) respectively.
41 Note that if we wanted to represent issuer payoff over the entire range of r 6 [0.1] , we would need to adjust
our maximisation problem by the probability of informed investment to occur (see section 5.2).
42 IC2 implies a higher (lower) allocation to informed investors in response to a higher (lower) number of 
informed investors relative to the number of informed investors associated with high (low) uncertainty. For 
efficient price discovery under uniform pricing, knowledge about 6 (as a determinant of the allocation 
schedule) registers as a critical factor. We know from section 4 that only the distribution of uninformed types is 
commonly known. However, if informed investors could estimate 6 valuation uncertainty, issuer payoffs 
would decrease in the precision of investor knowledge about 6 as IC2 would become more restrictive. The 
lack of information about the presence of uninformed investors adds inefficiency to the maximisation problem 
of issuers in Theorem 2 (see section 5.4). Chances are that informed investors would be more inclined to 
misrepresent themselves under uniform pricing unless they can claim higher net payoffs as they refine their 
investment decision. Given a precision measure y € T from absolutely continuous P i/ )  with f { y )  > 0,
informed investors might infer the realisation of uninformed investment G € 'F = G J from the accuracy of
their noisy signal g . Conditioning F(y) on {pi) > 0 yields the conditional number of uninformed as
Ey (G) = Ggy (0)d6 , with the unconditional number of uninformed investors Ey(0)= ^f{y)gr {G)dy. In
keeping with MLRP any pair (y , / ) e T  with y'> Y the ratio gy{G)j gy{9) is strictly increasing in 6 for all 
0 € 'F .
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Theorem 1 [Discriminatory pricing]. The issuer maximises own payoff under discriminatory pricing by 
solving max i^ us (r )  — ^q(s)dsj / ( j ) ^  for where 0 < q(s)  < 1 is non-decreasing
Proof of Theorem 1. See Appendix.
Theorem 2 [Uniform pricing]. The issuer maximises own payoff under uniform pricing ly solving 
max q(s)ds j q ( s ) ^ f  (s)ds for s <=Q.(s), where allocation q{j-) e  [ j / ( j  + 0 ) , l j  is non­
decreasing.
Proof of Theorem 2. See Appendix.
The issuer can mitigate underpricing and optimise the proposed issue design at the lowest possible 
allocation ^ (r)  to informed investors within acceptance set Q(x) . We now derive the optimal range
of allocation choices to maximise issuer payoff, with some underpricing required for profitable 
participation based on their private information about actual issue quality.
Corollary 1 [Discriminatory pricing]. Under discriminatory pricing and fu ll allocation the issuer can extract 
investor surplus only up to £ ( n ) D = m y  ( r ) -  ^ q ( s ) d s ^ f  (s)ds > ( r ) f ( s ) d s - £ ,  which
implies allocation qe (j-) e 1J to satisfy informed investment demand according to luemma at discount s  > 0 .
Proof of Corollary 1. See Appendix.
Corollary 2 [Uniform pricing]. Under uniform pricing and fu ll allocation the issuer can extract investor surplus 
only up to E  (n ) „ s ™ ) y ‘' , W - i x,)« ( ' ) * / ? ( ' ) ) / ( ^ 4 , )* '( r )/ W i ‘ ?’
1 — q { s ) < 6 j { l  + 6} ,  which implies allocation qE ( /)  6 ^ 6 l / ( 7  + 0 ), 1J to satisfy informed investment demand 
according to Uemma at discount to q> > 0 .
Proof of Corollary 2. See Appendix.
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Corollary 1 verifies previous findings about higher sustainability o f the proposed issue design under 
price discrimination, when only litde allocation to informed investors suffices to induce price 
discovery by informed investors through an allocation preference and overall investor surplus s  
invariant to uninformed investment demand. Discriminatory pricing allows issuers to extract the most 
investor surplus from informed investors, who might otherwise misrepresent themselves as 
uninformed types if p(s )  = pu (r) < us (r )  under uniform pricing. This case requires a lower (higher)
incidence o f uninformed investors associated with a higher (lower) valuation uncertainty to coincide 
with a higher (lower) allocation to informed investors, so that each informed investor receives a 
higher individual payoff than uninformed investors (IC2), given overall investor surplus cp. Corollary 
2 shows that the optimal rule of action of the issuer in the case o f uniform pricing prescribes an 
allocation choice based primarily on the incidence o f types rather than the degree o f underpricing 
(see also section 5.3).
6 DISCUSSION
In the course o f the above analysis we saw that the prospect o f informed investors to obtain positive 
payoffs from DRM-based disclosure of their private information about the true issue quality via 
allocation preference is fundamental to our issue design process. The acceptance set of profitable 
informed investment qualifies the optimal allocation schedule for maximum issuer payoffs from 
endogenous price discovery at varying degrees of valuation uncertainty and pricing regimes. Issuers 
maximise their payoffs over a positive measure o f issue quality if the fixed price-quantity schedule 
implied by an auction-style allocation preference as a continuous function of perceived issue quality 
yields profitable informed investment. Moreover, a contractually predefined repayment level would 
restrict the acceptance set o f perceived issue quality due to lower payoff to be appropriated by 
investors. We find that issuers would strictly prefer discriminatory over uniform pricing. Issuers can 
extract most surplus from informed investors as “truth tellers” by offering only marginal positive net 
payoff (“underpricing”) through a certain allocation choice. The residual allocation to uninformed 
investors and the incentive of informed investors to subscribe to DRM at any issue quality -  as long 
as some allocation yields positive payoff — curtails the ability o f informed investors to optimise own 
payoffs from disclosing their beliefs. So uninformed investment demand implicitly strengthens the 
position o f issuers to maximise their payoffs under any pricing regime. Under uniform pricing, price 
discovery by informed investors is only sustainable if both the incidence of investor types and the 
allocation choice translate into higher individual profit of each informed investor relative to 
uninformed investors. Informed investors require higher underpricing under uniform pricing to
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obtain higher relative payoffs than uninformed investors in return for private information 
disclosure.43 Hence, uniform pricing generates (even) lower expected issuer payoffs than 
discriminatory pricing the higher the valuation uncertainty. Issuers would generally prefer a small 
(high) allocation to informed (uninformed) investors at low (high) valuation uncertainty to maximise 
own payoffs under either pricing regime. Again, the presence o f uninformed investors, depending on 
the degree o f valuation uncertainty contributes to the optimisation o f issuer payoffs. The higher the 
incidence o f uninformed investors, the lower the degree of underpricing due to the profitability 
constraint o f informed investors under uniform pricing.
If we were to rule out price discrimination as a suitable pricing regime due to statutory provisions in 
securitisation markets, further analysis o f our issue design model begs the question how the 
(strategic) allocation choice conditional on valuation uncertainty changes expected issuer payoffs 
under uniform pricing. Our preliminary findings in Corollary 1 and 2 suggest that higher informed 
investment demand associated with more valuation uncertainty and higher perceived issue quality always reduces issuer 
payoffs irrespective of the pricing regime — though the effect is larger under uniform pricing. We 
consider a numerical solution to illustrate optimal issuer payoffs under uniform pricing at varying 
allocation levels.
In Fig. 3 we approximate net issuer payoff under uniform pricing in a quasi-closed form solution of 
Theorem 2, where the allocation choice to informed investors for U  (j-)j = ^ (r )  (see section 5.4) is a 
continuous function o f perceived issue quality for all s e  (see Lemma in section 5.2). We
obtain conditional investment return us (r )  from repayment <r(r) at r e Q ( r )  by assuming the 
precision measure y  —> 0 (i.e. belief s becomes noiseless) to model how investor belief s translates 
into a corresponding realisation r  according to MLRP of Gs (r)  > 0 (see section 5.2). We set the 
discrete allocation level commensurate with the incidence o f investors in accordance with 
q ( s ) > l / ( l  + 0)  o f IC2. (see section 5.4) The cut-off signal is assumed to be
q{s) = i  = {0.25; 0.5;0.75} for simplicity. The issuer retains a reservation utility in the form o f credit 
enhancement so that constant repayment c{r) = 0.9. For illustrative purposes we also show net 
issuer payoff for full repayment, c{r) = r , at q(s) = 0.25 and cut-off signal £ = 0.15 (scaled to 
conditional expected return us (r)  on the x-axis of Fig. 3). As we traverse different degrees of
43 This implies a low option value of informed investment from valuation uncertainty and a high precision of 
adjusted investor beliefs s at the limit s —> f .
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valuation uncertainty -  proxied by the minimum discrete allocation level ^ ( j ) according to Theorem
2 (see section 5.4) -  we find that optimal allocation to informed investors as a strategic choice
variable to maximise issuer payoffs is contingent upon the valuation o f conditional return us ( r )  .
Once more informed investors participate at higher valuation uncertainty -  so that only a high
allocation ^ ( r )  satisfies IC2 -  higher valuation will engender higher issuer payoff. Conversely, we
maximise issuer payoff only if lower issue valuation entails a matching reduction in valuation 
uncertainty.
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Fig. 3. Approxim ated optimal issuer payoffs under uniform pricing at varying levels o f valuation uncertainty.
Fig. 3 represents optimal issue payoffs as an “efficient frontier” o f deterministic allocation levels for 
given conditional expected return for all levels of issuer beliefs about actual issue quality. We derive a 
positively concave function as solution to the DRM design problem of issue payoffs if valuation
uncertainty is continuous. The curvature is induced by continuous allocation preference ^q^s^ds
(see Proof o f Theorem 1), which drains issuer profits as higher perceived issue quality increases
informed investment demand in excess o f ^ (j-) . This situation follows the basic routine o f  our
model. If  the allocation choice is not commensurate to informed investment demand contingent on 
perceived issue quality, issuers cannot achieve optimal issue payoffs. We also observe that the
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reservation utility from partial repayment <r(r) limits the acceptance set Q (r)  o f eligible perceived 
issue quality. Fig. 3 also shows the efficiency loss associated with forgone net issue payoffs due to the 
reservation utility from repayment c(r) as the shaded area between the payoff curves at allocation
y (j") = 0.25 for full repayment r and repayment f ( r )  respectively.
Both the comparative perspective of both pricing regimes and the graphical representation of issuer 
payoffs in Fig. 3 reveal two main insights into the mechanics o f our model under uniform pricing. 
First, only high uninformed investment demand associated with low valuation uncertainty allows 
issuers to satisfy IC2 at low valuation, while higher valuation uncertainty requires higher valuation for 
issuer payoff to remain the same. Second, we find that lower expected repayment facilitates higher 
valuation at lower (valuation) uncertainty to generate the same net issuer payoff.
7 CONCLUSION
Securitisation markets are marred by problems o f asymmetric information between market makers 
with superior knowledge about securitised asset exposures and uninformed investment demand, 
where issuers frequently sound out a fair market price from sophisticated investors before they issue 
new securities. The potential effects of this market configuration on price formation, however, have 
mostly been acknowledged in the academic and professional literature as agency costs of “winner’s 
curse”-type underpricing.
In the course o f the above analysis, we addressed this issue in a general allocation-based, auction- 
style issue design based on price discovery by informed investors. We presented a basic model 
framework of optimal security issuance in the spirit of the conventional, allocation-based argument 
of IPO underpricing due to asymmetric information between issuers and investors. However, our 
approach did not reason underpricing on the grounds of the “winner’s curse” problem. Instead of 
compensating rationed uninformed investors, price discounting in our general issue design ensured 
profitable informed investment over a positive measure of issue quality to maximise issuer proceeds. We 
formalised a direct revelation mechanism (DRM) with a fixed price-quantity schedule, which endogenised 
price discovery in an auction-style allocation preference as a continuous function o f perceived issue 
quality. Our thinking was mainly guided by sustainable allocation-based price discovery, assuming 
that a monopolistic issuer can only solicit “truth telling” from informed investors if their allocation 
choice yields profitable investment. The resultant acceptance set of efficient allocation choices 
qualified maximum issuer payoffs at varying degrees of valuation uncertainty and pricing regimes.
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With uninformed investment demand clearing the market, we studied how the incidence of 
uninformed investors at varying levels of valuation uncertainty affects the utility o f informed 
investment especially under uniform pricing. Hence, we explored underpricing as jointly determined 
by profitable allocation by informed investors and the incidence of uninformed investment demand. 
We also conditioned profitable informed investment on some exogenous repayment level to account 
for structural support mechanisms in securitisation markets.
We found that — irrespective of the applicable pricing mechanism — the issuer maximises own payoffs 
at the lowest possible allocation (within the acceptance set o f efficient allocation choices) that still 
implies profitable informed investment. Although discriminatory pricing yields higher issuer payoffs, 
our evidence suggests that issuers could mitigate forgone net payoffs under uniform pricing by 
maintaining low valuation uncertainty at moderate levels of issue quality to induce a high presence of 
uninformed investors. Uninformed investment demand implicitly strengthens the position o f issuers 
to maximise own payoffs, mainly because it lowers the degree o f underpricing needed to satisfy the 
profitability constraint o f informed investors. Under uniform pricing, the issuer needs to ensure that 
the composition o f the investor pool allows informed investors to appropriate higher individual 
profit (than uninformed types). Otherwise, they might be inclined to request no allocation at all (i.e. 
misrepresent themselves as uninformed investors) due to insufficient profitability from price 
discovery in DRM. Any reservation utility from partial repayment carried an efficiency loss and 
required a higher issue valuation. The degree of valuation uncertainty critically mattered only under 
uniform pricing, where an altered incidence of investor types required an adjustment o f the allocation 
choice to still guarantee profitable informed investment at the highest possible level o f issuer payoffs. 
Since a higher (lower) allocation to informed investors at higher (lower) valuation uncertainty and a 
lower (higher) incidence o f uninformed investors implies higher (lower) underpricing, we would 
expect the minimisation of valuation uncertainty to be the dominant strategy for each level of 
valuation at the margin (cf. second moment o f payoff curve in Fig. 3). The issuer maximised payoffs 
under uniform pricing by following an “efficient frontier” of allocation choices across all states of 
issue quality, where the amount o f implied investment induced information disclosure by informed 
investors as a continuous function of perceived issue valuation. Nonetheless, informed investors 
never receive an allocation that maximises their own payoffs from investment unless high valuation 
uncertainty rules out any uninformed investment demand.
Overall this chapter represents a first attempt to reason underpricing on the grounds o f a strategic 
allocation choice by issuers to maximise own payoffs by engaging informed investors in profitable 
price discovery o f actual issue quality. The coincidence of valuation uncertainty and the allocation
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choice for a certain level o f perceived issue quality seems to be a prime consideration for optimal 
issuer payoffs under asymmetric information. While our approach might be overly parsimonious in 
many respects, we have restricted our issue design to include the reservation utility from a pre­
defined level o f repayment as the only element pertinent to securitisation markets. Hence, the general 
tenor o f our model invites a more specialised adaptation o f our findings to different asset types and 
entertains the need for more refined modelling o f intricate security design features o f asset-backed 
securities, such as the impact of option clauses, loss subordination and payment structures. Also the 
possible relaxation o f several exogenous assumptions in our model design, such as the repayment 
level and uniform informed investment, warrants further theoretical investigation.
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9 APPENDIX: PROOFS
Proof of equation (7).
E(n)D = L{s/ i  (s)f(s)ds+ a  M)/(j)*
= £(/)(a (s) + 4u( s) t i j ( s) - 4 u ( s) p i  (s ) ) f ( s) ds
Wl ( s ) +a‘W?IW f ( s) ds
Pu M >>» (5)
C^7 (X) = 1 — ^  (**■)
= y » , W - * , ( r W  (j) + A (*)fr CO-fr* (/)(*, (/))^7)/(/)if
= JL(> « M  i s) ( 1 + 0T?)) + Pi (s)4i (s) (1 + 07l ) ) f ( s ) d s
L(.)
l-« fl * , w
\ \
V * + 1
(1 + 077)
\  \ a +  ^ s
(1 + 077)
/ W *
(13)
q.e.d.
Proof of Theorem 1. In keeping with the standard logic of the optimal auction model by Myerson 
(1981) we can re-write IC and PC in section 5.4 in order to substitute the pricing component o f the 
optimisation problem as an allocation-based profitability constraint. We re-write (ICi) in terms o f s 
and r as
U(s)1 > 0 < ^ t?(s)us( r ) - p ( s ) > q ( s ) u s( r ) - p ( s )  \/s,s ,r , r.  (ICi5)
Combining ICi’ with ICi for U  (r )/ — U (x)7 > 0 yields
M r ) - * A r )
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which implies = q { s )  for us (r)  —» us (r)  with continuous q ( s } . Hence, we can derive
U O ,= U ( £ ) ,+  L  , where the assessment o f cut-off signal £ yields zero payoff of
informed investors set Combining ICi and PC to
u (i)i  + l 1{s)<?(s)ds = ‘?(s) “s (r) -  P ( s) ^ °  (15)
yields the allocation-based offering price
p ( s )  =  q ( s ) u s ( r ) -  ^ { s y i s  , (16)
where U ( j) j = 0 as optimal mechanism for non-decreasing and absolutely continuous U (j-); > 0 . 
Substituting equation (16) into the optimisation problem in (9) yields
e (u )d = L )(^(j ) +u* (r)(1~^(s) ) ) f ( s)ds p (s) = <?(s)us(r) -  L A * ) *
= max JLw(?(-rk ( r)-  JL( ,)?(, )‘<r+*-(r)(1-?(-,)))/('r)* (17)
= X T  U ) ( * - ( r ) “
i.e.d.
Proof of Theorem 2. Analogous to the Proof of Theorem 1, the optimal price-quantity schedule 
under uniform pricing hinges only on the continuous allocation q(s)  to informed investors for
U ( j)  > 0 . We substitute ^>(r) = q i j ) us (r ) ~ f q(s)ds into the optimisation problem and obtainJn(/)
E ( % , „  r 4 4 / ( , ) i o _  r
V )D q(s)  W  q(s)
W  W  (18)
T q(s)ds
<=> max f us (r)  ^  /  f { s)^s
s.t. IC2 to prevent informed investors from misrepresenting their type.
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q.e.d.
Proof of Corollary 1. Since = q{/) f°r us{f) u s ( r )  (see Tro°f °f Theorem 1) of
profitability constraint U (j')/ >0 for ;gQ(/), let us assume that some investor surplus £>0 
(which implies us (r) > us (r) for profitable informed investment in Lemma) as upper bound of 
“underpricing” involves allocation qe (j-) = A e (r) — us ( f  )) (with A s so that the issuer
appropriates payoff E(n)D = JM us (r ) -  f ^ q e ( s ) d s \ \ f ( s ) d s  = (r ) f ( s ) d s  -  e  (see
Theorem 1) under discriminatory pricing (see Theorem 1). Issuers minimise the amount of 
underpricing
IxiW* (')*)/w* =®. («)
which yields A.e (us (r)  — us (r )) = 4s (s) = y t e  as the optimal allocation schedule for investor 
surplus £ > 0  with issuer payoff = I us { r ) f ( i )d s  — £ under discriminatory pricing and
full allocation.
q.e.d.
Proof of Corollary 2. Analogous to the Proof o f Corollary 1 we assume that for all s e  Q(s)  
informed investor surplus (p> 0 is associated with allocation qv ( /)  = A.^ (with
e ] 0,l]), which entails issuer payoff
E (n )D = |i(j)^(r)“(jL(0^ (-r)if/^(J)) / ( • fVJ' = uniform
pricing (see Theorem 2), where issuers minimise the amount of “underpricing”
(20)
Rewriting L.H.S. o f (20) with IC2 generates inequality
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(21)
and rewriting R.H.S. o f (20) yields
x,)l W * / , w  J / ( j ) * = T ^ ' ( r ) "  (r))3 / ( j V j = *  (22)
Combining both equations above generates inequality
7—~—\ L / T / ( JV-f - — ~ ( us (r ) — us ( r )) L  ^ / (jV j ^  ^  < A  (u (r) — u (r)) ,(23)
( l  + 0 ) k s ) q (s ) J K ^  6V'W lK h ' ) q (s ) j y  *  (1 + 0) pV'W
which yields («, (r) ~ *t M )  = q9 (s) = ^ 61/ ( 1+ 0)  as the optimal allocation schedule for 
investor surplus (p> 0 with issuer payoff J5 (ll) = I us (r)  /  (s)ds — (p under uniform pricing and
full allocation.
q.e.d.
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